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THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN KOREA, 19^5-1953
BY; KENNETH R. MAUCK 
MAJOR PROFESSOR: RUSSELL D. BUHI!$, Ph.D.
T his study i s  in tended  to  e x p lo re , a t  the h ig h e s t 
l e v e ls  of th e  U.S. governm ent, the fo rm atio n  of U.S. p o lic y  
toward Korea in  the  19^5-1953 p e r io d , which r e s u l te d  in  a  b i ­
l a t e r a l  s e c u r i ty  p a c t  th a t  i s  s t i l l  in  e f f e c t  today .
The U.S. involvem ent in  K orea grew o u t o f a  deeper 
commitment to  A sian a f f a i r s  in  the  immediate post-WW I I  p e rio d . 
I n i t i a l l y  hoping f o r  a  u n ite d , dem ocratic  K orea, e s ta b l is h e d  
under A tla n t ic  C h a rte r  p r in c ip le s ,  the  U nited S ta te s  saw what 
was a t  b e s t an ambiguous R ussian-A m erican agreem ent f lo u n d e r 
under the  burden o f in c re a s in g  Soviet-A m erican te n s io n s  and 
su sp ic io n s . S u ffe r in g  from inadequate  re so u rc e s  to  meet i t s  
worldwide o b l ig a t io n s ,  the  U nited S ta te s  tu rned  to  the  U nited  
N ations to  so lve  the  problem . C ontinued i n a b i l i t y  to  agree 
w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union le d  to  an a l t e r e d  p la n , which e s ta b ­
l is h e d  a  se p a ra te  South Korean government in  1948.
The R epublic o f  K orea had a  very  am bivalent p la c e  in  
the  U.S. s e c u r i ty  system , a s  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent, the  De­
fense D epartm ent; and American M il i ta ry  Government in  South 
Korea, d i f f e r e d  over the  b e s t  p o lic y  to  fo llo w . The r e s u l t  
of t h i s  c o n f l i c t  was the  d e c is io n , which the  m il i ta r y  fav o red ,
to  withdraw U.S. tro o p s  from Korea in  1949, w ith  U.S. a id  and 
th e  m oral fo rce  of th e  U nited  N ations involvem ent i n  the 
c re a t io n  o f the  R epublic  o f Korea designed  to  ensure i t s  
s e c u r i ty .
With the  o n se t o f the  Korea War, the  U .S. commit­
ment to  South K o re a 's  co n tin u ed  e x is te n c e , which had been 
c le a r ly  o u tlin e d  in  1949-1950, was g iven  substance a s  the  
U nited  S ta te s  in te rv e n e d  in  o rd e r  to  m ain ta in  i t s  c r e d i b i l i t y  
bo th  in  A sia  and in  th e  w orld . The i n i t i a l  U.S. commitment 
o f June 25, 1950, to  r e s to r c e  peace, was a l t e r e d ,  a f t e r  in ­
ten se  debate  in  W ashington, to  the  goa l of u n ify in g  a l l  o f 
K orea. The b u re a u c ra tic  consensus reached in  t h i s  m a tte r , 
which m il i ta ry  su ccess  de te rm ined , was a l t e r e d  q u ick ly  when 
th e  P e o p le 's  R epublic o f C hina in te rv en e d  in  December, 1930. 
The U.S. commitment was now to  the  R epublic o f  K o re a 's  su r -  • 
v iv a l .  The p e rio d  le a d in g  up to  the  s ig n in g  o f an a rm is t ic e  
and then  a b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i ty  p a c t , was a  complex and o f te n  
b i t t e r  one, t h a t  th re a te n e d  to  degenera te  in to  a U .S .- le d  
coup a g a in s t  Syngman Rhee.
T h is study e x p lo re s  in  d e ta i l  the p ro c e ss  which 
e v e n tu a lly  le d  the  U n ited  S ta te s  to  commit i t s e l f  to  the 
R epublic  o f K o rea 's  co n tin u ed  e x is te n c e .
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The involvem ent o f the  U nited  S ta te s  in  the Korean 
War has been c i t e d  c o r r e c t ly  as an ex trem ely  c r i t i c a l  even t 
in  the fo rm ation  of American fo re ig n  p o lic y  in  th e  postw ar 
p e rio d . I t  had th e  e f f e c t  of in s u r in g  th a t  Sino-Am erican 
r e la t io n s  would rem ain alm ost n o n e x is te n t;  i t  a c c e le ra te d  
both the  tre n d  toward in te g r a t in g  Germany in to  th e  W estern 
European defense  system ,and the d e c is io n  to conclude a  peace 
t r e a ty  w ith  Japan  and to  rearm th a t  country  ; i t  gave credence 
to  the th e o r ie s  ex p ressed  in  NSC 68 about S o v ie t in te n t io n s  
and in su re d  i t s  ad o p tio n , and c o n cu rren t w ith i t ,  m assively  
in c reased  defense  e x p en d itu re s ; and f i n a l ly ,  i t  s e t  a  p rec e ­
den t f o r  American involvem ent in  a lan d  war on the  A sian con­
t in e n t  th a t  l a t e r  would a f f e c t ,  to  a  deg ree , the  U.S. d e c i­
sion  to  commit tro o p s  to  South Vietnam. While the  Korean War 
had a l l  of these  e f f e c t s ,  p r io r  to  19^5 the U nited  S ta te s  
had a t  b e s t  a  ve ry  m inor i n t e r e s t  in  K orea. With the  o n se t 
of World War I I ,  the  U nited  S ta te s  in e v i ta b ly  became invo lved  
in  t h i s  m ajor Japanese  "co lony", though Korea d id  n o t become 
an im p o rtan t c o n s id e ra tio n  u n t i l  n e a r  th e  end o f the war.
The purpose o f t h i s  study  i s  to  tra c e  th e  fo rm ation  
o f U.S. p o lic y  tow ard K orea from the  tim e of A m erica 's  commit
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ment in  19^3 to  the e s ta b lish m e n t of a f r e e ,  independen t, 
u n if ie d  Korea, through the  p e rio d  o f j o in t  Soviet-A m erican 
p la n s  in  1943-194? f o r  a t ru s te e s h ip  fo r  K orea, through U.S. 
e f f o r t s  in  194? to  e s t a b l i s h  under the  a u sp ic e s  o f the U nited 
N a tio n s  a n a tio n a l  s ta te  in  South K orea, th rough  the  d e c is io n  
in  1947-1949 to  withdraw American tro o p s  from K orea on the  
b a s is  of U.S. s t r a te g ic  i n t e r e s t s  w ith  the p o s s ib le  r e s u l t  
t h a t  e v e n tu a lly  the communists would dom inate a l l  o f  Korea, 
th rough  the  fo rm ation  of the  groundwork th a t  le d  th e  U nited  
S ta te s  to  r e - e n te r  South Korea in  1930 on the b a s is  of U.S. 
s t r a te g ic  i n t e r e s t s ,  and f i n a l ly  through the  s ig n in g  in  1953 
of a  b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i ty  p a c t  th a t  in su re d  a prom inent p lace  
f o r  the  R epublic o f Korea in  the  American s e c u r i ty  system .
This study  w ill  concern  i t s e l f  p r im a r ily  w ith  p o lic y  
fo rm a tio n  a t  the  h ig h e s t l e v e l s  o f th e  U.S. Government. 
Answers w il l  be sought to  such q u e s tio n s  a s  where p o lic y  
making r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  la y  and what the  key in f lu e n c e s  were 
in  th e  decision-m aking  p ro c e ss , and w hether the  r e l a t i v e  im­
p o rtan c e  o f p o lic y  in f lu e n c e s  s h i f t e d .  In  answ ering  these  
q u e s t io n s ,th e  m ajor em phasis w il l  be on in te rd e p a r tm e n ta l 
d is c u s s io n s , though c e r ta in  in tra d e p a r tm e n ta l c o n f l i c t s  w il l  
be exam ined.
This study is  not intended to t e l l  a detailed  story 
of the Cold War or of Korea's internal history from 1945 to 
1953' Yet i t  i s  obvious that the events of the Cold War 
(for example the Truman Doctrine, the f a l l  of China, or
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George K ennan 's leng thy  te leg ram  from Moscow in  1946) had d i ­
r e c t  in flu en ce  on p o lic y  fo rm atio n . These ev en ts , as w ell 
a s  in te r n a l  ev en ts  in  K orea, w i l l  be d isc u sse d , however, only 
to  p lace  the  decision-m aking  p ro c e ss  in  i t s  p roper c o n te x t.
In  a d d it io n , t h i s  study i s  n o t designed  to  d e lin e a te  what 
p o lic y  the U nited S ta te s  should have fo llow ed or what p e r ­
c e p tio n s  th a t  U nited S ta te s  ought to  have had. While a t  some 
p o in ts  such judgments a re  made, th ey  a re  very  secondary to  the 
purpose o f t h i s  s tudy .
One problem th a t  developed in  p re p a ra tio n  of t h i s  
study was th a t  th e  absence of r e le v a n t  documents stym ied a t ­
tem pts to  t e l l  the  f u l l  s to ry  o r to  reach  d e f in i te  co n c lu s io n s  
on c e r ta in  s u b je c ts . From the 1951-1953 p e rio d , most S ta te  
Departm ent documents w il l  n o t  be a v a i la b le  u n t i l  1979-1980. 
There were, however, s u b s ta n t ia l  numbers o f J o in t  C hiefs o f 
S ta f f  and o th e r  m il i ta ry  documents a v a i la b le  fo r  th i s  p e r io d . 
Enough documents have been re le a s e d  to  f i l l  in  s u b s ta n t ia l  
gaps th a t  have e x is te d  in  the  s to ry  of U.S. involvem ent in  
K orea, e s p e c ia l ly  in  the 1950 p e r io d  and to  a l e s s e r  e x te n t  
f o r  th e  1951-1953 p e rio d .
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THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN KOREA, 1945-1953
CHAPTER I
THE INITIAL U .S. COMMITMENT IN KOREA
Korea, the Land o f  the  Morning Calm, has had a  h i s ­
to ry  th a t  b e l ie s  i t s  name. P a r t i c u la r ly  in  the 19 th  and 20 th  
cen tu ry , Korea was the p la y th in g  of i t s  s tro n g e r n e ig h b o rs .
As e a r ly  a s  600 A .D ., however, i t  was su b je c t to  the  a t ta c k s  
of i t s  pow erful n e igh bo r, China. Continued d e p re d a tio n s  over 
ten  c e n tu r ie s  led  th e  Korean people to  r e a l iz e  the  h o p e le ss ­
n e ss  of defending  t h e i r  b o rd e rs  m i l i t a r i l y .  Thus in  the  
a fte rm a th  o f  the Manchu in v a s io n s  o f 162? and I 636, Korea 
adopted a p o lic y  of i s o l a t i o n ,  excep t th a t  China, in  exchange 
fo r  K o re a 's  acknowledgement of the  su z e ra in ty  of the  Middle 
Kingdom, would provide p ro te c t io n .^
C h in a 's  d e c lin e  a s  a fo rm idable power was exposed 
during  the Opium V/ar. Her obvious i n a b i l i t y  to  p rov ide  p ro ­
te c t io n  opened Korea to  a  renewed in f lu x  of o u ts id e  i n f lu ­
ences. Two o th e r powers showed a  s p e c ia l  i n t e r e s t  in  Korea 
because of i t s  geographic lo c a t io n  and year-round  harbo r
^Gregory Henderson, Korea; The P o l i t i c s  of the 
V ortex(Cambridge ; H arvard P re s s , 1968), 14-15.
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f a c i l i t i e s .  The two c o u n tr ie s ,  R ussia  and Jap an , emerged as 
major A s ia t ic  powers in  the  19 th  c e n tu ry , and from the  l870s 
u n t i l  th e  R usso-Japanese War of 190^-5» th ey  v ied  fo r  ascen ­
dancy in  K orea. A nnexation o f Korea in  1910, a s  a  co lony , 
follow ed J a p a n 's  v ic to ry  over R ussia; K orea a s  an i n t e r -  
n a tio n a l  s ta te  ceased  to  e x i s t .
J a p a n 's  g e n e ra l ly  recogn ized  dom ination  o f Korea 
did n o t  dim the  sense o f Korean n a tio n a lism , f o r  "Korea has 
one o f th e  lo n g e s t  t r a d i t i o n s  of u n ity  w ith in  approx im ate ly  
the  same b o rd ers  o f any n a tio n  in  the p re s e n t  w orld ."  A 
c u l tu r a l  hom ogeneity of an e x ce p tio n a l degree e x is te d  a long  
w ith t h i s  t r a d i t i o n  o f  u n i ty .  These f a c to r s  worked to  
c r e a te ,  d e s p i te  Japanese  an n ex a tio n , an unshakab le  sense 
of n a tio n a lism .^
E x ile d  K oreans o rgan ized  them selves w ith  the  g o a l of 
r e - e s ta b l i s h in g  a  Korean n a t io n a l  s t a t e .  In  1919, 33 
l i b e r a l  le a d e r s  p u b lish ed  the  "P roclam ation  o f Korean In d e ­
pendence." In  the  same y e a r , the  Korean P ro v is io n a l  Govern­
ment was e s ta b l is h e d  in  Shanghai w ith  Syngman Rhee as 
p r e s id e n t .^  The e s ta b lish m e n t of a  new spaper, a  m il i ta r y
^ . S .  D epartm ent o f the  Army, K orea—1950 
(W ashington; GPO, 1952), 1 -3 .
-^Henderson, K orea . 15-21.
^Rhee was from a  ty p ic a l  hyangban fam ily  (a  r a th e r  
i l l - d e f in e d  s o c ia l  group o f " lo c a l  sq u ire s"  who had l o s t  o f­
f i c i a l  s t a te  p o s i t io n s )  and was from an im poverished and 
pow erless branch o f the  ro y a l c la n . R h e e 's  long  c a re e r
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schoo l, and branch a s s o c ia t io n s  in  o th e r  c i t i e s ,  in d ic a te d  
th a t  the  Korean P ro v is io n a l  Government was p ro sp e r in g , b u t 
in  r e a l i t y  i t  was h o p e le ss ly  s p l i t  over both o b je c tiv e s  and 
s t r a te g y . Not u n t i l  Ju n e , 1940, when Kim Koo- .^ Finance 
M in is te r  of th e  Korean P ro v is io n a l  Government, s e t  up th e  
Korean Independence P a r ty  in  Chungking, did a semblance o f  
u n ity  appear. In  Korea p ro p e r , Japanese a d m in is tra t io n  was 
so t i g h t  and severe  th a t  no la rg e  n a tiv e  o rg a n iz a tio n
as a Korean n a t i o n a l i s t  began in  I 898 when he jo in ed  th e  In ­
dependence C lub, a  l i b e r a l  group c r i t i c a l  o f t h e i r  govern­
m en t's  sup ineness b e fo re  fo re ig n  powers. Rhee, a r r e s te d  
when the  Club was broken up, was im prisoned and se v e re ly  
to r tu re d .  R eleased  in  1904, Rhee, a  C h r is t ia n  c o n v e rt, went 
to  America w ith  th e  a id  o f m is s io n a r ie s . There he re c e iv e d  
th ree  u n iv e r s i ty  d e g re e s ,in c lu d in g  a d o c to ra te  in  i n t e r ­
n a tio n a l r e l a t i o n s  from P r in c e to n , where he took sem inars 
from Woodrow W ilson. He was too  c lo s e ly  watched on h i s  r e ­
tu rn  to  K orea, so he made America h is  home base from 1912 
to  1945. He worked t i r e l e s s l y  fo r  Korean n a tio n a lism  and 
in  the  p ro ce ss  of su rv iv in g  the  v a rio u s  f a c t io n a l  d i s ­
pu tes  th a t  wracked Korean n a t io n a l i s t  g roups, he became 
an extrem ely  s k i l le d  p o l i t i c i a n .  See Henderson, K orea , 
422-423. No f i r s t - r a t e  E n g lish  language biography of Rhee 
e x i s t s ,  bu t th e  b e s t  a v a i la b le  i s  R ichard C. A lle n , K orea*s 
Syngmann Rhee (R utland , V t.:  C.E. T u tt le ,  I 96O).
^ i m  Koo, l ik e  Rhee, was a  hyangban. H is a n c e s to rs  
had been fo rced  to  f l e e  the  c a p i ta l  and to  take  up the  
"mean" e x is te n c e  o f t i l l i n g  f i e l d s .  Kim adm its th a t  h is  
fam ily  was t r e a te d  a s  i f  th ey  were l e s s  th an  commoners. In  
h is  you th , Kim was a  member of the Tonghak, a r e l ig io u s ,  
s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l  group th a t  served as a  channel f o r  opp res­
sed members o f so c ie ty  v/ho wished to  d e s tro y  the  e x is t in g  
s o c io p o l i t ic a l  s t r u c tu r e .  He a lso  a tten d ed  an American P ro ­
t e s t a n t  m issio n ary  sc h o o l. A f i e r y  Korean p a t r i o t ,  Kim 
k i l l e d  one o f  the  Japanese  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  m urdering Queen 
Minh and he was a  p rim ary  le a d e r  of t e r r o r i s t  a c t i v i t i e s  
a g a in s t  th e  Japanese in  the  1930s. Henderson, K orea, 391; 
Chong-sik L ee, The P o l i t i c s  of Korean N ationa lism  
(B erkeley ; U n iv e rs ity  o f C a li fo rn ia  P re s s , 1963), 24-25.
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developed to  le a d  an independence movement.^ Thus a t  the 
end of WWII the  Korean people were a  h igh ly  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  
group th a t  was both le a d e r le s s  and h o p e le ss ly  s p l i t .
The U nited  S ta te s ,  r a p id ly  developing  a s  a  major 
power, g e n e ra lly  fo llow ed a h a n d s-o ff p o lic y  v i s - a - v i s  
K orea. The i n i t i a l  American i n t e r e s t  in  Korea in  I 834 was 
ro o ted  in  a d e s ire  f o r  expanded t r a d e ,  but l i t t l e  of sub­
stan ce  was accom plished in  t h i s  d i r e c t io n .  Not u n t i l  the 
s ig n in g  o f the T ie n ts in  T reaty  of 1882 d id  the  U nited 
S ta te s  ga in  even minimal d ip lom atic  r e la t io n s  w ith  Korea.
Two f a c to r s  dominated the  newly formed Korean- 
American r e la t io n s h ip .  F i r s t  was th e  U.S. a t t i tu d e  on the  
su b je c t  o f Chinese su z e ra in ty  over K orea. Second was the 
U.S. p o s i t io n  on th e  in te rn a t io n a l  s tru g g le  f o r  dom ination 
o f Korea. While c o n s is te n t ly  s t a t i n g  th a t  K orea was an i n ­
dependent s t a t e ,  n o t a v a ssa l o f C hina, the U nited S ta te s  
n o n e th e le ss  was w il l in g  in  I 89O to  concede th a t  in te r n a l ly
g
Korea had some kind of feu d a l o b l ig a t io n s  to  China.
The American p o s i t io n  tow ard the  Chinese, R ussian , 
and Japanese s tru g g le  f o r  c o n tro l o f  Korea a lso  was a
g
Henderson, K orea , 85-86; E . G rant Meade, American 
M il i ta ry  Government in  K orea(New York; K in g 's  P re s s , 1951). 
38-40; L is le  Rose, The Roots o f Tragedy; The U nited S ta te s  
and the  S tru g g le  f o r  A sia , 1945-1953CNew York: Greenwood,
1976), 32.
^U.S. Departm ent of S ta te ,  A H is to r ic a l  Summary o f 
U .S .-K orean R e la tio n s  (W ashington: GPO, 1962), 3 -4 .
^ I b id . ,  4 -6 .
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c au tio u s  one. American c o n su ls , in s t ru c te d  to  avoid  any 
entanglem ents in  d is p u te s  concern ing  K orea, re fu se d  to  be­
come invo lved  in  the  S ino-Japanese  War o f 1894-^ . J a p a n 's  
growing in flu e n ce  in  K o re a 's  in te r n a l  a f f a i r s  was accep ted  
as  was the r a p id ly  e s c a la t in g  r i v a l r y  between R ussia  and 
Japan . When the  R usso-Japanese War broke o u t ,  the  U nited 
S ta te s  went so f a r  a s  to  i n s t r u c t  i t s  Ambassador in  Japan 
t h a t  the  C o n su lta te  in  Seoul "Should be ex trem ely  c a re fu l  
n o t to  encourage any b e l i e f  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  w ill  
a s s i s t  Korean n a t i o n a l i s t s  in  c a rry in g  out t h e i r  p la n s ."  
R ather than  become involved  deep ly  in  a  r i v a l r y  over K orea, 
th e  U nited S ta te s  r e s t r i c t e d  i t s  r e l a t io n s  w ith  Korea a l ­
most t o t a l l y  to  tra d e  and m iss io n a ry  a c t i v i t i e s  in  the  
p e rio d  from WWI to  WWII.^
The war w ith  Japan fo rce d  th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  r e ­
c o n s id e r  i t s  Korean p o lic y . The Korean P ro v is io n a l  Govern­
ment in  Chungking fo rm ally  re q u e s te d  U.S. re c o g n itio n  as 
the  o f f i c i a l  government of K orea. This r e q u e s t ,  in  the 
form o f a  l e t t e r  from Syngman Rhee, was d e c lin e d . Soon 
th e  U nited S ta te s  was faced  w ith  a  number o f  groups seek ing  
re c o g n itio n  a s  the  " o f f i c i a l  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s "  o f K orea.
A ll re q u e s ts  were den ied , and the  U nited S ta te s  in s te a d  
suggested  th a t  the  m yriad groups u n ite  th em se lv es. At 
most th e  U nited  S ta te s  in  March, 1942, e x p re ssed  i t s
^ I b id . ,  6 -9 . '
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utm ost sympathy fo r  Korean n a t i o n a l i s t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  w hile r e a s ­
su rin g  a l l  th a t  Korea was re c e iv in g  c a re fu l  c o n s id e ra tio n .^ ^
I d e a l ly ,  R oosevelt co n sid ered  Korea, indeed most o f 
c o lo n ia l  A sia , a s  a  problem t h a t  a  postw ar world o rg a n iz a tio n  
could b e s t hand le . The people o f the l ib e r a te d  c o u n tr ie s  de­
served independence and democracy, but they  would need to  be 
p repared  fo r  the co m p lex itie s  invo lved  in  o p e ra tin g  such a 
system . To c re a te  a " true  dem ocratic  o rd er on the American 
m odel," t ru s te e s h ip s  would have to  be e s ta b lis h e d  f i r s t  to  t u ­
to r  th ese  backward peop le , p re fe ra b ly  under the  guidance o f a 
world o rg a n iz a tio n  formed around A t la n t ic  C harte r p r in c ip le s .  
What the U nited S ta te s  wanted to  do in  A sia was " e s ta b l is h
a new in te rn a t io n a l  o rd e r where i d e a l i s t i c  v is io n s  would be
11provided  w ith  a s tru c tu re  of pow er."
The problem of Korea was f i r s t  d iscu ssed  among the 
A llie d  powers a t  C airo  in  November, 194], w ith R oosevelt 
le a d in g  the d is c u s s io n . The r e s u l t a n t  C airo D e c la ra tio n  r e ­
lea se d  December 1, declared  t h a t  the  A l l ie s ,  "m indful of the  
enslavem ent of the  people o f K orea ,"  were determ ined " th a t  
in  due course Korea s h a l l  become f re e  and independen t."  At 
Teheran, before  the  D e c la ra tio n  was p u b lish ed , S ta l in
10
11
I b id . .  9.
Rose, R oo ts, 508, 21-23, 27-29; H erbert F e is ,
C h u rc h ill . R oosevelt, ^ d  S ta l in ;  The War They Waged and 
the Peace They Sought (P rin c e to n ; P rin c e to n  U n iv e rs ity  
P re s s , 2nd e d .,  196?). 58-59. 68; A k ira  I r i y e ,  The Cold War 
In  A sia ; A H is to r ic a l  In tro d u c tio n  (Englewood C l i f f s ,  N . J . ! 
P re n t ic e -H a ll ,  1974), 69-75.
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te n ta t iv e ly  agreed  to  the id e a  of a t r u s te e s h ip  o r  a p e rio d
of tu te la g e ,  though he would n o t commit h im se lf  to  the  form
12or the le n g th  of a p p re n tic e sh ip  needed.
The ambiguous phrase " in  due course" con ta ined  the 
seeds o f d is c o n te n t  and f r u s t r a t i o n  f o r  bo th  Koreans and 
Americans, because i t  had no ex ac t e q u iv a le n t in  the  Korean 
language. The Korean P ro v is io n a l Government, in  o rd e r to  
make the D e c la ra tio n  a s  a p p e tiz in g  a s  p o s s ib le ,  t r a n s la te d  
the phrase a s  " in  a  few days" o r "very  soon", and p r in te d  and 
smuggled in to  Korea thousands o f cop ies o f  i t s  t r a n s la t io n  
and had them w idely d i s t r ib u te d ;  the  U nited  S ta te s  d id  no t 
d isco v er t h i s  u n t i l  Septem ber, 19^5-^^
While th e re  was a  " s tro n g  i d e a l i s t i c  component" in  
U.S. p o l ic y , th e re  were more p r a c t ic a l  re a so n s  f o r  the  s t i l l -  
developing  p o lic y . One memorandum, p rep a red  on A p ril 18,
19^51 in  th e  F ar E a s te rn  A f fa ir s  D iv is io n  of th e  S ta te  D epart­
ment, n o ted  th a t  " th e  a re a  of the  P a c if ic  and E a s t  A sia i s  of 
g re a te r  im portance, both a b so lu te ly  and r e l a t i v e l y ,  to  the 
U nited S ta te s  than  m ost r e a l i z e . "  America had lo n g  P a c if ic  
c o a s t l in e s ,  a g re a t  deal o f t r a d e ,  and many "w ide-flung  c u ltu ­
r a l  i n t e r e s t s  in  th e  P a c i f i c ."  A fte r  th e  war, A m erica 's  ta sk  
—
S ta te  D epartm ent, H is to r ic a l  Summary, 10; M inutes 
of M eeting of P a c i f i c  War C ouncil, January  12,1944, U.S. 
Departm ent o f S t a t e , Foreign  R e la tio n s  of the U nited  S ta te s ;  
The C onferences a t  C airo  and Teheran. 1943 (W ashington;
GPO, 1961) ,  869.
13The P o l i t i c a l  A dviser in  K orea(B enninghoff) to  the 
S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te ,  September 15, 19^5, U.S. Departm ent of 
S ta te , F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  of th e  U nited S ta te s .  1945; The 
F ar E a s t . Volume VI (W ashington: GPO, 1973), 1049.
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would be to  make the a re a  secu re  f o r  a l l  p eace-lo v in g  peop le , 
so th a t  g re a t  o p p o r tu n it ie s  cou ld  be opened f o r  the n a t iv e s ,  
f o r  the  U nited S ta te s ,  and f o r  " a l l  who seek honest and 
m utually  p r o f i ta b le  r e l a t i o n s .
The q u e s tio n , a cc o rd in g  to  the  memorandum, was how 
b e s t to  achieve these  g o a ls . N e ith e r  an A llied  v ic to ry  no r 
any balance o f power concep t would e ra d ic a te  the  ro o ts  of con­
f l i c t  in  A sia . In s te a d , A l l ie d  co o p era tio n  was n ecessa ry .
How to  accom plish t h i s  was n o t d is c lo s e d , since no b lu e ­
p r in t s  e x is te d . A sia , however, would have to  be helped to  
develop m a te r ia l ly  and e d u c a tio n a l ly  i f  i t  was to  accep t the  
d u t ie s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of se lf-governm ent and l i b e r t y .
An e x c e lle n t  example was A m erica 's  re c o rd  in the  P h i l ip p in e s .^ ^
No p lan s  e x is te d  f o r  a c h ie v in g  U.S. g o a ls , though i t  
g e n e ra lly  was accep ted  th a t  C hina, America, G reat B r i ta in ,  
and R ussia  would tak e  p a r t  in  l ib e r a t i o n  of K orea. Assump­
t io n  of a s u b s ta n t ia l  r o le  in  th e  l ib e r a t i o n ,  as w ell as in  
any fu tu re  c i v i l  o r m i l i ta r y  in te r im  a d m in is tra tio n  o f K orea, 
would be in  A m erica 's  b e s t  i n t e r e s t .  In  a d d itio n , a d m in is tra ­
t io n  of any occupied a re a  was " to  be l e f t  to the  d is c r e t io n  
o f the  lo c a l  commander because o f the  need in  f i t t i n g
Memo P rep ared  in  th e  O ffice  o f Far E as te rn  A f fa ir s ,  
A p ril 18, 1944, U.S. D epartm ent o f S ta te ,  Foreign R e la tio n s  
o f the  U nited S ta te s .  1944: The F ar E a s t.  Volume V
' ) #(W ashington: GPO, 1972), 1232.
l ^ Ib id . ,  1233-1234.
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in  m il i ta ry  a d m in is tra t io n  w ith  the lo c a l  s i tu a t io n .
Some apprehension  was exp ressed  about the S ov ie t
U n ion 's  ro le  in  l ib e r a t io n .  The S o v ie ts , a tta c k in g  from
M anchuria in to  n o rth e rn  K orea, were in  an e x c e lle n t  p o s i t io n
to  occupy a c o n sid e rab le  p a r t  o f K orea w ith  a  fo rce  th a t
m ight c o n s is t  o f  around 35•000 R u ss ia n - tra in e d  K oreans, who
had been " thorough ly  in d o c tr in a te d  w ith  S ov ie t id eo lo g y ."
While apprehensive about these  tro o p s , the  S ta te  Department
17acknowledged R u s s ia 's  n a tu r a l  i n t e r e s t  in  K orea.
A nother memorandum, p rep ared  May 4, 1944, noted th a t  
e x c lu s io n  from government f o r  35 y e a rs  had d ep rived  the  Korean 
people  o f a l l  experience  in  managing a s t a t e .  T his f a c to r ,  
when combined w ith  the  p o s s ib i l i t y  t h a t  an independent Korea 
m ight again  become su b je c t  to  in te r n a t io n a l  p re s s u re s  and in ­
t r ig u e s ,  th u s  th re a te n in g  s t a b i l i t y  and peace in  the P a c if ic ,  
made fo rm ation  o f an in te r im  su p e rv iso ry  government h ig h ly  
d e s i r a b le .  The s e c u r i ty  of the  N orthern  P a c if ic  was of g re a t 
concern  to  the  U nited S ta te s  and s in ce  Korean p o l i t i c a l  d iv i ­
s io n  would a f f e c t  U.S. s e c u r i ty ,  Am erica n a tu r a l ly  would p a r-
18t i c i p a t e  in  any Korean a d m in is tra t iv e  body.
While th e  C airo  D e c la ra tio n  had committed the  U nited
Memo P repared  by th e  In te r -D iv is io n a l  Area Com­
m itte e  on the  F a r E a s t, March 29, 1944, I b id . . 1225-26; JCS 
to  G eneral S t i lw e l l ,  September 15, 1944, quoted in  I r i y e ,  
Cold War. 72.
^^Memo, March 29, 1944, PR,1944. V, 1226.
18Memo P repared  by the  In te r - D iv is io n a l  Area Com­
m itte e  on the  F ar E a s t,  May 4, 1944, I b i d . , 1239-1240.
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S ta te s  to  p a r t i c ip a te  in  postw ar Korean a c t i v i t i e s ,  America 
d id  no t want so le  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  a  Korean t r u s te e s h ip .  
W ith l im ite d  re so u rc e s  a v a i la b le  to  p a r t i c ip a te  in  the  p o s t­
war world and a re c o g n itio n  of C h in a 's  and R u s s ia 's  p rox im ity  
to  and i n t e r e s t  in  Korea, p o lic y  m akers were aware o f the  lim ­
i t a t i o n s  on A m erica 's a b i l i t y  to  c o n tro l  e v e n ts  in  K orea.
The S ta te  D epartm ent’ s b r ie f in g  books f o r  R o o se v e lt 's  
use  a t  Y a lta  rep e a te d  the  w ish to  avo id  a zonal arrangem ent 
in  fav o r of a  c e n tra l iz e d  a d m in is tr a t io n , m u ltip le  in  n a tu re , 
to  avoid the  " se r io u s  p o l i t i c a l  re p e rc u ss io n s"  in h e re n t  in  a 
s in g le  power occupation . An American p resence  was n ecessa ry  
to  balance o f f  any su sp ic io n s  t h a t  e x is te d  between China 
and R ussia .
The S ta te  Departm ent b e lie v e d  t h a t  some form o f 
agreem ent on p a r t i c ip a t io n  had to  be reached  a s  soon a s  pos­
s ib le  and t h a t  the  S o v ie t U n io n 's  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  in
K orea made i t  a lm ost mandatory t h a t  i t  be in c lu d ed  w hether
21i t  jo ined  th e  P a c if ic  War o r n o t .  I f  an a g re e a b le , 
t ro u b le - f r e e  m il i ta ry  occupation  in c lu d in g  th e  v i t a l l y  in ­
te r e s te d  powers was e s ta b l is h e d ,  a  t r u s te e s h ip  could  be s e t  
up much more e a s i ly  and would have a  framework o f e s ta b l is h e d  
r e la t io n s h ip s  w ith in  which to  work.
19%bid. .  1241.
20Postw ar S ta tu s  of K orea, B r ie f in g  Book P ap er, U.S. 
Departm ent o f S ta te , Foreign  R e la tio n s  o f the  U nited  S t a te s . 
1945: The C onferences a t  M alta  and Y a lta  (V/ashington: GPO,
Ï9 5 5 ) , 358-359.
b id . ,  359- 361.
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I t  seems l ik e ly  th a t  a  t i r e d  and d is t r a c te d
R oosevelt never read  the  S ta te  Departm ent b r ie f in g  books on
Korea. In s te ad  of a  s e t ,  d e ta i le d  program o u tl in in g  a
four-pow er m il i ta ry  occupation , d isc u ss io n  of Korea a t  Y alta
was l im ite d  to  one b r ie f  exchange between R oosevelt and
S ta l in - a  d isc u ss io n  th a t  in d ic a te d  t h a t  Soviet-A m erican
r e la t io n s  would determ ine K o re a 's  f u tu r e .  On February 8,
19^5 , R oosevelt expressed  a d e s i r e  to  see a t r u s te e s h ip ,  of
perhaps 20 to ]0 yeairs in  d u ra t io n , s e t  up in  Korea, to  be
composed o f the U nited S ta te s , C hina, and the S ov ie t Union.
S ta l in  agreed , but f e l t  the s h o r te r  the  t r u s t e e s h ip 's  le n g th ,
the  b e t te r .  S ta l in  was n o t r e c e p t iv e ,  however, to
R o o se v e lt 's  suggestion  th a t  B r i t i s h  p a r t i c ip a t io n  be avoided,
sin ce  he be lieved  C h u rc h il l 's  resen tm en t would be s tro n g  and
22t h a t  B r i ta in  must be in v ite d  to  p a r t i c i p a t e .
R o o se v e lt 's  a ttem p t to  exclude B r i ta in  r e f le c te d  a 
growing disenchantm ent w ith what he saw as B r i t a i n 's  p o s t­
war im p e r ia l is t ic  am b itions, s in c e  he f e l t  i t  was im perative  
f o r  America to take a stand  f o r  " l iq u id a t io n  of im peria lism . " 
The P re s id e n t 's  a c t io n s  a lso  in d ic a te d  a se r io u s  la c k  
o f  commitment to  c o a l i t io n  c o n s u l ta t io n .  A pparently  
K o re a 's  fu tu re , indeed the w o r ld 's  f u tu r e ,  would depend on 
R o o se v e lt 's  "grand design" fo r  c lo se  Soviet-A m erican coope­
r a t io n .  T his coopera tion  could  be achieved only "by m eeting
^^Rose, R oots-. 33*
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le g i t im a te  R ussian  s e c u r i ty  n e e d s ."  ^ The agreem ents 
reached  a t  Y a lta  were designed  to  co rrespond  to  the  r e a l i ­
t i e s  o f power p o l i t i c s  a t  the  end o f th e  war, to  the  p e rcep ­
t io n s  o f  the th re e  le a d in g  n a tio n s  of th o se  r e a l i t i e s ,  and 
" to  t h e i r  v is io n s  of a new world o rd e r  which would p rovide 
a  framework f o r  postw ar in te r n a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s  and accomo- 
d a te  t h e i r  re s p e c t iv e  i n t e r e s t s  and d e s i r e s ."
While S ta l in  and R oosevelt b r i e f l y  pondered K o re a 's  
f a te  a t  Y a lta , the  Korean e x i l e s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  Rhee and the  
Korean P ro v is io n a l  Government, grew in c re a s in g ly  r e s t iv e .  
A m erica 's  r e fu s a l  to  reco g n ize  R h ee 's  o rg a n iz a tio n  was r e ­
sen ted  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s in c e  China and F rance  had expressed  a 
w illin g n e s s  to  do so i f  the  U nited  S ta te s  took the  le a d . 
America, however, con tinued  to  re fu se  r e c o g n it io n , re fu sed  
to  employ the  group in  the  war e f f o r t ,  and adam antly op­
posed is su in g  i t  an i n v i t a t i o n  to  a t te n d  the  U nited 
N ations m eetings in  San F ra n c isco .
The grow ing re sen tm en t among K oreans went beyond d i s ­
p le a su re  w ith  A m erica 's  in a c tio n . In  F eb ru ary , 19^5, Rhee
I b i d . , 21-27; John L. G addis, The U nited S ta te s  
and the  O rig in s  of the  Cold W p. 1 9 4 1 -1 9 ^  (New York; Colum- 
b ia  U n iv e rs ity  P re s s , 1972), 6 -7 ; I r i y e ,  Cold War. 71, 94.
24^ ^ I r iy e , Cold War. 94, 100.
^^A cting S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  to  th e  Ambassador in  
China (H urley ), F eb ruary  20 and March 20, 1945, and the 
A cting  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  to  the  Charge in  China (A teheson), 
A p ril  9, 1945, FR .1945. VI, 1022, 1025.
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exp ressed  the  f e a r  th a t  the S o v ie t Union m ight advance in to  
K orea w ith  i t s  Korean Communist Army and e s t a b l i s h  a  govern­
ment under a  "Korean L ib e ra t io n  Committee" a l le g e d ly  e x is t in g  
in  M anchuria. The S ta te  Departm ent b e liev ed  th a t  R h ee 's
f e a r  was u n su b s ta n tia te d  and th e  Far E a s te rn  D iv is io n  recom-
26mended th a t  R h ee 's  l e t t e r  n o t be answered.
W ashing ton 's s i le n c e  d id  n o t s t i l l  R h ee 's  f e a r s .
This became c le a r  in  a  May 15 l e t t e r  in  which Rhee made 
known h is  " re c e n t d isco v ery  o f  a  s e c re t  agreem ent a t  
Y a lta  c o n tra ry  to  the  C airo D e c la ra tio n ."  He asked f o r  
a d e n ia l  of t h i s ,  n o tin g  th a t  i t  would n o t be th e  f i r s t
27time th a t  K orea had been the v ic tim  o f s e c re t  d iplom acy. 
R h ee 's  l e t t e r  a p p a re n tly  s tru c k  a raw nerve som ew here,• 
f o r  i t  e l i c i t e d  a re p ly  th a t  was a t  b e s t  und ip lom atic  i f  
n o t  in s u l t in g .
R eply ing  on June 5. Frank P. L ockhart, A cting  D irec ­
t o r  o f  th e  O ffice  o f F a r  E a s te rn  A f f a ir s ,  to ld  Rhee th a t  he 
should  g ive  no credence to  the  unfounded r e p o r ts  abou t s e c re t  
commitments made a t  Y a lta . Rhee was inform ed t h a t  the  
Korean P ro v is io n a l  Government and o th e r  Korean o rg a n iz a tio n s  
d id  n o t  p o sse s s  the n ecessa ry  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  f o r  o b ta in in g  
re c o g n itio n . R h ee 's  o rg a n iz a tio n  had never h e ld  a d m in is tra ­
t iv e  a u th o r i ty  over any p a r t  o f K orea, i t  was n o t
26A cting  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  to  Ambassador in  China, 
March 20, 1945, and Footnote 23, I b i d . . 1022-1023.
^^Rhee to  Truman, May 25, 1945, I b i d . . 1028.
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r e p re s e n ta t iv e  of the  Korean peop le  to d ay , and even i t s  f o l ­
low ing among e x ile d  Koreans was l im i te d .  The p o lic y  o f the 
U nited S ta te s  was to  do n o th in g  " to  compromise the  r ig h t  of
the  Korean people to  choose the  u ltim a te  form and personnel
28o f the  government they  may w ish to  e s t a b l i s h ."
L ockhart p o in ted  out t h a t  th e  S ta te  D ep artm en t's  
p o s i t io n  d id  n o t , o f cou rse , im ply a  la c k  of sympathy fo r  
the  K oreans and t h e i r  hopes f o r  freedom . He was sure th a t  
Rhee was aware th a t  the  S ta te  D epartm ent had " spen t a g re a t 
d ea l o f tim e in  stu d y in g  the  problem s r e l a t i n g  to  K orea." 
Rhee f u r th e r  was reminded th a t  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  had " ta lk e d  a t  
g re a t  le n g th  w ith  you and o th e r  in d iv id u a ls  in te r e s te d  in  
the  w e lfa re  o f K orea," and had alw ays t r i e d  to  e x p la in  U.S. 
p o lic y  c le a r ly  and f u l l y . L o c k h a r t ' s  message to  Rhee i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  c o r r e la te  both w ith  the  t a c i t  s e c re t  agreem ent 
reached  a t  Y a lta  concern ing  K orea and w ith  the  la c k  o f any 
w r i t te n  evidence th a t  a  g re a t d e a l of tim e had been spen t 
s tu d y in g  the  Korean problem .
R h ee 's  re p ly  was re c e iv e d  on J u ly  25. The th re e  
week d e la y  in  answ ering did n o t serve to  s o f te n  an e q u a lly  
b lu n t re sp o n se , couched in  the  r h e to r ic  of anti-communism, 
which made i t  c le a r  t h a t  the  Korean P ro v is io n a l  G overnm ent's
28
L ockhart to  Rhee, June 5, 1945, I b i d . . 1029-1030. 
Z^ I b id . .  1030.
-  17 -
doubts had n o t been d is p e l le d  e n t i r e l y .  The " o th e r  Korean 
groups" and "o th e r o rg a n iz a tio n s"  which the  o f f i c e r s  o f the 
S ta te  Department had p laced  o n . the  same le v e l  as the Korean 
P ro v is io n a l Government were n o th in g  more than  a  handfu l of 
Korean Communist a g i t a to r s  and pro-Communist g roups. These 
elem ents were working toward a L u b lin -ty p e  government and 
were re c e iv in g  the co o p era tio n  of American o f f i c i a l s .  Rhee 
believed i t  was obvious th a t  the  good in te n t io n s  of America 
to  give the  Korean people a  chance fo r  a f re e ly -c h o se n  gov­
ernment would be im possib le  under S o v ie t dom ination .
The wisdom of W ashington 's condescending and 
" c a v a lie r"  trea tm en t o f  Rhee and the  Korean P ro v is io n a l 
Government can be q u e s tio n e d . No a ttem p t had been made to  
r a is e  up any o th e r  groups w ith in  o r  w ithou t K orea to  assume 
a lead in g  p o s i t io n  in  prom oting n a tio n a lism  and democracy 
i n  Korea a s  an a l t e r n a t iv e  to  the  "u n p a la ta b le  Rhee group. 
While t h i s  was unwise, the  f a i l u r e  to  ach ieve  a  co n cre te  
program f o r  postw ar K orea a t  Potsdam was even more unwise.
Truman agreed to  the Potsdam C onference because the 
" s t r ik in g  d e te r io r a t io n  in  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  R u ss ia  which took 
p lace  in the  month fo llo w in g  R o o se v e lt 's  d e a th  . . . "  had 
c re a te d  g re a t  alarm  in  W ashington. Germany, E a s te rn  Europe, 
S o v ie t en try  in to  the F a r  E a s te rn  War, and th e  s o lu t io n  of
^^Rhee to L o ck h art, J u ly  25,19^5f I b i d . . IO32-IO 36 .
^^Rose, R oots. 35-36.
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rem ain ing  European problem s which were d e lay in g  a peace con­
fe re n c e , were to  be the  main to p ic s .  Truman went to  Potsdam
s t i l l  ho ld ing  firm  to  th e  b e l i e f  th a t  "on ly  con tinued  Big
32Three u n ity  could g u aran tee  l a s t i n g  peace.
Once aga in , a s  a t  Y a lta , a  gap e x is te d  between the  
concerns expressed about Korea in  S ta te  Department b r ie f in g  
books and what was decided  a t  Potsdam . The minimum o b je c tiv e  
s ta te d  in  the  b r ie f in g  books was to  gain  S ov ie t adherence to  
th e  C airo D e c la ra tio n  and to- p re v e n t any o f  the  th re e  con­
cerned powers from ta k in g  u n i l a t e r a l  a c tio n  to  e s t a b l i s h  a
33" f r ie n d ly "  government in  the  t e r r i t o r i e s  c o n s i d e r e d . T h e  
S ta te  Departm ent p ro v id ed  a  len g th y  paper o u t l in in g  th e  need 
f o r  some form of A llie d  m i l i ta r y  occupation  follow ed by an 
" in te r im  in te r n a t io n a l  su p e rv iso ry  a d m in is tra tio n  o r  t r u s t e e ­
s h ip ,"  c o n s is t in g  a t  l e a s t  of the  United S ta te s ,  B r i ta in ,  
China, and R ussia . No firm  p la n s , however, were p rov ided  
f o r  ach iev in g  t h i s  g o a l. S ta te  Departm ent o f f i c i a l s  be­
lie v e d  th a t  some form o f d e ta i le d  agreem ent should be reached 
concern ing  fu tu re  Soviet-A m erican a c tio n s  in  the  F a r  E a s t ,  
in c lu d in g  p lan s  f o r  a  combined zone of o p e ra tio n  in  Korea 
under a  s in g le  A llie d  commander. K o re a 's  s t r a te g ic  p o s i t io n .
^^Gaddis, O r ig in s . 230-231, 239.
^^B rie fin g  Book P aper, U.S. Department of S ta te ,  
F ore ign  R e la tio n s  of the  U nited S ta te s ,  19^5: The
Conference of B e r l in , Volume I (W ashington: GPO, I9 6 0 ),
310- 313.
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which v i t a l l y  in flu e n ce d  the peace and s e c u r i ty  of E as t 
A sia, made such p la n s  m andatory.
S e c re ta ry  o f War Henry L . Stim son se n t a  message to 
Truman a t  Potsdam, which s tro n g ly  re in fo rc e d  the  S ta te  De­
p a r tm e n t 's  b e l i e f  th a t  S o v ie t dominance o f the Korean occu­
p a tio n  should be avo ided . Stim son no ted  th a t  th e  S o v ie ts  
had agreed to  the t r u s te e s h ip  id e a , b u t th a t  de . a i l s  had no t 
been agreed  to .  Since th e  R ussians a lre a d y  had tra in e d  one 
o r two d iv is io n s  of K oreans, undoubtedly  f o r  use in  Korea, 
Stimson warned th a t  " i f  an  in te r n a t io n a l  t r u s te e s h ip  i s  no t 
s e t  up, and perhaps i f  i t  i s ,  th e se  d iv is io n s  w i l l  probably  
g a in  c o n tro l ,  and in f lu e n c e  s e t t in g  up a Soviet-dom inated  
lo c a l  governm ent, r a th e r  than  an independent one ."  T his 
would be " th e  P o lis h  q u e s tio n  tra n s p la n te d  to  th e  Far 
E a s t ."  Stim son warned Truman to  p re s s  f o r  a t ru s te e s h ip  
w ith  a t  l e a s t  a  token  fo rc e  of U.S. tro o p s  s ta tio n e d  in  
Korea d u rin g  the  t r u s te e s h ip  p e r io d .
E ven ts a t  Potsdam in d ic a te d  th a t  l i t t l e  c o n s id e ra tio n  
was given to  e i t h e r  the  S ta te  D ep artm en t's  p o lic y  th in k in g  o r 
to  S tim son' s f e a r s ,  s in ce  th e re  was no e f f o r t  to  o b ta in  a  de­
t a i l e d  program fo r  K orea. G eneral George C. M arsh a ll, U.S. 
Army C hief of S ta f f ,  e x p re ss ly  re fu se d  the  S ov ie t o f f e r  to
oU
B rie f in g  Book P aper, In te r im  A d m in is tra tio n  fo 2 
Korea and P o s s ib le  S o v ie t A t t i tu d e s , I b i d . . 311-313; 
B r ie f in g  Book P aper, R e la tio n sh ip  of S o v ie t Union to  the  
War A gainst Japan , I b i d . . Vol. I I ,  925.
^^Stim son to  Truman, J u ly  16,1945, I b i d . , I ,  63I ,
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c o n s id e r  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  U.S. f o rc e s  c o o p e ra t in g  in  con­
ju n c t io n  w ith  Russian fo rc e s  to c a r ry  out an o ffen s iv e  
i n  Korea. American tro o p s  and re s o u rc e s  were committed 
too  h e a v i ly  t o  amphibious a s s a u l t s  on J a p a n 's  home i s la n d s  
f o r  the  United  S ta te s  even to  c o n s id e r  o p e ra t io n s  in  
K orea. America’ s d e f a u l t  of Korea to  R ussia  a t  the m i l i t a r y  
l e v e l  might have been unders tandab le  i f  some ba lan c in g  a r ­
rangements had been made a t  the p o l i t i c a l  l e v e l .  The only 
agreement reached  a t  t h a t  l e v e l ,  however, provided f o r  " a  
l i n e  of dem arcation in  the gen era l  a re a  o f Korea between 
American and R ussian  a i r  and sea o p e ra t io n s .
At t h i s  p o in t ,  two q u e s t io n s  might be asked. Why 
had the  S ta te  Department f a i l e d  to  produce a concre te  p r o ­
p o sa l  f o r  Korean occupation? Why d id  Truman and h is  p o l i ­
t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  a d v is e r s  f a i l  a t  Potsdam to  reach  a  f i rm , 
d e t a i l e d  agreement w ith  R uss ia  v i s - a - v i s  Korea? Aside from 
the  unknowns invo lved  in  e v a lu a t in g  th e  m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n ,  
one could  sp e cu la te  t h a t  the t ro u b le  t h a t  developed over 
a g re e in g  to  a  su c c e ss fu l  form ula f o r  t r u s t e e s h i p  might have 
d iscouraged  re a c h in g  con cre te  p lan s  f o r  Korea. The S o v ie ts  
d e s i re d  a g e n e ra l iz e d  t r u s t e e s h i p  system th a t  would apply  to  
I t a l i a n  and German p o s s e s s io n s ,  a s  w ell  a s  to  Korea. The 
U nited  S ta te s  and G reat B r i t a i n  wanted to  l i m i t  c o n s id e ra t io n
^6P r in c e to n  Seminars, Dean Acheson P a p e rs ,  Harry S. 
Truman L ib ra ry ;  Rose, R o o ts . 37» Harry Truman, Years o f T r i a l  
and Hope (New York: ' Doubleday, 1956), 317 .
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of t r u s t e e s h ip  to  l e s s  s t r a t e g i c  a re a s .  The Sov ie t d e s i r e  
to  g a in ,  a t  I t a l y ' s  expense, a  colony or base in  the Medi­
te r ra n e a n ,  under the  gu ise  of a  t r u s t e e s h ip ,  seemed a  c l e a r  
s ig n a l  to  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  James F. Byrnes t h a t  the 
Russians wanted a s t r a t e g i c  p o s i t io n  from which to  th r e a te n  
the West. The problem then , was to  agree  to  a  t r u s t e e s h ip  
form ula a p p lic a b le  to  Korea, t h a t  a t  the  same time would not
a id  Sov ie t expansionism  in  the s t r a t e g i c  M editerranean  a re a .
37U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  no such agreement could be re a c h e d .^ '
The U.S. experience  a t  co o p era t iv e  a c t io n  w ith  the  
R ussians on the  A l l ie d  C on tro l Commissions f o r  E a s te rn  
Europe and I t a l y ,  a s  w ell a s  S ov ie t  a c t io n s  in  Poland, a lso  
were f a c to r s  in  d isc o u rag in g  a formal agreement. The Russian 
and American i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of s e l f -d e te rm in a t io n  and democ­
racy  were d r a s t i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t .  By ta k in g  u n i l a t e r a l  a c ­
t i o n s  in  the occupied c o u n tr ie s  where they  were the s t ro n g e s t  
the  United S t a te s  and the  S o v ie t  Union made the  C on tro l Com­
m issions im poten t. S o v ie t  a c t io n s  in  Poland were viewed 
a lso  as  v i o la t io n s  o f  agreem ents made a t  Y a lta .  Truman, un­
l i k e  R oosevelt, expected  agreements to  be c a r r ie d  ou t l i ­
t e r a l l y .  When they  were n o t ,  a s  in  P o la n d 's  case , the  do­
m estic  f u r o r  had made both  R o o s e v e l t 's  and Truman's p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  very u ncom fortab le .^^  Truman p robab ly  though t i t  b e s t
37^ H e r b e r t  P e i s ,  Between War and Peace; The Potsdam 
Conference (P r in c e to n :  P r in c e to n  P re s s ,  i 960) ,  306- 309 .
^®Gaddis, O r ig in s . 139-171, 200-206.
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to  avoid making commitments t h a t  might n o t  be c a r r i e d  o u t .
Whatever the  answer, i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  c o n tra ry  to  
L o c k h a r t 's  c o n te n t io n ,  "a g re a t  deal of t im e " had n o t  been 
spent in  s tudying  the  Korean problem. T h is  i s  hard to  ex­
p l a in  when c o n s id e ra t io n  i s  g iven  to  the  importance which 
the  United S ta te s  a ttach ed  to  Japan . A much c l e a r e r  r e l a ­
t io n s h ip  between K o re a 's  f a t e  and J a p a n 's  fu tu re  should have 
been perce ived . In  a d d i t io n ,  f a i l u r e  to  reach  any s p e c i f i c  
Korean s o lu t io n s  a t  Potsdam le d  in  p a r t  t o  the  h a s t i l y  con­
s id e red  38th  p a r a l l e l  d e c is io n ,  which proved to  be a source 
o f  considerab le  t ro u b le  f o r  the  United S t a te s .
J a p a n 's  s w if t  c o l la p s e ,  fo llo w in g  use of the atomic 
bomb and Soviet e n t ry  in to  the  war, fo rced  America to  decide 
qu ick ly  what i t  was going to  do in  Korea. The S ta te-W ar- 
Navy C oord inating  Committee held  long  se s s io n s  from August 10 
to  August 15, to  coo rd ina te  and make d e c is io n s  concern ing  
J a p a n 's  su rren d er .  At a meeting on the  n ig h t  of August 10-11, 
the  su b je c t  of Korea was d isc u sse d .  The S ta te  Department 
had suggested, th roug h  Byrnes, t h a t  American fo rc e s  re c e iv e  
J a p a n 's  su rrend er  a s  f a r  n o r th  as p o s s ib l e .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  
the  m i l i t a r y  was faced  both w ith  a la c k  o f  tro o p s  t h a t  were 
needed elsewhere immediately and w ith  the  p ro sp e c t  t h a t  i t  
would be d i f f i c u l t  to  reach  very f a r  n o r th  in to  Korea before  
Sov ie t tro o p s  could  e n te r  the  a re a .  Dean Rusk, then in  the  
F a r  E as te rn  A f f a i r s  D iv is io n , r e c a l l s  t h a t  "The m i l i t a r y  
view was t h a t  i f  our p ro p o sa ls  f o r  r e c e iv in g  su rre n d er
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g r e a t ly  overreached our p robable  m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  there  
would be l i t t l e  l ik e l ih o o d  of S ov ie t  accep tance .
Rusk and Colonel C harle s  B o n e s tee l ,  Chief of the  
P o licy  P lann ing  S ec tion  of the  War Departm ent, were asked 
to  r e t i r e  to  an a d jo in in g  room and p rep a re  w ith  a l l  has te  a  
p roposa l which would "Harmonize th e  p o l i t i c a l  d e s i re  to  have 
the United S ta te s  rece iv e  th e  su r re n d e r  a s  f a r  n o r th  a s  pos­
s ib le  and the  obvious l i m i t a t i o n  on the  a b i l i t y  of the 
United S ta te s  f o rc e s  to  re a c h  the  a r e a ."  Rusk r e c a l l s  t h a t  
the  38th  p a r a l l e l  was s e le c te d  because, even though i t  was 
f u r t h e r  n o r th  than  U.S. t ro o p s  could re a c h  in  the  event of 
Sov ie t d isag reem en t, i t  was b e lieved  im po rtan t  to  include  
K o re a 's  c a p i t a l  in  the U.S. zone. B onestee l b e lieved  the  
prim ary c o n s id e ra t io n  was to  ge t  as  f a r  n o r th  a s  the  S o v ie ts  
would a c c e p t .  There were no adequate maps p r e s e n t ,  so the • 
38t h  p a r a l l e l  was taken  as  a  d iv id in g  p o in t  because i t  cu t  
Korea a lm ost in  th e  middle and gave the  United S ta te s  Seoul 
and a  nearby  p r iso n e r -o f -w a r  camp
The State-War-Navy C o o rd in a t in g  Committee considered  
the p ro p o sa l  in  the  e a r ly  morning hours o f  August 11. The 
Navy suggested moving the  l i n e  to  the  3 9 th  p a r a l l e l ,  which 
S e c re ta ry  of the Navy James C. F o r r e s t a l  ap p a ren tly  favored ,
30
Memo from Rusk to  Chief of the  D iv is io n  of H is­
t o r i c a l  P o l ic y  R esearch(N oble) , J u ly  12, 1950, PR,1945.
VI, 1039.
40I b i d . ; James P. Schnabel, P o l ic y  and D ire c t io n ;  
The P i r s t  Year (O ffice  of the  C hief of M i l i t a r y  H is to ry ,  
1972), 9 .
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but the Army thought such a  move would be unacceptable  to  
the S ov ie ts  a s  i t  would b a r  them from D airen , P o r t  A rthur, 
and o ther  p a r t s  of the  L iao tun g  P e n in su la .  More im portan t, 
th e re  was l i t t l e  chance of American fo rc e s  b e a t in g  the 
S o v ie ts  to  the 39th p a r a l l e l .  A s s i s t a n t  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  
James C. Dunn added t h a t  Korea was more im portan t p o l i ­
t i c a l l y  to  the U nited S ta te s  th an  Manchuria. Thus the 38th  
p a r a l l e l  subsequen tly  was used in  General Order No. 1 as  the 
dem arcation l i n e  f o r  a c c e p t in g  J a p a n 's  su rre n d e r .  The 
S o v ie ts ,  c o n tra ry  to  R u sk 's  e x p e c ta t io n s ,  accep ted  the 
l in e .^ ^
Truman l a t e r  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  the l i n e  was in tended to
be only a temporary exped ien t  to  be used to  a ccep t  J a p a n 's
su rren der  p r i o r  to  e s ta b l ish m e n t  o f a j o i n t  t r u s te e s h ip
ho
throughout the Korean p e n in s u la .  I t  was, however, an ex­
p e d ie n t  which ignored  long-range  q u e s t io n s  concerning occu­
p a t io n  p o l ic y .  In  f a c t ,  an August 24 memorandum fo r  
MacArthur which d e c la re d  t h a t  the  i n i t i a l  occupation  was to  
be only a two-power concern , dem o ns tra te s  t h a t  only a t  t h i s  
p o in t  in  time was the  S ta te  Department in s t r u c te d  to 
p repare  a  d i r e c t i v e  f o r  MacArthur on p o l i t i c a l ,  economic.
I b i d . ;  Truman, T r i a l . 317. General Order No. 1 
s ta te d  in  p a r t  t h a t  "by v i r tu e  of the  a u th o r i ty  v es ted  in  me 
a s  CIC, U.S. Army, P a c i f i c ,  I  hereby e s t a b l i s h  m i l i t a r y  con­
t r o l  over Korea sou th  of the  38 degree n o r th  l a t i t u d e  and 
the  in h a b i ta n ts  th e r e o f ."
42,Truman, T r i a l ,  317 .
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43and o th e r  m a t te rs  p e r t a in in g  to  Korea. ^
M il i ta ry  expediency d i c t a t e d  the  d e c is io n  to  d iv id e  
Korea a t  the  ]8 th  p a r a l l e l .  From the American p o in t  o f  view, 
i t  probably  was a  b e t t e r  deal th a n  could  have been gained 
through m i l i t a r y  means and a d d i t i o n a l ly  i t  served  the p u r ­
pose of t e s t i n g ,  to  a  d e g re e , S o v ie t  i n t e n t io n s  in  the F ar  
E a s t .  The United  S t a te s  a lso  was a ssu red  of an opportun ity  
to  uphold th e  Cairo D e c la ra t io n .  F in a l ly ,  the  d ec is io n  r a t i ­
f i e d  agreem ents made a t  Y a l ta  t h a t  th e  S o v ie t  Union would 
m a in ta in  a predominant in f lu e n c e  in  n o r th e rn  A s ia .
From the Sov ie t p o in t  o f  view, the  hope f o r  a p o s t ­
war U.S. lo an ,  a wish to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  the  Japanese  occu­
p a t io n ,  and a d e s i re  to  ga in  a  b e t t e r  p o s i t io n  in  the Medi­
te r ra n e a n ,  in f lu en ced  R u s s i a 's  a c c e p ta n c e . I t  might be 
added t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l l y  the ] 8 th  p a r a l l e l  had lo n g  been ac-, 
c e p ta b le  to  R ussia  a s  a dem arcation  p o in t  f o r  spheres o f  
in f lu e n c e  and i t  must have seemed t h a t  the  United S ta te s  
p ro posa l  was a r e a l i s t i c  r e c o g n i t io n  of S o v ie t  i n t e r e s t s  in  
Korea. In  sum, the  S o v ie t  Union wished to  avoid  r a i s in g  any 
su sp ic io n s  o r  an tag o n iz in g  the U nited  S t a te s  when there were 
more im portan t f r u i t s  s t i l l  to  be gained  in  a r e a s  of g re a te r  
s t r a t e g i c  importance to  R ussia .
^%emo by the SWNCC to  B r ig a d ie r  General Andres 
MacFarland, S ec re ta ry  of the JOS, August 24. 1945. FR, 1945. 
VI, 1040.
44Rose, R o o ts . 38; A rth u r  Gray, "The 38 th  P a r a l l e l , "  
F o re ign  A f f a i r s . 27 (A nril  1951), 484-486.
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The S ov ie t d e c is io n  r e f l e c t e d  the cau t io n  w ith  which 
S ta l in  approached the  F a r  E a s t  when compared with E a s te rn  
Europe. The S ov ie t l e a d e r s h ip  co n cen tra ted  on the a re a  t h a t  
was o f d i r e c t  im portance to  the  S o v ie t  Union: E a s te rn  and
so u th e as te rn  Europe. This enabled the  S o v ie t  Union to  avoid 
"any appearance of a many-sided a t t a c k  on the  Old W orld 's  
p o s i t io n s  t h a t  would in c re a s e  American su sp ic io n s  and 
counterm easures . . . ."  With the excep tio n  of China and 
Japan, A sia  was n o t  a  p rim ary  concern  of Sovie t fo re ig n  
p o l ic y  between 19^5 and 1948.^^
However one views the  m otives behind the p ropo sa l  
and accep tance  of the 38th  p a r a l l e l  a s  a  dem arcation l i n e ,  
i t  was a  f a t e f u l  d e c is io n  f o r  the  U nited S ta te s  because i t  
r e s u l te d  in  a  permanent boundary t h a t  American p o l ic y  makers 
had n o t  env isaged . The i n i t i a l  occupation  experience  and 
the harden ing  o f the 38th  p a r a l l e l  i n to  an u ncrossab le  
boundary, q u ick ly  soured  A m erica 's  involvem ent in  Korea.
^■^ Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The
H isto ry  o f  S ov ie t  Fore ign  P o l ic y ,  1917-1963 (New York: 
P raege r ,  1968), 514, 457.
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CHAPTER I I
TRUSTEESHIP AND THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT
During the p e r io d  of Japanese dom ination, K o re a 's  
po pu la tio n  had doubled and i t s  urban, i n d u s t r i a l ,  e d u c a t io n a l  
and communication f a c i l i t i e s  had grown. A lien  co lo n ia l ism  
had the  e f f e c t  of w h e tting  the  p o l i t i c a l  a p p e t i t e s  of the 
Korean people th rough  re p re s s io n  and the  economic ones 
through a d e s i r e  to  emulate the  c o lo n ia l  power. With the 
onset o f the war came the f u r t h e r  s t i r r i n g s  o f  mass m o b il i ­
z a t io n .  Soc ie ty  in  K orea was f l u id ,  la c k in g  s tro n g  i n t e r ­
mediary i n s t i t u t i o n s  o r  c la s s  i d e n t i t i e s .  S trong  le a d e r s h ip  
was needed to  lea d  an aroused and im p a tien t  people through 
a mass of economic and p o l i t i c a l  t ro u b le s ,  but K o re a 's  own 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  were u s e l e s s ,  w ith  the r e s u l t  t h a t  the fo rc e s  
of chaos a ro se .^
The la c k  of d i r e c t i o n  given to  Korean a f f a i r s  and 
the r e s u l t i n g  chaos i n  la rg e  p a r t  must be blamed on the  com­
p le te  la c k  of U.S. p re p a ra t io n  fo r  th e  occupation . J a p a n 's  
dram atic  co llap se  allow ed l i t t l e  time fo r  p ro p e r  p re p a ra t io n
^Henderson, K orea. 113.
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of occupation  tro o p s .  General MacArthur had to  s e l e c t  u n i t s
fo r  occupation  d u t ie s  on the b a s i s  of a v a i l a b i l i t y  of t ro o p s
and t r a n s p o r t .  L t .  General John Hodge commanded the  t ro o p s
se lec te d  f o r  Korea, the  24th Corps. Hodge had a d i s t in g u is h e d
combat re c o rd  a t  B ouganv ille , L ey te ,  and Okinawa, and was
w ell-p rep ared  fo r  a  m i l i t a r y  in v a s io n — but n o t f o r  the  m i l i -
2
ta ry  occupation  and a d m in is t r a t io n  of Korea.
Hodge was keen ly  aware of h i s  need fo r  guidance. He 
cabled the  S ta te  Department on August 26, 19^5» n o t in g  t h a t  
he had rece iv ed  no d i r e c t i v e s  w ith  reg a rd  to  Korea. Hodge 
concluded t h a t  the  Japanese d i r e c t i v e  was the  i n i t i a l  p la n  
to  be u t i l i z e d  f o r  the  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f Korea, which meant 
th a t  Japanese Governor-General Abe Nobuyuki and h is  s t a f f  
would be used f o r  a d m in is t r a t io n  under the  d i r e c t io n  of the  
American M i l i t a ry  Government (AMG). Hodge req uested  an im­
mediate Korean d i r e c t i v e  fo r  g u id an ce . ^
General Hodge rece ived  no d i r e c t i v e s  p r i o r  to  the 
f i r s t  American en tran ce  in to  Korea on September 8, 1945. I n ­
s tead , Hodge used M acA rthur's P ro c lam atio n  No. 1, signed 
September 2, which r e s t a t e d  t h a t  " in  due course" Korea would 
become f r e e  and independent. The purpose of the occupation
Robert K. Sawyer, M i l i t a r y  A dvisers in  Korea: KMAG
in  War and Peace (Washington; O ffice  o f  the Chief of M i l i ­
ta ry  H is to ry ,  1952), 3-4; General John Hodge F i l e ,  3290, 
Harry S. Truman L ib ra ry ,  Independence, M issouri.
^Consul General a t  M a n i la (S te in to r f )  to  the  Secre­
t a r y  of S ta te ,  August 26, 1945, FR.1945. VI, 1041.
- 29 -
was to  en fo rce  the  su r re n d e r  and to  p r o t e c t  Koreans in  t h e i r  
personal and r e l i g i o u s  r i g h t s .  Korean help  and compliance 
was re q u ire d —a l l  a c t s  o f  d i s tu rb in g  p u b l ic  peace would be 
punished se v e re ly .  F i n a l l y ,  the  P roc lam ation  d i r e c te d  a l l  
those engaged in  e s s e n t i a l  s e rv ic e s  to  con tinue  in  the p e r ­
formance of t h e i r  usua l fu n c t io n s  and d u t i e s . ^
Hodge a ls o  lacked  adequate ly  t r a in e d  p e rso n n e l .  The 
f i r s t  c i v i l  a f f a i r s  team, which did n o t  rea ch  Korea u n t i l  
October 20, was t r a in e d  f o r  work in  the  P h i l ip p in e s  and sub­
sequent teams were t r a in e d  f o r  se rv ice  in  Ja p an . One p a r t i ­
c ip a n t ,  E. Grant Meade, r e c a l l e d  t h a t  h i s  one y e a r ' s  t r a i n in g  
and i n s t r u c t i o n  in c lu d ed  a  " s in g le  one-hour l e c tu r e  on K orea."  
But "d esp i te  ignorance o f  t h e i r  d u t ie s  and t h e i r  la c k  of 
background, c i v i l  a f f a i r s  teams were charged w ith  the  execu­
t io n  of v i t a l  American p o l ic ie s ." -^
Hodge's problem s in  the  i n i t i a l  weeks o f  occupation  
went beyond inadequate  p re p a r a t io n  and d i r e c t i o n .  The a r t i ­
f i c i a l  d iv i s io n  of the  cou n try  a t  the  38t h  p a r a l l e l  compounded 
K orea 's  b a s ic  e x i s t i n g  problem s. The Korean people  d e s i r e d  
quick l i b e r a t i o n  and independence, but J a p a n 's  f o r ty - y e a r  
occupation  had made K orea a  Japanese colony. A bureaucracy 
had a r r iv e d  from Japan  and had taken complete c o n t r o l  o f  a l l  
im portan t phases o f  K o re a 's  l i f e .  The Korean economy was
P roc lam ation  No. 1, by General of th e  Army Douglas 
MacArthur, Signed September 2, 194-5, I b i d . . 104-3.
51- 52.
^Henderson.K orea , 124-25; Meade, American M i l i t a r y .
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t ie d  se c u re ly  to Japan , a s  Korea became J a p a n 's  r i c e  bowl 
and a one-crop coun try . J a p a n ’ s t o t a l  c o n tro l  p reven ted  the  
development o f any " t r a in e d ,  n a t iv e  a d m in i s t r a to r s ,  tech- 
n ic ia n s  and m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s . "
The absence of t r a in e d  Koreans le d  Hodge to  continue 
a l l  Japanese in  t h e i r  p o s ts  on a tem porary  b a s i s .  This 
caused considerab le  d is c o n te n t  among Koreans, l e a d in g  o f­
f i c i a l s  in  Washington to  no te  t h a t  the  d e c is io n  had "an un­
fo r tu n a te  e f f e c t  on our p o s i t io n  i n  K orea."  Hodge was in­
s t ru c te d  to  remove Governor-General Abe, c h ie f s  o f  a l l  
bureaus of the  Governor-General, and p ro v in c ia l  governors 
and p o l ic e  c h ie f s ,  and to  proceed "as  r a p id ly  as p o ss ib le  
with the  removal of o th e r  Japanese and c o l l a b o r a t io n i s t  
Korean a d m in i s t r a to r s . " ^
I t  became in c re a s in g ly  c l e a r  t h a t  d iv i s io n  of Korea 
exacerba ted  the  b a s ic  problems f a c in g  the  co un try . The 
economies o f n o r th  and south Korea were in t im a te ly  linked .
The sou th e rn  h a l f  of Korea, b e s id e s  c o n ta in in g  tw o -th ird s  o f 
the people and being th e  prim ary  food s u p p l ie r ,  had produced 
7 ^  of K o re a 's  l i g h t  consumer goods in  1940. P la n t s  in  the 
south had been b u i l t  " to  p ro ce ss  raw m a te r i a l s  from northern  
Korea."  The n o r th  had va lu ab le  m ine ra l  d e p o s i t s  and provided 
almost a l l  o f  south K o re a 's  e l e c t r i c a l  power a s  w ell  as  the
^Sawyer, M i l i t a r y  A d v ise rs . 5-7•
7
I b i d . ; Memo by Acting Chairman of the  SWNCC, 
September 10, 1945, FR.1945. VI, 1044-1045.
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i ro n ,  s t e e l ,  wood p u lp ,  and i n d u s t r i a l  chem icals  t h a t  her 
l i g h t  i n d u s t r i e s  needed. D iv is io n  s h a t te r e d  th e se  economic
O
connec tions  and made reco v ery  d i f f i c u l t .
Hodge's t re a tm e n t  o f a government t h a t  had been 
e s ta b l is h e d  p r i o r  to  h i s  a r r i v a l  in  Korea made h i s  d u t ie s  
more d i f f i c u l t .  The Japanese  G overnor-G eneral, hoping to  
c re a te  a p ro -Japanese  atmosphere to  p r o t e c t  Japanese  l i v e s  
and p ro p e r ty ,  decided to  form a  t r a n s i t i o n a l  government made 
up of prom inent K oreans. A f te r  a few f a i l u r e s .  General Abe 
on August 15 persuaded the  enigm atic  Lyuh Woon-hyung, a  long­
time p o p u la r  l i b e r a l ,  and one-time communist, p a t r i o t  and 
former Japanese p o l i t i c a l  p r i s o n e r ,  to  head th e  Committee f o r  
P re p a ra t io n  o f  Korean Independence. T his o rg a n iz a t io n  was 
"packed” w ith  l e f t i s t s  a s  Abe had a n t i c ip a te d  Russian c o n tro l  
over most o f Korea. Pak Hong-yong, the  most i n f l u e n t i a l  Comr 
munist l e a d e r  in  sou the rn  Korea, helped to  in c re a s e  the  Com­
munist ro le  i n  the  Committee. At the same t im e , hundreds of 
P e o p le 's  Committees were c re a te d  a l l  over K orea, some spon­
tan eo u s ly  and some by d e s ig n .  They e x e rc is e d  vary ing  deg rees  
o f  lo c a l  and a d m in is t r a t iv e  c o n tro l  and g e n e r a l ly  were l e f t i s t  
le a n in g .  The Korean Communist P a r ty  wielded "an e x tra o rd in a ry  
in f lu e n ce  over the  Korean P e o p le 's  Republic and so over the 
P e o p le 's  Committees th ro ugh ou t the  co un try .
O
Schnabel, P o l i c y , 12.
^Henderson, K orea , 114-119; Robert S ca lap ino  and 
Chong-sik Lee, Communism in  K orea, 2 Volumes (B erkley: 
U n iv e rs i ty  o f C a l i f o r n ia  P re s s ,  1972), I ,  239-24?, 257.
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A d e s i re  " to  prove t h e i r  a b i l i t y  f o r  se lf-governm ent"  
i n s p i r i t e d  the Committee f o r  P re p a ra t io n  of Korean Indepen­
dence and i t  qu ick ly  e s ta b l i s h e d  i t s e l f  as a  powerful p o l i ­
t i c a l  fo rc e .  On September 6, th e  Committee c a l le d  a "Na­
t io n a l  Assembly" of about 1,000 d e le g a te s ,  which d e c la re d  i t ­
s e l f  th e  P e o p le ’s Republic o f Korea. The need to  achieve a 
semblance of leg i t im a c y  led  the newly-formed Republic to  ap­
po in t  Rhee a s  i t s  p re s id e n t  and o th e r  e x i l e d  Koreans to  c a b i ­
n e t  p o s t s .  A ll  those named were abroad and could n o t  fun c ­
t io n  i n  t h e i r  p o s ts .  V ic e -m in is te rs ,  i n e v i t a b ly  Communists 
or extreme l e f t i s t s ,  assumed t h e i r  p o s i t io n s .  By the end of 
19^ 5 . the  l e f t  had organ ized  enough f r o n t  o rg a n iz a t io n s  to  
enable i t  to  be the predominant p o l i t i c a l  fo rce  in  Korea.
The Korean Communist P a r ty  had v i r t u a l  c o n tro l  o f  numerous 
youth, la b o r ,  and peasan t f r o n t  o rg a n iz a t io n s ,  th us  in ­
c re a s in g  i t s  power g r e a t ly .
D e lega tes  from the P e o p le ’s Republic  of Korea met 
Hodge when he landed in  Korea on September 8 and o f fe re d  i t ­
s e l f  a s  the government of Korea. I t  was r e j e c t e d  immediately 
because Hodge's i n s t r u c t i o n s  d id  not a llo w  him to  recogn ize  
any group which challenged  h i s  a u th o r i ty .  The S o v ie ts ,  how­
ever ,  i n i t i a l l y  used the  P e o p le 's  Committees to  a d m in is te r  
11t h e i r  zone. Hodge, in s te a d ,  t r i e d  to  a s s e s s  the  s i t u a t i o n
Soon Sung Cho, Korea i n  World P o l i t i c s (B erkeley: 
U n iv e rs i ty  o f C a l i f o r n ia  P re s s ,  1967) ,  68-69; Sca lap ino  and 
Lee, Communism in  K orea . I , 257 .268 ,312;Henderson, K orea, 119»
^^Soon, Korea. 88; Meade, American M i l i t a r y .  59-
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before  deciding on the best a d m in is t r a t iv e  course . Hodge's 
assessm ent was r e f l e c t e d  in  a  September 15 memorandum to the 
S ta te  Department from h is  p o l i t i c a l  a d v is e r  H. M erre ll  
Benninghoff.
Benninghoff d esc r ibed  Korea as a "powder-keg ready 
t o  explode," because the Korean people, expec ting  immediate 
independence, f a i l e d  to  unders tand  the meaning of the term 
" in  due co u rse ."  The f a i l u r e  to  sweep out the Japanese and 
to  ga in  t h e i r  independence immediately had l e f t  them d isa p ­
p o in ted  and a g i t a t e d .  While acknowledging the  d e s i r a b i l i t y  
o f  removing Japanese o f f i c i a l s ,  Benninghoff f e l t  they  had to  
be continued in  t h e i r  work in  the  absence of q u a l i f ie d  
Koreans. Benninghoff be lieved  the p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t io n  was 
c h a o t ic  because Koreans had been on a "prolonged ho liday  
s in ce  August," i n t e r p r e t i n g  independence to  mean freedom from 
work. He adm itted , however, t h a t  con tinued  Japanese owner­
sh ip  or co n tro l  o f most b u s in e ss  and i n d u s t r i a l  e s t a b l i s h ­
ments made i t  d i f f i c u l t  " to  convince Koreans to  s tay  on the
12job and to  b u i ld  up t h e i r  c o u n try ."
To Benninghoff, the s in g le  most encouraging f a c to r  
i n  Korea was the "presence in  Seoul of se v e ra l  hundred con­
s e rv a t iv e s  among the o ld e r  and b e t te r -e d u c a te d  Koreans." They 
tended to favor the  r e tu r n  o f  the  Chungking-based "Korean 
P ro v is io n a l  Government" and were the l a r g e s t  s ing le  p o l i t i c a l
12Benninghoff to  the S ec re ta ry  of S ta te ,  September 15, 
1945, FR.1945. VI, 1049- 1052.
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group in  the  American zone, though no t a  m a jo r i ty .
There was no doubt, Benninghoff con tinued , t h a t  
Sov ie t agen ts  were sp read ing  t h e i r  ideology throughout south 
Korea, hoping to  b r in g  chaos and a re p u d ia t io n  of America in  
favo r  of "S ov ie t  freedom and c o n t r o l T h i s  a c t i v i t y  might 
prove su ccess fu l  because Hodge lacked  s u f f i c i e n t  t ro o p s  to
1 [l
c o n tro l  wide a re a s  of sou th  Korea.
Benninghoff sounded what became a c o n s ta n t  theme of 
American M i l i t a ry  Government in  Korea. "The s p l i t t i n g  of 
Korea in to  two p a r t s  f o r  occupa tion  by armed fo rc e s  of n a ­
t io n s  having widely d iv e rg e n t  p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h ie s ,  w ith  
no common ground, i s  an im possib le  s i t u a t i o n . "  The la c k  of 
in fo rm atio n  and d i r e c t i o n  concern ing  K o re a 's  f u tu r e ,  and the 
inadequacy both  in  numbers and t r a i n in g  of U.S. o f f i c i a l s ,  
made the s i t u a t i o n  even more im p oss ib le .
B enninghoff ' s r e p o r t  c lo sed  w ith  a  summary of Hodge's 
recommendations. Some o f  the more im portan t in c luded : a  de­
s i r e  f o r  i n s t r u c t i o n s  on fu tu re  p o l ic y  in  Korea; e f f o r t s  to  
upgrade the q u a l i ty  o f Hodge's s t a f f ;  and a  re q u e s t  t h a t  the 
Chungking g o v e m m en t- in -ex i le  be re tu rn e d  to  Korea to a c t  as  
a  f igu rehead  p ro v is io n a l  government du ring  the  occupation  
u n t i l  the s i t u a t i o n  was s ta b le  enough f o r  an e le c t io n  to  
be h e ld . ‘ ^
l ^ I b i d . ^^ I b i d . ^^ I b i d . ^^ I b i d .
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A p o r t io n  o f  one of Hodge's recommendations was 
agreed to r e l u c t a n t l y  on September 21. The S ta te  Department 
had no o b je c t io n s  t o  a llo w in g  Rhee and o th e r  e x i le s  to r e tu r n  
to  Korea a s  long as  a l l  Koreans were t r e a t e d  e q u a l ly .  On 
September 27, the  S ta te  Department d e c la re d  t h a t  r e tu rn in g  
Koreans would have to  s ig n  an agreement recogn iz ing  the  su­
preme a u th o r i ty  of American M i l i t a r y  Government over sou th  
Korea. While o u t r ig h t  support o f any one p o l i t i c a l  group 
ou ts ide  Korea was n o t  being  contem plated , any groups w i l l i n g
to opera te  c o n s t r u c t iv e ly  in  the  m i l i t a r y  government fram e-
17work were to  be encouraged to  do so.
While one o f  h i s  recommendations had been accep ted , 
Hodge s t i l l  p e rce iv ed  a  dangerous s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea. He 
d e te c ted  a  growing, deep d i s t r u s t  of A l l ie d  in te n t io n s  and 
a growing c r i t i c i s m  of d iv is io n  of the co u n try .  Many i n t e l l i ­
g e n t  Koreans had concluded t h a t  th e  A l l i e s  had no in te n t io n  
of r e b u i ld in g  a f r e e  and independent Korea. T h is  was under­
s tandab le ,  s ince  based upon p o l i c i e s  to  da te  th e re  was no­
th in g  to  encourage a  b e l i e f  t h a t  the  A l l i e s  would f u l f i l l
18t h e i r  p ledge f o r  an independent Korea. To many i t  must 
have seemed t h a t  the  Japanese  had been exchanged fo r  Ameri­
c an s .
17'A c t in g  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  to  the  Ambassador i n  
China, September 21, 19^5, I b i d . . 1053-5^» A cting  S e c re ta ry  
o f S ta te  to  the  Charge'’ in  China, September 27, 1945, I b i d . . 
1050 ; Henderson, K orea. 129-130.
18Hodge to  MacArthur, i n  Tokyo, September 24,
1945, I b i d . ,  1054- 1055.
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Hodge f e l t  t h a t  the  A ll ie d  d e c is io n  to  d iv ide  Korea 
had "crea ted  a s i t u a t i o n  im possib le  of p eacefu l  c o r re c t io n "  
in  a way th a t  would be a  c r e d i t  .to the United S ta te s .  Im­
mediate a c t io n  on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  was needed to  s e t  
up a  s in g le  p ro v is io n a l  government w ith  a common p o l ic y .
Hodge be lieved  t h a t  only  the S ov ie t  Union had g iven  s e r io u s  
thought to  the problems involved in  the  Korean occupation , 
bu t  the S o v ie ts  were t a lk in g  to  no one. A ll  e f f o r t s  to  s e t  
up a  working arrangem ent w ith  the  R ussians had f a i l e d .
B en n in g h o ff 's  September 29 a n a ly s i s  o f the  p o l i t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea q u ick ly  follow ed Hodge's p e s s im is t ic  
e v a lu a t io n .  South Korea was d esc r ib ed  as p o l i t i c a l l y  d iv ided  
in to  two d i s t i n c t  groups. The f i r s t  was th e  democratic o r 
co n se rv a t iv e  group, composed in  p a r t  of the  p ro g ress iv e  and 
educated le a d e r s  t r a in e d  in  the  United S ta te s  o r in  American 
m issionary  scho o ls .  This group, d e s i r in g  to  fo llo w  the west­
e rn  dem ocracies, a lm ost unanimously wished to  see Rhee and 
th e  Chungking group re tu rn e d  as  soon a s  p o s s ib l e .  The second 
group was the  r a d i c a l  o r  communist group composed of sm a lle r  
groups from l e f t - o f - c e n t e r  to  r a d i c a l .  The communist group 
was the most r a d i c a l  and prov ided  most of the  le a d e r s h ip .
While Benninghoff p ro fe s se d  no e x p l i c i t  p re fe re n c e ,  h i s  
s t a r k ly  drawn r e p o r t  l e f t  l i t t l e  doubt which group he be­
l ie v e d  should be supported .
l^Ibid.
20Benninghoff to  Byrnes, September 29. 1945, I b i d . ,
1061- 1065.
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Benninghoff was concerned th a t  l i t t l e  was known 
about what the S o v ie ts  were doing in  n o r th  Korea, beyond 
having e je c te d  the Japanese and having s e t  up l o c a l  govern­
ments based on a  one-party  system. N o rth  Korea probably  
would be so v ie tize d  as  E a s te rn  Europe had been and the  United 
S ta te s  would have to  d ea l  w ith  a  s im i la r  s e t  of problems.
When the s i t u a t i o n  became c l e a r e r ,  n o r th  Korea would be un­
d er  Communist dom ination, while American-occupied south
21Korea would have a l a r g e  communist fo l lo w in g .
B enninghoff ' s a n a ly s i s  reached a  l o g ic a l  conclusion  
in  an October 10, 1945, memorandum to  General M acArthur's 
p o l i t i c a l  a d v is e r ,  George Atcheson. Benninghoff rep o r te d  
t h a t  evidence in d ic a te d  th a t  r a d i c a l  o r  communist groups, who 
had organized  the  P e o p le 's  Republic of Korea, "were re c e iv in g  
support and d i r e c t io n  from the Sov ie t  Union." The conserva­
t iv e  groups, while l e s s  agg ress ive  th an  the  r a d i c a l s ,  r e p r e ­
sented  "the thought o f the m a jo r i ty  o f th in k in g  Koreans."
This group was w i l l in g  to  cooperate  w ith  the m i l i t a r y  govern­
ment and r e a l i z e d  t h a t  a  p e r io d  of t u t e l a g e ,  p r e fe ra b ly
22American, was n e ce ssa ry .  B enn inghoff ' s r e p o r t  made i t  
c l e a r  once more which group he wished America to  support.
L a te r ,  t h i s  p re fe ren ce  f o r  the  co n se rv a t iv e  group 
would fo rce  American M i l i t a r y  Government o f f i c i a l s  to  defend
21I b id .
^ b e n n in g h o f f  to  George Atcheson, October 1 , 1945, 
I b i d . .  1070.
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as
themselves a g a in s t  p re s s  r e p o r t s  of b i a s .  On November 26, 
W illiam Langdon, the  a c t in g  U.S. p o l i t i c a l  a d v ise r  in  Seoul, 
adm itted th a t  in  the  beginning  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  may have f a ­
vored "plu tocracy" a t  the expense o f  " l e f t - w in g e r s " , but t h i s  
was being c o rre c te d  so as  to  include a  more broadly-based  
s t r u c t u r e . R e l a x a t i o n  of a  n o n - f r a t e r n iz a t io n  ru le  had an 
im portant e f f e c t  in  fav o r in g  co n se rv a t iv e  elem ents, because 
the  Koreans w ith  a t t r a c t i v e  homes, who could  e n t e r t a i n  w ell, 
who could speak E n g lish  and t a lk  of Western c u l tu r e ,  were the 
w ealthy. Wealth i n  Korea u s u a l ly  in d ic a te d  a d e s i re  to  main­
t a i n  the " e x i s t in g  s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic o rd e r  w ith  
a  minimum of change." Americans in  Korea in  a  conscious 
or unconscious manner, tended to  fav o r  a c o n se rv a t iv e ,  mi­
n o r i t y ,  la n d lo rd  group. Yet a t  the same tim e, they  avoided 
open c la sh es  with the  l e f t  d u ring  the  i n i t i a l  occupation ,
25
hoping to b u i ld  a system on a consensual b a s i s .
On October 5. American M i l i t a ry  Government moved to  
provide  o rd e r  to  the  c h a o t ic  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  desc r ibed  
in  i t s  memoranda. Major General V ic to r  A. Arnold, M i l i t a r y  
Governor, appointed an Advisory Council o f  e leven  c a r e f u l l y  
chosen prominent Koreans, in c lu d in g  e d u c a to rs ,  law yers , bus i­
nessmen, p a t r i o t s ,  and l e a d e r s  o f the  two major p o l i t i c a l
^^Acting P o l i t i c a l  Adviser in  Korea (Langdon) to  
the  S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e ,  November 26, 1945, I b i d . . 1135.
24Meade, American M i l i t a r y . 104.
^^Scalapino and Lee, Communism in  K orea, I ,  269 .
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groups. The Council was to  g ive  advice on p o l i t i c a l  and 
economic m a tte rs  and to  b u i ld  up in  the  consc iou sness  of 
Koreans the f e e l in g  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  t h e i r  government. 
Arnold followed t h i s  on O ctober 9 w ith  an announcement t h a t  
a  number o f groups had e i t h e r  is su e d  o f f i c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  or 
had assumed a u th o r i ty  on no b a s i s  o th e r  than  t h a t  they  r e p r e ­
sented  some "Government." Arnold wanted i t  c l e a r l y  under­
stood th a t  American M i l i t a r y  Government was the  so le  a u th o r i ­
ty  sou th  of the  38th  p a r a l l e l  and he im plied t h a t  fo rce  would
be used i f  n e ce ssa ry  to  s top  a c t i v i t i e s  designed to  d i s tu r b  
26peace and o rd e r .
Atcheson supported th e s e  a c t io n s  and advocated o th e rs  
in  an October 15 memorandum to  Byrnes, in  which he r e l u c t a n t ly  
recommended t h a t  the  S ta te  Department co n s id e r  u s in g  "some 
p ro g re s s iv e ,  p opu lar  and re s p e c te d  l e a d e r ,  o r  sm all group, 
to  a c t  as a  n uc leus  o f  an o rg a n iz a t io n "  to  work w ith  and un­
d e r  AMG d i r e c t io n ,  perhaps to  develop in to  an execu tive  and 
governmental agency. Rhee was w idely  re sp e c te d  and could
serve a s  an i n i t i a l  n uc leus  a lo n g  w ith  Kim Koo and Kimm 
27K iu -s ic  , two o th e r  po pu la r  Korean l e a d e r s .  The time had 
come f o r  p o s i t iv e  U.S. a c t io n  in  the  p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d .  While 
open support of any one group o r  l e a d e r  was c o n tra ry  to  p a s t
 ^ 2^ ^  " '
Benninghoff to  A tcheson, October 9. 1945, FR,1945,
VI, 1068- 1069.
27Kimm was Am erican-educated a t  Roanoke C o lleg e .  An 
e a r ly  foe of Japanese dom ination of Korea, he was Ambassador 
P le n ip o te n t ia r y  to  the  V e r s a i l l e s  Conference, where he spoke 
ou t a g a in s t  Jap an . See Lee, Korean N a t io n a l ism . 104.
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U.S. p o l ic y ,  the  p re se n t  s i t u a t i o n  f u l l y  warranted such a 
s te p ;  to  f a i l  to  do so would in c re a s e  the  p re se n t  d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s .  The Communist group in  n o r th  Korea, which the S o v ie ts  
had s e t  up and encouraged, would p r o f i t  i f  the  United S ta te s
d id  no t a c t ,  expanding i t s  in f lu e n c e  in to  south  Korea "w ith
28r e s u l t s  t h a t  can r e a d i ly  be e n v isag ed ."
A tch eso n 's  recommendations, a  sharp break from p r e ­
v ious p o l ic y ,  reached Washington a t  about the  same time as 
the  i n i t i a l  Korean p o l ic y  d i r e c t i v e  was sen t  to  Hodge on 
October 17, 19^5* The State-War-Navy C oord inating  Committee 
d i r e c te d  t h a t  Korea should be developed p ro g re s s iv e ly  from 
the  in te r im  p e r io d  o f  m i l i t a r y  government to  a period  of 
t r u s t e e s h ip ,  and f i n a l l y  to  the e s ta b l ish m e n t  of a  f re e  and 
independent n a t io n ,  capable  of j o in in g  the United N ations. 
Achievement of t h i s  goal would r e q u i r e  the  e l im in a t io n  of a l l  
t r a c e s  o f Japanese  c o n t r o l  over K o re a 's  economic and p o l i t i ­
c a l  l i f e  and "even tua l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  an independent Korean 
government, economy, and s o c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s . " ^ ^
In  c a r ry in g  out t h i s  p o l ic y ,  the  S ta te  Department 
gave perm iss ion  to  employ any Japanese  and Koreans deemed 
e s s e n t i a l  by reason  of t h e i r  t e c h n ic a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .
28Atcheson to  Byrnes, O ctober 15, 1945, FR,1945,
VI, 1091- 1092.
^^SWNCC 101-4, Basic I n i t i a l  D i re c t iv e  to CIC, USAF, 
P a c i f i c ,  f o r  the  A d m in is tra t io n  of C iv i l  A f f a i r s  in  Those 
Areas of Korea Occupied by U.S. F o rc es ,  Sent October 17, 
1945, I b i d . .  1073-1090 and 1094-1097.
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P o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and o rg a n iz a t io n s  were to  be encouraged i f
t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  were c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  the  requ irem ents  o f the
m i l i t a r y  government. The S ta te  Department added t h a t  "You
w il l  n o t  extend o f f i c i a l  r e c o g n i t io n  to ,  nor u t i l i z e  f o r
p o l i t i c a l  pu rposes, any s e l f - s t y l e d  Korean p ro v is io n a l  govern-
30ment o r  s im i la r  p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n iz a t io n s  . . . .
In  l i g h t  of t h i s  c l e a r  s ta tem en t ,  the  S ta te  D epart­
ment was bound to  be unhappy about Hodge's a c t io n s ,  which 
seemed to  fav o r  Rhee. Rhee was Hodge's d in n e r  guest Oc­
to b e r  17, a t  which tim e Rhee was "outspoken in  h is  c r i t i c i s m s  
o f  S ov ie t  p o l ic y ."  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  Byrnes,’ re p ly in g  Octo­
ber 15 to  A tcheson 's  e a r l i e r  memorandum, expressed h i s  unhap­
p in e s s  w ith  t h i s .  The S e c re ta ry  s t ro n g ly  opposed "Unguarded 
re fe re n c e s  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  q u e s t io n s  made lo c a l ly "  a s  l i k e l y  
to  com plica te  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w ith  the  S o v ie t  Union.
N e i th e r  the  p o l ic y  d i r e c t i v e  no r B yrnes ' comments 
appeared to  a f f e c t  Hodge, who b e liev ed  t h a t  Communist a c ­
t i v i t i e s  were re a c h in g  the  p o in t  "where they  may ga in  c o n tro l  
u n le s s  p o s i t iv e  a c t io n  i s  tak e n ."  The b e s t  response to  t h i s  
t h r e a t  was u t i l i z a t i o n  of " the  s e rv ic e s  o f Rhee and Kim Koo 
to  he lp  screen  a d d i t io n a l  Koreans to  be brought to  K orea ,"  
and to  use them to  p la c e  s u i t a b le  and r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  Koreans 
i n  re sp o n s ib le  government p o s i t i o n s .  Hodge made a  p o in t  of
30lbid.
^^Bymes to  Atche son, October 25,1945, I b i d . , 1104.
-  42 -
no tin g  t h a t  the presence  of Rhee appeared to have a  fav o rab le  
in f lu en ce  on c o n s o l id a t io n  of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .
Hodge's a c t io n s  brought a sharp rebuke on November 7 
from John C a r te r  V incent, D i r e c to r  of the O ffice  of F a r  
E as te rn  A f f a i r s .  The S ta te  Department, Vincent s a id ,  was 
aware of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  and co m p lex it ie s  of the  p o l i t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n  c o n fro n tin g  Hodge. N one the less , the c o n s i s t e n t ly  
s ta te d  p o l ic y  o f  the U.S. government was th a t  n o th in g  should 
be done to  g ive  the im pression  th a t  any Korean in d iv id u a l  or 
Korean group was being favored  o r  supported over o th e r s .
Any a c t s  of f a v o r i t i s m  p r i o r  to  the f r e e  ex p re ss io n  o f  the 
w i l l  o f the  Korean people would com plicate  the p o l i t i c a l  
problems the United S ta te s  faced in  Korea and would encourage 
the S o v ie t  Union to  s e t  up a s im i la r  group in  i t s  zone, thus 
de lay ing  the e s tab l ish m en t of a  u n i f ie d  Korea.
V incent b e liev ed  t h a t  Hodge should be i n s t r u c t e d  to 
r e f r a i n  from tak in g  the a c t io n s  mentioned in  h i s  November 5 
telegram  as they  would jeo p a rd ize  the success o f  n e g o t i a t io n s  
in  p ro g ress  re g a rd in g  the  opening of the  38th  p a r a l l e l .  A 
f i n a l  jab  was added a s  Vincent noted th a t  Hodge had n o t  de­
sc r ibed  a d eq u a te ly  the  "o b jec tio n a b le  Communist a c t i v i e s "
^^Hodge to  MacArthur, November 2, 19^5» I b i d . , 1106; 
MacArthur to  M arshall, November 5, 1945, I b i d . . 1112.
^%emo by the D ire c to r  o f  the O ffice  of F a r  E a s te rn  
A f f a i r s  (V incen t)  to  Colonel R u sse l l  V i t t ru p ,  War Department, 
November 7, 1945, I b i d . . I I I 3 .
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r e f e r r e d  to  in  h i s  te legram . Any a c t io n s  he might f in d  i t  
necessa ry  to t a k e , should be o u t l in e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  
S ta te  Department consideration ."^
On November 13, the A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  o f  War, John 
McCloy, in  r e p ly in g  to  V in c e n t 's  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  Hodge, po in ted  
out t h a t  Communist a c t i v i t i e s  were be ing  c a r r ie d  out a c t iv e ly  
and i n t e l l i g e n t l y  in  the American zone. The b e s t  way to  com­
b a t  t h i s  was to  b u ild  up under Hodge a "reasonab le  and r e ­
spected government o r  group of p o l i t i c a l  a d v is e rs "  to  b ring  
o rd e r  out of the  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c ia l ,  and economic chaos now 
rampant in  sou th  Korea. This ta s k  would n o t  be easy  since 
" the lo c a l  Koreans are  most narrow, s e l f i s h  and confused in  
t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  th o u g h t."  They did have, however, g r e a t  
" re sp ec t  and confidence in  the e x i le d  Koreans" and were su r ­
p r is e d  t h a t  the  United S ta te s  had no t employed them immediate­
ly  in  the government. The f a i l u r e  to  u t i l i z e  th e se  Koreans 
a lso  puzzled McCloy, e s p e c ia l ly  since the  S o v ie t  Union was 
u s ing  "two d iv i s io n s  of Koreans thoroughly  in d o c t r in a te d  in  
the Communist c reed" in  i t s  zone to  re p la c e  f o r c ib ly  a l l  
o f f i c i a l s  w ith  Korean Communists.^-^
McCloy f e l t  t h a t  V in c en t 's  memorandum had th e  e f f e c t  
o f t e l l i n g  Hod>e th a t  "we r e a l l y  repose l i t t l e  confidence in  
him" and t h a t  Washington was n o t  p repared  to  do th o se  "few
^^ I b id .
^% cCloy to  the U nder-Secre tary  of S ta te  (Ache s o n ) , 
November 13, 1943, I b i d . . 1123-1124.
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th in g s ” which could be u se fu l  tov/ard ach iev in g  U.S. aims.
Hodge should be to ld  to  use a t  h i s  d i s c r e t io n  a s  many e x iled  
Koreans a s  p o s s ib le .  To con tinue  to  do n o th in g  would 
th re a te n  the chance of the  Korean people to  choose f r e e l y  
t h e i r  own government, the  goal t h a t  American p o l ic y  was sup­
posed to  ach ieve . McCloy added th a t  the  United S t a te s  should 
co n s id e r  what to  do i f  the  S o v ie ts  "con tinue  to  re fu s e  to  
cooperate
Vincent l a t e r  a ttem pted  to  g lo s s  over the  d i s a g r e e ­
ments between the  S ta te  and War Department^"^, bu t  he could 
n o t  hide the c le a r  p o l ic y  d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  e x i s te d .  These 
d i f f e r e n c e s  a lso  were r e f l e c t e d  in  a t t i t u d e s  toward coopera­
t io n  w ith  Russia  in  Korea and the  whole t r u s t e e s h i p  concept. 
The d iv is io n s  between the  S ta te  Department and American M il i ­
t a r y  Government e s p e c ia l ly  were obvious.
From the beginning, Hodge experienced  l i t t l e  success 
in  d e a l in g  w ith the  R u s s i a n s . T h e  S o v ie ts  had rep la ce d  
f o r c ib ly  s e l f - r u l e  c o u n c i ls  w ith  a  Communist-dominated 
" P e o p le 's  P o l i t i c a l  Committee." A Communist P a r ty  was formed, 
while an o p posit ion  "Democratic P a r ty "  was fo rced  to  d isband . 
These c o n s id e ra t io n s ,  Hodge b e l ie v e d ,  would make i t  d i f f i c u l t  
to  b ring  about c o l la b o ra t io n  a t  th e  m i l i t a r y  l e v e l  to  produce
^ I^bid.
^^Vincent to  Acheson,November 16,1945, I b i d . , 1127-28.
^^Hodge to  MacArthur, September 24,1945, I b i d . , 1055-
-  45 -
the d es ired  r e s u l t s .  While some "sm all and s t r i c t l y  m i l i ta ry  
problems of a  l o c a l  n a tu re"  might be s e t t l e d ,  i t  was n o t  
l i k e l y  th a t  "fundamental m a t te rs  in v o lv in g  q u e s t io n s  o f broad 
p r in c ip le "  would e v e r  be d iscussed  u n le s s  " n e g o t ia t io n s  a t  
the  h ig h es t  l e v e l s  in  Washington and Moscow" r e s u l t e d  in  i n ­
s t r u c t i o n s  to  the  commanders i n  Korea.
On the same day t h a t  Hodge was downgrading the 
chances o f  su c c e s s fu l  Soviet-American c o o p e ra t io n  based on 
m i l i t a r y  d is c u s s io n s  a lone , he was t o ld  t o  seek a " s t r e n g th ­
ened and expanded l i a s i o n "  between the American and Russian 
zones to  g a in  a u n ifo rm ity  of a d m in is t r a t iv e  p r a c t i c e  in  
Korea. The d isad v an tag es  o f  the  "h ig h ly  a r t i f i c i a l "  d i v i ­
s io n  of Korea had to  be minimized to  in su re  th e  su c c e ss fu l  
e s ta b l ish m e n t  of an in t e r n a t io n a l  t r u s t e e s h i p  a t  the e a r l i e s t  
p o s s ib le  da te
Hodge's e f f o r t s  continued to  be u n su c c e s s fu l .  The 
S o v ie ts  informed him th a t  n e g o t ia t io n s  on the m i l i t a r y  l e v e l  
were out of the q u e s t io n  u n t i l  " d e c is io n s  a re  made and r e l a ­
t io n s h ip s  e s ta b l is h e d "  between the r e s p e c t iv e  governments. 
Hodge again  urged Washington to  c o n s id e r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a t  the 
h ig h e s t  l e v e l .  A d d i t io n a l ly ,  he exp ressed  su sp ic io n  t h a t  the 
Sov ie t Consul General in  Seoul was a s s i s t i n g  the  communists 
in  south  Korea and was a ttem p tin g  to  d i s c r e d i t  the  United
^^Benninghoff to  B yrnes,O ctober 1 ,1 9 4 5 .I b i d . . 1066.
40,M arshall to 'M acA rthur, O ctober 1 ,1 9 4 5 .I b i d . , 1068.
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2i1
S t a te s .
The State-War-Navy C oord inating  Committee remained 
i n s i s t e n t  on the  p o in t  t h a t  Hodge should t r y  to  a t t a i n  the  
"maximum p o s s ib le  c o o rd in a t io n  w ith  the S o v ie t  Commander 
th roug h  l i a s i o n  on a m i l i t a r y  l e v e l . "  U nited  S ta te s  p o l ic y  
sought to  e l im in a te  a s  qu ick ly  a s  p o s s ib le  th e  zonal occupa­
t i o n ,  in  o rd e r  to  in tro d u c e  a t r u s t e e s h i p .  R iv a lry  among 
fo r e ig n  powers f o r  the c o n tro l  of Korea cou ld  develop once 
more u n le s s  prompt agreement was reached among the  fo u r  
m ajor powers on the  form of t r u s t e e s h ip .
Byrnes passed on Hodge’ s r a t h e r  d i s q u i e t i n g  e v a lu a ­
t i o n  to  Ambassador W. A v e re l l  Harriman in  Moscow. Byrnes 
p o in te d  o u t t h a t  the  38t h  p a r a l l e l  had become a  "c losed  bo r­
d e r , "  le a d in g  to  a g re a t  d i s r u p t io n  in  Korean n a t io n a l  l i f e .  
Harriman was to  seek an agreement i n  p r i n c i p l e  to  r e g u la r  de­
l i v e r y  of c o a l  and e l e c t r i c  power, resum ption  of r a i l  t r a f f i c  
and c o as t-w ise  sh ip p in g , adop tion  o f  uniform  f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s ,  
o rd e r ly  s e t t le m e n t  of d i s p la c e d  persons  in c lu d in g  Japanese  
to  Japan , and resum ption of normal t ra d e  between the  two 
zones. On November 8, th e se  r e q u e s t s  were g iven  to  
Vyacheslav Molotov, the  Sov ie t M in is te r  o f  F o re ign  A f f a i r s .^ ^
^^MacArthur to  JCS, October 11,1943, I b i d . . 1071-72; 
Hodge to  MacArthur, October 12, 1945, I b i d . . 1072-73. 
ho
R eport by SWNCC f o r  th e  F a r  E a s t ,  October 20-22, 
1945, and O ctober 24, 194$, I b i d . .  1094-1101.
43Byrnes to  Harriman, November 3 ,1945 , I b i d . , 1107-9.
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Harriman was n o t  o p t im is t ic  about Soviet acceptance 
of Byrnes' p ro p o s a ls ,  s ince  the Soviet Union had made i t  
c le a r  t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l l y  Korea was regarded  in  the  same l i g h t  
"as F in land , Po land , and Rumania—springboards f o r  a t t a c k  on 
the Soviet Union." He concluded th a t  " th e  Sov ie t Union may 
be expected to  seek predominate in f luence  in  Korea." A 
t r u s t e e s h ip  would n o t  in su re  S ov ie t  predominance since i t  
would d iv id e  govern ing  s t re n g th .  The Ambassador be lieved  
th e re  was n o th in g  to  suggest t h a t  the S ov ie t  Army was be­
having any d i f f e r e n t l y  than  i t  had in  Europe. Harriman ac­
c u ra te ly  p r e d ic te d  t h a t  once the  Sov ie t Union had c re a te d  an 
obedient and r e l a t i v e l y  s tro ng  Korean m i l i t a r y  fo rce  and 
m i l i t i a ,  i t  was q u i te  p o ss ib le  t h a t  the  S o v ie ts  would want
to  withdraw th e  Red Army from Korea and b r in g  p re s su re  to
Lli
bear on the  United S t a te s  to  withdraw i t s  troop s  too .
In  l a t e  November, the A cting  P o l i t i c a l  A dv iser in  
Korea, W illiam  Langdon, a ttacked  the whole concept of a 
t r u s t e e s h ip  f o r  Korea, g iv in g  added weight to  Hodge's su s ­
p ic io n s  and H arrim an ' s gloomy e v a lu a t io n .  Langdon was un­
ab le  "to  f i t  t r u s t e e s h i p  to  the a c tu a l  co n d it io n s"  then  
e x i s t in g  in  Korea o r  to  be convinced o f  i t s  s u i t a b i l i t y  from 
moral and p r a c t i c a l  s ta n d p o in ts .  The t r u s t e e s h ip  id e a  should 
be dropped because K o re a 's  long e x is te n c e  as a d i s t i n c t  na­
t io n  w ith  h ig h  l i t e r a c y  and c u l tu r a l  s ta n d a rd s  made th e
44Harriman to  Byrnes, November 12. 1945. I b i d . ,
1 1 2 1 - 1 1 2 2 .
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id ea  u n s u i ta b le .  The Korean people would not a ccep t  i t  and 
fo rce  would have to  be used to  m ain ta in  the t r u s t e e s h ip .
The i n i t i a l  warm f e e l in g s  fo r  U.S. l i b e r a t i o n  fo rc e s  had 
soured qu ick ly  when American M il i ta ry  Government was s e t  up; 
ye t  the Korean people worked amicably w ith  American o f f i c i a l s  
because of t h e i r  a b id in g  t r u s t  in  the United S t a te s .  Un­
f o r tu n a te ly ,  r e c e n t  S ta te  Department p r e s s  r e l e a s e s  sup­
p o r t in g  t r u s t e e s h ip  had caused g re a t  c o n s te rn a t io n  among 
many Koreans.
Langdon f e l t  t h a t  American cau t io n  over becoming a s ­
so c ia ted  with the  Chungking "Korean P ro v is io n a l  Government" 
was unwarranted. T h is  o rg a n iz a t io n  had no r i v a l  a s  the f i r s t  
government of l i b e r a t e d  Korea and was regarded a s  "q u as i­
l e g i t im a te  by a l l  e lem ents  and p a r t i e s . "  Kim Koo enjoyed 
g r e a t  esteem and t h i s  o f fe re d  the United S ta te s  a  chance to 
a ttem pt a  c o n s t ru c t iv e  Korean p o l ic y .  To continue the p re s ­
e n t  p o l ic y  of a b s ta in in g  from a c t io n  which might seem to  f a ­
vor a  p a r t i c u l a r  group was unwarranted and in a p p ro p r ia te  in  
l i g h t  of p re s e n t  c o n d it io n s  in  Korea. While Langdon would 
l a t e r  back away from h i s  e n th u s ia s t i c  support o f the Kim
Koo-Rhee group, he would no t give up advocating  U.S. a c t io n
46to  form a  p ro v is io n a l  government o rg a n iz a t io n .
The S ta te  Department responded to  Langdon in  a
^ ^ a n g d o n  to  Byrnes,November 20,1945, I b i d . , 1130-31*
^ ^ I b id . ; Langdon to  Byrnes, December 14, 1945,
I b i d . .  1142.
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somewhat equ ivocal f a s h io n .  Langdon was to ld  t h a t  " c a re fu l  
c o n s id e ra t io n "  was being given to  h i s  suggestion  t h a t  an i n ­
t e r n a t i o n a l  t r u s t e e s h ip  be abandoned. The key was to  gain  
from the Sov ie t Union "adequate s p e c i f i c  g u a ran tee s  f o r  the 
u n i f i c a t i o n  and independence of K orea ."  Since n e g o t i a t i o n s  
w ith  the S o v ie ts  would co n tin u e ,  i t  was b e s t  t h a t  American 
M i l i t a r y  Government n o t  p re ju d ic e  th e se  t a l k s  by form ing a 
" P ro v is io n a l  Government" o r  a "Governing Committee"
Langdon was "g lad  to  note  t h a t  we might be w i l l in g  
to  abandon in te r n a t io n a l  t r u s te e s h ip  f o r  Korea" under the 
c o n d i t io n s  mentioned. American o f f i c i a l s  in  Seoul sensed the  
"beg inn ings  of a tugg ing  to  g e t  the  t ro o p s  and m i l i t a r y  
government out of the l i b e r a t e d  la n d ,"  and thought t h a t  i t  
m ight no t be p o s s ib le  to  form an adequate t r u s t e e s h ip  s t r u c ­
tu r e  in  t im e. American M i l i t a r y  Government b e liev e d  t h a t  
U .S. Korean p o l ic y  "had been p re d ic a te d  s o le ly  on R u s s i a 's  
c o o p e ra t io n ,  w ith  no p lann ing  beyond t h i s  p rem ise ."
Washington a p p aren tly  had given l i t t l e  c o n s id e ra t io n  to  the
p r e s e n t  mood o f  the  Korean people— a v i t a l  f a c t o r  i f  a  suc­
ksc e s s f u l  p o l ic y  was to  be fo rm ula ted .
On December 16, Hodge, in  a n o th e r  e v a lu a t io n ,  c l e a r ly  
o u t l in e d  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  e x i s t a n t  between the  S ta te  D epart­
ment and American o f f i c i a l s  in  Seoul. The dua l occu pa tion ,
k7'Byrnes to  Langdon,November 29, 1945, I b i d . . I I 38 . 
48Langdon to  Byrnes,December 11,1945, I b i d . .1140-41.
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Hodge b e l ie v e d ,  c re a te d  an im possible  c o n d i t io n .  Koreans 
blamed the United S t a te s  fo r  the p a r t i t i o n  of t h e i r  co u n try , 
which r e s u l t e d  in  growing resen tm ent a g a i n s t  a l l  Americans. 
The s i t u a t i o n  was being allowed to  d r i f t ,  making the  U.S. 
p o s i t io n  more un tenab le  and d e c re a s in g  U.S. p o p u la r i ty .
South Korea was f e r t i l e  ground f o r  the  e s ta b l is h m e n t  of com­
munism and the  s teady  in f lu x  of Manchurian and C hinese- 
t r a in e d  Korean communists made the  s i t u a t i o n  worse. Hodge 
a l s o  found S o v ie t  methods of occupation  p u z z l in g ,  because 
evidence in d ic a te d  th a t  they had e s t a b l i s h e d  an " e f f e c t i v e  
f i e l d  works system of defense a g a in s t  in v a s io n  j u s t  n o r th  of 
the  38th  p a r a l l e l . "  Dangerous bo rder  i n c i d e n t s  cou ld  occur 
e a s i l y  under the  e x i s t i n g  c o n d it io n s .
The time had come, Hodge f e l t ,  e i t h e r  f o r  p o s i t iv e  
a c t io n  on the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  o r  f o r  the  U nited  S ta te s  
to  se iz e  the  i n i t i a t i v e  in  south  Korea in  o rd e r  to  s top  the 
dangerous d r i f t .  C l a r i f i c a t i o n  and removal of the  38th  
p a r a l l e l  to  u n ify  K orea, a  c le a r  s ta te m e n t  abandoning the  
concep t of t r u s t e e s h i p  f o r  Korea, and a  p o l ic y  govern ing  the  
s t a t u s  of form er Japanese  p ro p e r ty  in  Korea was needed 
u rg e n t ly .  I f  no c o r r e c t iv e  was forthcom ing , an agreem ent 
should be reached  f o r  s im ultaneous withdraweil o f  S o v ie t-  
American t ro o p s ,  l e a v in g  "Korea to  i t s  own d e v ic e s  and
ho
MacArthur to  the JCS, December I 6 , 19^5 ( rea d  by 
Acheson on December 19. 19^5). I b i d . . 1145-114?.
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in e v i ta b le  i n t e r n a l  upheaval fo r  i t s  s e l f -p u r i f i c a t io n ." - ^ ^
The s ta rk  c o n t r a s t  between the p o s i t io n s  of the S ta te  
Department and American M i l i ta ry  Government was obvious be­
fo re  Byrnes d iscu ssed  the  Korean q u e s t io n  in  December, 19^5i 
a t  the  Moscow Fore ign  M i n i s t e r ' s  C onference . On th ree  d i f ­
f e r e n t  occasions  in  O ctober, S ta te  Department r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  
had committed the U nited  S ta te s  f i rm ly  to  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r u s t e e s h ip  based on coop era tion  w ith  R u ss ia .  This was r e a f ­
firm ed in  v a r io u s  memoranda to  Seoul and most em p h a tica lly  
i n  V in c e n t 's  memorandum c r i t i c i z i n g  Hodge. American p o l ic y  
was based on the unquestioned  assumption o f  Korean acceptance 
o f  a  t r u s t e e s h ip .  However, McCloy's r e p ly  to  V incent, and 
memoranda from Harriman in  Moscow and Hodge in  Seoul, i n d i ­
ca ted  t h a t  commitment to  the  S ta te  D epartm en t 's  p o l ic y  was 
f a r  from unanimous. American o f f i c i a l s  i n  Korea were g iven  
the  ta sk  of implementing a S ta te  Departm ent p o l ic y  they  d id  
n o t  be liev e  in  from e i t h e r  a  p r a c t i c a l  o r  moral v iew poin t.
Doubts about the  S ta te  D ep artm en t 's  p o l ic y  went be­
yond Hodge, Harriman, McCloy, and the  Korean p eop le .  G reat 
B r i t a in  and China both  thought the p o l ic y  n e i t h e r  p r a c t i c a l  
n o r  h e lp f u l .  The Chinese gave lukewarm a s s e n t  to  t r u s t e e ­
sh ip , while u rg ing  the r e tu r n  of the  Chungking Koreans to 
form a  new government. The C hinese, f e a r in g  p o s s ib le  S o v ie t  
dom ination of Korea, urged t h i s  a s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to
50I b id .
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t r u s t e e s h ip .  The B r i t i s h  thought t r u s t e e s h ip  was a  good 
idea  but they ques tioned  whether i t  would work in  Korea.
The r e p e t i t i o n  of doubts about the f e a s i b i l i t y  of a 
j o i n t  Soviet-American t r u s te e s h ip  would n o t  have had the e f ­
f e c t  of shaking  W ashington 's commitment, had the autumn of 
19^5 no t seen a  steady  growth of new problem s, sources of 
ten s io n , and su sp ic io n s  between America and R u ss ia .^ "
Byrnes moved away s l i g h t l y  from the id e a  o f t r u s t e e s h ip  on 
November 19» when he sa id  t h a t  the United S t a te s  "was p re ­
pared to p re s s  f o r  the e s tab l ish m en t of an independent Korean 
Government," and i f  t h i s  could n o t  be o b ta in ed ,  the  United 
S ta te s  would favo r  a  t r u s t e e s h ip  of l im i te d  d u ra t io n  under 
the United N ation s . Byrnes recogn ized , however, t h a t  the 
United S ta te s  had made an in form al commitment to  t r u s t e e s h ip  
p r io r  to occupation  and th a t  r e t e n t io n  of the  form agreed to 
p rev io u s ly  might be necessa ry  to "secure  the  e l im in a t io n  of 
the 38th  p a r a l l e l  b a r r i e r . T h e  q u e s t io n  of t r u s t e e s h ip  
would be decided a t  the Moscow conference , w ith  the f i n a l  de­
c is io n  r e s t i n g  on S ov ie t  in te n t io n s .
Charge in  China to  Byrnes, September 25, 1945,
I b i d . . 1057; Ambassador in  the  United Kingdon to  Byrnes, 
November 14, 1945, I b i d . .  1124-1125.
^ ^ i s l e  Rose, A f te r  Y a lta  (New York: C harle s
S c r ib n e r 's  Sons, 1973), 139-150.
53"^^General P o l i t i c a l  and Economic M a t te rs ,  the  Moscow 
Conference, U.S. Department o f S ta te ,  Fore ign  R e la t io n s  of 
the United S ta te s ,  1945; R uss ia , Volume I I  (Washington: GPO,
1970), 578; Byrnes to  Langdon, November 29, 1945, PR,1945,
VI, 1137- 1138.
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The United S t a te s  proposed t h a t  a Foreign M in is te r s  
Conference be held i n  Moscow i n  December, 194j, in  o rder  to  
"reso lve  the  impasse over Rumania and B u lg ar ia ,  so t h a t  work 
on peace t r e a t i e s  w ith  Germany’ s form er s a t e l l i t e s  could be­
g in ."  Byrnes a lso  hoped to  dea l w ith  the issue  o f  atomic 
energy. Both s id e s  made a few token concessions, but the 
S o v ie ts  were l e f t  predom inant in  E a s te rn  Europe and the 
United S ta te s  r e t a in e d  i t s  ab so lu te  a u th o r i ty  in  Japan . The 
Sov ie t Union accepted  B yrnes ' atomic energy p ro p o sa ls  and 
r e i t e r a t e d  i t s  re c o g n i t io n  of Chiang K ai-shek .
Byrnes' e f f o r t s  were n o t  well rece ived  in  the  United 
S ta te s  and h i s  atomic energy agreement was re p u d ia te d .  Many 
Americans, in c lu d in g  a  number of p o l ic y  makers, had begun to  
f e e l  t h a t  they had misjudged the  K re m lin 's  p o l ic y .  The ac ­
t io n s  of the  Sovie t Union in  E a s te rn  Europe in  1945, to g e th e r  
w ith  the  i n te r n a t i o n a l  communist movement's change in  t a c t i c s ,  
convinced many U.S. o f f i c i a l s  " th a t  Moscow had embarked on a 
program of u n lim ited  expansion  which th rea ten ed  the  very s u r ­
v iv a l  of the  United S ta te s  and i t s  Western a l l i e s . "  The r e ­
s u l t  o f  t h i s  p a t t e r n  of th in k in g  was a  fundamental r e o r i e n t a ­
t io n  of U.S. p o l ic y  toward Moscow in  th e  f i r s t  th re e  months 
o f 1946, t h a t  held " t h a t  compromise w ith  the S ov ie t  Union was 
no lo n g er  p o l i t i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e . T h i s  toughening of U.S.
^^Gaddis, O r ig in s . 276-290.
^^ I b id . ; Rose-, A f te r  Y a l ta , 140-155: Adam Ulam, The 
R iv a ls  (New York; V iking P r e s s ,  1971), 114-115-
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p o l ic y  was a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  in  the way Washington viewed im ple­
m entation  of the  agreement reached concern ing  Korea.
At the f i r s t  F ore ign  M in is te r s  m eeting on December 16 
Byrnes s ta te d  t h a t  A m erica 's  immediate goal was a  u n i f ie d  ad­
m in i s t r a t io n  o f  Korea a s  an i n i t i a l  s te p  toward a "n o n -m il i­
t a r y  a d m in is t r a t io n  of K orea."  The v i t a l  f i r s t  s te p  was r e ­
u n i f i c a t i o n  to  a l l e v i a t e  the c h a o t ic  c o n d i t io n s  in  Korea. 
Byrnes prov ided  a b r i e f  o u t l in e  of the  form t h a t  a  t r u s t e e ­
sh ip  should ta k e .  Molotov d e c la re d  t h a t  th e re  had n ever been 
a form al agreement f o r  a t r u s t e e s h ip ,  only an exchange of 
views, and w ith  t h i s  Korea passed from the d is c u s s io n .
On December 20, the  S o v ie ts  p re s e n te d  t h e i r  own 
p roposa l  f o r  Korean independence. A f te r  two minor changes, 
the  United S ta te s ,  China, and B r i t a i n  accep ted  the S o v ie t  
p ro p o sa l .  The f i n a l  Moscow communique or agreement re g a rd in g  
Korea provided f o r  the  c re a t io n  of a " p ro v is io n a l  dem ocratic  
Korean government" to  develop the in d u s t r y ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  
and a g r i c u l tu r e  o f Korea. A j o in t  commission composed of the  
S o v ie t  and American m i l i t a r y  commands i n  Korea was to  be 
formed to  a s s i s t  in  fo rm a tio n  of a p r o v is io n a l  government by 
c o n su l t in g  w ith  dem ocratic  p a r t i e s  and s o c ia l  o rg a n iz a t io n s  
in  Korea. The com m ission 's recommendations would be p r e ­
sen ted  fo r  approval to  R u ss ia ,  B r i t a i n ,  China, and the United
Memo by U.S. D e lega tion  a t  the  Moscow F o re ign  
M in is te r s  Conference, December 1?, 19^5» FR, 1945, I I ,  
642-64].
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S ta te  p r i o r  to  any f i n a l  agreement.
The j o i n t  commission, working w ith  the  p ro v is io n a l  
government and Korean dem ocratic o r g a n iz a t io n s  was to  develop 
measures to  a id  i n  th e  dem ocratic , s o c i a l ,  and economic p ro ­
g re s s  of Korea f o r  a  p e r io d  of up to  f i v e  y e a rs  ( i n  o th e r  
words, a  t r u s t e e s h i p ) .  F in a l ly ,  the  commission was to  con­
vene a j o in t  m eeting of the Sov ie t and American commands in  
Korea to  work o u t  measures f o r  e s ta b l is h m e n t  of permanent 
c o o rd in a tio n  in  the  ad m in is tra t iv e -eco n o m ic  sphere .
The Moscow agreement was the b a s i s  on which K o rea 's  
f u tu re  would depend. The d e c la r a t io n  was vague and la c k in g  
i n  s p e c i f i c s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in  r e l a t i o n  to  p ro ced u res  le a d in g  
to  the fo rm ation  of the  p ro v is io n a l  government, bu t i t  d id  
a t  l e a s t  s e t  up a  procedure  f o r  c re a t io n  o f  an independent 
Korea. Perhaps e q u a l ly  im portan t was t h a t  some form of ag ree ­
ment had been reached  a f t e r  a long p e r io d  of in d e c is iv e n e s s  
and s ta g n a t io n .  While im p e rfec t ,  the agreem ent a t  l e a s t  
provided a method f o r  r e s o lv in g  the  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  remained 
to  be seen whether the  mechanism of the  j o i n t  commission 
could  be made to  work—and whether the Korean people would 
a cc ep t  a  d e c is io n  reached  w ithout t h e i r  knowledge.
57^'Moscow Communique Regarding K orea, December 27,
1945, FR. 1945. VI, 1150. 
^hhid.
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CHAPTER I I I
TRUSTEESHIP AND THE SOVIET-AMERICAN JOINT COMMISSION
With the agreement reached a t  the Moscow Fore ign  
M in is te rs  Conference in  December, 19^5. the  Korean q u e s t io n  
e n te red  a new ph ase . An appara tu s ,  the J o i n t  Commission, 
had been e s t a b l i s h e d  to  dea l  w ith  the  problem of re u n ify in g  
Korea and s e t t i n g  up a  t r u s t e e s h ip .  The agreement d id  not 
s p e l l  out s p e c i f i c a l l y  the  s te p s  to be taken , no r  d id  i t  i n ­
d ic a te  th a t  both s id e s  had vary ing  degrees of commitment 
to  the id eas  embodied in  the  Moscow agreement.
Perhaps th e  most severe f a u l t  of the  Moscow agree­
ment was t h a t  i t  f a i l e d  to  gauge c o r r e c t ly  the i n t e n s i t y  of 
the Korean r e a c t io n  to  the  id ea  of t r u s t e e s h i p ,  which v a ried  
"from d e p re ss io n  and d is i l lu s io n m e n t  to  anger and open de­
f i a n c e ."  The very  m ention of the  word t r u s t e e s h ip  caused 
"unreasoning  resen tm en t and v io le n t  o p p o s i t io n  in  the  Korean 
mind." The i n i t i a l  r e a c t io n  was l im i te d  to  h a n d b i l l s ,  
p o s te r s ,  newspaper a r t i c l e s ,  and dem onstra tions  e x p re ss in g  
the  s t ro n g e s t  p o s s ib le  o p p o s i t io n  to  t r u s t e e s h ip .^
^Aide to  the  P o l i t i c a l  Adviser in  Seoul(Emmons) to  
Byrnes, December 30, 1943, FR.1945, VI, 1152-1153.
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P re l im in a ry  i n d ic a t io n s  were th a t  the resen tm ent was 
d i re c te d  n o t  a t  the United S ta te s ,  but,more towards the 
Sovie t Union and l o c a l  p o l i t i c i a n s  who had f a i l e d  to  un ify  
the country , thus  p ro v id in g  an excuse f o r  a  t r u s t e e s h ip .  
Hodge, t r y in g  to  q u i e t  the s i t u a t i o n ,  emphasized t h a t  the 
question  o f  t r u s t e e s h ip  had n o t  been decided y e t ,  and th a t  
removal o f the  38th p a r a l l e l  b a r r i e r  and c re a t io n  of a p ro ­
v is io n a l  government would be s ig n i f i c a n t  f i r s t  s te p s  toward 
Korean independence.
Hodge's b e l i e f  t h a t  t ru s te e s h ip  was n o t  a  keystone 
o f  U.S. p o l ic y  was based on more than w ish fu l  th in k in g .  In  
a d d it io n  to  Byrnes ' s ta tem en t p r i o r  to th e  Moscow conference 
t h a t  c o n s id e ra t io n  was being g iven  to  d ropping  the  t r u s t e e ­
sh ip  concept, must be added h i s  pub lic  s ta tem en t of December 
30 , th a t  " th e  J o i n t  Commission . . .may f ind  i t  p o s s ib le  to  
dispense w ith  t r u s t e e s h i p . "  John C arte r  Vicent sa id  much the 
same th in g  in  a r a d io  a d d re ss ,  n o t in g  th a t  the c l e a r  im p li­
c a t io n s  of the  Moscow agreement were th a t  "se lf-governm ent 
and independence are  the  g o a l,  and that t r u s t e e h ip  i s  only 
a procedure, which may o r  may n o t  be n e c e ssa ry ." ^  Hodge 
could be fo rg iv e n  f o r  th in k in g  t h a t  America no lo n g e r  was 
p re s s in g  f o r  t r u s t e e s h i p .
^I b i d .
3
^Radio A ddress, December 30, Department of
S ta te  B u l l e t i n , X I I I ,  3^0(December 30, 1943), IO36 ; Radio 
Address, I b i d . ,  XIV, 344(January 27, 194-5), 107-108.
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The R ussians a p p a ren t ly  had a d i f f e r e n t  view o f  the 
importance o f  t r u s t e e s h ip  to  th e  Moscow agreement. On 
January  23, S t a l i n  informed Harriman th a t  Soviet-American r e ­
l a t i o n s  in  Korea had no t g o t te n  o f f  to  a  fav o rab le  s t a r t .  
In fo rm ation  had been rece iv ed  from Korea t h a t  U.S. r e p r e ­
s e n ta t iv e s  were advoca ting  ab ro g a t io n  of t r u s t e e s h i p .  In  
a d d i t io n ,  newspaper a r t i c l e s  s t a te d  t h a t  "on ly  the U.S.S.R. 
and n o t the U.S. had i n s i s t e d  on t r u s t e e s h i p . "  Harriman 
could  do n o th in g  but no te  t h a t  the " a l le g e d  s ta tem en ts"  a t ­
t r ib u te d  to  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  in  Korea were n o t  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  
of h i s  governm ent's p o l i c y .^  S t a l i n ' s  concern , which i n d i ­
ca ted  the importance the S o v ie ts  a t ta c h ed  to  t r u s t e e s h ip ,  be­
came even c le a r e r  as d is c u s s io n s  in  the  J o i n t  Commission 
proceeded.
While g en e ra l  d is o rd e r  over t r u s t e e s h ip  d e c l in e d  
somewhat, o rd e r ly  d em on s tra tions  co n tin u ed . On January  12, 
the  N ationa l M o b il iz a t io n  Committee A ga inst T ru s tee sh ip  
staged  a la rg e  dem onstra tion  i n  Seoul. Hodge continued to  
a ssu re  the Korean people t h a t  a  f i n a l  d e c i s io n  on t r u s t e e ­
sh ip  had no t been reached , and th a t  i t  was R ussia , n o t  
America, t h a t  was push ing  the  id e a .^
Harriman to  the S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  January  25, 
1946, U.S. Department of S t a t e ,  Fore ign  R e la t io n s  o f the 
United S ta te s ,  1946; The F ar E a s t , Volume VIII(Washington; 
GPO, 1971), 622.
^Benninghoff to  the S e c re ta ry  o f  S t a t e ,  January  23, 
1946, I b i d . . 6 l5 ; Soon, Korea. 105.
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The Russians were und e rs tan d ab ly  r e l u c t a n t  to  a c ­
cep t  the "blame" f o r  t r u s t e e s h ip .  In  a  s ta tem en t p ub lished  
in  Tass on January  2 j ,  1946, the  S o v ie t  Union claimed t h a t  
in c o r r e c t  r e p o r t s  were being spread t h a t  made i t  seem l i k e  
th e  Sov ie t Union alone had sought th e  e s ta b l ish m e n t  of a  
t r u s t e e s h ip  in  Korea, d e sp i te  American o p p o s i t io n .  Ac­
cord ing  to  T ass . t h i s  was u n tru e  a s  the  U nited  S ta te s  had 
i n i t i a t e d  d is c u s s io n  of the s u b je c t  a t  Moscow and had always 
wanted a  t r u s t e e s h ip  f o r  Korea. The R uss ian  p ro posa l  had 
been much more generous than the  American p la n ,  s ince  i t  
l im i te d  the t r u s t e e s h ip  pe rio d  s t r i c t l y  to  f iv e  y e a rs ,  and 
provided f o r  c re a t io n  of a n a t io n a l  Korean government.^
The Korean r e a c t io n  to  t h i s  r e p o r t  was both sw if t  
and c r i t i c a l  of A m erica 's  " b e t ra y a l"  of Korea. Hodge was 
eq u a lly  qu ick  to  c r i t i c i z e  the  S ta te  Department in  a  s t in g in g  
memorandum. He accused S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s  o f  f a i l i n g  
t o  pass on v i t a l  in fo rm a tio n  t h a t  would have confirmed t h a t  
l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  had been p a id  e i t h e r  to  the  in fo rm a tio n  
se n t  from Seoul on the  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  s t a t e  of th e  Korean 
people o r  to  S e o u l 's  rep ea ted  recommendations. The accuracy  
o f  the Tass s ta tem en t was a s u r p r i s e  to  Hodge, e s p e c i a l l y  
in  l i g h t  of r e c e n t  i n d ic a t io n s  from the  S ta te  Department 
t h a t  t r u s t e e s h ip  might n o t  be n e c e s s a ry .^
^Charge'' in  the  S ov ie t  Union(Kennan) to  the  S ecre ­
t a r y  of S t a te ,  FR. 1946, V III ,  6 l? .
^MacArthur to  JCS, February  2, 1946, I b i d . , 628- 630.
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What was p a r t i c u l a r l y  g a l l i n g  to  Hodge was t h a t  the  
Tass sta tem ent came a f t e r  the  q u e l l in g  of the  r e v o l t s  and 
r i o t s  th a t  had accompanied the announcement of the  t r u s t e e ­
sh ip .  A m erica 's  p o s i t i o n  in  Korea had been the  s t ro n g e s t  
s ince  the i n i t i a l  la n d in g ,  but now th e  Korean people f e l t  the  
U nited S ta te s  had " so ld  them down th e  r i v e r , "  t h i s  time to  
R ussia  in s te a d  of Japan . The whole s i t u a t i o n  le d  many 
th in k in g  and educated Koreans to  f e e l  t h a t  th ey  would 
have to f i g h t  f o r  t h e i r  freedom and independence. Hodge 
c lo sed  w ith  the o b se rv a t io n  th a t  th e  e x p e r ts  who guided th e  
S ta te  D epartm ent 's  p o l ic y  were people  who e i t h e r  had never 
seen Korea o r  had n o t  been in  Korea since the war. In  the  
f u tu re ,  Hodge wanted to  be informed f u l l y  about U.S.
O
p o l ic y  in  Korea.
There was more a t  the  c e n te r  of Hodge' s d i s c o n te n t  
than  the is su e  of being  p ro p e r ly  informed about U.S. p o l ic y .  
The essence of the s p l i t  between the  S ta te  Department and 
Seoul was th e  q u e s t io n  o f  whether any element of the Moscow 
agreement could  be implemented in  a way th a t  would r e f l e c t  
fav o rab ly  on America. Hodge b e l ie v e d  t h a t  the  Moscow a g re e ­
ment, with i t s  emphasis on c o l l a b o r a t io n  w ith  the  S o v ie t  
Union, would n o t  work. The R ussians had done n o th in g  to  
in d ic a te  t h a t  they  would help to  u n i fy  Korea a s  long  as  the  
United S ta te s  k e p t  f o r c e s  th e re .  Hodge b e liev e d  t h a t  the
®Ibid.
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n o r th  and south  would never  be un ited  u n t i l  the R uss ians  were 
sure t h a t  the whole coun try  would be soundly communistic. 
George Kennan, the  Charge in  Moscow, supported t h i s  sen tim ent 
when he sa id ,  "There can now be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  the  U.S.S.R. 
wishes to  assu re  e a r l i e s t  and most complete e x c lu s io n  of
Q
o th e r  g r e a t  powers from a l l  connection  w ith  Koream aims.
Hodge's c r i t i c i s m s  and doubts caused Byrnes co n s id e ­
ra b le  concern . Byrnes was u n w il l in g  to  admit e i t h e r  t h a t  
p o l ic y  had s h i f t e d  in  the  December p e r io d  o r  t h a t  Hodge had 
been uninformed about p o l ic y .  Byrnes was "somewhat p e r tu rb ed  
by the a t t i t u d e  taken by General Hodge" a t  a time when the 
J o i n t  Commission d is c u s s io n s  had j u s t  commenced. The Secre­
t a r y  adm itted  t h a t  he would " f e e l  l e s s  concern as to  the  ou t­
come i f  Hodge were n o t  so convinced of f a i l u r e  a t  the  very 
o u ts e t  of the d iscussions."^*^  Byrnes d iscom fort i s  under­
s tandable  s ince  Hodge was charged w ith  execu ting  a p o l ic y  
he d isagreed  w ith .
Hodge's i n i t i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was to  c a r ry  out the 
p ro v is io n s  of s e c t io n  fo u r  of th e  Moscow agreement to  s e t  up 
a j o in t  conference  w ith  the  S o v ie ts  " to  work out measures f o r  
the e s tab l ish m en t o f permanent coo rd in a tion"  between the  two 
in  the "ad m in is tra t ive -econ om ic  sphere" . P o l i t i c a l  m a t te r s  
were n o t  to  be inc luded  in  the  d is c u s s io n s .  Hodge arranged
^ I b id . ; Kennan to  Byrnes, January  25, 1946, I b i d . .
619- 620.
^ S y r n e s  to  the  S e c re ta ry  of W a r(P a t te rso n ) , A p ri l  1,
1946, I b i d . .  655- 656.
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with h i s  Sovie t c o u n te rp a r t ,  General Ivan C h is t iak o v , fo r  
d isc u ss io n s  to  begin i n  Seoul on January 15. 1946.
The d is c u s s io n s ,  which met w ith l i t t l e  success ,  
qu ick ly  demonstrated t h a t  while the United S ta te s  wished to  
d is c u s s  m a tte rs  on a  broad s c a le ,  R ussia  hoped to  l i m i t  the 
t a l k s  to  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s .  According to  Benninghoff, " the 
United S ta te s  and S o v ie t  d e le g a t io n s  approached the  so lu ­
t io n  of economic and a d m in is t r a t iv e  problems from widely  
d iv e rg e n t  a n g le s ."  The U.S. p o s i t io n  was based on a b e l i e f  
t h a t  i t  was n ecessa ry  to  remove the 38th  p a r a l l e l  b a r r i e r  in  
o rd e r  to  t r e a t  Korea a s  a  s in g le  economic and a d m in is t r a t iv e  
u n i t .  The Sov ie t Union was in te n t  on l im i t i n g  d is c u s s io n s  
t o  a very narrow range of su b je c ts .  While the United S ta te s  
sought to  do e v e ry th in g  " to  open up the country" and u n ify  
i t s  economic and a d m in is t r a t iv e  f a c i l i t i e s ,  the S o v ie ts  ap­
proached the problem as  one o f  "exchange and c o o rd in a tio n
between two a d jo in in g  but separa te  zones of m i l i t a r y  
12r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . "
Some agreem ents were made: r a i l ,  motor, and water
t r a n s p o r ta t io n  on a l im i te d  b a s is :  e s tab l ish m en t of j o i n t  
c o n tro l  p o s ts  a long  the  p a r a l l e l  ; l im i te d  exchange of f i r s t  
c l a s s  m ail; l im i te d  movement o f Koreans from zone to  zone;
^^JCS to  MacArthur, January 15, 1946, I b i d . , 6-7; 
Hodge to  Byrnes, January  12. 1946, I b i d . . 6O8- 6O9 .
^ b e n n in g h o f f  to  Byrnes, February 15, 1946, I b i d . ,
634- 635.
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a l lo c a t io n  of r a d io  f re q u e n c ie s ;  and measures f o r  fu tu re  co­
o rd in a t io n  between the two commands. The q u e s t io n  of ex ­
changing r i c e  f o r  raw m a te r ia l  from the n o r th  proved to  be 
the is su e  on which the d is c u s s io n s  h a l te d .  The United 
S ta te s  faced a s e r io u s  r i c e  shortage in  south  Korea and had 
no r i c e  a v a i la b le  f o r  exchange. The R ussians d id  no t be­
l ie v e  t h i s ,  l e a d in g  to  an end of the d is c u s s io n s .^ ^
Benninghoff f e l t  th a t  the Sov ie t Union contemplated 
"a len g th y  occupa tion  o f  a t  l e a s t  the n o r th e rn  h a l f  of 
Korea."  Moscow probab ly  would r e s i s t  a l l  U.S. e f f o r t s  to  
open th e  country  and t r e a t  i t  a s  a  s in g le  u n i t  u n t i l  i t  had 
"gained p o l i t i c a l  ascendance in  the  country" o r  was fo rced  
to  change because of p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty .
O f f i c i a l s  in  Korea probably saw S ov ie t  behavior as 
l i t t l e  more than  a  r e p e a t  of i t s  performance in  E a s te rn  
Europe (though A m erica 's  t o t a l  exclu s ion  of R u ss ia  from the 
occupation  of Japan  undoubtedly a f f e c te d  Moscow's a t t i t u d e ) .  
Hodge, determined to  avoid such a  r e p e t i t i o n ,  wanted to  
make a  key is su e  of the Sovie t "b lackout" of n o r th  Korea— 
th a t  i s ,  the c lo s in g  of the  Sov ie t zone to  Western v i s i ­
t o r s  and r e p o r t e r s  as  w ell as south Koreans. I n  order 
to  solve the problems fa c in g  Korea, Hodge b e l ie v e d  t h i s  
"b lackout"  had to  be broken down. The i n i t i a l  e f f o r t s  to
l ^ Ib id . .  635. ^^ Ib id . .  636,
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accomplish t h i s  f a i l e d ,  and Hodge decided  to  i n s t r u c t  the 
American d e le g a t io n  to  the  J o i n t  Commission to  begin p ro ­
ceedings w ith  "a s t ro n g  demand fo r  complete freedom o f  
speech, p re s s  and movement w ith in  Korea of Koreans . . .
The task  of f r e e l y  c o n su l t in g  Korean p a r t i e s  and l e a d e r s  
would be im possib le  i f  t h i s  was n o t  accom plished. Hodge 
was w i l l in g  to  postpone c o n s id e ra t io n  of the  s t r u c tu r e  of 
the  in te r im  government u n t i l  the  R ussians ag reed .
The S ta te  Department was r e l u c t a n t  to  take up 
Hodge's su g g e s t io n s  a s  "make o r  break" p ro p o s i t io n s .  While 
U.S. d e le g a t io n  members should p re s s  f o r  freedom of speech, 
p re s s ,  and t r a v e l ,  the is su e  should n o t  be used as an ex­
cuse to  d e la y  o r  abandon the  J o in t  Commission t a l k s  i n  the 
event of S o v ie t  in t r a n s ig e n c e .  N e g o t ia t io n s  on the s t r u c ­
tu re  of an in te r im  government should be pursued .
There were, however, o f f i c i a l s  in  the  S ta te  D e p ar t­
ment who agreed w ith  Hodge. A February  28 memorandum, in ­
tended fo r  MacArthur, se v e re ly  c r i t i c i z e d  the  Sov ie t Union 
f o r  employing the  same t a c t i c s  i t  had used in  E a s te rn  Europe 
to  gain  c o n t r o l  th rough  u t i l i z a t i o n  of S o v ie t - c o n t r o l le d  
m inority  g roups. Because of t h i s ,  Hodge should make a  
p u b lic  s ta tem en t about the  primary reason  f o r  the p re v io u s  
deadlock—S o v ie t  r e f u s a l  to  open n o r th  Korea—and should
^-^MacArthur to  JCS,February 12, 1946, I b i d . , 6 ]2 .
^^JCS to  MacArthur, February  28, 1946, I b i d . , 644.
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p ressu re  the  Kim Koo group to adopt and implement a  p ro ­
g re s s iv e  program, which would lead  to  U.S. support f o r  the  
17group. While the  su g g e s t io n s  in  t h i s  proposed d i r e c t i v e
would n o t  have p rov ided  an a u sp ic io u s  s t a r t  f o r  the  J o i n t
Commission d is c u s s io n ,  th ey  n o n e th e le s s  r e f l e c t e d  a  growing
tendency among some U.S. o f f i c i a l s  " to  o f f e r  no f u r t h e r
18concessions of th e  k ind  Byrnes had made a t  Moscow."
The J o i n t  Commission t a l k s  began on March 20, 1946. 
The State-War-Navy C o ord in a ting  Committee s e n t  Hodge a 
p o l ic y  paper on F ebruary  11, making h i s  g o a ls  f i r s t  and 
forem ost the  fo rm u la tio n  o f  p lan s  f o r  c r e a t io n  of a  p r o v i ­
s io n a l  government and u t i l i z a t i o n  of t h a t  government to  
g a in  economic, s o c i a l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  p ro g re s s  in  Korea. I t  
p rovided a  s p e c i f i c  p rocedure  f o r  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  Korean 
democratic p a r t i e s  and s o c ia l  o rg a n iz a t io n s .  The United 
S ta te s  was to  encourage a c o a l i t i o n  o f p a r t i e s  to  achieve  
a  u n i ty  o f p r in c ip le  and th e  J o i n t  Commission was to  choose 
a  group o f Korean l e a d e r s  f o r  c o n s u l ta t io n  on fo rm ation  of 
a  p ro v is io n a l  government. Such l e a d e r s  should be s e le c te d  
a f t e r  f u l l  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  a l l  dem ocratic  p a r t i e s  and 
s o c ia l  o rg a n iz a t io n s  th roughou t Korea. E x tr e m is ts  of the  
r i g h t  and l e f t  were to  be avoided .
17Proposed Memo f o r  MacArthur, D ra f te d  in  the  De­
partm ent o f S ta te ,  February  28, 1946, I b i d . . 645.
^®Gaddis, O r ig in s . 284.
19^ Policy Paper Adopted by SWNCC, Jan u ary  28, 1946, 
FR,1946, V III ,  624-626.
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The p ro v iso  to  avoid e x t r e m is t s  o f  both  l e f t  and 
r i g h t  p resen ted  a growing dilemma f o r  the  United S ta te s .  On 
February  12, Moscow announced com pletion of an a ll-K orean  
C e n tra l  Government o f N orth  Korea. According to  S e o u l 's  
e v a lu a t io n ,  i t s  members were " v io le n t  Communists o r unknown 
Koreans" from R u ss ia  and Manchuria. American M i l i ta ry  Gov­
ernment be lieved  t h a t  the  S o v ie ts  wanted the J o i n t  Commission 
to  accep t t h i s  government as  the dem ocratic  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  
o f  n o r th  Korea, w hile  a t  the  same time t r y in g  to  force the  
United S ta te s  to  a cc ep t  enough sou th  Korean Communists to  
in su re  dom ination of the p ro v is io n a l  governm ent.^^
Hodge found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  induce the  same kind of 
u n i ty  among south  Korean p a r t i e s  t h a t  the  S ov ie t  Union had 
induced in  n o r th  Korea. The Kim Koo and Rhee groups had 
never  been po pu la r  w ith  Washington, and t h e i r  c r i t i c i s m  
o f  t r u s t e e s h ip  and t h e i r  p e rso n a l  a t t a c k s  on American M i l i ­
t a r y  Government and Hodge made them in c r e a s in g ly  unpopular 
w ith  Americans in  Korea. The S ta te  Department had given 
Hodge the  task  o f f in d in g  a  group o f  c e n t r i s t s  to  form ulate 
a  d e ta i l e d  p ro g re s s iv e  program t h a t  would appeal to  the v a s t  
m a jo r i ty  of Koreans. T his  group would re c e iv e  f u l l  U.S. 
backing as  a coun terw eigh t to  the  S ov ie t-backed  communist 
g roups. Hodge had the d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  o f conducting  n e g o t i ­
a t i o n s  w ith  the S o v ie ts ,  o f  o p e ra t in g  American M il i ta ry
20MacArthur to  Byrnes, February  24, 1946,I b i d . , 640.
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Government, and of r e s t ru c tu r in g  the  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
s i t u a t io n  in  south  Korea in  a way th a t  would no t lead  to 
open c o n f l i c t  w ith  the l e f t  and R ussia .
Hodge had l i t t l e  success u n i t in g  the l e f t  and r i g h t .  
When he c a l le d  a  N ationa l Emergency Congress in  e a r ly  
February, drawing r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  from a l l  announced p a r ­
t i e s ,  the Communists re fused  to p a r t i c i p a t e .  The r e s u l t  of 
the meeting was form ation  of the Korean R ep resen ta t iv e  Demo­
c r a t i c  Council, which sought a balance between the l e f t  and 
r i g h t .  At the  l a s t  moment the le a d in g  l e f t i s t ,  Lyuh 
Woon-hyung, re fu sed  to  p a r t i c ip a te  w ith  the r e s u l t  t h a t  
Rhee le d  a r ig h t is t -d o m in a te d  Council. The l e f t  responded 
on February 15 w ith  form ation  of the Democratic N ational 
F ro n t .  Hodge, however, s t i l l  in tended to  keep up the p re s ­
t ig e  of the Council while t ry in g  to g a in  the  f u l l  backing 
o f the Korean people to  d i s c r e d i t  the Communists. He be­
l ie v e d  t h i s  probably  would "get the l i b e r a l  and pink p ress"
of America on h i s  neck, but he f e l t  any o th e r  a c t io n  would 
21be dangerous. With both  powers su s p ic io u s  of the o t h e r ' s  
a c t io n s ,  and w ith  both b u ild in g  up a n t i t h e t i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  
fo rc e s  in  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  zones, the p ro s p e c ts  fo r  success­
f u l  d isc u ss io n s  in  the J o i n t  Commission were n o t  b r ig h t .
Soviet-American ta lk s  in  the J o i n t  Commission qu ick ly  
bogged down in  a  d isp u te  over the is su e  of which p a r t i e s  and
Z l lb id . .  641-642.
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s o c ia l  o rg a n iz a t io n s  would be e l i g ib le  to  be consu lted  on 
the  form ation of a p ro v is io n a l  government. The Sov ie t ■
Union was opposed to  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  any groups t h a t  pub­
l i c l y  opposed the  Moscow agreement p ro v is io n  fo r  t r u s t e e s h i p .  
These groups were in v a r ia b ly  r i g h t i s t s ,  since the Communist 
groups had been " induced” to  change t h e i r  p o s i t io n  from op­
p o s i t io n  to  suppo rt  o n ' i n s t r u c t i o n s  from n o r th  Korea. In  
th e  p ro c e ss ,  th e  Korean Communist P a r ty  was "never able  
again  to  command the degree of p u b lic  support t h a t  i t  g a r ­
nered in  the  opening months a f t e r  l i b e r a t i o n . "  The t a c t i c a l  
advantage had s h i f t e d  to  the r i g h t i s t s  and c e n t r i s t s .  While 
b e l ie v in g  th e re  was no p o in t  in  deba ting  t r u s t e e s h ip  since 
the  f i n a l  d e c is io n  would r e s t  with the powers who had 
agreed to  the Moscow communique, Byrnes agreed th a t  Korean 
oppo sit io n  to t r u s t e e s h i p  could no t be used as an excuse 
f o r  exc lusion  from c o n s u l ta t io n .  While the United S ta te s  
wished to  see the  Korean s i t u a t i o n  fav o rab ly  re so lv ed ,  i t
would no t be fo rc e d  in to  a h a s ty  se t t lem en t which denied
22the  Korean people a f r e e l y  chosen government.
In  the f i r s t  weeks of A p r i l ,  the J o in t  Commission 
appeared h o p e le s s ly  deadlocked over the issue  of c o n s u l ta ­
t i o n .  The ap p aren t deadlock was broken in  the middle of 
A pril  a f t e r  America e x e r te d  g r e a t  p re ssu re  on the Sov ie t
Byrnes to  Langdon, A pril  5i 1946, I b i d . , 657; 
Byrnes to  C e r ta in  D ip lom atic  O f f ic e r s  Abroad,April 11, 1946, 
I b i d . ,659; Sca lap ino 'and  Lee, Communism In K orea, I ,2 ? 6 -7 8 .
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Union—in c lu d in g  a t h r e a t  of a  f u l l  p r e s s  r e le a s e  of J o i n t  
Commission p ro ceed in g s . The S o v ie ts  agreed to  a form ula by 
which a l l  p a r t i e s  uphold ing  the  aims o f  the Moscow agreement 
would be c o n su l te d .  This a p p a ren t ly  in su red  t h a t  "moderate 
r i g h t i s t  elem ents" would n o t  be e x c l u d e d . H o d g e ,  however, 
foresaw a d isp u te  a r i s i n g  over s e le c t io n  of r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  
from the p a r t i e s .  He decided  to  p re s s  fo r  immediate co n su l­
t a t i o n ,  provided the  38th  p a r a l l e l  b a r r i e r  was r a i s e d  to  en­
able n o n - l e f t i s t s  complete freedom of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  in  
n o r th  Korea. An a l t e r n a t e  s o lu t io n  would be accep tance  of
the U.S. view re g a rd in g  the composition of the  p ro v is io n a l
ok
government o r a  f u l l  p u b lic  r e le a s e  of the d is c u s s io n s .
I t  q u ick ly  became apparen t t h a t  the deadlock had n o t  
been re so lv ed .  As Hodge p re d ic te d ,  t ro u b le  arose  over the  
s e le c t io n  of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  The S o v ie t  p rop osa l  r e q u ire d  
th a t  Korean p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  s e le c t  f o r  c o n s u l ta t io n  only  
those r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  who had no t compromised them selves "by 
a c t iv e  o p p o s i t io n  to  the Moscow agreement and the A l l i e s . "  
This was t o t a l l y  u naccep tab le  to  Hodge.
On May 6, th e  J o in t  Commission adjourned s ine  d i e . 
Accompanying t h a t  adjournment was a len g th y  p r e s s  r e le a s e
^ ^angd on  to  Byrnes, A p ril  14, 1946, I b i d . , 660.
24Acheson to  C e r ta in  D iplom atic  O f f ic e r s ,  A p r i l  23, 
1946, I b i d . .  661.
26^Acheson to  C e r ta in  D ip lom atic  O f f ic e r s ,  A p ril  25, 
1946, I b i d . ,  661- 662 .
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summarizing bo th  the J o i n t  Commission d is c u s s io n s  and th e  
Soviet-American d isp u te  over  the is su e  of c o n s u l ta t io n .  Af­
t e r  fo u r  weeks o f n e g o t ia t io n s  i t  was agreed t h a t  groups 
would be co nsu lted  i f  they showed a rea so n ab le  degree o f  co­
op e ra t io n  w ith  the J o i n t  Commission. T his agreem ent, pub­
l i s h e d  in  Communique No. 5 which a l l  p a r t i e s  were to  s ig n ,  
d id  n o t  r e q u i r e  support of t r u s t e e s h i p ,  bu t  m erely t h a t  o r ­
g a n iz a t io n s  should "coopera te  w ith  the  J o i n t  Commission in  
working out o f  p ro p o sa ls"  r e g a rd in g  the  t r u s t e e s h i p .  The 
United S ta te s  i n te r p r e t e d  t h i s  to  mean t h a t  p a r t i e s  and 
o rg a n iz a t io n s  could exp ress  them selves f r e e l y  a g a in s t  t r u s -  
te e s h ip  when work began on t r u s t e e s h i p  p ro p o sa ls .
In  re a c h in g  t h i s  agreement, the  U nited  S ta te s  con­
t i n u a l l y  emphasized t h a t  sou th  Koreans were f r e e  to  speak 
t h e i r  minds on the su b je c t  o f  t r u s t e e s h i p .  The S o v ie ts  i n ­
te r p r e te d  the agreement d i f f e r e n t l y ,  h o ld in g  th a t  p a r t i e s  
and o rg a n iz a t io n s  must no t  s e l e c t  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  who had 
compromised them se lves  by o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  Moscow a g re e ­
ments. While the p o in t  was d ebated , the  Chairman of the  Rep­
r e s e n ta t iv e  Dem ocratic Council o f  South Korea, Syngman Rhee, 
d e c la re d  t h a t  study o f  Communique No. 5 had le d  to  th e  con­
c lu s io n  t h a t  s ig n in g  the  document meant " co o p e ra t io n  w ith the 
Am erican-Soviet J o i n t  Commission in  the  m a t te r  of form ing a 
p ro v is io n a l  governm ent," and t h a t  a f t e r  th e  government was
26Hodge to  Byrnes, May 9 , 1946, I b i d . . 665- 667.
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formed, o p p o s it io n  to t r u s t e e s h i p  could be expressed openly . 
The S o v ie ts  viewed R hee 's  comments a s  grounds fo r  d i s q u a l i ­
fy in g  from c o n s u l ta t io n  a l l  p a r t i e s  and o rg a n iz a t io n s  a f f i l ­
i a t e d  w ith  the Council. The S o v ie t  Union would no t c o n su l t  
w ith  these  p a r t i e s  u n t i l  th ey  renounced such views—even i f  
they  had signed or in tend ed  to  s ig n  Communique No.
The United S ta te s  r e a l i z e d  t h i s  new s i t u a t i o n  would 
le a d  to  a  long  de lay  and suggested  t h a t  the J o i n t  Commission 
move on to  co ns id er  th e  removal of the  "38th p a r a l l e l  bound­
a ry  a s  an o b s ta c le  to  r e u n i f i c a t i o n . "  The S ov ie ts  re fu se d  
and th e re  was no choice but to  ad jou rn  on May 6, 1946, s ine  
d i e . In  so doing, the  U nited S t a t e s  made i t  c le a r  t h a t  i t  
would n o t  agree to  any a c t io n  t h a t  denied the  r i g h t  o f p a r ­
t i c i p a t i o n  in  c o n s u l ta t io n  to  more th an  100 Korean p a r t i e s  
and s o c ia l  o rg a n iz a t io n s .  To do so would v io la t e  " the  u n i ­
v e r s a l l y  accep ted  r i g h t  f o r  a l l  people  to  freedom of ex-
28p re s s io n  promised them in  the  A t l a n t i c  C h a r te r ."
The J o i n t  Commission d i s c u s s io n s  p resen ted  two d ilem ­
mas to  the United S t a te s .  The f i r s t  involved the d e s i r a b i l ­
i t y  of a  t r u s t e e s h ip .  Hodge, and Byrnes to  a l e s s e r  e x te n t ,  
viewed t r u s t e e s h ip  as  e i t h e r  im p ra c t ic a l  o r  unnecessary .
The S ov ie t  Union, Langdon d e c la re d ,  viewed t r u s t e e s h ip  very 
d i f f e r e n t l y .  American a u t h o r i t i e s  in  sou th  Korea had 
p layed  the theme of t r u s t e e s h ip  "p ian iss im o" and had p laced
2?Ibid. ^®ibid.
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much stock in  B yrnes ' remarks of December 30, 1945, th a t  the  
J o i n t  Commission might f in d  i t  p o s s ib le  to  d ispense  with 
t r u s t e e s h ip .  The S o v ie t  Union, however, made i t  c le a r  t h a t  
t r u s te e  sh ip  i s  " the  meat o f  the Moscow communique, th a t  th e re  
i s  no a l t e r n a t iv e  to  i t  and t h a t  o p p o s i t io n  to  i t  i s  subver­
s iv e ."  Since th e  S ov ie ts  t r e a t e d  t r u s t e e s h ip  a s  "sacred and 
a b so lu te ,"  Langdon b e liev e d  i t  would be wise f o r  the United 
S ta te s  to  decide f i rm ly  f o r  t r u s t e e s h ip .^ ^
The importance of the  t r u s t e e s h ip  issue  was confirmed 
sev e ra l  months l a t e r ,  i n  a d is c u s s io n  between A rthu r Bunce, 
S e o u l 's  Economic A dviser, and G.M. Balasanov, Russian  P o l i t i ­
c a l  Adviser in  n o r th  Korea. Both accused the o t h e r ' s  govern­
ment of having t r i e d  to  in su re  t h a t  f r i e n d ly  p a r t i e s  would 
dominate a p ro v is io n a l  government. Balasanov in te rp r e te d  
Hodge's comments about Communique No. 5 to  mean t h a t  s ign ing  
the  d e c la ra t io n  d id  no t in d ic a te  support f o r  t r u s te e s h ip  and 
t h a t  the r i g h t i s t  p a r t i e s  could  c r i t i c i z e  t r u s t e e s h ip  "as a 
means of whipping up o p p o s i t io n  to  the  JC, the P ro v is io n a l  
Government, and the Moscow D e c la r a t io n ." Bunce denied t h i s ,  
bu t agreed t h a t  t r u s t e e s h ip  should n o t  be used to  make p o l i t i ­
c a l  c a p i ta l  or to  sabotage the  work of the  J o i n t  Commission.
He rea ff irm ed , however, t h a t  America would n o t  exclude from 
c o n s u l ta t io n  a l l  those who might oppose t ru s te e sh ip .^ ®
^^Langdon to  Byrnes, May 8, 1946, I b i d . , 669-6?4.
^®Langdon to  Byrnes, October 9, 1946, I b i d . . 745-746.
73 -
The Sovie t d e s i re  to  exclude th e  r i g h t i s t  e lem ents 
i s  q u i te  understandable  i f  i t  i s  accep ted  th a t  a f r e e ,  i n ­
dependent democratic Korea was never a  Sov ie t g o a l .  Trus­
t e e s h ip  seemed the b e s t  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  ach iev ing , in  a  way 
t h a t  would n o t  alarm the  United S t a te s ,  the  Russian goal of 
a  s t a t e  t ie d  secu re ly  to  the  Sov ie t Union. The Kremlin, 
however, c le a r ly  had made a mistake in  fo rc in g  the Korean 
Communist P a r ty  to  support t r u s t e e s h i p .  The predominant 
p o l i t i c a l  fo rce  in  Korea in  l a t e  19^5. the Korean Communist 
P a r ty  had su ffe red  severe lo s s e s  because of i t s  support of 
t r u s t e e s h i p .  The r i g h t i s t s  used the  i s s u e  as a  " c a t a l y t i c  
ag en t  to  induce p o l i t i c a l  u n ity "  and to  g a in  in c reased  sup­
p o r t .  The Sovie t Union, stuck w ith  th e  t r u s t e e s h ip  ag re e ­
ment, could make i t s  p lan s  fo r  dom ination of Korea work only 
by exclud ing  what they saw as  the American-sponsored 
r i g h t i s t s  to make up f o r  the  l e f t ' s  l o s s e s . T h o u g h  no t 
p lanned , a t r u s te e s h ip  probably  worked in  A m erica 's  favo r  
by p rev e n tin g  a communist takeover in  sou th  Korea.
The in te r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  south Korea p r e ­
sen ted  another dilemma to  America. American M i l i t a r y  Gov­
ernment continued to uphold the " c i v i l  r ig h t s "  of a l l  south 
Koreans because i t  had f a i l e d  to  produce an e f f e c t iv e  p o l i ­
t i c a l  fo rce  of moderate Koreans. As a  r e s u l t ,  ex c lu s io n  of 
r i g h t i s t  p a r t i e s  from p a r t i c i p a t i o n  would have in su red  a
^^Scalapino and Lee, Communism in  Korea, I ,  2?8.
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Soviet-dom inated s t a t e .  The United S ta te s  may have viewed 
the t r u s te e s h ip  q u es t io n  from the r a t h e r  im p ra c t ic a l  p o in t  
of view of p r in c ip le .  D iscuss ion  of t r u s t e e s h ip  could have 
been p ro h ib i te d  u n t i l  a f t e r  form ation o f  a  p ro v is io n a l  govern­
ment. This would have g iven  R ussia  concre te  p ro o f  t h a t  the 
United S ta te s  d id n o t  e x c lu s iv e ly  fav o r  r i g h t i s t  elem ents 
and would have in su red  r i g h t i s t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n :  i t  a ls o  would 
have been "un-American".
The breakdown of J o i n t  Commission d is c u s s io n s  fo rced  
a re -exam ina tio n  of the assum ptions on which U.S. p o l ic y  had 
been grounded. Should th e  United S ta te s  con tinue  to  base 
i t s  Korean p o l ic y  on Sov ie t co op era tion  o r  should America go 
i t  a lone o r  take  some middle course? Should th e  Rhee-Koo 
r i g h t i s t  groups continue to  be bypassed in  fav o r  of a ttem p ts  
to  c re a te  a  moderate c e n t r i s t  group? Washington and Seoul 
had d i f f e r e n t  answers to  these  q u e s t io n s .
Some of the q u e s t io n s  rec e iv e d  t e n t a t i v e  answers in  
a  May 22 meeting of the S e c re ta r ie s  o f S ta te ,  War, and Navy.
In  t h a t  meeting, the A s s i s ta n t  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  fo r  Occu­
p ied  A reas, Major John H. H i l ld r in g ,  sa id  t h a t  the  O ffice  of 
F a r  E a s te rn  A f f a i r s  b e liev ed  th e re  was n o t  much hope f o r  fu ­
tu re  J o i n t  Commission accomplishments and suggested  t h a t  the 
United S ta te s  proceed immediately to  hold e l e c t i o n s  in  south 
Korea. These e le c t io n s  would n o t  be f o r  a  n a t io n a l  govern­
ment, bu t fo r  h ig h er  p o l i t i c a l  o f f i c e s  than  those c re a te d  in  
Germany. The United S ta te s  needed to  s t im u la te  p o l i t i c a l
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a c t i v i t y  to  produce new le a d e r s h ip .  H i l ld r in g  b e l ie v e d  t h a t  
the use of only American o f f i c i a l s  in  a d m in is t r a t in g  Korea 
had weakened the U.S. p o s i t io n .  The S o v ie ts  employed many 
Koreans in  o f f ic e  and they were making c a p i t a l  out o f  the 
la c k  o f  Koreans in  American M i l i t a r y  Government. Byrnes 
agreed  t h a t  something should be done about t h a t .  S e c re ta ry  
o f  War Robert P a t te r s o n  sounded a cau tiona ry  no te  on the 
q u e s t io n  of e l e c t io n s ,  r e p e a t in g  Hodge’ s c h a r a c t e r i z a t io n  
o f  the  Koreans a s  u n ru ly  and very  backward.
The tren d  e x h ib i te d  in  the  May 22 d is c u s s io n  toward 
some k in d  of u n i l a t e r a l  U.S. a c t io n  in  Korea, r e c e iv e d  sup­
p o r t  in  a p e s s im is t i c  memorandum from William Langdon on 
May 24. Langdon b e liev ed  i t  now was c le a r  t h a t  Moscow " in ­
tended to  impose a u n i te d  f r o n t  p o l ic y  throughout the  country" 
s im i la r  to  those  in  Y ugoslavia, B u lg a r ia ,  and Rumania.
U nited  S ta te s  acquiescence in  t h i s  Russian design  would h as­
t e n  and s im p lify  S o v ie t  c o n tro l  over the  e n t i r e  p e n in s u la .
The S o v ie t  Union might delay resum ption of n e g o t i a t io n s  un­
t i l  A m erica 's  n a tu r a l  im patience , dem o b il iza tio n  problem s, 
d e c l in in g  American i n t e r e s t s  i n  Korean a f f a i r s ,  and lo c a l  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  d iv i s io n  of the  country  o b l ig e d  the  
U nited  S ta te s  to  supply s o lu t io n s  on terms t h a t  in c lud ed  a 
u n i te d  f r o n t  exclud ing  a l l  e lem ents but those the  Communist 
P a r ty  could c o n tro l .  I f  the U nited S ta te s  stood f i r m ly .
^^em o of a Meeting of the S e c re ta r ie s  of War, S t a te ,  
and Navy, May 22, 1946, I b i d . . 681.
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however, i t  was l i k e l y  t h a t  R ussia  would f in d  a compromise 
s o lu t io n  on a  government a ccep tab le  to  America would b es t  
serve long-range S ov ie t  i n t e r e s t s ,  " thereby  a c c e le r a t in g  our 
dep a r tu re  from Korea and th u s ,  in  her e s t im a te ,  le a v in g  the 
S ov ie ts  a  f r e e  hand to  pursue t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  aims here
In  Langdon's op in ion , the United S ta te s  should show 
both  a  f i rm  d e te rm in a tio n  to  r e s i s t  Sov ie t dom ination of 
Korea, and a  r e a d in e s s  to  s tay  as  long  as  n e ce ssa ry  both  to  
p rev en t S o v ie t  dom ination and to  c o n so l id a te  the p o s i t io n  of 
moderate e lem ents in  th e  south  and encourage t h e i r  r e s i s ta n c e  
in  the  n o r th .  In c re a s in g  Korean p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  American 
M il i ta ry  Government, to  b e t t e r  p repa re  Koreans to  takeover 
when the U nited  S ta te s  d e p a r ted ,  was the  b e s t  way to  achieve 
c o n s o l id a t io n .  A t ru e  c o a l i t i o n  of p a t r i o t i c  s o c i e t i e s  was 
needed and i f  one could be o b ta ined , Hodge proposed to  in ­
c re ase  Korean p a r t i c i p a t i o n  th rough  c re a t io n  of a  Korean 
N on-A dm inistra tive  C ab ine t and L e g i s l a t iv e  Body which would 
e n a c t  r e g u la t io n s  and law s, s u b je c t  to  U.S. app rova l, f o r  the 
p e r io d  p r i o r  to  e s ta b l ish m e n t  o f a  p r o v is io n a l  government un­
d e r  the  Moscow agreem ent. E le c t io n s  p robably  would be r e ­
ceived  fav o ra b ly  and i f  c a r r i e d  out a t  the  p r o v in c ia l  l e v e l  
would no t  com plicate  n e g o t i a t io n s  i f  the  J o i n t  Commission 
was reconvened .
^%,angdon to Byrnes, May 24, 1946, I b i d . . 685- 689.
34I b i d . ;  Langdon to  Byrnes, June 3. 1946, I b i d . ,
690.
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Langdon denied t h a t  Seoul had backed only  c o n se r­
v a t iv e  e lem ents. Kira Koo had been ignored because of h i s  po­
l i t i c a l  in e p t i tu d e .  Rhee, however, had been very  h e lp f u l  in  
r a l l y i n g  pub lic  op in ion  toward u n i f i c a t i o n  and i n  p rev e n tin g  
excess iv e  a n t i - a l l i e d  d em o n s tra tio n s . While Hodge d id  n o t 
f e e l  Rhee was e s s e n t i a l  o r  even d e s i ra b le  for the  su ccess  of 
a  fu tu re  p ro v is io n a l  government, he did remain an i n f l u e n t i a l  
n a t io n a l  le a d e r  whose c o o p e ra t io n  could n o t  be d isp en sed  w ith 
a t  the p re s e n t  t im e .^^
The S ta te  Department, in  a  p o l ic y  p lanning  paper 
which the  War Department and the  Navy concurred i n ,  showed a 
s im i l a r  t ren d  of th in k in g .  The problem fac in g  America was 
how to achieve U.S. p o l ic y  g o a ls  through J o in t  Commission n e ­
g o t i a t i o n s  and through u n i l a t e r a l  a c t io n  in  sou th  Korea. The 
United S ta te s  s t i l l  in tended  " to  achieve i t s  o b j e c t iv e s  in  
Korea w ith in  the framework of the  Moscow agreem ent." Talks 
w ith  the Sov ie t Union would be resumed whenever th e r e  was any 
reason  to  be lieve  th e re  might be a  b a s is  fo r  an agreem ent 
c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  American p r i n c i p l e s .  The United S t a te s  i n ­
tended to  s tay  in  Korea a s  long  a s  i t s  presence c o n tr ib u te d  
to  i t s  bas ic  o b je c t iv e s .
The S ta te  Department b e lie v e d ,  however, t h a t  th e  im­
passe  in  Korea could be re so lv e d  fav o rab ly  only i f  a
^^angdon  to  B yrnes, May 24, 1946, I b i d . . 685-689.
H i l ld r in g  to  th e  O perations D iv is io n , War D epart­
ment, June 6, 1946, I b i d . , 692- 698.
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u n i l a t e r a l  course of a c t io n  was undertaken  to win p o p u la r  
support f o r  U.S. p r i n c i p l e s .  This would force  R ussia  to  
modify i t s  p o s i t io n  and would make i t  e a s i e r  to  reach  an un­
d e rs tan d in g .  To achieve popu lar  support Hodge would have to  
broaden Korean p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  p o s ts  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
He should use "popular e l e c t o r a l  p ro ce sse s  fo r  the  e l e c t i o n  
of Koreans to  occupy key p o s ts  i n  l o c a l  and p ro v in c ia l  ad ­
m in i s t r a t io n s  and in  the  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  the U.S. zone as 
a whole." The United S ta te s  in tended to  e s t a b l i s h  th rough  
broad e l e c t o r a l  p ro c e sse s  an advisory  l e g i s l a t i v e  body to  
supersede the  R e p re se n ta t iv e  Democratic C ouncil. The d u ty  
o f  t h i s  body, the  South Korean In te r im  L e g i s l a t iv e  Assembly, 
was to form ulate  and d r a f t  laws, to  be used a t  S e o u l 's  d i s ­
c r e t io n ,  f o r  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and s o c ia l  reform .
An e l e c t i o n  was n e cessa ry  to  choose a body more r e p ­
r e s e n ta t iv e  of Korean p o l i t i c a l  op in ion  since  the  R ep resen ta ­
t i v e  Democratic Council had no l e f t i s t s .  Such a body would 
be s tro n g e r  and y e t  would be more accep tab le  to  Moscow, 
making the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f agreement much b e t t e r . T h u s ,  
w hile  the S ta te  Department was w i l l in g  to  pursue a  u n i l a t e r a l  
cou rse , i t  was a course d i r e c te d  toward rea ch in g  an ag re e ­
ment with the  S o v ie t  Union.
At the  same tim e, the  S ta te  D epartm en t 's  p o l ic y  p a p e r  
was c r i t i c a l  o f  S e o u l 's  a l le g e d  p re fe ren c e  fo r  th e  r i g h t i s t s .
37I b id . 38I b id .
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Washington wanted a  program which inc luded  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  
groups and a l e g i s l a t u r e  which would be more r e p re s e n ta t iv e  
than the  AMG-created Council. Washington a ls o  b e liev e d  the 
s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea would be much improved i f  c e r t a i n  p e r ­
s o n a l i t i e s  who had been storm c e n te r s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o n tro ­
versy  would r e t i r e  tem p o ra r i ly  from the  scene . This group 
was described  a s  " o ld e r  emigre Koreans who have re tu rn e d  to  
Korea since the c a p i tu l a t i o n  of Ja p an ."  They were n o t  r e p ­
r e s e n ta t iv e  of Korean p o l i t i c a l  op in ion  and t h e i r  presence  
only hampered U.S. o b je c t iv e s  in  Korea. American M i l i t a r y  
Government r e j e c te d  the re fe re n c e s  to  f a v o r i t i s m ,  and noted  
th a t  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent 's  su gges tions  would ach ieve  the  
Communist goal of e l im in a t in g  the r i g h t i s t s  from the  
p o l i t i c a l  scene.
Edwin Pau ley , Truman's p e rso n a l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  on a 
s p e c ia l  m ission to  the Far E a s t ,  echoed the  growing f e e l in g  
in  U.S. c i r c l e s  t h a t  some k ind  of a c t io n  was needed to  g e t  
the Korean s i t u a t i o n  o f f  d e a d -c e n te r .  In  a  June 22 r e p o r t  
to  Truman, Pauley expressed  g re a t  concern t h a t  Korea was 
n o t  r e c e iv in g  the  a t t e n t i o n  and c o n s id e ra t io n  i t  should . 
Korea was an " id e o lo g ic a l  b a tt leg ro u n d  upon which our e n t i r e  
success  in  A s ia  may depend." The r e s o l u t i o n  of the  Korean 
s i t u a t i o n  would t e s t  whether a  dem ocratic  system could meet
39I M d . ;  Langdon to  Byrnes, June 7. 1946, I b i d . ,
700.
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the cha llen ge  of "d e fea ted  feudalism " or o f Communism.
The S ov ie t  Union, Pauley  b e l ie v e d ,  had no in te n t io n  
of w ithdrawing e a r ly  from Korea, because i t s  a c t io n s  were de­
signed to  s t a l l  any agreement while i t  propagandized Commu­
nism in  Korea. The S o v ie t  Union and the  United S ta te s  had 
r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f "democracy", making t ru e  
agreement d i f f i c u l t .  Korea was a  f e r t i l e  ground fo r  S ov ie t  
moves, which probably  would be tak e n  over a  lo n g  period  of 
time since the  Soviet Army gave every  in d ic a t io n  of p re ­
p a r in g  fo r  a long s ta y .  The S o v ie ts  wanted n o th ing  l e s s  
than dominance in  Korea. To avoid  t h i s ,  the  United S ta te s  
had to  compel compliance w ith  the' Moscow agreement. America 
should coun te r  with i t s  own propaganda campaign, continue 
to  b u i ld  up south  Korea, and should c o n s id e r  ta k in g  the 
issue  to  the United N a tio n s  o r  th e  Big Four.^^
Truman agreed w ith  P a u le y 's  assessm ent o f  Korea as  
an id e o lo g ic a l  b a t t le g ro u n d .  The P r e s id e n t  b e lieved  the  b e s t  
way to  persuade the S o v ie t  Union to  comply w ith the Moscow 
agreement was " to  i n t e n s i f y  and p e rsev e re  in  our p re s e n t  e f ­
f o r t s  to  b u i ld  up a  s e l f -g o v e rn in g  and dem ocratic  Korea, 
n e i t h e r  su b se rv ie n t  to  no r  menacing any pow er." In  broad­
ening the  b a s i s  of Korean p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  south  Korean ad­
m in is t r a t io n ,  a  sep a ra te  sou th  Korean government would n o t
40P au ley  to  Truman, June 22, 1946, I b i d . . 706- 709. 
^^Ibid.
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be s e t  up, but in c reased  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  should make i t  
e a s i e r  to  n e g o t ia te  w ith  the  S o v ie ts .  Truman a lso  thought 
t h a t  a  p o l ic y  of u n i l a t e r a l  a c t io n  could provoke the S o v ie ts  
to  n e g o t i a t io n s .  But even i f  such a  p lan  d id  n o t  le a d  to
ho
d i s c u s s io n s ,  some k ind  of a c t io n  was n e c e ssa ry .
The United S t a te s ,  then , had decided  on a u n i l a t e r a l  
course t h a t  would broaden the b a s i s  o f sou th  Korean p a r t i c i ­
p a t io n  in  a d m in is t r a t io n  and would form an in te r im  l e g i s l a ­
t i v e  body designed to  s tre n g th e n  sou th  Korea and A m erica 's  
p o s i t io n  in  Korea. The success of such a p o l ic y  depended on 
the  co o p era t io n  o f  Korean p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .
A f te r  the breakdown of J o i n t  Commission t a l k s ,  Hodge 
spen t a  g r e a t  deal o f time t r y in g  to  persuade  Lyuh and Kimm 
K iu -s ic  to  form a c o a l i t i o n  c o n s i s t in g  of th e  l e f t  and r i g h t  
t h a t  would e l im in a te  both extrem es— the Rhee r i g h t i s t s  and 
the  Pak communists. The r i g h t  would be under Kim Koo, the 
l e f t  under Lyuh, and Kimm in  the m iddle . N e g o t ia t io n s  p ro ­
g ressed  th roughou t the  summer to  the  p o in t  where p ro p o sa ls  
were fo rm a lly  exchanged f o r  form ation of a C o a l i t io n  Commit­
t e e ,  a llow ing  fo r  a  r a t i o  o f f iv e  r i g h t i s t s  to  f iv e  l e f t i s t s ,  
w ith  Kimm and Lyuh a l t e r n a t i n g  the  chairm ansh ip .^^
ho
^'^Truman to  Pau ley , Ju ly  l6 ,  1946, I b i d . . 713-714.
^ ^an g d o n  to  Byrnes, May 14, 1946, I b i d . . 677-679; 
Memo of C onversa tion  Held in  the D iv is io n  o f  Japanese Af­
f a i r s ,  J u ly  l 6 ,  1946, I b i d . , 715; Langdon to  Byrnes, J u ly  13, 
1946, I b i d . . 710-711; Scalapino and Lee. Korean Communism,
I ,  281-283.
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At a  time when th e  p ro sp e c ts  f o r  a  balanced c o a l i ­
t io n  appeared to  be improving, two ev en ts  consp ired  to  dim 
those chances. Hodge's J u ly  announcement of e l e c t io n s  f o r  
form ation of the South Korean In te r im  L e g i s l a t iv e  Assembly 
was no t  g ree ted  fa v o ra b ly .  A number of l e f t i s t s  b e lieved  
such an assembly was prem ature and served no u se fu l  purpose . 
The support t h a t  the  announcement d id  re c e iv e  came from the 
r i g h t i s t s ,  who saw in  the  proposal a  chance to  dominate 
tem p o ra r i ly  the  South Korean p o l i t i c a l  scene through domi- 
n a t io n  of the Assembly.
The o th e r  even t which caused gloom in  Seoul was the  
m i l i t a n t  o p p o s i t io n  of Pak and o th e r  south  Korean communists 
to  both  the  Assembly and a l l  c o a l i t io n  e f f o r t s  w ith  the 
r i g h t .  A f te r  a t r i p  to  n o r th  Korea in  l a t e  J u ly ,  Pak began 
a  s e r i e s  o f  s t ro n g  c r i t i c i s m s  of the  C o a l i t io n  Committee.
At the  same time he launched a d r iv e  to  form a l e f t  c o a l i t i o n ,  
to  match a  s im i la r  c o a l i t i o n  drive being  c a r r i e d  ou t in  the 
n o r th .  Lyuh was caught in  the  middle—he was committed 
p u b l ic ly  to  c o a l i t i o n  w ith  Kimm, y e t  he continued to  co n so r t  
s e c r e t ly  w ith  both n o r th  and south Korean communists. Lyuh 
seemed to  be t r y in g  to  g a in  fav o r  w ith  both  side  s .
L y u h '8 a c t io n s ,  the  t h r e a t  to  the  c o a l i t i o n  t a l k s ,  
and the  in c re a sed  m il i ta n c y  o f  the communists le d  Langdon to
^ ^ a n g d o n  to  Byrnes, Ju ly  28, 1946, FR.1946, V III ,
720-721.
^^Scalapino  and Lee, Communism in  Korea, I ,  282-85.
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make a  p e s s im is t i c  r e p o r t  on August 23- Langdon b e liev ed  
t h a t  "a small a r t i c u l a t e  element of the popu la tion"  f e l t  the 
U.S. job in  Korea was f in i s h e d .  While g r a t e f u l  f o r  U.S. e f ­
f o r t s ,  they now wished to  co n cen tra te  on the  "e s ta b l ish m e n t  
o f  t h e i r  own N a tio n a l  P ro v is io n a l  Government and union of 
t h e i r  coun try  . . . ."  I n  l i g h t  of t h i s  a t t i t u d e ,  the  
l e f t i s t s  were opposed to  S e o u l 's  in n o v a t io n s , while the 
r i g h t i s t s  r e c e iv e d  them a p a th e t i c a l l y .  The l e f t i s t s  were 
e s p e c ia l ly  unhappy w ith  U.S. o f f i c i a l s ,  because i t  was be­
l ie v e d  they had p e rp e tu a te d  the t r a d i t i o n a l  s o c ia l  o rd e r ,  
thus  c h e a t in g  the  l e f t i s t s  out of a so c ia l  r e v o lu t io n .  The 
l e f t i s t s  seemingly were committed to  noncooperation .
Langdon f e l t  t h a t  S ta te  Department p ro p o sa ls  had 
overlooked "Korean p r id e  o f  s t o l i d  c o n c e i t  in  t h e i r  own i n ­
s t i t u t i o n s . "  American M i l i t a ry  Government under i t s  d i r e c ­
t iv e s  thought i t  n e c e ssa ry  to  e f f e c t  fundamental and lo n g -  
range refo rm s, while the  Korean people f e l t  t h i s  was a ta s k  
f o r  a  P ro v is io n a l  Government and the  t r u s te e s h ip  agency.
Thus they re s e n te d  the  "raw enthusiasm on our p a r t "  to  remake 
Korea. I f  the  United S ta te s  did n o t  do something very  soon, 
th e re  would be widening s e c t io n a l  and id e o lo g ic a l  c le av a g es  
in  Korean s o c ie ty ,  a  d im in ish ing  p o p u la r i ty  of America, apa­
thy  from the  r i g h t  and o p p o s it io n  o r  non-coopera tion  from the 
l e f t  to  any n o n - e s s e n t i a l  a d m in is t r a t iv e  a c t i v i t y  o r  any
■^^angdon to  Byrnes, August 23, 1946, PR, 1946, 
V III ,  726- 729.
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inn ova tio n  in  American M i l i t a r y  Government, and entrenchm ent
o f  Sovie t in f lu e n ce  and a  S o v ie t  system in  n o r th  Korea.
The r a d i c a l  course of a c t io n  t h a t  P a k 's  Communists
had i n i t i a t e d  in  September d id  n o t  l i g h t e n  Langdon 's  gloom.
V io len t dem onstra tions  accompanied a s e r i e s  o f s t r i k e s  which
s t a r t e d  with the r a i l r o a d  workers. Seoul t ig h te n e d  in te r n a l
p o l ic y  to  match the  communist move to  r a d ic a l i s m .  Three
l e f t i s t  newspapers were suspended and r a i d s  were c a r r ie d
kg
ou t on a  number o f l e f t i s t  p a r ty  o f f i c e s .
E le c t io n s  of e le c to r s  f o r  the  South Korean In te r im  
L e g i s l a t iv e  Assembly were held  on October 1? and 22, and 
went smoothly d e s p i te  the d is tu rb a n c e s  and the  communist 
b o y c o tt .  The l e f t  was c r i t i c a l  of the  s h o r t  n o t ic e  given 
and charged t h a t  th e re  were many i r r e g u l a r i t i e s .  T he ir  
c r i t i c i s m  of r i g h t i s t  dominance of the  e l e c t i o n  p rocedures  
was v a l id  only because the  l e f t  c o n s i s t e n t l y  had re fu sed  to  
coopera te  or p a r t i c ip a te  w ith American M i l i t a r y  Government. 
The e le c t io n  produced, to  no o n e 's  s u r p r i s e ,  an overwhelming 
m a jo r i ty  of r i g h t i s t s  among the  ^5 e le c te d  members.
'^^ I b id .
48Scalapino  and L ee, Communism in  K o re a , I ,
287-301.
^^Langdon to  Byrnes, November 3, 1946, FR.1946, 
V II, 76I - 763; Langdon to Byrnes, November 14, 1946, I b i d . , 
766- 768; Ambassador in  the  S ov ie t  Union (Smith) to  Byrnes, 
November 13, 1946, I b i d . . 765.
-  85 -
While the e l e c t i o n s  p roceeded, the pace of d i s ­
tu rb an c es  i n  south Korea reached a  c re scen do , a s  a t t a c k s  
con tinued  on p o l ic e  and o th e r  Korean o f f i c i a l s .  Sabotage of 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and communication f a c i l i t i e s  occu rred  in  many 
a re a s ,  w ith  c a s u a l t i e s  on bo th  s i d e s . T h e  l e f t i s t - i n s p i r e d  
t r o u b le s  occurred j u s t  a s  problems w ith  Rhee were growing.
Messages to  and from Rhee, i n te r c e p te d  in  December, 
in d ic a te d  t h a t  he in tended  to  f i g h t  and wreck U.S. p o l ic y  in  
Korea by b u i ld in g  up o p p o s i t io n  to  American p o l ic y  in  the  
U nited  S t a te s  and the U nited  N a t io n s .  R h ee 's  "decep tion  and 
d is r e g a rd  o f  r e a l i t y "  was u n fo r tu n a te  because of h i s  la rg e  
and lo y a l  n a t io n a l  f o l l o w i n g . I n  l a t e  December, th e  i n d i ­
c a t io n s  were t h a t  Rhee p lanned to i n s t i g a t e  mass dem onstra­
t i o n s  a g a in s t  American M i l i t a r y  Government. Hodge be lieved  
Rhee was a  co n s id erab le  n u isa n ce ,  b u t  one t h a t  could  be han.- 
d le d ,  though c a u t io u s ly  s ince  he had the  p o t e n t i a l  to  do i r -  
re p e ra b le  damage.-'^ T roubles w ith  Rhee were to  become a 
c o n s ta n t  f a c t o r  in  the  American experience  in  Korea.
As 1946 drew to  a  c lo s e ,  the  United S ta te s  had suc­
ceeded in  implementing one p a r t  o f th e  p o l ic y  promulgated 
a f t e r  the J o i n t  Commission breakdown. A need f o r  a c t io n  had
■^^Langdon to  Byrnes, November l 6 ,  1946, I b i d . .766-68.
■^^Langdon to  Byrnes, December 10, 1946, I b i d . ,
775-778.
^^Hodge to  Byrnes, December 31, 1946, I b i d . .  785-786.
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been perce ived  t h a t  would induce the  S o v ie ts  to  r e tu r n  to 
the t a l k s .  The course  chosen was to  hold e l e c t i o n s  to form 
the South Korean In te r im  L e g i s l a t iv e  Assembly to  p rovide 
Koreans with a  g r e a t e r  sense of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  and c o n tro l  
over d e c is io n s  in v o lv in g  t h e i r  d e s t in y .  In  g a in in g  t h i s  ob­
j e c t i v e  though, the  U nited  S ta te s  saw i t s  hopes f o r  a c o a l i ­
t io n  o f  the r i g h t  and l e f t  dashed. The s t r e n g th  o f the 
r i g h t  was on the r i s e  and would predom inant in  the newly 
e le c te d  Assembly. The United S ta te s  had to  decide  whether 
to  g ive  i t s  b le s s in g  p u b l ic ly  to  the r i g h t i s t s .
While p u rsu in g  a u n i l a t e r a l  c o u rse ,  the  United S ta te s  
con tinued  to  seek a resum ption  of the J o i n t  Commission t a l k s ,  
which in  p a r t  would depend on W ashington 's and Moscow's p e r ­
c e p t io n s  of t h e i r  d e s i r a b i l i t y .  The success  o f any fu tu re  
d is c u s s io n s ,  however, would depend on Moscow's w i l l in g n e s s  • 
to  concede on the  is su e  of c o n s u l ta t io n  r i g h t s .  During 
19^6 , th e  United S t a t e s  had toughened i t s  p o l ic y  toward 
R uss ia .  Sov ie t m ach ina tions in  I r a n  and Turkey, S t a l i n ' s  
February  9 "wars a re  in e v i ta b le "  speech, S o v ie t  r e f u s a l  to  
jo in  th e  World Bank and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund, d i s ­
p u te s  i n  Germany, S ov ie t  r e j e c t i o n  of the Baruch atomic 
energy p lan ,  the  con tinued  r i s e  of Communist p a r t i e s  in  
France and I t a l y ,  combined to  make U.S. p o l ic y  makers espe­
c i a l l y  re c e p t iv e  to  th e  id e a s  George F. Kennan expressed  in  
h i s  famous February 22 te leg ram  an a ly z in g  S o v ie t  behav io r .
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Kerman's a n a ly s i s ,  a r r i v in g  w ith  p e r f e c t  t im in g , a r ­
t i c u l a t e d  emotions deep in  the  subconscious of o f f i c i a l  
Washington, and th u s  was pow erfu lly  p e rsu as iv e  in p ro v id in g  
a  framework fo r  v iew ing Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s .  B r i e f ly ,  
Kennan saw Sovie t fo re ig n  p o l ic y  as based on in te rn a l  f a c ­
t o r s .  The Sovie t view of the  world d iv id e d  in to  two i r r e ­
c o n c i la b le  camps, s o c i a l i s t  and c a p i t a l i s t ,  r e s u l te d  from the  
need to  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  t o t a l i t a r i a n  r u le  in  Russia. The 
S o v ie ts  " r e l e n t l e s s l y  fo rced  t h e i r  co u n try  onto ever new 
h e ig h ts  o f m i l i t a r y  power in  o rd e r  to  guaran tee  e x te rn a l  
s e c u r i ty  f o r  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l l y  weak regime
I f ,  as Kennan b e liev e d ,  Moscow's p o l ic y  was based 
only on in te r n a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s  t h a t  came from a " t r a d i ­
t io n a l  and i n s t i n c t i v e  sense of i n s e c u r i t y , "  no U.S. ac­
t io n s  could m it ig a te  S ov ie t h o s t i l i t y  to  the  West. The 
United S ta te s  faced  a  p o l i t i c a l  fo rce  committed f a n a t i c a l l y  
to  the b e l i e f  t h a t  i f  S ov ie t  power was to  be secure, th e re  
could be no permanent modus v ivend i w ith  the  United S t a te s ,  
t h a t  i t  was d e s i r a b le  and n ecessa ry  t h a t  the  in te rn a l  h a r ­
mony o f  American s o c ie ty  be d is ru p te d ,  t h a t  the t r a d i t i o n a l  
American way of l i f e  be d e s tro y ed , and t h a t  the  in te rn a ­
t i o n a l  a u th o r i ty  o f  the United S ta te s  be broken. To meet 
t h i s  ch a l len g e ,  th e  United S ta te s  had to  r e s i s t  communist
^^George F. Kennan, Memoirs. 1925-1950 (New York: 
Bantam E d it io n ,  I 967) ,  309-310, 583-588; Gaddis. O r ig in s .
302- 303.
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e f f o r t s  to  overthrow Western i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and then  had to  
aw ait f o r  i n t e r n a l  d e fe c t s  in  the S ov ie t  system to lead  to
ijh,
a change in  p o l ic y .- '
The "g e t  tough w ith  Russia" p o l ic y  became a  r e a l i t y  
in  1946. Truman was convinced th a t  f u r t h e r  compromises with 
the S o v ie t  Union "would mean p o l i t i c a l  d i s a s t e r  a t  home." 
Kennan's a n a ly s i s  of S ov ie t  behavior a ls o  convinced Washing­
ton  o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  S t a l i n  and h i s  a s s o c i a t e s  were " id eo ­
lo g ic a l  z e a lo t s " ,  as they  picked out those  f e a tu r e s  of 
Kennan's e v a lu a t io n  which po rtrayed  the  S o v ie t  Union as un­
compromising, w a r l ik e ,  ag g re ss iv e ,  n e u r o t i c ,  and subvers ive . 
I n  the f u tu r e ,  " n e g o t ia t io n s  would c o n tin u e ,  b u t  from now on 
a l l  concess ions  would have to  come from the o th e r  s i d e .
For Korea, t h i s  a t t i t u d e  meant th a t  u n i f i c a t i o n  was no t 
l i k e l y  to  occur a s  a r e s u l t  of J o in t  Commision d isc u ss io n s .-  
Already in  the  s p r in g  and summer of 1946, Korea was p e r ­
ceived through th e  id e o lo g ic a l  prism of the  Cold War.
K o re a 's  f a t e  would be decided  in  the c o n te x t  o f  the s t ru g ­
g le  between the  U nited  S ta te s  and the  S o v ie t  Union.
^ Kennan, Memoirs, 594-596; Gaddis, O r ig in s , 303: 
Thomas G. P a te rso n ,  "George Kennan", in  Frank M erli  and 
Theodore Wilson, Makers of American Diplomacy, Volume I I ,  
(New York: C h a r le s  S c r ib n e r 's  Sons, 1974).
■^■^Gaddis, O r ig in s . 313: P a te rso n ,  "George Kennan,"
Makers.
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CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AMERICAN DECISION 
TO WITHDRAW FROM KOREA
A fte r  the  J o i n t  Commission was ad journed  in  e a r ly  
May, U.S. p o l ic y  makers implemented a  two-pronged approach 
to  so lv in g  t h e i r  problems in Korea. One approach was based 
on u n i l a t e r a l  U.S. a c t io n s  to s t re n g th e n  so u th  Korean and to  
r a i s e  U.S. s t a tu r e  among Koreans. With the  e l e c t i o n  and 
in au g u ra tio n  of the South Korean In te r im  L e g i s l a t i v e  Assembly
the f i r s t  phase was completed. The second approach was to  •
seek resum ption o f  the  J o in t  Commission d i s c u s s io n s .
Almost imm ediately a f t e r  the  May breakdown of the 
J o i n t  Commission t a l k s ,  Hodge, on i n s t r u c t i o n s  from Washing­
to n ,  began co rrespon d in g  with General Ivan  C h is t iak o v  on th e  
su b je c t  of resuming n e g o t i a t io n s .  The exchange i n i t i a l l y  
bore l i t t l e  f r u i t .  The U.S. m ain ta ined  t h a t  th e r e  was no­
th in g  in  the  Moscow agreement t o  j u s t i f y  e x c lu d in g  groups 
from c o n s u l ta t io n  because of t h e i r  o p p o s i t io n  to  t r u s t e e ­
sh ip . In  a d d i t io n ,  r e g a r d le s s  o f  the  S o v ie t  c la im  to  the
c o n tra ry ,  th e re  was n o th in g  in  the agreement o r  in  the
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genera l  usage of the word "dem ocratic"  t h a t  r e s t r i c t e d  i t s  
a p p l ic a t io n  to  groups be longing to schoo ls  of thought f a ­
voring  c e r t a i n  c la s s e s  over o th e r s .  The S o v ie ts  were u n i l a ­
t e r a l l y  i n t e r p r e t i n g  th e  Moscow agreement to  p r o h ib i t  Koreans 
from ex p re ss in g  f r e e ly  t h e i r  w ishes and d e s i r e s .^
The S ov ie t  Union denied the U.S. charges ,  c la im ing  
t h a t  the aims and s p i r i t  of the Moscow D e c la ra t io n  made i t  
im possib le  to  c o n su l t  w ith  p a r t i e s  t h a t  d e c la re d  t h e i r  sup­
p o r t  of the  agreement, while a t  the same time adding s t i p u ­
l a t i o n s  which turned  t h e i r  support in to  empty s ta tem en ts .
As f a r  as  the term "democracy" went, th e  S ov ie t  Union be­
l ie v e d  th a t  i t  was n e ce ssa ry  to  c o n s id e r  the  a c tu a l  p o l i c i e s  
and a c t io n s  of any p a r ty ,  no t  i t s  announced in te n t io n s .
Both s id e s  con tinued  to  argue a long  th ese  l i n e s  
throughout the  summer and f a l l  o f  1946. American M i l i t a ry  
Government on more than  one occasion  suggested  to  Washington 
t h a t  the  only way to  re s o lv e  th e  deadlock and stop  the  de­
c l in in g  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea was f o r  the United 
S ta te s  to  approach the  Sov ie t Union on the  h ig h e s t  p o s s ib le  
governmental l e v e l ,  where s ta tem en ts  o f  U.S. i n te n t io n  and 
d e te rm in a tio n  to  s tay  in  Korea would have more e f f e c t . ^  The
^Hodge to  C h istiakov ,A ugust 12,1946, U.S. Department 
o f  S ta te ,  K o re a 's  Independence(Washington; GPO, 1947), 22-23.
^C his tiakov  to  Hodge,October 26,1946, I b i d . , 23-26.
%emo by S ta te  Department Member (H i l ld r in g )  o f  SWNCC, 
to  M arsha ll ,  J u ly  25; 1946, FR.1946, V I I I ,  718-719; Langdon 
to  Byrnes, August 3, 1946, I b i d . , 722-723*
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S ta te  Department had c o n s i s t e n t ly  d ec lin ed  to  do t h i s ,  
f e e l in g  i t  would in d ic a te  impatience and a weakening of 
American r e s o lv e .  The b e s t  p o l ic y  f o r  the United  S t a te s  was 
to  continue to  implement v ig o rously  th e  program t h a t  was to 
culm inate in  the South Korean In te r im  L e g i s l a t iv e  Assembly.^ 
In  October, 1946, the S ta te  Department seemed ready, 
a f t e r  months of f r u s t r a t i o n ,  to  adopt S e o u l 's  su g g e s t io n s .
A conv ersa tio n  on October 9, between General Arnold and the 
S ta te  D epartm ent's  top Far E a s te rn  o f f i c i a l s ,  r e s u l t e d  in  
agreement t h a t  a memorandum should be p repared  f o r  th e  Secre­
t a r y  of S ta te  suggesting  the need f o r  an approach on the 
governmental l e v e l .  L a te r ,  General John H i l ld r in g  sa id  he 
was p repared , i f  lo c a l  e f f o r t s  obviously  were f a i l i n g  to 
reconvene the J o i n t  Commission, "To recommend to  the  S ecre­
t a r y  th a t  he d is c u s s  o u ts tan d in g  problems on Korea w ith  Mr. 
Molotov," in c lu d in g  reconvening  the J o i n t  Commission.-^
While the S ta te  Department was contem pla ting  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of making a h ig h - le v e l  governmental approach to 
the  Soviet Union, an exchange of l e t t e r s  between Hodge and 
C his tiakov  in  l a t e  November-December brought n e a r  agreement. 
On February 28, 194?, C h is t iak o v  accepted  most of Hodge's
A cting  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  (C layton) to  Langdon, 
September 13, 1946, I b i d . . 736-737.
%emo of C onversation  w ith  General Arnold,
October 9, 1946, I b i d . . 743; Memo of C onversa tion  by the  
A cting  Chief of the D iv is io n  o f  Japanese A f f a i r s  (B orton ), 
October 16, 1946, I b i d . .  747-748.
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m o d if ica t io n s  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of an e a r l i e r  S ov ie t  p lan. 
Some of the accepted p ro p o sa ls  inc luded : a  d e c la r a t io n  in
good f a i t h  to  uphold the Moscow d e c is io n  would make a group 
e l i g i b l e  f o r  c o n s u l ta t io n ;  a  d e c la ra n t  p a r ty  had the  r ig h t  
to  appo in t the r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  i t  b e liev e d  would b e s t  p resen t 
i t s  views , though i f  such in d iv id u a ls  were a n ta g o n is t i c  the 
J o i n t  Commission a f t e r  mutual agreement cou ld  re q u i re  a sub­
s t i t u t e ;  a  p a r ty  o r o rg a n iz a t io n  which had signed Communique 
No. 5 could no t i n s t i g a t e  a c t iv e  o p p o s i t io n  to  the  work of 
the  J o i n t  Commission or to  any of the A l l ie d  powers and i f  
they  did so the J o i n t  Commission cou ld , a f t e r  mutual agree­
ment, exclude them from c o n s u l ta t io n .^  The S ta te  Department 
d id  n o t  f e e l ,  however, th a t  C h is t ia k o v ’s r e p ly  prov ided  a 
"sound b a s is"  f o r  reconvening  the  J o i n t  Commission and i t  had 
been given "no p u b l i c i ty  here  o r  in  Korea and w i l l  n o t  be 
answered f o r  the time b e i n g . T h i s  d e c is io n  r e f l e c t e d  a 
slow ly develop ing  change in  W ashington 's  commitment to  the 
Moscow d e c la r a t io n .
The in te r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  sou th  Korea in  e a r ly  19^7 
fo rce d  Hodge to re-em phasize the U.S. commitment to  the  
Moscow agreement. Rhee and h i s  fo l lo w ers  were fom enting
C his t iako v  to  Hodge, November 26,1946 and Hodge to 
C h is t iakov , December 24, 1946, K o re a 's  Independence, 28-31.
7
C h is t iakov  to  Hodge, February 28, 194?, I b i d . , 31- 
32; S ta te  Department to  the Ambassador in  Moscow, March 15. 
1947, c i te d  in  fo o tn o te  38 , i n  U.S. Department o f S ta te ,  
Fore ign  R e la tio n s  of the United S ta te s ,  1947: The F a r  East,
Volume VI(Washington: GPO, 1972), 0I 9 .
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confusion  about the United S t a te s ,  c la im ing  America was com­
m it ted  to  an independent south  Korea, while a t  the  same time 
accusing  the United S ta te s  of s e l l i n g  Korea down the r i v e r
O
to  Communism by n e g o t ia t in g  w ith  the Sov ie t Union.
Hodge continued  to  urge a  governmental approach to  
reconvene the J o i n t  Commission d is c u s s io n s ,  f e e l in g  th a t  
w ithout such an approach, the United S ta te s  could  lo se  the  
chance to  accomplish i t s  m ission  in  Korea and lo s e  the sup­
p o r t  of the Korean p eo p le , w ith  a  r e s u l t a n t  danger of v io ­
l e n t  ou tb reaks . MacArthur, i n  t r a n s m i t t in g  Hodge's memoran­
dum, expressed  h i s  s e r io u s  concern  over the Korean s i t u a t i o n .  
He recommended t h a t  the  e n t i r e  q u e s t io n  be subm itted  to  the 
United N ations o r  to  a Four Power conference o r  to  a  group 
o f  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  n a t io n s .  He too f e l t  a  governm ent-to-govern- 
ment meeting a t  the  h ig h e s t  l e v e l s  p o ss ib le  was the best hope 
o f  reach in g  a  so lu t io n  to  the Korean problem.^
John V in c e n t 's  r e p ly  r e i t e r a t e d  the S ta te  D epart­
m en t 's  p o l ic y —f o r  the time being  the i n i t i a t i o n  of an ap­
proach  to  the R ussians on a governmental l e v e l  would no t p ro ­
duce the d e s i re d  r e s u l t s .  Such an approach m ight be m is in -  
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  an in d ic a t io n  o f  American o v e r-a n x ie ty  to  ge t 
o u t  of Korea a s  soon as  p o s s ib le .  Yet Vincent d id  note  th a t
l a n g d o n  to  M arsha ll ,  Jan u a ry  4 and January  17,1947, 
FR. 1947. VI, 596-600.
o
Memo by the  D ire c to r  o f the  O ffice  o f F a r  E a s te rn  
A f f a i r s  (V incent) to  the S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  Jan uary  27,
1947, I b i d . .  601- 603.
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i n  the p a s t  months the  S ta te  Department had considered  many 
o f  MacArthur's recommendations.^^
V in cen t 's  memorandum in d ic a te d  th a t  no change in  
p o l ic y  was being con tem pla ted , y e t  on January  29, a  new Sec­
r e t a r y  of S ta te ,  George C. M arsha ll ,  had Vincent d r a f t  a  p lan  
to  organize a government of sou th  Korea th a t  would be con­
nected  economically to  Japan  and the United S t a t e s .  Both 
th e  War Department and th e  S ta te  Department supported  a 
g r a n t - i n - a id  fo r  sou th  K o r e a . A s s i s t a n t  C hief o f the  Di­
v is io n  of Japanese A f f a i r s ,  John A l l is o n ,  f u r th e r  suggested
t h a t  the United S ta te s  submit th e  Korean problem to  th e
12United Nations independent of R uss ia .
On February 4 , General A lb e rt  Brown, C hief Commis­
s io n e r  o f the U.S. J o i n t  Commission d e le g a t io n ,  concluded 
th a t  the in tense  e f f o r t s  o f the  "extreme r i g h t i s t  block" had 
made t ru s te e s h ip  such an is su e  in  south  Korea t h a t  a l l  o th e r  
p o l i t i c a l  is su e s  were e c l ip s e d .  The le a d e r s  of t h i s  group 
would keep t h i s  " s u r e - f i r e  is su e "  in  the f o r e f r o n t  f o r  i t s  
exp los ive  a p p e a l . T h e  s i t u a t i o n  was s l ip p in g  away from 
the  o p t im is t ic  a t t i t u d e  t h a t  had p re v a i le d  a f t e r  the e l e c ­
t io n s  f o r  the South Korean In te r im  L e g i s l a t iv e  Assembly.
In  February, Washington had decided " to  convene a 
h ig h - le v e l  S ta te  Department and War Department Committee to
bid. ^^I b i d . ,603. ^^ I b id . .  fn .  38, 613- 
^ la n g d o n  to  M arsh a ll ,  February  20, 1947, I b i d . ,
607- 608.
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make recommendations on fu tu re  p o l ic y  in  K orea."  The I n t e r -  
Departmental C om m ittee 's  r e p o r t  on Korea was produced on 
February 25 and re p re se n te d  a con s iderab le  s h i f t  away from 
p a s t  U.S. p o l ic y —or as  Vincent had s ta te d  t h a t  p o l ic y  in  
l a t e  January . The d e t e r i o r a t i n g  s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea, the  a s ­
cension of a  new S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  and the  f r u s t r a t i o n s  of 
nine months of s ta g n a t io n  produced a w il l in g n e s s  to approach 
R ussia  on a governm ental l e v e l .
The In te r-D e p a r tm en ta l  Committee concluded t h a t  
M arshall should d i s c u s s  "the  q u e s t io n  of Korea with  the 
S o v ie ts  on h i s  upcoming t r i p  to  Moscow." T his approach, 
along w ith  funds " f o r  economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n ,  e d u ca tio n a l  
and governmental improvement, and p o l i t i c a l  g u id an ce ,"  was 
necessary  f o r  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o lu t io n  of the  Korean problem.
A p ro p er ly  p lanned , a g g re ss iv e  approach would minimize the 
appearance of weakness, would be of g r e a t  a s s i s ta n c e  to  
Hodge, would c l a r i f y  A m erica 's  p o s i t io n  w ith  reg a rd  to  i t s  
in te n t io n s  in  Korea, and would show Congress " t h a t  a l l  p o s s i ­
ble e f f o r t s  had been made to  achieve a Korean s e t t l e m e n t .
To give the  im press ion  of a s tro n g  U.S. commitment 
in  Korea i t  was e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  Congress approve a  th re e  year  
program of a id  f o r  K orea—t h i s  would enable the  U nited  S ta te s  
to  approach " the  S o v ie ts  on a s u f f i c i e n t l y  s t ro n g  b a s i s  to
14M arshall to  MacArthur, February  7, 1947, I b i d . ,  
605- 606; Memo by the S pec ia l  In te r -D e p a r tm en ta l  Committee 
on Korea, February  25, 1947. I b i d . . 6O8- 609.
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give  hope o f  se cu r in g  a s e t t le m e n t  s a t i s f a c to r y  to  the  United 
S t a t e s . "  The f ig u re  o f  $600 m i l l io n  fo r  th e  th re e  yea r  p ro ­
gram was mentioned, o f which $250 m il l io n  would be prov ided  
in  1948. I f  such a program were n o t approved, Washington 
fe a re d  th a t  the  Korean s i t u a t i o n  would so d e t e r io r a t e  t h a t  
A m erica 's  world p o s i t io n  would be s e r io u s ly  im paired .
Other recommendations were: b ring  c i v i l i a n s  in to
American M i l i t a r y  Government; end MacArthur’ s p o l i t i c a l  but 
n o t  m i l i t a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  in  Korea; i s s u e  a new d i r e c t i v e  
to  Hodge; i n t e n s i f y  e f f o r t s  to  include Koreans in  government; 
and d isp a tc h  b u s in e ss ,  i n d u s t r i a l ,  and e d u c a t io n a l  groups f o r  
reform  and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  of Korean so c ie ty .  The Com m ittee 's  
r e p o r t  a lso  no ted  t h a t  the re  was some p re s s u re ,  p r im a r i ly  
from the Rhee group, f o r  U.S. re c o g n i t io n  of an independent 
sou th  Korea. While t h i s  s te p  might enable the  U nited  S ta te s  
to r i d  i t s e l f  o f some onerous burdens, the r e p o r t  concluded 
t h a t  no s in g le  a c t  could  solve the  p re se n t  problems fa c in g  
Korea. R ecognition  of south Korean independence would no t 
so lve  her  economic problem s—only  u n i f i c a t i o n  and a  program 
of a id  could do th a t . ^ ^
An independent south  Korea might p rov ide  an excuse 
to  end U.S. f i n a n c ia l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  but such a  course would
^ In te r-D epartm en ta l  Committee R eport, I b i d . , 6 l4 .  
I t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  Truman D o c trine  re q u e s ts  made i t  impos­
s i b l e  to  ask f o r  funds i n  the  magnitude suggested  in  the 
r e p o r t .
16Ib id . .  611, 617.
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mean s ta rv a t io n  and economic chaos. Even more im p o r ta n t ,  the 
Committee be lieved  i t  would be a  " d i r e c t  break o f  our commit­
ments, both to our a l l i e s  and to th e  K oreans," commitments 
t h a t  were being watched w ith  g re a t  concern "by a l l  sm all 
powers and dependent peop les  throughout the  w orld ."  F u l f i l l ­
ment of U.S. p ledges  would show t h a t  American fo re ig n  p o l ic y  
was based on fundamental p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  would n o t  be aban­
doned. The r e s t  of the world would p e rce iv e  r e c o g n i t io n  and 
withdrawal of U.S. f o r c e s  as  a  complete d e fe a t  f o r  th e  United 
S ta te s  in  a  t e s t  o f s t r e n g th  w ith  the S o v ie ts .  In  term s of 
world power r e l a t i o n s ,  the  e f f e c t  would c e r t a i n l y  f a r  t r a n s ­
cend a mere t r a n s f e r  of sou th  Korea from U.S. to  S o v ie t  con­
t r o l .  The r e s u l t i n g  l o s s  of p re s t ig e  and in f lu e n c e ,  and the 
consequent in c rease  i n  S o v ie t  in f lu en ce  and power "would have 
p r e j u d i c i a l  r e p e rc u s s io n s  n o t  only on the  U.S. i n t e r e s t s  in  
the  Far E a s t ,  bu t on the e n t i r e  U.S. world p o s i t io n .
The Committee, however, d id  n o t t o t a l l y  r e j e c t  the 
f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  seek ing  a so lu t io n  o u ts id e  the  Moscow a g re e ­
ment. P re se n t in g  the  problem to the  U nited  N a tions  would be 
u n s a t i s f a c to r y  f o r  th ree  rea so n s :  f i r s t ,  i t  would be an ad­
m ission of A m erica 's  f a i l u r e  in  Korea and would damage U.S. 
p r e s t ig e ;  second, the  S o v ie ts  could co un te r  w ith  a  c la im  
t h a t  America was committed to  an in te r n a t io n a l  agreement 
reg a rd in g  Korea which she re fu sed  to  implement; t h i r d ,  such
l ? I b id . .  611-612.
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a c t io n  probably  would no t r e s u l t  in  a  speedy s o lu t io n  of the 
problem. I f  a l l  o th e r  e f f o r t s  to solve the Korean problem 
f a i l e d ,  however, r e f e r r a l  o f the, q u e s t io n  to  the  United 
N ations might become d e s i r a b l e .  This could be done only
when i t  could be shown co n c lu s iv e ly  t h a t  R uss ia  was d e l ib e -
18r a t e l y  p re v e n t in g  a  s o lu t io n  to  the  Korean problem.
S e c re ta ry  of War Robert P a t te r s o n  had reached  a d i f ­
f e r e n t  conc lusion  th an  had the  S ta te  D epartm ent 's  Committee. 
He be liev ed  the  s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea was so p o t e n t i a l l y  exp lo ­
sive t h a t  an i n t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  could develop which would 
fo rce  a  p r e c i p i t a t e  American withdrawal under c o n d i t io n s  
g rav e ly  d e tr im e n ta l  to  i t s  p o s i t io n  in  the F a r  E a s t  and in  
the world. As lo ng  a s  the United S ta te s  remained in  Korea 
t h i s  danger would c o n tin u e , s ince  no program could  s a t i s f y  
the in te n se  d e s i r e  f o r  independence f e l t  in  Korea. On the 
b a s is  of the  r e l a t i v e  s t r e n g th  of the  two occupa tion  fo rc e s ,  
the Korean occupa tion  was a  most d i f f i c u l t  one to  m a in ta in . 
From the s ta n d p o in t  o f  U.S. s e c u r i ty  "the p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of
long-te rm  rem unera tive  r e s u l t s  a re  low ," e s p e c i a l l y  i f  a
19speedy s o lu t io n  u n i t i n g  the  country  was no t a t t a i n e d .
P a t te r s o n  was convinced th a t  America should "g e t  out 
of Korea a t  an e a r l y  d a te ,"  and th a t  a l l  measures "should 
have e a r ly  w ithdrawal a s  t h e i r  o v e rr id in g  o b je c t iv e . "
l ^ i b i d . . 613 .
^ ^ P a t te r so n  to  Acheson, A pril  4,194?, I b i d . , 626.
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P a t te r s o n  was aware of the importance of a  s o lu t io n  t h a t  did 
n o t  abandon Korea to  the Sovie t Union. He a lso  was cog n izan t 
t h a t  A m erica 's  f a i l u r e  to  c a r ry  ou t i t s  p o l i c i e s  would have 
a n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t  on Japan and on U.S. s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s  in  
the  F a r  E a s t .  But i t  e q u a l ly  was c l e a r  t h a t  from the s tan d ­
p o in t  of U.S. s e c u r i ty  i n t e r e s t s ,  American p o lic y  in  A sia
could n o t  be viewed on a piecemeal b a s is ;  Korean p o l ic y  had
20to  be an in te g ra te d  p a r t  of an o v e ra l l  s t r a te g y .
P a t te r s o n  a lso  b e liev ed  th a t  r e q u e s ts  fo r  funds 
should  be made only a f t e r  i t  could be shown t h a t  the  f o l ­
low ing had been done: t h a t  every e f f o r t  had been made on the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  to  solve the economic i l l s  a r i s i n g  from 
the d i v i s io n  a t  the 38th  p a r a l l e l ;  t h a t  th e  United S ta te s  had 
developed a program th a t  would in su re  re d u c t io n  of the c o s t  
of the  Korean commitment a t  an e a r ly  date  ; and, t h a t  i f  an 
agreement w ith  the  Sov ie t Union could n o t  be reached , th e re  
was a program a v a i la b le  t h a t  included a l t e r n a t i v e s  such a s
r e f e r r a l  of the problem to  the  United N ations  or e s t a b l i s h -
21ment o f  an independent sou th  Korean government. Thus, in  
A p r i l ,  1947, the War Department had decided  t h a t  i f  n e g o t ia ­
t io n s  bogged down aga in , the two p o l ic y  a l t e r n a t i v e s  to  be 
pursued  were to  r e f e r  the  problem to  the  U nited  N a tions  and 
to  e s t a b l i s h  an independent south  Korea, th u s  e n ab lin g  the  
United S t a te s  to withdraw. This p o l ic y  e v e n tu a l ly  was
^ ° Ib id .. 626- 627. ^ ^ Ib id .. 627.
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accep ted , and d u ring  the n e x t  few months the War Department 
and then the Defense Department pushed these  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
a g a in s t  opposit ion  from the S ta te  Department.
The S ta te  D epartm en t 's  r e a c t io n  to  P a t t e r s o n 's  com­
ments in d ic a te d  t h a t  a s  y e t  i t s  th in k in g  had n o t  developed 
along the same l i n e s .  V incent, in  a  c o n c i l i a to r y  memorandum, 
p o in ted  out t h a t  th e re  was a consensus of op in ion  between 
the two departm ents and th a t  P a t t e r s o n 's  extreme pessimism 
was the only r e a l  d i f f e r e n c e .  While a g re e in g  with P a t te r s o n  
about the i n t e n s i t y  o f  the  Korean d e s i r e  f o r  independence, 
Vincent be liev ed  the dangers a r i s i n g  from t h i s  d e s i r e  were 
being exaggera ted . E a r ly  withdrawal was d e s i r a b l e ,  bu t a de­
f i n i t i o n  of "ea r ly "  would have to  be reached ; Vincent be- • 
l ie v e d  th ree  yea rs  was e a r ly .  F i n a l l y ,  while P a t te r s o n  f e l t  
t h a t  an independent sou th  Korea and r e f e r r a l  o f  the problem 
to th e  United N ations were d e f i n i t e  p o l ic y  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,
Vincent was ab le  only  " to  e n v is io n  the p o s s i b i l i t y "  o f such 
22a cou rse . V in c e n t 's  comments were designed to  give the 
im pression  t h a t  a  consensus e x is te d  where th e re  was none.
While V incent t r i e d  to  smooth over in te r -d e p a r tm e n ta l  
d i f f e r e n c e s .  Acheson informed M arshall of the  Committee's 
recommendation th a t  w hile  in  Moscow he should approach the 
S o v ie ts  on the s u b je c t  c f  reconvening the J o i n t  Commission.
22Vincent to  Acheson, A p ri l  8, 19^7, 740.00119 Con­
t r o l  (K orea)/4-847, i n  C en tra l  F i le  Records, Decimal F i l e s ,  
I 9IO -I949, Record Group 59. Department of S ta te  Branch, 
N a tiona l A rchives, Washington D.C.
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The r e s u l t  was t h a t  M arsha ll and Molotov agreed to  reconvene 
the  J o i n t  Commission on May 20, on a  b a s is  th a t  c lo s e ly  r e ­
sembled the one Hodge had o u t l in e d  on December 24, 1946, and 
which C h is tiakov  had accep ted  on February 20, 194?.^^
Announcement t h a t  th e  J o i n t  Commission would be r e ­
convened was n o t  met w ith  unanimous enthusiasm  in  south  
Korea. The "Rhee, Kim Koo, a n t i - t r u s t e e s h i p ,  a n t i - S o v ie t  
e lem ents" were t r y in g  d e s p e ra te ly  " to  bulldoze a l l  r i g h t i s t  
p a r t i e s  and groups" in to  t h e i r  o p p o sit io n  movement. Mass 
p o l i t i c a l  m eetings were fo rb idd en  in  an a ttem pt to  head o f f  
dem onstra tions  t h a t  would e l im in a te  the  r i g h t i s t s  from con­
s u l t a t i o n ,  which some r i g h t i s t s  may have d e s i r e d .  I f  e x c lu ­
ded, only the l e f t i s t s  would remain, making a  communist-domi­
n a te d  s ta te :  a c e r t a i n t y ,  an outcome America would n o t  accep t
in  l i g h t  of "our Governm ent's d e c la r a t io n  of war on 
24Communism."
While the i n t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  sou th  Korea d id  n o t  
bode w ell f o r  the  J o i n t  Commission, rap id  p ro g re s s  marked 
the  "easy  and in fo rm a l"  f i r s t  s e s s io n .  By June 7, agreement 
had been reached on both  the  o rd e r  o f c o n su l t in g  the  p a r t i e s  
and on un lim ited  o r a l  c o n s u l ta t io n ,  and q u e s t io n n a i r e s  had 
been p r in te d .  Langdon concluded from the r e l a t i v e l y  c o rd ia l
^Acheson to  M a rsh a ll ,  A p ril  11, 194?, FR.1947. VI, 
630-631 ; fo r  the  exchange of l e t t e r s  see I b i d . ,  632. 638. 
640, 643, 644.
24P o l i t i c a l  A dviser in  Korea(Langdon) to  M arsha ll ,  
May 1 9 , 1947, I ^ . ,  645.
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manner of th e  t a l k s  t h a t  the  S ov ie ts  might be t r y in g  "to 
produce co n cre te  r e s u l t s  by Ju ly  o r  A ugust."  By June 11, 
Langdon could r e p o r t  t h a t  th e  d e le g a t io n s  had exchanged "de­
t a i l e d  w r i t t e n  d a ta  on the s t r u c tu r e ,  fu n c t io n s ,  and d i r e c ­
t in g  personnel o f the  ex ecu tiv e , l e g i s l a t i v e ,  and ju d ic ia r y  
organs of a u th o r i ty  of N orth  and South Korea.
The e a r l y  success i n  the J o i n t  Commission allowed 
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  in  both zones to  apply  f o r  re c o g n i t io n  f o r  
c o n s u l ta t io n .  In  the  n o r th ,  th ree  p a r t i e s  and 35 so c ia l  o r ­
g a n iz a t io n s ,  w ith  an a l l - l e f t i s t  membership of 13 m il l io n ,  
a p p lied .  In  the south , 425 p a r t i e s  w ith  a  membership of 62 
m il l io n  a p p l ie d ,  in d ic a t in g  d u p l ic a t io n  s ince  K o re a 's  e n t i r e  
p o p u la tio n  was only 30 m i l l io n .  Hodge es tim ated  t h a t  the
r i g h t i s t s  h e ld  a s l i g h t  m a jo r ity  o f the  t o t a l  membership
26of  a l l  p a r t i e s  i n  Korea.
With the  n e g o t ia t io n s  p ro g re s s in g  to  an apparen t s e t ­
t lem en t, the S ov ie t  Union re v e r te d  to  i t s  o ld  p o s i t io n  , on 
c o n s u l ta t io n .  I n  d is c u s s io n s  on June 27, the S o v ie t  Union 
announced t h a t  i t  would i n s i s t  on exc lud ing  from c o n s u l ta t io n  
e ig h t  r i g h t i s t  p a r t i e s ,  w ith  a membership of over th ree  m i l ­
l i o n .  Other p a r t i e s  a ls o  would be excluded i f  i t  appeared 
t h a t  they were opposing t r u s t e e s h ip  o r  the  Moscow d e c la ra ­
t io n .  On the  2 8 th , the R ussian d e le g a t io n  i n s i s t e d  th a t
^ ^ a n g d o n  to M arsha ll ,  June 9, 1947, I b i d . , 668-71; 
I b i d . . June 11, 1947, I b i d . .  673-674.
26
Hodge to  M arsha ll ,  June 26,1947, I b i d . . 679 .
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approxim ately  35 groups belonging to an a n t i - t r u s t e e  sh ip  com­
m it te e  formed in  January , 194?, be excluded u n le s s  they  q u i t .  
The United S ta te s  re fu se d  a  b lanket e x c lu s io n  based on mem­
bersh ip  in  an in a c t iv e  committee. Each case  should be con-
27s id e red  on i t s  in d iv id u a l  m e r i t .
In  la rg e  p a r t ,  the  Sovie t r e v e r s a l  was a n o th e r  a t ­
tempt to ensure a  l e f t i s t - d o m in a te d  Korean P ro v is io n a l  gov­
ernment. I f  the groups involved  had to  q u i t  .p u b l ic ly  the 
a n t i - t r u s t e e s h i p  committee, they undoubtedly would b o l t  the 
J o i n t  Commission, c a r ry in g  almost a l l  r i g h t i s t  suppo rt  with 
them. But ano th e r  element in  Soviet th in k in g  was the  v io ­
len ce  with which the Rhee r i g h t i s t s  a t ta c k e d  t r u s t e e s h i p  and 
the Sovie t Union, e q u a tin g  coopera tion  w ith  the J o i n t  Com­
m ission  w ith  Communism and Russian c o n t ro l .  Hodge was d i s ­
tu rbed  too , b e l ie v in g  t h a t  R hee 's  propaganda served  only to  
confuse a  " p o l i t i c a l l y  i n f a n t i l e  p e o p le ."  The r i g h t i s t  
g roups, Hodge though t, had n o t  changed t h e i r  o p p o s i t io n  to  
the Moscow agreement, but had agreed to  coopera te  w ith  the
J o i n t  Commission only to  g a in  a p ro v is io n a l  government
28opposed to  t r u s t e e s h ip .
Hodge's b i t t e r  c r i t i c i s m  of the r i g h t  con tinued  on 
J u ly  7, when he re p o r te d  t h a t  R hee 's  a c t i v i t i e s  were a l l
^ ^ P o l i t i c a l  A dviser in  Korea (Jacobs) to  M arsh a ll ,  
June 28, 1947, I b i d . , 680-682; M arshall to  Ja co b s ,  J u ly  2, 
1947, IM d*. 682.
^^Jacobs to  M arsh a ll ,  June 28, 1947, I b i d . , 682; 
Hodge to M arsha ll ,  J u ly  2 and J u ly  3» 1947, I b i d . , 682- 
684, 686.
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p a r t  of a  campaign to break up the  J o i n t  Commission and e s ­
t a b l i s h  a  se p a ra te  south Korean government. On the l 6 th ,  he 
wrote t h a t  "Rhee and h i s  gang a re  engaged in  a l l - o u t  opposi­
t io n  to  the R uss ians , the J o i n t  Commission, General Hodge, 
and m i l i t a r y  government . . u s in g  the a n t i - t r u s t e e  sh ip  
i s s u e  as  a  r a l l y i n g  p o i n t . T h e  n ex t day, a f t e r  a  conver­
s a t io n  w ith Rhee, Hodge re p o r te d  t h a t  Rhee "would n o t  p a r t i ­
c ip a te  in  the work of the  J o i n t  Commission and would n o t  co­
ope ra te  u n le s s  the  r e s u l t s  s a t i s i f i e d  Rhee and h i s  p a r ty .
Hodge' s growing and in te n s e  d i s l ik e  o f Rhee once 
again  p resen ted  th e  United S ta te s  w ith  a problem of whom to  
support in  Korea ( e s p e c ia l ly  s in ce  Lyuh Woon-hyung,the only 
hope f o r  f o r c e f u l  moderate l e a d e r s h ip ,  had been a s s a s s in a te d  
on J u ly  19)• The d i f f i c u l t y  developed because no m a t te r  how 
f l e x i b l e  and open to compromise the United S ta te s  was, the  • 
S o v ie t  Union adamantly re fu sed  to  change i t s  J o i n t  Commis­
s ion  p o s i t io n .  With no p ro sp e c t  o f p ro g re s s  in  s ig h t ,  the 
S ta te  Department in s t ru c te d  the U.S. d e le g a t io n  n o t  to  c a l l  
any more m eetings except fo r  the  purpose of p re p a r in g  a 
j o i n t  r e p o r t  on J o i n t  Commission p roceed ings .^^
With the  onset of the J o i n t  Commission dead lock , the 
United S ta te s  had to  develop a  new course o f a c t io n .  Joseph
^^Hodge to  M arshall, J u ly  16,194?, I b i d . . 703-704.
^^Jacobs to  M arshall, J u ly  16,194?, I b i d . , ?04-?06.
^^Henderson, K orea, 133-34; Jacobs to  M arsh a ll ,
Ju ly  2 5 , 1947, I b i d . , 732-733: A cting  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  to  
Jaco b s , August 2? , 194?, I b i d . , 7?4.
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Jacobs , the new P o l i t i c a l  A dviser in  Seoul, concluded, a f t e r  
a  t r i p  to  n o r th  Korea, t h a t  th e  Sovie t Union had e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  a  "Korean Communist S ta te  with a l l  i t s  t r a p p in g s ."  
Even i f  the J o i n t  Commission was s u c c e s s fu l  in  imple­
menting the Moscow agreement, the s i t u a t i o n  in  North 
Korea would make in te g r a t io n  of the two zones ex trem ely  
d i f f i c u l t .  On Ju ly  25, he added th a t  the  U.S. d e le g a t io n  
to  the  J o i n t  Commission b e liev ed  th a t  th e  p re s e n t  l i n e s  of 
arguments "are v i r t u a l l y  exhausted and t h a t  new l i n e s  must 
be adopted.
John A l l i s o n 's  memorandum of J u l y  29, added substance  
to J a c o b s ' suggestion  t h a t  a new course be considered . 
A l l i s o n ,  A s s is ta n t  C h ie f  of N o rth eas t  Asian A f f a i r s ,  recom­
mended t h a t  in  case the  S o v ie ts  broke o f f  the  J o i n t  Com­
m ission  t a l k s  p r i o r  to  August 5, the U n ited  S ta te s  should 
seek a  Four Power p lan  f o r  e a r ly ,  s e c r e t ,  m u l t i - p a r ty  e l e c ­
t io n s  in  both zones to  choose p ro v is io n a l  l e g i s l a t u r e s ,  
l e a d in g  e v en tu a l ly  to  fo rm ation  of a P ro v is io n a l  Government. 
This Government would c o n su l t  w ith the Four Powers f o r  a id  
and a s s i s ta n c e  "needed in  o rd e r  to  pu t Korea on a  f irm  eco­
nomic fo u n d a t io n ."  T h is  should be done w ith  speed, a s  "no 
undue de lay  can be p e rm i t te d ."  I f  a  speedy arrangement could 
n o t  be reached , the United S ta te s  should p re s e n t  the  United
^^Jaco b s .to  M arsha ll ,  J u ly  7, 194?, I b i d . . 690- 
691; Jacobs to  M arsha ll ,  Ju ly  25, 194?, I b i d . . 731- 
733.
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3 3N atio n s  the  problem a t  i t s  n e x t  g e n e ra l  s e s s io n .
Meanwhile, A l l i s o n  b e liev e d  the  United  S ta te s  should 
c a r r y  ou t immediately the p re v io u s ly  mentioned e le c t io n s .
I f  the  United N ations f a i l e d  to  so lve  th e  problem the United 
S t a t e s  should be ready to  g ra n t  independence to  south  Korea, 
and should  be a c t iv e ly  p re p a r in g  a  study of the economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  consequences o f such a  s te p .  A l l i s o n 's  recommen­
d a t io n s  took form in  a te legram  o f  August 26, from Washing­
to n  to  th e  S ov ie t  F ore ign  O ff ic e .  The S o v ie t  Union unequi­
v o c a l ly  r e j e c t e d  the program on September 5i 19^?.^^
Follow ing  in  September on the  h e e l s  of the  Sov ie t 
r e f u s a l  to  compromise were a s e r i e s  o f v i t a l l y  im portan t 
p o l ic y  d is c u s s io n s .  On September 9, 1947, F ra n c is  S tevens, 
A s s i s t a n t  C hief of the E a s te rn  European A f f a i r s  D iv is io n ,  
a f t e r  a  m eeting in  the  S ta te  Departm ent, wrote to  George 
Kennan and John A ll is o n  t h a t  he was " in c r e a s in g ly  concerned 
a s  to  whether what seemed to  be a  f a i r l y  unanimous agreement 
to  abandon the Koreans to  t h e i r  f a t e  may n o t  be a  r a th e r  
s h o r t - s ig h te d  p o l ic y  from the s ta n d p o in t  of our long-range  
i n t e r e s t s . "  While conceding t h a t  m i l i t a r i l y  Korea was a 
s t r a t e g i c  l i a b i l i t y ,  S tevens n o n e th e le s s  f e l t  th e re  were im­
p o r t a n t  " id e o lo g ic a l  im ponderables" t h a t  should n o t  be
^%emo by A l l is o n ,  J u ly  29, 1947, and Ad Hoc Com­
m it te e  Report on Korea, August 4 ,1947 , I b i d . . 734-35,736-40.
34L o v e t t  to the Embassy in  the  S o v ie t  Union,
August 26, 1946, I b i d . , 771-774; M o lo to v 'to  the S e c re ta ry  
o f  S t a t e ,  September 5, 1947, I b i d . . 779-780.
-  1 0 7  -
3*5overlooked in  making a f i n a l  d e c is io n  on Korean po licy .
Stevens b e liev ed  th a t  " in  the id e o lo g ic a l  s trugg le  
between E a s t  and West, between-Communist and Western p o l i ­
t i c a l  co n ce p ts ,"  d e c is io n s  based on l o c a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  
could  have a  worldwide im pact. Only in  Korea were Sov ie t and 
American fo rc e s  in  d i r e c t  c o n ta c t ,  sh a r in g  the ad m in is tra ­
t io n  of the coun try . A m erica 's  pledge to  e s t a b l i s h  an i n ­
dependent Korea had made the  country  a  symbol o f both the 
East-W est s t ru g g le  and of the  s i n c e r i t y  of Am erica's commit­
ment to the n a t io n a l  aims of Asian p eop le .  To allow Korea 
to  f a l l  by d e f a u l t  to  the  S o v ie ts  would p re se n t  the world 
w ith  ano ther  U.S. d e f e a t ,  th u s  damaging A m erica 's  p r e s t ig e .  
The f a i t h  o f  Asian n a t io n a l  movements would be shaken and the 
consequences would be f a r - r e a c h in g .  Stevens hoped th a t  these  
f a c to r s  would re c e iv e  " s e r io u s  c o n s id e ra t io n  before  a hasty  
d e c is io n  i s  taken to  withdraw e n t i r e l y  from Korea.
General A lb e r t  Wedemeyer's r e p o r t  to  Truman r e i t e ­
r a t e d  Stevens co ncerns . Wedemeyer b e liev e d  t h a t  a withdrawal 
of a l l  U.S. a id  from Korea would r e s u l t  in  the c re a t io n  of a 
S ov ie t  s a t e l l i t e ,  an event t h a t  "would c o s t  the United S ta te s  
an immense l o s s  in  moral p r e s t ig e  among the peop les  o f Asia" 
and would have s e r io u s  re p e rc u s s io n s  in  Japan . Soviet p r e s ­
t ig e  in  A sia  would in c r e a s e ,  a s  would chances f o r  " fu r th e r
35-^^ Memo by Stevens to  George Kennan and John A l l is o n ,  
September 9, 1947, I b i d . .  784-785.
^^Ibid.
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S o v ie t  expansion among n a t io n s  c lose  in  p rox im ity  to  the 
S o v ie t  Union." I f  the  United N ations provided  no s o lu t io n ,  
the  United S ta te s  would have to  decide whether to  withdraw 
o r  whether to  o rgan ize  an independent south  Korea t h a t  
America would su ppo rt  econom ically  and m i l i t a r i l y .
Wedemeyer f e l t  i t  was v i t a l  f o r  the United S ta te s  to  p re ­
v e n t  d i r e c t  or i n d i r e c t  Sov ie t co n tro l  of Korea.
On September 19, Joseph Jacobs added a  p rob ing  and 
p e rc e p t iv e  a n a ly s i s  o f  U.S. p o l ic y  in  Korea. According to  
Ja co b s ,  the  United S ta te s  needed to  r e o r i e n t  i t s  Korea p o l ic y  
i n  l i g h t  of the p r e s e n t  world s i t u a t i o n .  Any d e c is io n  to  
undertake  heavy commitments in  south Korea should be based 
on the  c a r e f u l l y  co n s id e re d  ques tion  o f  whether Korea was 
o f  s u f f i c i e n t l y  v i t a l  importance in  the  c o n tex t  o f  S o v ie t-  
American r e l a t i o n s  w ith in  the fo re see ab le  fu tu re  f o r  the 
U nited  S ta te s  to  undertake  the r i s k  and expense o f  ho ld ing  
so u th  K orea. A c o r o l l a r y  qu es tio n  was, i f  the United S ta te s  
d id  n o t  have the re s o u rc e s  to  e n te r  in to  a l l  the u n d e rtak in g s  
around th e  Soviet p e r im e te r  considered  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  n eces­
s a ry ,  was sou th  Korea one a re a  th a t  could be s a fe ly  aban­
doned in  fa v o r  o f some o th e r  nearby undertak ing?^^
I f  the  answer was t h a t  Korea was so v i t a l  to
37•'^  Report to  th e  P re s id e n t  on China-Korea, Submitted 
by LT. General A.C. Wedemeyer, Dated September 19, 19^7,
I b i d . .  796- 803.
^^Jacobs to  M arshall,Septem ber 19, 19^7, I b i d . ,
805.
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A m erica 's  p o l ic y  of containment of the S ov ie t  Union th a t  i t  
had to  be h e ld ,  then the Moscow agreement should be l i q u i ­
dated  a s  q u ick ly  and g ra c e fu l ly  a s  p o s s ib le  and p la n s  should 
be implemented to develop south Korea "w ith  the utm ost v i ­
g o r ."  The c o s t s  simply would have to  be borne; th e re  was no 
o th e r  a l t e r n a t i v e .  I f  p o l ic y  makers, however, decided south  
Korea was n o t  v i t a l  to  Am erica's defense  or t h a t  i t  could no t 
be held  w ith  e x i s t i n g  a v a i la b le  r e s o u rc e s , th e n  America should 
compromise w ith  the  R ussians to  work out a  p lan  f o r  the f o r ­
mation o f  an a ll-K orean  government, w ith sim ultaneous w ith ­
drawal o f a l l  fo rc e s  to  fo llow . Such withdrawal would r e ­
s u l t  in  a " s t a t e  o f anarchy and b lo o d le t t in g " ,  th u s  e l im i ­
n a t in g  the  need f o r  a id  o r a s s i s ta n c e .  Jacobs concluded 
th a t  "We cannot g ive democracy, as  we know i t ,  to  any 
people o r  cram i t  down t h e i r  t h r o a t s .
The S ta te  Department had p u t  the  q u e s t io n  o f  the
jkn
s t r a t e g i c  va lue  of Korea to  the m i l i t a r y  on September 15- 
S e c re ta ry  of Defense James F o r r e s t a l l  answered on Septem­
ber 29 . The J o in t  C h ie fs  of S ta f f  concluded t h a t  the  United 
S ta te s ,  from a m i l i t a r y  s ta n d p o in t ,  had l i t t l e  s t r a t e g i c  in ­
t e r e s t  in  m a in ta in in g  i t s  p resen t  tro o p s  and bases in  Korea. 
I f  h o s t i l i t i e s  broke ou t in  the F a r  E a s t ,  American fo rc e s  
in  Korea would be a  m i l i t a r y  l i a b i l i t y  :.nd could n o t  be
39 i b i d . , 805- 806 . 
hoMemo by SWNCC to  the S e c re ta ry  of the  JCS, Sep­
tember 15 , 1947, I b i d . .  817-818.
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m aintained  th ere  w ithou t s u b s ta n t ia l  re in fo rce m en ts  p r i o r  to 
the i n i t i a t i o n  of h o s t i l i t i e s .  In  a d d i t io n ,  the Korean pe­
n in s u la  p robably  would be bypassed should the United S ta te s  
wish to  conduct o f fe n s iv e  o p e ra t io n s  on the  A s ia t ic  c o n t i ­
n e n t .  Yet the  p resence of s tron g  enemy a i r  and naval bases 
in  Korea could i n t e r f e r e  "w ith  U.S. communications and naval 
bases in  E a s t  China, Manchuria, the  Yellow Sea, the  Sea of 
Japan , and a d ja c e n t  i s l a n d s .
The J o i n t  C h iefs  f e l t  t h a t  the 45,000 men in  south  
Korea could  be b e t t e r  used e lsew here . T h e ir  w ithdrawal from 
Korea would no t im pair  the F a r  E as t  Command's m i l i t a r y  p o s i ­
t io n  u n le s s  R ussia  e s ta b l i s h e d  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g th  in  Korea 
s u f f i c i e n t  to  a s s a u l t  Jap an . The m i l i t a r y  warned, however, 
t h a t  a  p r e c i p i t a t e  w ithdrawal could p o s s ib ly  low er U.S. m i l i ­
t a r y  p r e s t ig e  " to  the  e x te n t  o f ad v erse ly  a f f e c t i n g  coopera­
t io n  in  o th e r  a re a s  more v i t a l  to the s e c u r i t y  of the United
S ta te s . "  A program of economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and c u l t u r a l
42r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  should accompany w ith d raw a l.
The Defense D epartm en t 's  view of w ithdraw al seemed 
to  c r y s t a l l i z e  p rev ious  th in k in g  on the s u b je c t .  V incent, 
i n  November, 1946, had expressed  f e a r s  abou t the  e f f e c t s  of 
a  p r e c i p i t a t e  withdrawal when he noted  t h a t  the  United 
S ta te s  "would g e t  i n to  a l l  k in d s  o f  t ro u b le "  i f  a
4 l F o r r e s t a l  to  M arsh a ll ,  September 29, 194?, I b i d . ,
817-818.
^^Ibid.
I l l  -
sim ultaneous troop withdrawal occurred  before  the e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of a  u n i f ie d  Korean a d m in is t r a t io n .  H i l ld r in g  agreed 
th a t  a  s t ro n g  c e n t r a l  government was a n e c e s s i ty  f o r  Korea, 
bu t he a ls o  concluded th a t  should the R ussians p re s e n t  a 
program f o r  dual withdrawal the  n e x t  day, the United S ta te s  
"very p ro p erly "  should decide to  "haul our f r e i g h t . "  In  the 
February  1947, In te r-D ep artm en ta l  r e p o r t ,  w ithdraw al had been 
p re d ic a te d  on e s tab l ish m en t of sa feguards  to  guaran tee  
Korean p o l i t i c a l  and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y .
The l a s t  and most im portan t  of the many September 
p o l ic y  d is c u s s io n s  came on - September 29, in  a m eeting in  
the  S ta te  Departm ent, during  which i t  was agreed  t h a t  the 
U.S. p o s i t io n  in  Korea u l t im a te ly  would be un tenab le  even 
w ith  a  c o n s id e ra b le  expend itu re  o f  money and e f f o r t .  But 
the  U nited  S ta te s  could no t " s c u t t l e  and run" from Korea 
w ithout a  g re a t  l o s s  of p r e s t ig e  and s tand ing  in  A sia  and 
the  world . T herefore , a se t t le m e n t  in  Korea should be 
reached t h a t  would a llow  the United S ta te s  to  withdraw as 
soon as  p o s s ib le  w ith  a minimum of bad e f f e c t s .  Nothing 
should be done to  make i t  im possib le  fo r  a Soviet-American 
agreement on Korea to be reached . Thus, any U.S. r e s o lu t io n  
f o r  the United N a tions  should be w r i t te n  in  a  manner which 
p re se n te d  both the  American and th e  Russian p o s i t io n .
^Vincent to  H i l ld r in g ,  November 4, 1946, FR.1946, 
V III ,  764; H i l ld r in g  to  V incent, November 8, 1946, I b i d . , 
764-765; Memo by In te r-D ep ar tm en ta l  Committee on Korea, 
February  25, 1947, FR. 1947. VI, 608- 617.
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F in a l ly ,  i t  was e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  the U.S. p ro p o sa ls  no t  be 
perceived  " in  a t a k e - i t - o r - l e a v e - i t  manner."
By the end of September, 194?, the United S ta te s  had 
reached th re e  co n c lu s io n s  reg a rd in g  i t s  commitment in  Korea. 
F i r s t ,  p o l ic y  makers had concluded t h a t  Korea was n o t  v i t a l  
s t r a t e g i c a l l y  to  U.S. s e c u r i ty  i n t e r e s t s  and given the l im ­
i te d  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of re so u rc e s  i t  could be a s t r a t e g ic  l i ­
a b i l i t y  in  case of an Asian c o n f l i c t .  Second, a p r e c i p i t a t e  
withdrawal t h a t  did n o t  p rov ide  even a  chance f o r  a f re e  and 
independent Korea would cause a  p o t e n t i a l l y  s e r io u s  lo s s  of 
U.S. p r e s t ig e  in  A sia and in  the  world. With t h i s  in  mind, 
the t h i r d  conc lusion  was th a t  the  b e s t  way fo r  the  United 
S ta te s  to  achieve a  qu ick  w ithdraw al, w ith  a minimum of bad 
e f f e c t s ,  was to bu ild  up south K o rea 's  s t r e n g th  while p re ­
se n t in g  the problem to  the United N a tions . These conc lusions  
were reached in  the c o n te x t  of the Soviet-American c o n f l i c t  . 
then in  p ro g re s s ,  w i th in  which the S o v ie ts  and Americans 
viewed the o t h e r ' s  a c t io n s  th rough  a v e i l  of su sp ic io n .
The g radual d e t e r io r a t i o n  in  Soviet-American r e l a ­
t io n s  t h a t  began before  the end of WWII, a c c e le ra te d  r a p id ly  
i n  1946 and climaxed w ith  e n u n c ia t io n  of the  Truman D octrine  
on March 12, 194?. The Truman D o c t r in e 's  s ig n i f ic a n c e  d id  
n o t  l a y  in  i t s  being  a  fundamental r e o r i e n t a t i o n  of p o l ic y
44Memo by the D ire c to r  of F a r  E a s te rn  A f fa i r s  
(B u tte rw orth ) to  the U nder-S ecre ta ry  of S ta te  ( L o v e t t ) , 
October 1, 194?, I b i d . , 820-822.
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nor in  being the f i r s t  s te p  in  the containm ent of the Sov ie t 
Union, f o r  i t  was n e i t h e r  o f  th e s e .  R ather, i t  was s i g n i f i ­
can t because i t  was "the f i r s t  r e a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  which spe­
c i a l  a p p ro p r ia t io n s  were n e ce ssa ry  to  c a r ry  out the Admini­
s t r a t i o n ' s  program." The need to  sc a re  Congress in to  p ro ­
v id in g  $400 m il l io n  in  m i l i t a r y  a id  f o r  Greece and Turkey,
led  th e  Truman a d m in is t r a t io n  " to  s t a t e  i t s  i n te n t io n s —or
Ac
o v e rs ta te  them—in  u n iv e r s a l  te rm s ."
Truman, in  h i s  speech to  Congress, committed America 
to  support f r e e  people "who a re  r e s i s t i n g  a ttem pted  subjuga­
t io n  by armed m in o r i t ie s  o r  by o u ts id e  p r e s s u r e s ."  At the  
p re s e n t  time every n a t io n  had to  choose between two bas ic ,  
a l t e r n a t i v e  ways of l i f e —dem ocratic  ve rsu s  communist. The 
United S ta te s  had a du ty  to  support democracy a g a in s t  commu­
nism. In  J u ly ,  1947, George Kennan argued th a t  the only way 
to  deal w ith  in e v i t a b le  S o v ie t  expansion  d i r e c te d  a t  the West 
was to  c o n ta in  the S o v ie t  Union "by the  a d r o i t  and v ig i l a n t  
a p p l i c a t io n  of c o u n te rfo rce  a t  a  s e r i e s  of c o n s ta n t ly  s h i f ­
t in g  g eo g rap h ica l  and p o l i t i c a l  p o in t s ,  corresponding  to  the 
s h i f t s  and maneuvers of S o v ie t  p o l ic y ."  Many in te rp re te d  
Truman's and K ennan 's  rem arks a s  a commitment " to  po lice  the 
world a g a in s t  communism."^^The r e a l i t y ,  however, was q u ite  
d i f f e r e n t  and t h i s  was obvious in  Korea.
^^John Gaddis, "Was the  Truman D octrine  a  Real 
Turning P o in t? " ,  Foreign  A f f a i r s , 52 (January  1974), 389.
^ ^ I b id . .  389-393; Rose, ^ 00t s . 242.-243.
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The conc lu s ions  reached in  September, 19^7 concern ing  
Korea, demonstrated th a t  the concept o f  containm ent had n o t  
ye t  become a worldwide c o n s id e ra t io n .  The United S ta te s  
evinced a w i l l in g n e s s ,  a l b e i t  a  r e l u c ta n t  one, to  see Korea 
e v e n tu a l ly  f a l l  in to  S ov ie t  hands. The "au thor"  o f c o n ta in ­
ment, George Kennan, in  a September 24, 194? memorandum, 
no ted  th a t  d is c u s s io n s  w ith  the  m i l i t a r y  had le d  to  the con­
c lu s io n  th a t  ho ld ing  Korea was n o t  e s s e n t i a l  m i l i t a r i l y —th u s
U.S. p o l ic y  should be " to  c u t  our l o s s e s  and g e t  out of
47th e re  a s  g r a c e f u l ly  and prom ptly as p o s s ib le ."
The d e c is io n  to  reconvene the J o i n t  Commission in  
o rd e r  to  n e g o t ia te  w ith  the S ov ie t  Union,and the  l a t e r  d e c i ­
s io n  to  tu rn  the problem over to  the United N ations  and to  
withdraw from Korea, came a t  a time when Truman had roused 
the American people to  a holy  war a g a in s t  communism in  Eu­
ro p e . That the United S ta te s  would c o n s id e r  a p o l ic y  t h a t  
many be lieved  might le a d  to  communist dom ination of Korea, 
i s  a  c l e a r  in d ic a t io n  o f  a  f l e x i b l e ,  s e le c t iv e  containm ent 
p o l ic y .  While co o p e ra t io n  w ith  the S o v ie t  Union in  Korea 
had f a i l e d ,  p o s s ib le  c o n f ro n ta t io n  w ith  R ussia  over Korea 
was c a lc u la te d  as  n o t  i n  A m erica 's  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s .  In  t h i s  
c a se ,  U.S. p o l ic y  makers showed a c l e a r  awareness of the 
l i m i t s  on the a b i l i t y  o f  American power to  in f lu e n ce  de­
c i s io n s  and developments in  the  world.
47'Memo by the  D i r e c to r  of the P o licy  P lann ing  S t a f f ,  
(Kennan) to  B u tte rw o rth , September 24,194?, FR.1947. V I ,815.
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Yet the  United S t a te s  was n o t  conceding south Korea 
to  the S o v ie ts  w ithout a  s t r u g g le .  Dean Acheson, in  Senate 
h e a r in g s  on the Truman D oc tr ine  noted t h a t  the  United S ta te s  
d id  not have access  to  a l l  p a r t s  of the world, e s p e c ia l ly  
th o se  " in  the Russian sphere o f  p h y s ica l  f o r c e . "  While ex­
cluded  from those a re a s ,  Acheson po in ted  out t h a t  th e re  were 
o th e r  p la c e s  where the U nited  S ta te s  could be e f f e c t i v e .  One
o f  those p la c e s  was Korea and th e re  "the l in e  had been
48c l e a r l y  drawn between the  R uss ians  and o u rse lv e s ."  Korea 
occupied a  p o s i t io n  low er t h a t  a  v i t a l  s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r e s t ,  
bu t n o n e th e le s s  had r e a l  p o l i t i c a l  value to  the  United 
S t a t e s .  What Washington wanted, in  e f f e c t ,  was to  m u l t i l a ­
t e r a l i z e  the  containm ent p o l ic y  in  Korea by tu rn in g  the  prob­
lem over to  the  United N a t io n s .  This would a llow  the United  
S t a te s  to  withdraw tro o p s  t h a t  the m i l i t a r y  b e lieved  were . 
needed e lsew here , while p ro v id in g  the  symbolic moral fo rce  
o f  the United N ations as  p r o te c t io n  fo r  Korea. At the same 
tim e , the United S ta te s  would give economic a id  to  s t re n g th e n  
sou th  Korea as much as  p o s s ib le  before  w ithdraw al.
In  sum, the  United S ta te s  sought to  d i l u t e  i t s  r e ­
s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  in  Korea in  a way t h a t  would minimize th e  po­
t e n t i a l  bad e f f e c t s  r e s u l t i n g  from withdrawal o f American
48U.S. Congress, S en a te , L e g is la t iv e  O rig in s  o f the 
Truman D octrine  : Hearings Held in  Executive  Sess ion  Before
the  Committee on Fore ign  R e la t io n s ,  March 13 and 28, and 
A p r i l  1, 2, 3, 1947, 80 th  Congress, 1 s t  Session(W ashington: 
GPO, 1973). 22.
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fo rc e s .  T his p o l ic y  was necessa ry  because a sense of weak­
n e ss  permeated U.S. th in k in g  about Korea. The absurd t r a d i ­
t io n  of d ism an tl in g  American armed fo rc e s  a f t e r  a war had 
l e f t  the  United S t a te s  in  a p o s i t io n  where i t s  a v a i la b le  r e ­
sources could n o t  be s t r e tc h e d  to  match i t s  commitments a s  
a re sp o n s ib le  world power. The M i l i ta ry  E s tab lish m en t made 
i t s  p la n s  only w i th in  t i e  framework of an ou tbreak  of a gene­
r a l  war, when the  powerful U.S. bomber fo rce  could be used 
in  an a l l - o u t  e f f o r t .  They f a i l e d  to  p rep a re  the United 
S ta te s  to  r e a c t  to  l o c a l  a g g re ss io n s  t h a t  d id  n o t  c a l l  f o r  a 
genera l war, but were n o n e th e le s s  im portan t enough to  r e q u ire  
some k ind  of U.S. r e a c t io n .  Being unprepared to  deal w ith  
l o c a l  a g g re s s io n s  made Korea a s t r a t e g i c  l i a b i l i t y .
There were many in  the  S ta te  Departm ent, and even 
w ith in  the  m i l i t a r y ,  who were uncomfortable w ith  the w i t h - . 
drawal p o l ic y  t h a t  had been e s t a b l i s h e d .  While rec o g n iz in g  
the  v a l i d i t y  of the  m i l i t a r y ' s  e v a lu a t io n  of K o re a 's  r e l a t i v e  
la c k  of s t r a t e g i c  value in  a  genera l  war, many in  the S ta te  
Department s t i l l  b e liev ed  th a t  K o re a 's  p o l i t i c a l  value in  
the c o n tex t  of th e  Cold War was trem endously im portan t .  As 
a  r e s u l t ,  some S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s  fough t a d e la y in g  
a c t io n  a g a in s t  the  M i l i t a r y  E s ta b l i s h m e n t 's  p o l ic y  from 19^7 
r i g h t  up to  the time of withdrawal from Korea i n  I 949.
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CHAPTER V
THE CREATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KORE. AND 
UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL
The U.S. d e c is io n  in  September, 19^7 to  submit the 
Korean problem to  the United N ations seemed to  end the f l e x i ­
b i l i t y  t h a t  had marked W ashington 's Korea p o l ic y  in  the p a s t  
months. In  October, a p lan  su rfa ce d ,  which the  S o v ie ts  sup­
p o r te d ,  c a l l i n g  f o r  a m eeting of prom inent Korean le a d e r s  of 
both  zones to  work out a  program f o r  u n i t in g  Korea. E leven 
le a d e r s  were to be i n v i t e d ,  seven from the sou th  and fo u r  
from the n o r th ,  a  r a t i o  correspond ing  to  the  p o p u la t io n  of 
the two zones. F e e l in g  th a t  the  committee would be "p re ­
dom inantly  l e f t i s t " ,  Jacobs be lieved  i t  was a S o v ie t - in s p i r e d  
p lan  designed to  enable R ussia  to c la im  th a t  Koreans could 
work ou t t h e i r  d e s t in y  alone i f  a l l  t ro o p s  were withdrawn.^ 
This p la n ,  which on the su rface  gave America a chance to  
withdraw even sooner w ith  p r e s t ig e  i n t a c t ,  was ign o red .
The U nited S ta te s  a lso  r e j e c t e d  a  S o v ie t  p roposa l of 
September 26, su g g e s t in g  t h a t  a l l  t ro o p s  be withdrawn from
^Jacobs to  M arsha ll ,  October 8, 1947, FR, 1947, 
VI, 823-824,
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Korea a t  the  beginning of 1948, because the J o i n t  Commission 
did n o t  have the a u th o r i ty  to  c o n s id e r  the q u e s t io n .
Molotov forwarded a s im i la r  suggestion  to  M arshall on Oc­
to b e r  9. 1947, which was r e j e c t e d  because the q u e s t io n  of 
w ithdrawal had to  be considered  as  an in te g r a l  p a r t  o f  the 
s o lu t io n  of the Korean problem now before  the United N a tions .
On September 23, the General Assembly voted 41 to  6, to  place
2
the Korean q u es t io n  on the  agenda f o r  the  c u r r e n t  se s s io n .
The U.S. r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  to  the United N a tio n s , Warren 
A us tin ,  p resen ted  the U.S. r e s o lu t io n  to  the Assembly on Oc­
to b e r  1 7 . In  the r e s o lu t io n  the United S ta te s  expressed  i t s  
d e s i r e  to  do ev e ry th in g  p r a c t i c a l  to  speed the e s tab l ish m en t  
o f  a  t r u l y  independent Korea. A f te r  c a l l i n g  a t t e n t i o n  to  the 
S ov ie t  p roposa l f o r  tro o p  w ithdraw al, A ustin  c a l le d  on the 
occupying powers to  hold e l e c t io n s  in  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  zones, 
no l a t e r  than  March 3I , 1948, f o r  the e s tab l ish m en t o f  a  
N a tio n a l  Assembly and a N a tio na l  Government. F u r th e r ,  a  U.N. 
Temporary Commission on Korea would be e s ta b l is h e d  to  super­
v ise  the  e l e c t i o n s ,  g ive  adv ice , and r e p o r t  to  the  General 
Assembly on the e l e c t i o n s .
While the  United N ations considered  the Korean ques­
t i o n ,  Hodge re p o r te d  t h a t  the  p ro sp e c t  of a mutual t ro o p
U.S. Department of S ta te ,  Korea, 1945-1948; A Re­
p o r t  on Korea With S e lec ted  Documents (Washington: GPO,
19 4 0 ),6 -7 ;  S ta te  Department, K o re a 's  Independence, 15-16.
^Austin to  the S e c re ta ry  General of the  U.N. (L ie ) ,  
October 17, 1947, FR,1947, VI, 832.
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w ithdraw al was growing in  p o p u la r i ty  among many south 
K oreans. The United S ta te s  needed to  push fo r  a  speedy s o lu ­
t i o n  in  the United  N ations  to  head o f f  tro u b le s  th a t  might 
a r i s e  from the a p p ea lin g  p ro sp e c t  of f i n a l ly  r id d in g  Korea of 
f o r e ig n e r s .  The nex t S o v ie t  move might be u n i l a t e r a l  w ith ­
draw al, which would p u t  America in  a d i f f i c u l t  moral and 
p r a c t i c a l  p o s i t io n  in  m a in ta in in g  i t s  troops in  south  K orea .^  
The J o i n t  C h ie fs  a lre a d y  had concluded t h a t  R uss ia  
p ro b ab ly  would re fu s e  to  cooperate  w ith  the United N a tions , 
i n  which case America would implement the r e s o lu t io n  in  south  
Korea on ly . Even i f  the  S ov ie t  Union accepted the  U.N. r e ­
s o lu t io n ,  the United S ta te s  might withdraw a f t e r  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of a n a t io n a l  government. MacArthur was i n s t r u c te d  to 
p rep a re  an o u t l in e  p la n  fo r  o rd e r ly  w ithdraw al.^
The General Assembly adopted a  re s o lu t io n  on Novem­
b e r  14, c a l l i n g  f o r  e l e c t i o n s  in  Korea no l a t e r  than 
March 31, 1948, to  choose r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  fo r  a N a tion a l  As­
sembly, which would e s t a b l i s h  a s  soon as p o s s ib le  a f t e r  the 
e l e c t i o n s  a  N a tio n a l  Government of Korea. To f a c i l i t a t e  and 
e x p e d i te  the e l e c t i o n s ,  a U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea, 
composed o f  n ine  n a t io n s ,  was to  be s e t  up, " to  be p re s e n t  
i n  Korea, w ith  r i g h t  to  t r a v e l ,  observe and c o n s u l t
4Hodge to  the JCS, November 3, 194?, I b i d . . 852-53! 
Ambassador in the United Kingdom(King) to the S e c re ta ry  of 
S t a t e ,  November 5, 194?, I b i d . . 854. '
^Wedemeyer fo MacArthur, November 10, 194?, I b i d . ,
855-856.
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th roughout Korea." On be ing  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  the N a tiona l  Gov­
ernment would a rrange f o r  the  complete withdrawal from Korea 
of the  occupying powers f o r c e s . a s  e a r ly  as p o s s ib le ,  hope­
f u l l y  w ith in  n in e ty  days. The Government then  would assume 
" the  fu n c t io n s  o f government from the m i l i ta r y  commands and 
c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  of n o r th  and sou th  Korea.
The success of the  U.N. p la n  depended on the two 
powers co o p e ra t in g ,  s ince  e l e c t i o n s  would be v a l id  only i f  
the  U.N. Commission observed them. During the U.N. d eba tes  
R uss ia  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  would n o t  cooperate  in  p a te n t ly  
" i l l e g a l "  e l e c t i o n s .  D esp ite  t h i s ,  the United N ations did 
n o t  c o n s id e r  the c r u c i a l  q u e s t io n  o f  whether the  U.N. Commis­
s io n  would co n s id e r  h o ld in g  e l e c t i o n s  in  case they  could  no t 
be held  th roughou t K orea .^  This q u e s t io n  became the c e n te r  
o f debate between the  U nited  S ta te s  and c e r t a i n  members of 
the  U.N. Commission, f o r  e l e c t i o n s  observed only in  one zone 
would a lm ost c e r t a i n l y  l e g a l i z e  and f i n a l i z e  d iv is io n  of 
Korea in to  two d i s p a r a te  zones.
Prime M in is te r  MacKenzie King of Canada d id  n o t  want 
h i s  cou n try  to  serve on th e  U.N. Commission. He fea red  th a t  
th e  United N ations  was n o t  y e t  ready  to  dea l  "w ith  t h i s  ba­
s i c  c o n f l i c t  between E a s t  and W est." The Korean q u e s t io n
^R eso lu tion  Adopted by the  U.N. General Assembly on 
November 15, 194?, I b i d . .  857-859.
^Leland Goodrich, Korea; A Study of U.S. P o l ic y  in  
th e  U.N.(New York: Council of F o re ign  R e la t io n s ,  1956),30-35 .
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might become a n o th e r  f i e l d  of c o n f l i c t  between America and 
Russia  " such as e x is te d  in  B e r l in  today, which i l l - c o n s i d e r e d  
ac t io n  might ig n i t e  . . . The n a t io n s  most i n t e r e s t e d  
should re so lv e  the  Korean problem, n o t an "underweighted 
commission" th a t  might p r e c i p i t a t e  a c r i s i s .  The United 
S ta te s  r e p l i e d  t h a t  agreement was n o t  p o s s ib le  between 
America and R uss ia—acceptance  of the S ov ie t  U n ion 's  p lan  
"would le a d  to  the  e a r ly  e s ta b l ish m e n t  o f a d i c t a t o r s h i p  in  
Korea." Under c o n s id e ra b le  p re s su re  from the United S ta te s ,
g
King f i n a l l y  agreed to a llow  Canadian p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
The U.N. Commission was a lso  due fo r  tro u b le  from 
Rhee and o th e r  r i g h t i s t s .  Rhee wanted the  South Korean I n ­
te r im  L e g i s l a t iv e  Assembly to  a d m in is te r  immediate g enera l 
e l e c t i o n s  to  s e t  up a government to  c o n su l t  and cooperate  
with the  U.N. Commission. He was e f f e c t i v e l y  u s in g  in  h i s  
campaign f o r  a g e n e ra l  e l e c t i o n ,  the  r a t h e r  em barrass ing  
q u e s t io n  of what the  United  N a tions  and the United S ta te s  
would do " i f  the S o v ie ts  re fu s e d  t o  cooperate  w ith  the 
Commission?"9
The is su e  was jo in e d  d u r in g  the f i r s t  m eeting of the
Q
Memo of C onversa tion  by Ambassador in  Canada 
(A th e r to n ) ,  December 27 .1947 ,FR,1947, VI, 880-83; A cting  
S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  to  K ing, December 30 ,1947,I b i d . ,  883-86; 
Memo by C hief of the  D iv is io n  o f  B r i t i s h  Commonv/ealth Af­
f a i r s  (W aites) to  L o v e t t ,  Jan u a ry  9, 1948, U.S. Department of 
S t a t e , Fore ign  R e la t io n s  o f  the United S t a t e s , 1948: The F ar 
E a s t  and A u s t r a l i a ,Volume VI(Washington;GPO. 1974), 1084.
^Jacobs to  M a rsh a ll ,  November 19 .1947 ,FR,1947. VI, 
863-64; Hodge to M a rsh a ll ,  December 2, 1947 .I b i d . ,  866-67.
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U.N. Commission on January  12, 1948, when the  S o v ie t  Union 
announced i t  would n o t  cooperate  w ith the  Commission o r  the 
e l e c t io n s .  The United S ta te s  then  went on reco rd  i n  fav o r  
of e l e c t io n s  in  sou th  Korea on ly , announcing t h a t  i t  was 
"eager to  have the  a s s i s ta n c e  of the United N ations" in  
b r in g in g  a f r e e ly  e le c te d  government to  sou th  Korea..^^
In  south  Korean c i r c l e s ,  Rhee was most outspoken in  
fa v o r in g  se p a ra te  e l e c t i o n s ,  but s ince  he had advocated a 
sep a ra te  sou th  Korea in  194?, h i s  su pport was to  be expected. 
Kimm K iu - s ic ,  the  le a d in g  c e n t r i s t ,  was opposed to  ho ld ing  
se p a ra te  e l e c t io n s ,  f e e l i n g  they  would p e rp e tu a te  the  d i v i ­
s ion  of the  co un try . I f  agreement w ith  the  R uss ians  was im­
p o ss ib le  , he could support an e l e c t i o n  f o r  c r e a t io n  of a 
sou th  Korean government. But he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e re  should 
be a conference between the p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  of n o r th  and 
south  Korea under su p e rv is io n  of the U.N. Commission. Kim 
Koo agreed  w ith Kimm in  opposing the  e l e c t io n s  and in  c a l l i n g  
f o r  a  n o r th - s o u th  conference
On February  11, a  t e n t a t i v e  agreement between Rhee, 
Kimm, and Kim had been reached on the d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f a 
n o r th - s o u th  co n fe ren ce . The ap p aren t accord soon broke down 
when Rhee p u b l ic ly  claimed t h a t  a l l  th re e  men supported  a  ■
^^Jacobs to M arsh a ll ,  January  31, 1948, FR,1948, VI, 
1088-1089;Truman to King, January  5i 1948, I b i d . ,1081-1083.
^^Jacobs to  M arsh a ll ,  January  29, 30, and February 
10, 1948, I b i d . .  1087-88, 1099-1100, 1101-1102.
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a south  Korean s t a t e ,  which the o th e r  two denied. On the
20th , Hodge met w ith  the th re e  l e a d e r s  fo r  over th ree  hours
in  a  f u t i l e  a ttem p t to  g a in  a  degree  of u n i ty .  Rhee was the
only one who would p u t  " i t  on the  l in e  fo r  e le c t io n s  in  south
K orea."  Hodge f e l t ,  however, t h a t  i f  the In te r im  Committee
(the  " L i t t l e  Assembly" which was in  se ss io n  when the General
Assembly was in  adjournment) d i r e c te d  the U.N. Commission
to proceed w ith  e le c t io n s  in  sou th  Korea a lone, Kim and Kimm
12would supp o rt  the d e c is io n .
The U.N. Commission had decided on February  5, 1948, 
to  submit to  the  In te r im  Committee the q u es tion  of what to  
do in  l i g h t  o f  Sov ie t n o n -co o p e ra t io n .  This d e c is io n  caused 
c o n s id e ra b le  unhappiness in  Seoul. In  February , Jacobs 
charged t h a t  S.H. Jackson of A u s t r a l i a ,  George S. P a t te r s o n  
of Canada, and K rishna  Menon of I n d ia ,  c o n s t i tu te d  an a n t i -  
American b lock  on the U.N. C o m m i s s i o n . T h i s  view would be 
r e p e a te d  o f te n  as S e o u l 's  a t t i t u d e  toward c e r t a in  U.N. Com­
m iss ion  members grew more and more b i t t e r .
The S o v ie ts  announced on February 8, 1948, the forma­
t io n  o f  the N orth  Korean P eop les  Army, and a  subsequent r e ­
view in  Pyongyang e x h ib i te d  a we 11-o rg an ized , w ell-equ ipped , 
and well-armed North Korean Army. This a cc e le ra te d  the t ren d  
toward se p a ra te  sou th  Korean e l e c t i o n s ,  as d id  the
^ ^a n g d o n  to  M arsh a ll ,  Feb ruary  28, 1948, I b i d . ,  
1121- 1122 .
^^Jacobs to  M arsh a ll ,  February  5 and 12, 1948, I b i d . ,
1093- 1094, 1106- 1108.
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March announcement o f a N orth  Korean p le b i s c i t e  to  d r a f t  
a  c o n s t i t u t io n  fo r  a dem ocratic  peop les  r e p u b l ic .
As the U.N. Commission was making i t s  r e p o r t  to  the 
In te r im  Committee, Hodge once more b i t t e r l y  c r i t i c i z e d  the 
"P a tte rso n -Jack so n  p a t t e r n  of th in k in g "  on the Commission. 
According to  Hodge, n e i t h e r  man had any concept or co ns id e ­
r a t i o n  of the b i t t e r  "co ld  war" a g a in s t  communism t h a t  was 
going on in  Korea. Most d e le g a te s  and a l l  of th e  s e c r e t a r i a t  
gave the  appearance o f  w ishing  to  appease the S o v ie t  Union.
I f  the  United N ations was in d e c is iv e ,  the  United S t a te s  had 
to  proceed w ith  the e l e c t i o n s ,  because f u r th e r  d e la y  in  
p o s i t iv e  a c t io n  in  sou th  Korea would be f a t a l .
The In te r im  Committee opened i t s  c o n s id e ra t io n  of the 
m a t te r  on February 19, 1948. The U.S. r e s o lu t io n  c a l l e d  fo r  
e l e c t io n s  to  be held  in  those  p a r t s  of Korea which were ac­
c e s s ib le  to  the C o m m i s s i o n . O n  February 26, the  In te r im  
Committee adopted, 31-2, a  r e s o lu t i o n  c a l l i n g  f o r  the  e l e c ­
t i o n s  to  be implemented. The U.N. Commission was to  observe 
the  s i t u a t i o n  to  in su re  t h a t  the  e l e c t i o n s ,  scheduled fo r  
May 9 1 1948, would occur in  a  f r e e  atmosphere.
1A
Hodge to M arsh a ll ,  February  14, 1948, I b i d . . 1110; 
Langdon to M arsha ll ,  Feb ruary  17, 1948, I b i d . , 1114-1113.
I n  1948 North Korea re c e iv e d  enough m a té r ie l  from R u ss ia  to  
equip  60,000 men. See Schnabel, P o l i c y , 37»
^^Hodge to M a rsh a ll ,  F ebruary  22 .1948,I b i d . .  1125-27.
^^Austin to M arsh a ll ,  February  24.1948.I b i d . ,1128-29.
^^I b i d . . March 1 ,1948, I b i d . , 1134-36; Langdon to  
M arsh a ll ,  March 10, 1948, I b i d . , 1146-114?.
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The c l e a r - c u t  U.N. v ic to r y  f o r  the United S ta te s  le d  
the  Department of the  Army to  renew i t s  p re s s u re s  f o r  a f irm  
withdrawal program. The S ta te  Department continued to  remind 
the  Army o f  the need to  m ain ta in  f l e x i b i l i t y  in  i t s  w ith ­
drawal p la n s .  The United  S ta te s  had a moral commitment to 
withdraw only  a f t e r  the c r e a t io n  o f  an adequate n a t iv e  s e ­
c u r i t y  f o r c e ,  which meant t h a t  no f irm  t im e ta b le  could be 
e s t a b l i s h e d .  Withdrawal would depend on the  success of 
b u i ld in g  up a  South Korean s e c u r i t y  fo rce  to  a  s t r e n g th  of 
5 0 , 000, an e f f o r t  the  Army should be e x p e d i t in g  to  the 
f u l l e s t .  The Army a ls o  was c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  having assigned
an u n fo r tu n a te ly  low p r i o r i t y  to  equ ipp ing  Korean fo rc e s ,  an
1 8a c t io n  t h a t  should be remedied im m ediate ly .
An extrem ely  im portan t  p o l ic y  s ta tem en t from the 
N a tio n a l  S e c u r i ty  C ouncil, e n t i t l e d  NSC 8, followed the 
S ta te  D epartm en t 's  r e q u e s t  f o r  f l e x i b i l i t y  in  withdrawal 
p la n s .  The p o l ic y  paper c l e a r l y  supported  the p o s i t io n  t h a t  
while America had s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s  in  Korea, they were min­
imal and th u s  the U nited  S ta te s  should s t r i v e  f o r  withdrawal 
a s  e a r ly  as  p o ss ib le  w ith  a minimum of bad e f f e c t s .
There were th re e  p o s s ib le  p o l ic y  a l t e r n a t i v e s
18Memo by the  D i r e c to r  o f F a r  E a s te rn  A f f a i r s  
(B u tte rw o rth )  to M a rsh a ll ,  March 4 ,1948, I b i d . , 1137; Memo 
o f  C onversation  by the  C h ief  of N o r th e a s t  Asian A f fa i r s  
(A l l i s o n ) ,  March 4, 1948, I b i d . . 1139-1140.
^ % o te  by the  E xecutive  S e c re ta ry  of the  NSC(Souers) 
to  Truman, s u b j . :  NSC 8, Report by the NSC on the P o s i t io n
o f  the United S ta te s  With Respect to  Korea, A p ril  2, 1948,
I b i d . .  1163- 1168.
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o u t l in e d  in  NSC 8. One, the  government of South Korea 
e s ta b l is h e d  under U.N.-U.S. au sp ices  could be abandoned.
This was unaccep tab le  because i t  "would v io la t e  the  s p i r i t "  
of every  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commitment observ ing  Korea which the 
United S ta te s  had undertaken  during  and s ince  the war and 
a lso  would in d ic a te  th a t  the  United S ta te s  had used the 
United N ations "merely a s  a  convenient v e h ic le  f o r  w ith­
drawing from K orea ,"  thus  damaging the U .N . 's  p r e s t ig e .  But 
most c r i t i c a l ,  i f  the  United  S ta te s  d id  n o t  leave  behind a 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  s tro n g  n a t iv e  m i l i t a r y  fo rce  f o r  defense "a- 
g a in s t  any but an o v e r t  a c t  o f a g g re s s io n ," A m erica 's  f r i e n d s
would see withdrawal as a  b e t r a y a l ,  l e a d in g  to  a fundamental
20rea lignm en t of f o r c e s  in  A sia  favorab le  to  R ussia .
A second course was to  e s t a b l i s h  su pp o rt  "w ith in  
p r a c t ic a b le  and f e a s ib l e  l im i t s "  f o r  South Korea which would 
allow  America to  withdraw w ith  the minimum of bad e f f e c t s .  
This would r e q u i re  a  program to t r a i n  and equip  a n a t iv e  
army capable o f p r o te c t in g  South K orea’ s s e c u r i t y  a g a in s t  any 
ag g re ss io n  but an o v e r t  a c t .  Aid to  f o r e s t a l l  an economic 
breakdown would a ls o  have to  be given, an a c t io n  which in  the 
long run "would reduce the  d ra in  on U.S. r e s o u rc e s "  and would 
avoid "a commitment so deep a s  to  p rec lude  disengagem ent." 
What was " p r a c t ic a b le "  and " f e a s ib le "  was n o t  d e fin ed , but 
co n tin u in g  p ost-w ithd raw al m i l i t a r y  and economic a s s i s ta n c e
^^ I b id . ,  1167- 1168.
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was n o t  ru le d  out i f  i t  was deemed d e s i r a b le  in  l i g h t  of
21developments in  Korea.
The th i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e  was "to  guarantee  the p o l i t ­
i c a l  independence and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  of South Korea 
by fo rc e  of arms i f  necessa ry"  a g a in s t  e x te rn a l  o r  i n t e r n a l  
a g g re ss io n .  This course  would commit America to  d i r e c t  po­
l i t i c a l ,  economic, and m i l i t a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in c lu d in g  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f involvem ent in  a  major war, in  a s i t u a t i o n  
where " v i r tu a l l y  a l l  the  n a tu r a l  advantages accrue to  the
S o v ie ts ,"  but i t  was the  only c e r t a i n  course sh o r t  o f  war
22t h a t  would insure  South K o re a 's  continued independence.
The au th o rs  of NSC 8 concluded t h a t  the second 
course  was the  b e s t  cho ice . The United S ta te s  would expe­
d i t e  p la n s  f o r  expanding, t r a i n i n g ,  and equipping the South 
Korean co n s tab u la ry  to  p rov ide  s e c u r i ty  fo rce s  adequate to  
r e s i s t  any bu t an o v e r t  a c t  of a g g re ss io n . The United S ta te s  
would p repare  to withdraw fo l lo w in g  form ation  of a South 
Korean government, consonant "w ith  the r e le v a n t  commitments 
o f  th e  United S ta te s  v i s - a - v i s  the  U.N." Every e f f o r t  should 
be made to  withdraw by December 31, 1948. I t  was e s s e n t i a l  
t h a t  "The United S ta te s  n o t  become so involved in  South 
Korea t h a t  any a c t io n  taken  by a group in  South Korea or by 
any o th e r  power i n  Korea would be considered  a  casus b e l l i  
f o r  th e  United S ta te s .
Z^I b i d ., 1168-. ^^ I b i d . ^^ I b i d ..  I I 68- I I 69 .
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Nothing in  NSC 8 p rec luded  a U.S. involvement o r  a c ­
t io n  i f  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  was th re a te n e d .  Two r e la te d  id e a s  
in  NSC 8 should be k ep t in  mind. One, the United S ta te s  in  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e j e c t i n g  abandonment o f  the South Korean gov­
ernment e s t a b l i s h e d  under U.N.-U.S. au sp ice s , c le a r ly  reco g ­
n iz e d  th e  U .N . 's  p iv o ta l  r o le  in  South K o rea 's  b i r t h .  J u s t  
a s  c l e a r l y ,  U.S. i n t e r e s t s  were " p a r a l l e l  to ,  i f  no t i d e n t i ­
c a l  w ith ,  those  of the U.N." As n o ted  e a r l i e r ,  withdrawal 
had to  be consonant w ith  " the  r e l e v a n t  commitments of the 
U nited S ta te s  v i s - a - v i s  the U.N." In  a d d it io n ,  NSC 8 s t a te d  
t h a t  the  "United S t a te s  should  encourage continued U.N. i n t e ­
r e s t  and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  the  Korean problem and should con­
t in u e  to  coopera te  w ith  the U.N. i n  s o lu t io n  of th a t  p rob- 
24lem. " What the  r e l e v a n t  commitments were i s  n o t  sp e l le d  
o u t ,  bu t one could  i n t e r p r e t  these  s ta tem en ts  to mean t h a t  
the U.S. commitment to  the United N ations and i t s  sponsorship  
o f the  c r e a t io n  of the South Korean s t a t e  was such th a t  a 
s t r i k e  a t  t h a t  c r e a t i o n  would be a  s t r i k e  a t  the United 
N a tions  and America, r e q u i r in g  an agg ress iv e  response .
At th e  same time t h a t  NSC 8 was being p repared , 
e v e n ts  in  sou th  Korea were c o n sp ir in g  to b r in g  the  United 
S ta te s  and the  r i g h t i s t s  c lo s e r  to g e th e r .  Kimm and 29 o th e r  
m oderates and l e f t i s t s  re s ig n ed  from the South Korean I n t e ­
rim  L e g i s l a t iv e  Assembly in  e a r ly  March as a r e s u l t  of the
^^Ibid. .
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Assem bly 's c a l l  f o r  e a r ly  e l e c t i o n s  in  south Korea. The 
Communists and extreme l e f t i s t s  s taged  s t r i k e s  and v io le n t  
dem onstra tions  from the time of the announcement of e le c t io n s  
up to the e le c t io n  day. In  one months tim e, over 1,000 were 
k i l l e d ,  in c lu d in g  33 policemen, and over 8 ,000  a r r e s t s  were 
made. American M i l i ta ry  Government f e l t  i t s e l f  i r r e s i s t i b l y  
drawn to the r i g h t i s t s  because they  supported the e l e c t i o n s  
while the l e f t  announced i t s  in te n t io n  to b o y c o tt  them. Rhee 
in  o rder  to take  advantage of t h i s  s i t u a t io n  moderated h i s  
c r i t i c i s m s  o f  the United S ta te s  and Hodge.
P re p a ra t io n  f o r  the  e le c t io n s  con tinued  d e s p i te  l e f ­
t i s t  o p p o s i t io n .  R e g is t r a t io n  as of A pril  9 showed th a t  
of those e l i g i b l e  had r e g i s te r e d .  On A pril 1, Hodge issued  
a p roc lam ation  of Korean c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s  and r e le a s e d  3,140 
p o l i t i c a l  p r i s o n e r s  who were allowed to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  the 
e le c t io n .  The U.N. Commission concluded on A p ri l  28, t h a t  
since a  reasonab le  degree o f  f re e  atmosphere e x is te d  the 
Commission would observe the  e le c t io n s  on May 9, 1948. De­
sp i te  l e f t i s t  o p p o s i t io n  and co n tin u in g  v io le n c e ,  95^  o f  the
r e g i s t e r e d  v o te r s  went to  the  p o l l s  and b e t t e r  than h a l f  of
26those e le c te d  were r i g h t i s t s  and none were Communists.
The day a f t e r  the e l e c t i o n s ,  the S ta te  Department
^■^Henderson, K orea. 155; FR.1948. VI, see 1155,
1158- 1160, 1170- 1171, 1175- 1176.
26 Soon, K orea , 206; Henderson, Korea, 155-157: 
Jacobs to M arsha ll ,  A p r i l  2 9 , 1948, PR,1948. VI, 1184.
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moved to  cement r e l a t i o n s  w ith  the r i g h t .  At the S ta te  de­
p a r tm e n t 's  i n s i s t e n c e ,  the J o i n t  C h ie fs  o rdered  th a t  a t  the 
e a r l i e s t  d a te  p o ss ib le  fo llow ing  the May 10 e l e c t i o n s ,  Gen­
e r a l  Hodge was to  be re a s s ig n e d ,  w ith  Major General John B. 
C o u lte r  assuming h is  d u t i e s .  O f f i c i a l s  in  the  F a r  E a s te rn  
D iv is io n  had long  f e l t  t h a t  the  p e rso n a l  an im osity  e x i s t i n g  
between Rhee and Hodge could jeo p a rd ize  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  
t r a n s f e r  o f  governmental a u th o r i ty ,  e s p e c i a l l y  since  Rhee 
was expec ted  to  emerge as  the dominant f ig u re  in  the new 
South Korean government. The removal was to  be accomplished 
before  R h e e 's  e le v a t io n  to a u th o r i ty  to  avoid the im pression  
o f  p l a c a t in g  Rhee.^^
The S ta te  Department was c o r r e c t  in  assuming t h a t
Rhee would be the head of the new government. The N a tio n a l
Assembly had i t s  i n i t i a l  m eeting on May 31» and on J u ly  1?
a c o n s t i t u t i o n  was adopted, which provided f o r  a  s t ro n g
e x e c u tiv e ,  so s tro n g  " i t  could evolve in to  a government by a
28s t ro n g  man o r  a s t ro n g  p a r ty . "  Rhee was e le c te d  P re s id e n t  
on J u ly  20, and the government of the  Republic of Korea was 
in au g u ra ted  on August 15. 1948.
^ '^Butterworth to  L o v e t t ,  May 11, 1948, FR,1948,
VI, 1192-1193*
28Henderson, K orea , 158-159; B u tte rw o rth  to  L o v e t t ,  
Ju ly  20, 1948, FR.1948, VI, 1248.
^^Soon, Korea, 209-210; E d i t o r i a l  N ote , FR, 1948,
VI, 1275*
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These e v en ts  provided the United S ta te s  w ith  a number 
o f new problem s. The f i r s t  involved the  t im ing  of reco g n i­
t io n  of the new government. The United S ta te s  decided  no t 
to  wait f o r  a  U.N. d e c is io n .  On J u ly  10, a  p o l ic y  memorandum 
concern ing  Korean re c o g n i t io n  was s e n t  to  v a r io u s  d ip lom atic  
o f f i c e r s  abroad. The United S ta te s  was anxious to  avoid any 
a c t io n  d e ro g a to ry  of the U.N. ' s  r i g h t  to  make i t s  own d e c i ­
s ion  as to  whether the  new government f u l f i l l e d  the  aims of 
the  U.N. r e s o lu t i o n  o f  November 14, 194?. As an occupying 
power, however, America had to  d e f in e  immediately i t s  r i g h t s  
toward the  new government before  the o th e r  p ro v is io n s  of the 
U.N. r e s o lu t io n  r e l a t i n g  to t r a n s f e r  o f governmental func­
t i o n s  and withdrawal o f tro o p s  could be implemented. In  
l i g h t  of the s p e c ia l  r e l a t i o n s h ip  the  United S t a te s  had as 
i n i t i a t o r  and le a d in g  proponent of the  General Assembly 's 
Korean r e s o l u t i o n s ,  and as the  occupying power tu rn in g  over 
the  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  so v e re ig n ty ,  any f a i l u r e  to  g ra n t  reco g ­
n i t i o n  prom ptly would weaken dangerously  the p r e s t ig e  and 
a u th o r i ty  of the  new government, to  the  advantage of the 
S o v ie t  puppet regime in  the n o r th .
The S ta te  Department r e j e c t e d  the argument t h a t  South 
Korea must n o t  be recognized  because to  do so would lea d  to  
a  S o v ie t  r e c o g n i t io n  of a N orth  Korean regim e. To accept 
t h i s  l i n e  of re a so n in g  would be to  admit the  impotence of
^^M arshall to  C e r ta in  D iplom atic  and Consular Of­
f i c e r s  Abroad, J u ly  10, 1948, I b i d . . 1235-1237.
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"The U.N. to g ive e f f e c t  to the c l e a r l y  expressed w i l l  of an 
overwhelming m ajo rity  o f i t s  members in  face of o p posit ion  
o f  a  s in g le  power a c t in g  in  de fiance  o f  t h a t  m a jo r i ty ."  On 
th e  b a s i s  of these  co n c lu s io n s , the  S ta te  Department was con­
tem p la t in g  the issuance  of a  s ta tem en t soon a f t e r  fo rm ation  
o f  th e  new government to  the e f f e c t  t h a t  the United S ta te s  
reco gn ized  i t  as the "N ationa l Government of Korea envisaged 
by the  General Assembly R e so lu t io n ."  I n  a d d it io n ,  a  sp e c ia l  
American r e p r e s e n ta t iv e ,  John Muccio, would be se n t  to  nego­
t i a t e  w ith  South Korea "concern ing  im plem entation o f  the f u r ­
t h e r  p ro v is io n s  of the General Assembly r e s o lu t io n s ." ^ ^
The U.S. r e p re s e n ta t iv e  to  the  United N a tions , Warren 
A u s tin ,  opposed the p o s i t io n  B u tte rw o rth  o u t l in e d .  Austin  
b e liev e d  th a t  a formal U.S. re c o g n i t io n  of the  Korean na­
t i o n a l  government w ithou t p r i o r  U.N. support would se r io u s ly  
compromise the American case in  the  General Assembly. Joseph 
Ja c o b s  r e p l i e d  th a t  A u s t in 's  views were out o f d a te .  The 
U nited  S ta te s  d id  no t dare  show any v a c i l l a t i o n  or weakness 
i n  i t s  support o f the new g o v e r n m e n t . T h e  S ta te  Department 
was w i l l i n g  to  remove th e  t i t l e  of Ambassador from Muccio, 
d e s ig n a t in g  him in s tea d  a s  the  S pec ia l  R e p re se n ta t iv e  of the 
P r e s id e n t ,  w ith  a 'p e r s o n a l  rank  of Ambassador. He would 
s t i l l  be able to n e g o t ia te  agreements f o r  a t r a n s f e r
% b i d .
^ ^Je ssup to  M arsh a ll ,  J u ly  20, 1948, I b i d . , 1251; 
J aco b s  to  M arsha ll ,  Ju ly  24, 1948, I b i d . . 1255-1258.
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of a u t h o r i t y . T h e  United S ta te s  r e le a s e d  a s ta tem en t on 
August 12 which follow ed p r e c i s e ly  the  Ju ly  10 memorandum.
On August 24, Rhee and Hodge signed an in te r im  ag ree­
ment p ro v id in g  f o r  the p ro g re s s iv e  re linqu ishm en t of j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  to South K o r e a . O n  September 1, Rhee reques ted
f i n a n c ia l  and economic a s s i s t a n c e  from America to  r e c o n s t ru c t
35bas ic  i n d u s t r i e s  e s s e n t i a l  to  a  s t ro n g  Korean economy.^ 
C harles  Saltzman, A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  fo r  Occupied 
A reas, p repared  a len g th y  a n a ly s i s  o f fu tu re  economic a s s i s ­
tance  p lan s  f o r  Korea. There was no guarantee t h a t  an aid 
program would m ain ta in  South K o re a 's  independence, but w ith­
ou t s u b s ta n t i a l  a id  th e re  could  be no hope fo r  h er  s u rv iv a l .  
I t  was in  the b e s t  i n t e r e s t  o f  the U nited  S ta te s  to  p lan  a
g ra n t  program of r e l i e f  and economic development of severa l
y e a rs  d u ra t io n ,  so t h a t  South Korea could  a t t a i n  a n e a r ly  
s e l f - s u p p o r t in g  b a s is  a s  r a p id ly  as  p o s s ib le .  A ccordingly, 
an economic agreement was signed on December 10, 1948.
With l im i te d  r e c o g n i t io n  accomplished, the United 
S ta te s  t r i e d  n e x t  to  ga in  U.N. r e c o g n i t io n  fo r  South Korea.
At the  same time the  United S ta te s  continued  to  advocate a
^ ^ o v e t t  to  Truman, J u ly  28,1948, I b i d . ,  1264.
^^Jacobs to  M a rsh a l l ,August 24 ,194 8 ,I b i d . , 1287-88.
^^Specia l R e p re se n ta t iv e  to  Korea (Muccio) to  
M arsha ll ,  September 3> 1948, I b i d . , 1290-1292.
^^Memo by Saltzm an,Septem ber 7, 1948, I b i d . , 1292- 
1296; S ta te  Department, Summary, 71.
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p la n  supporting  a  new U.N. Commission on Korea to observe the 
sim ultaneous withdrawal of t ro o p s ,  to f a c i l i t a t e  the r e ­
moval of b a r r i e r s  to  r e u n i f i c a t i o n  of Korea, and to  r e p o r t  
to  the  In te r im  Committee on Korean co n d it io n s .
A f te r  len g th y  deba te ,  the  United N ations  adopted a 
r e s o lu t io n  on December 12, t h a t  "placed i t s  stamp of l e g a l  
v a l i d i t y "  on South Korea and promised "moral su p p o r t ."  The 
r e s o lu t i o n  c a l le d  f o r  troo p  withdrawal as soon as p o s s ib le  
and s e t  up a permanent U.N. Commission on Korea, w ith  no en­
forcem ent powers, to  he lp  remove the b a r r i e r s  between n o r th  
and sou th , to  work to  i n te g r a te  the two p eo p le s ,  to  observe 
tro o p  withdrawal and to  be a v a i la b le  to give a d v ic e .
The U.N. c a l l  f o r  tro o p  withdrawal f i t  the Army's 
p la n s  q u i te  w e ll ,  but th e  S ta te  Department s in ce  e a r ly  summer 
had continued to  d rag  i t s  f e e t  on the withdrawal i s s u e .
E ven ts  in  North Korea, South Korea, and China, were c re a t in g  
second though ts  among some S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s .  In  
Ju n e , M arshall wrote to  S e c re ta ry  of the  Army, Kenneth C. 
R o y a ll ,  t h a t  every  e f f o r t  was being  made to  achieve w ith ­
drawal by the end of 1948, but t h a t  i t  s t i l l  was n e ce ssa ry  
to  m ain ta in  f l e x i b i l i t y  in  U.S. withdrawal p la n s .
Royall r e p l i e d  t h a t  the  Army's p la n s  were based on
^^U.S. D e leg a tio n  P o s i t io n  Paper, October 22, 1948, 
FR.1948, VI, 1315.
^^Goodrich, Korea; U. N. . 69 .
^^M arshall to  R oya ll ,  June  23, 1948, FR.1948, VI,
1224- 1225.
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the  P r e s i d e n t 's  d i r e c t i v e  of A p ril  8 , 1948. American M i l i ­
t a r y  Government had s u f f i c i e n t  fo rc e s  to  con tinue  to  fu n c t io n  
u n t i l  i t  tu rned  over i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  to  the new govern­
ment and to  continue t r a in in g  and equ ipp ing  the South Korean
s e c u r i ty  fo rc e .  The Army, as d i r e c te d ,  had s e t  August 15 as
the date  to  commence t a c t i c a l  w ithdrawal and on September 2
would su r re n d e r  a l l  but tro o p  withdrawal r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  to 
the  U.S.  d ip lom atic  m ission  in  Korea. Unless o therw ise  i n ­
s t r u c te d ,  t h i s  t im e ta b le ,  designed  to  achieve  withdrawal by 
December 51, 1948, would con tinue  in  fo rc e .
The North Korean d e c is io n  to  form i t s  own government 
caused more second though ts  bo th  in  the S ta te  Department and 
i n  South Korea. On J u ly  10, Pyongyang announced t h a t  e l e c ­
t i o n s  would be held  on August 25 f o r  the Supreme P e o p le 's  
C ouncil .  On September 9 the Supreme P e o p le 's  Council announ­
ced c re a t io n  of the  Democratic P e o p le 's  Republic of Korea, 
c la im ing  j u r i s d i c t i o n  over a l l  o f  Korea. A re q u e s t  f o r  im­
m ediate w ithdrawal o f  fo re ig n  t ro o p s  fo llow ed and R uss ia  
agreed  to  do so before  the  end of 1948.^^ The United S ta te s
r e p l i e d  t h a t  the q u e s t io n  of w ithdrawal would be l e f t  f o r  the
42U nited  N a tio n s  to  c o n s id e r  a t  i s  forthcom ing m eeting.
D uring a September 23 m eeting  in  the  S ta te  Department
^°Royall to  M a rsh a ll ,  June 23,1948, I b i d . . 1225-1226.
Jacobs to  M arsh a ll ,  J u ly  11 .1 9 4 8 .I b i d . . 1238-39; 
S ta te  Department, Summary. 71; Muccio to  M arsha ll ,  Septem­
b e r  18, 1948, FR.1948. VI, 1305-1306.
^ ^ o v e t t  to  Muccio,September 20,1948, I b i d . , 1307-
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Dr. Chough Pyung-ok, R h ee 's  s p e c ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e ,  reques ted  
t h a t  the  United S ta te s  r e t a i n  i t s  occupation  f o r c e s  in  Korea 
u n t i l  an e f f e c t i v e l y  t r a in e d  and equipped Korean s e c u r i ty  
fo rce  could  be formed. Chough b e liev e d  th a t  a N orth  Korean 
in v as io n  would soon fo l lo w  U.S. w ithdraw al. The North,
Chough e s t im a te d ,  had fo u r  d iv i s io n s  f u l l y  equipped w ith  
modern S ov ie t  arms and a  t o t a l  r e g u la r  and p a r a m i l i t a r y  
s t r e n g th  of between 200- 350,000 men.^^
Ominous developments in  South Korea matched the  d i s ­
q u ie t in g  p ro spec t  of the  development o f a powerful North 
Korean Army. On O ctober 19, the  l 4 th  Regiment o f  the  South 
Korean Army m utinied and the  r e v o l t  sp read . F ive towns were 
c ap tu red  and " p e o p le 's  committees" executed hundreds before 
the  r e v o l t  was p u t  down in  l a t e  O ctober, w ith  a l o s s  of over 
2 ,000 l i v e s .  A group o f  young o f f i c e r s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  the 
Communists in s t ig a t e d  the  Yosu r e v o l t  under the l e a d e r s h ip  
o f  Kim T al-sam ,the  Korean Communist P a r ty  s e c r e ta ry  in
ilk
the  a re a .
On November 2, Rhee req u e s te d  the immediate e s t a b ­
l ish m e n t  of a  m i l i t a r y  and naval m ission  i n  Korea. The 
Korean c o n s ta b u la ry  of 50,000 men was e n t i r e l y  inadequate  
in  number. MacArthur had suggested  c re a t io n  of the
43^Memo of C onversa tion  by L o v e t t ,  September 23, 
1948, I b i d . . 1310- 1311.
44Henderson, K orea , 162; Muccio to  M arsha ll ,  Octo­
b e r  28, 1948, FR. 1948. VI, 1317-1318; Scalapino  and Lee, 
Communism in  K orea. I ,  308.
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co n s tab u la ry  in October, 19^7. as a  s u b s t i t u t e  fo r  form ation 
o f  a South Korean Army, which he opposed. Rhee be lieved  an 
a d d i t io n a l  50,000 men were needed to  a l l e v i a t e  f e e l in g s  of 
i n s e c u r i t y  which a powerful North Korean Army had c re a te d .
The sooner t h i s  was accom plished, the  sooner the United 
S t a te s  could withdraw i t s  t ro o p s .  Rhee was to ld  th a t  the  
p r e s e n t  P ro v is io n a l  M i l i t a r y  Advisory Group would continue 
t o  advise and a s s i s t  South Korea in  the  development of 
th e  Korean s e c u r i ty  f o r c e s  now in  e x is te n c e
L o v e t t ,  on November 5, sought M a rs h a l l 's  concurrence 
i n  de lay ing  en tran ce  in to  an i r r e v e r s i b l e  stage of troop 
withdrawal pending developments in  the  General Assembly. On 
th e  9 th , the  S ta te  Department informed Wedemeyer th a t  " the  
re d u c t io n  of fo rc e s  now being  c a r r i e d  ou t in  Korea should 
n o t  be p e rm itted  to p ro g re s s  beyond" November 15, the p o in t  
a t  which the  Army had to  know i f  w ithdrawal was to  
c o n tin u e .^ ^
On November 12, a  m i l i t a r y  in te l l i g e n c e  e s t im a te  con­
cluded t h a t  N orth  Korea was capable  o f  v ic to ry  i f  a  c i v i l  
war broke o u t .  T h is was made even more c e r t a in  i f  u n i t s  
se rv in g  i n  the Chinese Communist Army were made a v a i la b le ,  
which seemed l i k e l y  in  l i g h t  of Chinese Communist successes
he
•^Muccio to  M arsh a ll ,  November 5,  1948, FR, 1948,
V I, 1320-1321 ; Schnabel, P o l i c y . 33 .
^ ^ o v e t t  to  M arsh a ll ,  November 5, 1948, FR. 1948, VI, 
1319! Saltzman to  D i r e c to r  o f P la n s  and O perations, D epart­
ment of Army(Wedemeyer), November 11,1948, I b i d . . 1324.
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in  Manchuria. In vas io n  f e a r s  were growing as  N orth Korean 
t ro o p s  co n cen tra ted  between the ] 8th  and 39th p a r a l l e l s .  The 
s i t u a t i o n  was a  grave one, and while r e t e n t i o n  of U.S. t ro o p s  
was no panacea f o r  K o re a 's  problem s, a t  p re s e n t  the U.S.
Army alone p re sen te d  g u a ran tee s  o f a  minimum of Korean se ­
c u r i t y .  The p re s e n t  withdrawal schedu le  was inopportune be­
cause the  s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea was in  a  s t a t e  of f lu x .  A 
postponement o f  f i n a l  withdrawal f o r  s e v e ra l  months would a l ­
low f o r  a b e t t e r  a p p ra i s a l  o f the s t r e n g th s  and in te n t io n s
of N orth  Korea, and would a llo w  f o r  a  b e t t e r  p re p a ra t io n
48of South Korean s e c u r i ty  fo r c e s .
One week l a t e r ,  bo th  Rhee and the  South Korean 
N a t io n a l  Assembly appealed to  Truman to  r e t a i n  U.S. t ro o p s  
in  Korea. Because of r e c e n t  developments in  China, the 
Korean people were worried about the  r e p o r te d  t o t a l  w ith­
drawal of U.S. t ro o p s .  U n t i l  adequate Korean s e c u r i ty  fo rc e s  
could  be t r a in e d ,  i t  was e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  U.S. t ro o p s  remain. 
Muccio in  a fo l lo w in g  n o te ,  sa id  t h a t  Korean o f f i c i a l s  con­
s t a n t l y  sought some s ta tem en t of U.S. i n t e n t io n  to  r e t a in  
i t s  t ro o p s  in  Korea. Muccio could on ly  r e a s s u re  them t h a t  
the United S ta te s  had no in t e n t io n  of abandoning Korea.
The clamor a g a in s t  w ithdrawal had the in tended  im­
p a c t ,  a s  a  group o f o f f i c i a l s  in  the  F a r  E a s te rn  D iv is ion
^ I^b id .
4q
^Muccio to  M arsh a ll ,  November 19 ,194 8 ,I b i d . ,1331-32. 
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of the  S ta te  Department, p repared  a memorandum in  December 
th a t  c a l le d  f o r  a h a l t  to  withdrawal on the grounds t h a t  
complete evacuation  a t  t h i s  time "would s e r io u s ly  jeo p a rd iz e  
the s e c u r i ty  and s t a b i l i t y "  o f  the Republic of Korea. The 
S ta te  Department agreed  t h a t  prompt withdrawal should be 
sought, but only  i f  i t  could be c a r r i e d  out in  a way t h a t  
would n o t  c o n tr ib u te  " to  the expansion  of a h o s t i l e  Commu­
n i s t  p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y  system in N o rth eas t  A sia.
Communist dom ination of Korea would th re a te n  Japan  
and would lea d  to i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of e f f o r t s  to b r in g  Japan  
in to  the  Communist sphere of in f lu e n c e .  With the l o s s  of 
A m erica 's  only f r ie n d  on the n o r th e a s t  Asian c o n t in e n t ,  th e re  
soon would develop among the Japanese  a g r e a te r  u n e a s in e ss  
f low ing from t h e i r  exposed p o s i t io n .  R e ten tion  of U.S. 
tro o p s  would e n t a i l  m eeting problems both onerous and b u r­
densome, ye t  a f a i l u r e  to  face th e se  problems e v e n tu a l ly  
could d e s t ro y  U.S. s e c u r i ty  in  the  P a c i f i c .
The i n d e f i n i t e  maintenance of U.S. tro o p s  in  Korea 
and Japan could n o t  in su re  the achievement of the b as ic  
p o l ic y  o b je c t iv e s  o r the  s e c u r i ty  g o a ls  of the United S ta te s  
in  the  P a c i f i c .  N one the less , the Communist c o n s o l id a t io n  in  
N o r th e a s t  A sia  had to be recognized  as a breach in  the  U.S.
D ra f t  Memo by D ire c to r  o f F ar  E as te rn  A f f a i r s  
(B u t te rw o r th ) , P repared  by the C hief  o f the D iv is io n  of 
N o rth ea s t  Asian A f f a i r s ,  Max Bishop, December 17, 1948, 
I b i d . ,  1337- 1340.
^^I b id .
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s e c u r i ty  system, making a tta in m en t  of U.S. o b je c t iv e s  impos­
s i b l e .  The United S t a t e s  needed to examine se v e ra l  ques­
t io n s .  F i r s t ,  had communist expansion in  n o r th e a s t  Asia 
reached the p o in t  where the s e c u r i ty  i n t e r e s t s  of the United 
S ta te s  r e q u ire d  p o s i t iv e  e f f o r t s  to  p reven t f u r t h e r  expan­
sion? Second, was i t  n ecessa ry  th a t  the communist power sy s­
tem, a lre a d y  b r u t a l l y  frank  and outspoken in  i t s  h o s t i l i t y  
to  the United  S t a t e s ,  be made to draw back from i t s  p re s e n t  
e x ten s ive  ho ld ings?  F in a l ly ,  could the United S ta te s  a f fo rd  
to  a llow  f u r t h e r  S o v ie t  advances, while c o n tin u in g  measures 
designed merely to  r e t a r d  those  advances? I t  was im pera tive  
th a t  the  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i ty  Council rev iew  the d e c is io n s  
reached in  NSC 8 .^^
The Department of the Army had reached d i f f e r e n t  
conclu s io ns  about Korea than had the S ta te  Department.
William Draper, U nder-S ecre ta ry  of the Army, p o in ted  out t h a t  
the  Army had coop era ted  w ith the S ta te  D epartm en t 's  r e q u e s t  
of November 9, when MacArthur was ordered to  r e t a i n  in  Korea, 
f o r  an  i n d e f i n i t e  p e r io d ,  one re in fo rc e d  reg im en ta l  combat 
team n o t  to exceed 7»500 men. In  l i g h t  o f  the  United N ations 
fav o rab le  c o n s id e r a t io n  of the  Korean q u e s t io n .  Army b e liev e d  
t h a t  the time had come f o r  a  f irm  d e c is io n  to  complete w ith ­
draw al. D raper re q u e s te d  approval to  recommence withdrawal 
on February 1, 1949, to  be completed by March 31, 1949
^ I^b id .
^•'^Draper to  Saltzman, December 22 ,194 8 ,I b i d . , 1342-43 
— l 4 l  —
Both the  S ta te  Department and the Army continued  to 
p re s s  t h e i r  opposing views in to  19^9* A Ja n u ary  19, 1949, 
memorandum from General MacArthur b u t t r e s s e d  the Army's de­
s i r e  to  complete w ithdraw al. MacArthur b e lieved  th a t  the 
U nited  S ta te s  d id  n o t  have the c a p a c i ty  to  t r a i n  and equip 
Korean fo r c e s  to  enable them to  r e s i s t  a f u l l - s c a l e  in v a s io n .  
In  MacArthur*s words, " I f  a  s e r io u s  t h r e a t  developed, the 
United S ta te s  would have to  g ive  up a c t iv e  m i l i t a r y  support 
o f the  ROK . . . ." MacArthur was anxious f o r  the  United  
S t a te s  to  withdraw from Korea s ince  i t  had r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  
im portance m i l i t a r i l y .  South Korean defense  fo rc e s  should 
be capable  o f  o f f e r in g  r e s i s t a n c e  to  i n t e r n a l  problem s, n o t 
o v e r t  a g g re ss io n .  MacArthur c o n s i s t e n t ly  opposed the  id e a  
of b u i ld in g  up South Korean fo r c e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  he had to 
p rov ide  the m a te r i e l .
The reopened debate  on U.S. p o l ic y  in  Korea culm i­
n a te d  in  NSC 8 /2 ,  a c l e a r - c u t  v ic to r y  f o r  Army o b je c t iv e s .  
NSC 8 /2  was a  rea ssessm en t  of the U.S. p o s i t io n  in  Korea as 
d e f in e d  in  NSC 8 of A p r i l  3, 1949* The paper r e s t a t e d  
NSC 8 ' s  b e l i e f  t h a t  the  predominate goa l o f  S o v ie t  p o l ic y
ch,
Memo by the D ire c to r  of the O ffice  of F ar  E a s te rn  
A f f a i r s  (B u tte rw orth )  to  the A cting  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  
Janu ary  10, 1949, U.S. Department of S ta te ,  F o re ign  Re­
l a t i o n s  of the United S ta te s ,  1949; The F ar  E a s t  and 
A u s t r a l i a  ( P a r t  2 ) , Volume VII (Washington; GFO, 1976),
942; Schnabel, P o l i c y , 34-35; W illiam Stueck, "Cold War 
R evisionism  and the O r ig in s  of the Korean C o n f l i c t , "
P a c i f i c  H i s to r i c a l  Review, 42(No. 4, 1973), 541-542; W illiam 
Sebald , With MacArthur in  Japan (New York; N orton , 1965), 
177.
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in  Korea was to  achieve dom ination of the e n t i r e  co u n try .
NSC 8/2  agreed  w ith the o r i g in a l  e s t im a te  th a t  Communist 
c o n tro l  of a l l  of Korea would a d v e rse ly  a f f e c t  the p o l i t i c a l  
and s t r a t e g i c  p o s i t io n  o f the United S ta te s  throughout the 
F a r  E a s t .  The f a l l  of South Korea fo llo w in g  an a b ru p t  w ith ­
drawal o f  American fo rc e s  would appear to  be a U.S. b e t r a ­
y a l  o f i t s  f r i e n d s  and a l l i e s  and would c o n s t i tu te  a  se ­
vere  blow to  U.S. p r e s t ig e  and i n f lu e n c e .
The a u th o rs  of NSC 8 /2  agreed t h a t  the middle course 
chosen in  NSC 8 was the  c o r r e c t  one—to  support w ith in  p ra c ­
t i c a b l e  l i m i t s  a  South Korean government with a  reasonab le  
chance f o r  s u rv iv a l ,  while red u c in g  th e  U.S. commitment of 
men and money. While s i g n i f i c a n t  g a in s  had been made " in  
term s of both  the w e lfa re  and a s p i r a t i o n s  of the Korean 
people and of the  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  o f  the United S ta te s , "  
in  o rd er  to  c o n so l id a te  th ese  g a in s  " th e  United S ta te s  must 
continue  to  g ive p o l i t i c a l  support and economic, t e c h n ic a l ,  
m i l i t a r y ,  and o th e r  a s s i s t a n c e  to  the Republic of Korea.
In  pursuance of i t s  o b j e c t iv e s ,  the United S ta te s  
p lanned to  prov ide  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  f o r  a  " w e l l - t r a in e d  
and equipped Army o f  65,000 men, in c lu d in g  a i r  detachments 
s u i t a b le  f o r  m a in ta in in g  i n t e r n a l  o rd e r  . . .and f o r
•^^Report by the  NSC to  the  P r e s id e n t ,  March 22,
1949, FR. 1949. V II(2 ) ,  969- 978. 
56I b i d .
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m ain ta in in g  border s e c u r i ty  . . . A ss is tan c e  a l s o  would 
be provided f o r  a 4,000 man Coast Guard to  su pp ress  smug­
g l in g ,  p i ra c y ,  i l l e g a l  e n t r y ,  and h o s t i l e  i n f i l t r a t i o n .  
F in a l ly ,  a s s i s t a n c e  would be given in  the  form of small arms 
and ammunition f o r  a 35iOOO man p o l ic e  fo rc e .  The United 
S ta te s  in  each case would p rov id e , through a m i l i t a r y  ad­
v iso ry  group, t r a i n i n g  and m a te r ie l .  The Economic Coope­
r a t i o n  A d m in is tra t io n  would provide funds f o r  o th e r  than
m i l i t a r y  p u rposes . NSC 8 /2  thu s  committed the  U nited
“57S ta te s  to  m ain ta in in g  South Korea’ s s e c u r i ty  f o r c e s .^
The b a s ic  d e c is io n  of NSC 8 , however, was r e a f ­
firm ed—American tro o p s  would complete t h e i r  w ithdraw al no t 
l a t e r  than  June 30, 1949* The N ationa l M i l i t a r y  E s t a b l i s h ­
ment be lieved  t h a t  f u r t h e r  temporary postponement o f  w ith­
drawal "would n o t  a p p re c ia b ly  d im in ish  the  r i s k  of an a t ­
tempt by the  Sov ie t-dom inated  North Korean regime to  over­
throw the Republic  of Korea through d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  aggres-  
s io n ." ^  This view, when combined w ith  M acA rthur 's  es tim ate  
t h a t  the United S ta te s  could  no t t r a i n  a  South Korean force  
capable o f  r e s i s t i n g  a  f u l l - s c a l e  in v a s io n ,  l e d  the  m i l i ta r y  
to  decide f i rm ly  in  f a v o r  o f  w ithdraw al. An "unm istakably  
c le a r "  announcement t h a t  withdrawal in  no way in d ic a te d  a 
le s s e n in g  of U.S. su p po rt  f o r  the R epublic  o f Korea, was to  
accompany U.S. tro op  w ith d raw a l .
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid . ^^Ibid.
- 144 -
The United S ta te s  had decided to  withdraw i t s  fo rce s  
from Korea w ith  a f u l l  knowledge of the  r i s k s  involved .
Those r i s k s  inc luded  a p o s s ib le  Communist takeover of South 
Korea. T h is  d e c is io n  was made d e sp i te  the " lo s s  of China" 
and the S ov ie t blockade o f  West B e r l in ,  c l e a r  s igns  t h a t  r e ­
in fo rc e d  the  b e l i e f  t h a t  Communism was on the move. The lo s s  
o f  China was a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e m b i t te r in g  experience  f o r  many 
Americans, y e t  NSC 8/2 confirm ed the d e c is io n  to  withdraw 
from Korea. Yet i t  d id  so in  a  way t h a t  s e t  up a  framework 
f o r  p ro v id in g  South Korea w ith  a id  in  the  fu tu re  should i t  
be needed. T h is  framework was s tren g thened  in  1949-1950 
i n  a manner t h a t  would in su re  U.S. involvem ent in  the Korean 
War.
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CHAPTER VI
THE UNWRITTEN COMMITMENT TO SOUTH KOREA, 1949-1950
The d e c is io n s  reached  in  NSC 8 /2  supported  th e  m i l i ­
t a r y ' s  p o s i t io n  t h a t  Korea had l i t t l e  s t r a t e g i c  importance 
and re a f f i rm e d  the  d e c i s io n  to  withdraw U.S. tro o p s .  But 
from March, 1949 to  Ju n e ,  1950, a  s e r i e s  of s ta tem en ts  from 
major U.S. p o l ic y  makers l a i d  a f irm  fo und a tion  f o r  U.S. i n ­
te r v e n t io n  in  Korea in  th e  even t of Communist ag g re ss io n .
The conclusions  of NSC 8 /2  i n i t i a l l y  met with 
M uccio 's  app rova l, but by A p ri l  he was anx ious ly  re q u e s t in g  
in fo rm a tio n  re g a rd in g  equipment fo r  the  Korean Coast Guard, ' 
f o r  r e p a i r  of arms and m a te r i e l ,  and f o r  a i r c r a f t . ^
M uccio 's  a n x ie ty  was a m p lif ie d  many tim es over among Korean 
l e a d e r s .  Rhee p o in te d ly  asked Muccio what the  U.S. response 
would be to  ag g re ss io n  a g a in s t  South Korea, because many 
Koreans questioned  w hether the United S ta te s  could be r e l i e d  
upon. P la c in g  heavy emphasis on the  in f lu e n c e  o f  the  " lo s s  
o f  China,"  and the  rumor of the  c o n tra c t io n  o f  the  U.S. de­
fen s iv e  p e r im e te r  in  the  P a c i f i c ,  Rhee wondered how much
^Muccio to  the  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  A p r i l  12, A p r i l  22 
^ d  A p ri l  26, 1949, FR-.1949. V II (2 ) ,  986-87,994-996.
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Korea could  count on the United S ta te s  i f  an o u ts id e  a g g re s ­
sor a t t a c k e d .  M uccio 's on ly  re p ly  was t h a t  the United S ta te s
2
had a id e d ,  was a id in g ,  and would continue to  a id  Korea.
Rhee was n o t  re a s su r red and he continued to  r e s i s t  
agreement to  an e a r l y  withdrawal d a te .  In  a p re s s  r e l e a s e  
of May 7, I 949, he asked whether South Korea f e l l  w i th in  
A m erica 's  f i r s t  l i n e  of d e fe n se .  Could South Korea count on 
a l l - o u t  U.S. m i l i t a r y  aid i f  a ttacked?  This concern went 
beyond th e  q u e s t io n  of tro o p  w ithdraw al, a cco rd ing  to  Rhee. 
Since the  United S ta te s  had in v i te d  the Sov ie t Communists 
in to  Korea by t h e i r  d iv is io n  of Korea, the United S t a te s  had 
a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  support the Republic of Korea. While 
Rhee c r i t i c i z e d  U.S. Korean p o l ic y ,  Muccio continued to  p re s s  
fo r  a c t io n  in  the a re a  o f  su p p l ie s  f o r  a Coast Guard and fo r  
a i r  su p p o r t ,  e s p e c ia l ly  a s  inducements to  g a in  R hee 's  a g re e ­
ment to  an e a r ly  withdrawal d a te .^
M uccio 's  p l e a s  brought a sharp re p ly  from the  S ta te  
Department t h a t  tempered fu tu re  comments about South K o re a 's  
m i l i t a r y  weaknesses. Muccio was informed t h a t  Washington too 
shared h i s  concern f o r  K o re a 's  s e c u r i ty ,  but h i s  r e q u e s t s  fo r  
a d d i t io n a l  n ava l v e s se ls  and f o r  a i r c r a f t  " p r io r  to  o r  w ith in  
a rea so n ab le  time a f t e r  June 30 withdrawal was a b s o lu te ly
^em o  of C onversation , Muccio, May 2, 1949, I b i d . ,
1003- 1005 .
& u c c io  to  Ac he son. May 6, 7, 9, 1949, I b i d . . 1009,
1011, 1013.
- 147 -
out of the q u e s t io n  due to  the  lack  both of funds and equip­
m ent." Washington b e lieved  th a t  Rhee was a ttem p tin g  to  
r a i s e  the p r ic e  of h i s  concurrence in  withdrawal to  ga in  as 
many concessions a s  p o s s ib le .  M uccio 's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was to  
make i t  unm istakab ly  c le a r  to  Rhee th a t  worldwide demands, 
which exceeded A m erica 's  c a p a c i ty  to  f u l f i l l ,  se v e re ly  l im ­
i te d .U .S .  c a p a b i l i t y  to  a id  south Korea. The United S ta te s  
would withdraw by June ]0 w ith  or w ithout R hee 's  a s s e n t .^
The S ta te  Department added th a t  i f  M uccio 's re q u e s ts  
r e f l e c t e d  a  basic  r e v i s io n  of h i s  e s t im a te  of the  circum­
s ta n ce s  under which the United S ta te s  should withdraw i t s  
fo rc e s ,  t h i s  would c a l l  f o r  a  reopening of the e n t i r e  ques­
t io n  of withdrawal and fo r  a  r e a p p ra is a l  of the conc lusions  
o f  NSC 8 /2 . M uccio 's  de fens iv e  rep ly  was th a t  the  b e s t  ad­
v ice  a v a i la b le  had p rov ided  the modest e s t im a te s  he had sen t  
to  Washington. H is r e c e n t  messages d id  n o t  r e f l e c t  a d e s ire  
f o r  r e v i s io n  of n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i ty  policy.-^
As th e  p ro ce ss  of American troop  withdrawal continued 
in  l a t e  May and e a r l y  June , Rhee became more concerned about 
o b ta in in g  p u b lic  a s su ra n c e s  of con tinu in g  U.S. support than 
about troop  r e t e n t i o n .  Rhee was no t s a t i s f i e d  w ith A cting  
S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  James Webb's June 1 p re s s  conference
\ c h e s o n  to  Muccio, May 9, 1949, I b i d . . 1015.
^ I b i d . îMuccio to  Acheson,May 11 .1 949 .I b i d . , 1018-19.
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s ta tem en t to  the e f f e c t  t h a t  re c e n t  U.S. moves in  Korea in  
no way rep re se n te d  a  change in  American support f o r  the 
U.N. r e s o lu t io n s  d e a l in g  w ith  Korea.^
F u r th e r  su p p o r t  f o r  Korea came in  Truman's June 7 
message to  Congress concern ing  the Korean a id  b i l l .  The 
c o n t in u a t io n  of a id  to Korea was of g re a t  importance to  the 
su c ce s fu l  achievement of U .S. fo re ig n  p o l ic y  aims because 
Korea had become "a  t e s t i n g  ground in  which the  v a l i d i t y  and 
p r a c t i c a l  value o f  the  i d e a l s  and p r in c ip le s  of democracy 
which the Republic i s  p u t t i n g  in to  p r a c t ic e  are  being  
matched a g a in s t  the  p r a c t i c e s  of Communism which have been 
imposed upon the peo p le  o f  n o r th  K orea."  South K o re a 's  su r ­
v iv a l  and i t s  p ro g re s s  toward a  s e l f - s u p p o r t in g  s ta b le  econ­
omy would have an immense and f a r - r e a c h in g  in f lu e n c e  on the 
people  of A sia , "d em o n s tra tin g  the success  and t e n a c i t y  of 
democracy in  r e s i s t i n g  communism," and would stand  "a s  a 
beacon to  the  people  o f  n o r th e rn  A sia  in  r e s i s t i n g  the  con-
7
t r o l  o f  the Communist f o r c e s  which have overrun them."
Other o f f i c i a l s  p r i v a t e l y  r e i t e r a t e d  Truman's s tron g  
words of supp o rt .  I n  h e a r in g s  before the  Senate F o re ign  Re­
l a t i o n s  Committee on economic a s s i s ta n c e  to  South Korea, a 
c o n s ta n t ly  rep e a te d  theme was K o re a 's  symbolic value  and i t s  
r e l a t i o n s  to  the U n ited  N a tio n s .  U nder-Secre ta ry  o f  S ta te
^Muccio to  Acheson, June 6 , 1949, I b i d . , 1039-
^Glenn P a ig e ,  The Korean D ecis ion  (New York: 
C he lsea  House, 1970), 28.
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Webb, on June 28, d ec la red  t h a t  " the  r e s t  o f A sia  i s  watching 
us in  Korea."  I f  the  United S ta te s  d id  n o t  do a l l  in  i t s  
power, c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  i t s  worldwide o b l ig a t io n s ,  to  a s s i s t  
t h i s  o u tpo s t  of freedom, " c o u n t le s s  m i l l io n s  of the  peoples 
of Asia w i l l  begin to  doubt the  p r a c t i c a l  s u p e r io r i t y  of 
dem ocratic p r i n c i p l e s . "  Paul Hoffman, head of the  Economic 
Cooperation A d m in is tra t io n , observed t h a t  " i f  we f a i l  in  
South Korea, which i s  the only p lace  l e f t  on the mainland 
where you have any e f f o r t  being made to  l i v e  in  a  democratic 
way, t h a t  f a i l u r e  might very d i s a s t r o u s l y  a f f e c t  the  whole 
fu tu re  o f  Asia . . . ."®
Throughout the  h ea r in g s . S e n a to r  A rthu r Vandenberg 
r e f e r r e d  to  K orea’s value a s  "the on ly  symbol l e f t  of any 
c o n s t ru c t iv e  i n t e r e s t  on the p a r t  o f the  U nited  S ta te s  in  
a s s i s t i n g  a f f i r m a t iv e ly  to  c o n ta in  the  Communist menace in  
A s ia ."  Vandenberg was even c l e a r e r  when q u e s t io n in g  General 
W.E. Todd, D i r e c to r  J o in t  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Group, J o i n t  Chiefs 
of S t a f f ,  about Korea. Todd emphasized t h a t  i t  was the 
e s t im ate  of the  J o i n t  Chiefs t h a t  th e  S o v ie t  Union had l i t ­
t l e  to  g a in  in  agg ress ion  a g a in s t  South Korea. Vandenberg 
f e l t  the  is su e  was n o t  Sov ie t i n t e n t io n s ,  bu t U.S. i n t e n ­
t i o n s .  The U nited  S ta te s  had Korea and " i f  we should aban­
don i t ,  i t  would lo ok  l ik e  to  the whole of A sia  t h a t  we were
o
U.S. Congress, Senate , Economic A ss is tan ce  to  China 
and_Korea; 1949-1950. Hearings Held in  E xecu tive  Session  
Before the  Committee on Fore ign  R e la t io n s ,  8 1 s t  Congress, 1 s t  
and 2nd Session(W ashington; GPO, 1974), .120-121, 129.
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washing our hands o f  i t  and l e t t i n g  i t  go away." Vandenberg 
b e liev ed  th a t  Korea was of such symbolic importance t h a t  i t  
could  n o t  be abandoned to communist a g g re s s io n .^
A ll of th e se  s ta tem en ts  might have been r e a s s u r in g  
to  Rhee, but what he r e a l l y  wanted to  know was what s p e c i ­
f i c  measures the  U nited  S ta te s  would take in  case of ou ts ide  
a g g re ss io n  a g a in s t  South Korea. U n fo r tu n a te ly  both NSC 8 and 
NSC 8 /2  had ignored  t h i s  s u b je c t .  While acknowledging the 
very  r e a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a North Korean in v as io n  fo llow ing  
U.S. w ithdraw al, th e se  N a tio n a l  S e c u ri ty  Council papers  
f a i l e d  to  o u t l in e  the  op tion s  a v a i la b le  i f  such an ev en t  oc­
c u rre d  o r  to su g ges t  a  p e r t i n e n t  course of a c t io n .  C h ief  o f  
S t a f f  of the U.S. Army, General Omar B radley , however, did 
ad d re ss  h im se lf  to  th ese  q u e s t io n s .  In  an a ttem p t to  reopen 
d is c u s s io n  on K o re a 's  p lace  in  A m erica 's  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  
p o l ic y ,  Bradley p repa red  a  r e p o r t  t h a t  was in tended  fo r  
both  the J o i n t  C h ie fs  of S ta f f  and the S ta te  Departm ent.
The r e p o r t ,  e n t i t l e d  " Im p lic a t io n s  of a  P o s s ib le  F u l l  
Sca le  In v as io n  from N orth  Korea Subsequent to  Withdrawal of 
U.S. Troops from South K orea ," o u t l in e d  f iv e  b a s ic  c o u rse s ,  
o f a c t io n  f o r  the  U nited  S ta te s  should South K orea be i n ­
vaded. The o p t io n s  had to  be considered  because South Korea 
might be overthrown and the Korean p e n in su la  l o s t  to
9 l b id . .  179, 185.
^^Memo by the  Department o f  the  Army to  the D epart­
ment of S ta te ,Ju n e  27,1949, FR.1949. V I I ( 2 ) . 1046-1055-
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Communist domination by d e f a u l t  i f  America d id  n o t  adopt a 
course of a c t io n  to  co u n te r  a f u l l - s c a l e  Communist in v a s io n .  
The f a l l  of Korea would mean th a t  U .S. r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  e f f o r t s  
and sponso rsh ip  had been a  " f r u i t l e s s  u n d e rta k in g ."  There 
would be f a r - r e a c h in g  in t e r n a t io n a l  r e c r im in a t io n  to  the  e f ­
f e c t  t h a t  U.S. pronouncements to  c o n tin u e  to  support South 
Korea had n o t  been f u l f i l l e d .  I t  t h e r e f o r e  appeared t h a t  
some a c t io n  would have to be taken.
One course  would be to  "implement c u r r e n t  emergency 
e v ac u a tio n  p lan s  to  e x t r i c a t e  U.S. n a t i o n a l s  and m i l i t a r y  ad­
v is o ry  pe rsonnel  now a c c re d i te d  to the  Government of th e  
ROK." T his course would remove U.S. n a t i o n a l s  from the 
scene , th u s  l e s s e n in g  American r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e i r  se ­
c u r i t y ,  and would minimize U.S. involvement in  a dangerous 
s i t u a t i o n .  U n fo r tu n a te ly  i t  a lso  would be an acknowledgement 
of South K o re a 's  weakness and would in d ic a t e  t h a t  America 
would n o t  f u l f i l l  p rom ises o f support.  Prudence d i r e c te d ,
however, t h a t  t h i s  course of a c t io n  be invoked i f  the s i t u -
12a t io n  became a la rm in g ly  dangerous.
A second course  o f a c t io n  was " to  p r e s e n t  the  p ro b ­
lem to  th e  U.N. S e c u r i ty  C ouncil f o r  c o n s id e ra t io n  as  a 
t h r e a t  to  the g e n e ra l  p e a c e ."  The problem thu s  would be 
reco g n ized  a s  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  one and the  United N a tio n s  
could o pe ra te  in  a s i t u a t i o n  i t  was c re a te d  f o r .  In
^^Ib id ..  1052. ^^ Ib id .. 1053-
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a d d i t io n ,  the  S ov ie t Union would be fo rced  to  d ec la re  i t s  
co o p era t iv e  or noncoopera tive  i n t e n t io n s  and such a move 
would remove the "onus of U.S. u n i l a t e r a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and 
a c t io n . "  The d isad v an tag es  were tw ofo ld . The United Nations 
would have to  a c t  w ithou t "p ro p e r ly  o rgan ized  machinery to  
en fo rce  i t s  dictum s . . and t h i s  course involved  de lays , 
d eb a te ,  and re c r im in a t io n .  B rad ley  b e liev e d ,  however, th a t  
t h i s  course  appeared to  be l o g i c a l  and n e c e s sa ry .
A t h i r d  o p t io n  was to  i n i t i a t e  p o l ic e  a c t io n  with 
U.N. sa n c t io n  by in t r o d u c t io n  o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  fo rce  "with 
the  o b je c t iv e  of r e s t o r i n g  law and o rd e r  and r e s t o r a t i o n  of 
the  38t h  p a r a l l e l  boundary i n v i o a b i l i t y . " T h is  a c t io n  would 
enhance the p r e s t ig e  of the  U nited  N a tio n s ,  m ight lead  to an 
e f f e c t i v e  and e a r ly  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f the  s t a tu s  quo ante bellum 
and could provide a  recogn ized  p rocedure  t h a t  might d iscou rr  
age f u tu re  v i o l a t i o n s  of law and o rd e r .  Such an a c t io n ,  how­
ev er ,  m ight re q u ire  C ongressiona l a u th o r i ty ,  w ith  consequent 
d e la y s ,  and would invo lve  an e x p en d itu re  o f U.S. manpower 
and re s o u rc e s  a t  a  c r i t i c a l  time in  European a f f a i r s .
B rad ley  concluded t h a t  t h i s  course  o f  a c t io n  was unsound mi­
l i t a r i l y  and should be used on ly  i f  a l l  o th e r  methods f a i l e d  
and i f  o th e r  member n a t io n s  f u l l y  p a r t i c i p a t e d . ^ ^
A f o u r th  course  of a c t io n  was to  r e c o n s t i t u t e  a  U.S. 
j o i n t  ta s k  fo rce  a t  th e  s p e c ia l  r e q u e s t  of South Korea. This
l^ Ib id . .  1033- 1034. ^^ Ib id ..  1034.
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r e s o lu te  a c t io n  would command u n iv e r s a l  r e s p e c t  and would in ­
sp i re  anti-Communist movements around the world. Of co u rse , 
t h i s  maneuver would be u n i l a t e r a l ,  would commit re s o u rc e s  
needed e lsew here , and would g ive  the Chinese Communists the  
o p p o r tu n ity  to  a l ig n  them selves openly w ith  North  Korea.
T h is  approach c a r r ie d  the  r i s k  of b r in g in g  Sov ie t r e - e n t r y  
in to  North  Korea and could  l e a d  " to  a long  and c o s t l y  in ­
volvement of U.S. fo rc e s  in  an undeclared  war." B radley f e l t  
t h i s  p lan  was unaccep tab le  s in c e  i t  would n o t  f i n a l i z e  the  
s i t u a t i o n  and might le a d  to world c o n f l i c t ,  but he d id  n o t  
r u l e  ou t t h i s  course i f  p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty  re q u ire d  i t . ^ ^
A f i n a l  op tio n  was to  extend and apply  the  Truman 
D oc tr ine  to Korea. This would serve as a " ta n g ib le  in d ic a ­
t i o n  o f  an i n t e r e s t  i n  and su p p o r t  o f a p a r t  of the  world 
r a p id ly  succumbing to  Communism," and would serve a s  a  de­
t e r r e n t  to  Communist advances toward Japan. But i t  a lso  
could give the  appearance t h a t  th e  United S ta te s  was t r y in g  
to  p e rp e tu a te  a  government which the  popu lar  w i l l  d id  not 
t o t a l l y  su p p o r t .  Such an a c t io n  a ls o  would p lace  a f u r t h e r  
s t r a i n  on the U.S. Government, a lre a d y  faced  w ith  d e f i c i t  
spending, perhaps l e a d in g  to  a d i l u t i o n  of funds a v a i la b le  
f o r  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  programs of g r e a t e r  s t r a t e g i c  impor­
ta n c e .  B radley  f e l t  t h a t  a comparison could  be made to  the  
s i t u a t i o n  in  Greece, where a  l e g a l l y  c o n s t i tu te d  government
l^ Ib id . ,  1055.
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was th re a te n e d ,  bu t t h e r e a f t e r  any s i m i l a r i t y  d isap p ea red .
In  B ra d le y 's  view, "To apply the Truman D octrine  to  Korea 
would re q u ire  a  p ro d ig io u s  e f f o r t  and v a s t  e x p e n d i tu re s  f a r  
out of p ro p o r t io n  to  the b e n e f i t s  to  be expec ted .
Bradley  concluded t h a t  in  case of a f u l l - s c a l e  m i l i ­
t a r y  in v as io n  from N orth Korea, which South Korea could  n o t  
c o u n te r  s u c c e s s f u l ly ,  the United S ta te s  should adopt the 
f i r s t  two o p tio n s  of evacu a tion  and p r e s e n ta t io n  o f the  prob­
lem to  the U.N. S e c u r i ty  C ounc il .  He f u r t h e r  recommended 
t h a t  both the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  and the S ta te  Department c o n s id e r
t h i s  r e p o r t  f o r  re fe re n c e  to  the N a tiona l S e c u r i ty  Council
17f o r  a  reopening  o f  d i s c u s s io n s  about U.S. Korean p o l ic y .
The J o i n t  C h iefs  r e a c t io n  was to r e s t a t e  p rev io u s
p o l ic y — t h a t  i s ,  Korea was o f  l i t t l e  s t r a t e g i c  im portance to
the United S ta te s  and any commitment o f U.S. fo r c e s  would be
i l l - a d v i s e d  and im p ra c t ic a b le  in  view of A m erica 's  heavy in -
18t e r n a t i o n a l  o b l ig a t io n s  and he r  l im i te d  r e s o u rc e s .  While 
the J o i n t  C h ie fs  r e j e c t e d  i t ,  and while i t  d id  n o t  le a d  to  
a  r e c o n s id e ra t io n  of NSC 8 /2 ,  B ra d le y 's  r e p o r t  se rved  to 
p la c e  the i s s u e s  before  the  key p o lic y  makers. The r e p o r t  
was an a ttem pt to  reach  a balanced p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y  a s s e s s ­
ment o f  both th e  problems faced  in  Korea and of t h e i r  pos­
s i b l e  s o lu t io n .  B rad ley  expressed  a  keen p o l i t i c a l  sense in  
c o n c e r t  w ith  h i s  m i l i t a r y  e x p e r t is e  in  e v a lu a t in g  the various
^^ I b i d . .1056'. l ? l b i d . .1048. ^^ i b i d . .  1056-57. 
- 155 -
o p t io n s  open to  the  United  S ta te s  in  Korea— something th a t  
many p o l ic y  makers in  the  S ta te  and Defense Department had 
f a i l e d  to address  them selves to .
One of the  r e p o r t ' s  im portan t p o in t s  was t h a t  the 
r e j e c t i o n  of a p p l i c a t io n  of the Truman D o c tr in e  to  Korea was 
a n o th e r  s ig n  t h a t  conta inm ent was n o t  a worldwide U.S. p o l i ­
cy—the  United S ta te s  had v i t a l  commitments e lsewhere of 
g r e a t e r  s t r a t e g i c  importance than  South Korea. N on e the less , 
B rad ley  was n o t  ready  to  w r i t e - o f f  K orea. As Acheson had 
t r i e d  to  do in  194? in  d is c u s s in g  the  Truman D octrine  in  
Senate h e a r in g s ,  B radley  sought a middle ground f o r  U.S. 
p o l ic y  between the  two extrem es of a re a s  o f v i t a l  s t r a t e g i c  
im portance , such a s  Germany and Japan , and a re a s  which had 
to  be w r i t t e n  o f f  a s  w ith in  the Russian sphere of p h y s ic a l  
f o r c e ,  such as  E a s te rn  Europe. For B rad ley , p o l ic y  f o r  
such a re a s  appeared to  be p re d ic a te d  on m u l t i l a t e r a l  r a t h e r  
than  u n i l a t e r a l  a c t io n .
Bradley was n o t  a lone  in  the summer of 19^9 in  r e ­
a s s e s s in g  U.S. p o l ic y  in  Korea and A sia  a s  a  whole. Dean 
Acheson in  J u ly ,  1949, asked Ambassador a t  Large P h i l i p  
J e s s u p ,  to  draw up a program of a c t io n  f o r  A sia , w ith  e s t i ­
mates o f  i t s  c o s t  to  America, th a t  would be a p p l ic a b le  to  
a r e a s  n o t  under Communist c o n t r o l .  The program was to  be 
based on the  "assum ption t h a t  i t  i s  the fundamental d e c i ­
s io n  of American p o l ic y  t h a t  the United S t a te s  does n o t  
in te n d  to  pe rm it f u r t h e r  e x te n s io n  of Communist dom ination
— 1^6 -
on the  C on tin en t of A sia  . . . The p r a c t i c a l  adm ission
th a t  i t  might be beyond the c a p a b i l i t i e s  of the U nited  S ta te s
to pay the  c o s t s  of such a program tempered A cheson 's  r e -  
19q u e s t .  The re q u e s t  was an in d ic a t io n ,  however, t h a t  the 
f e a s i b i l i t y  o f ex tend ing  the  containm ent p o l ic y  to  A s ia  was 
a t  l e a s t  being contem plated .
The f i r s t  r e s u l t  of A cheson 's re q u e s t  was a Novem­
ber 16, 1949 p aper e n t i t l e d  "O utline o f  F a r  E a s te rn  and 
Asian P o l ic y  f o r  Review With the  P r e s id e n t . "  This s e a rc h in g  
paper recogn ized  t h a t  a  t id e  o f r e v o lu t io n  was sweeping A sia , 
composed both  of a  " n a t io n a l  r e v o l t  a g a in s t  c o lo n ia l  impe­
r i a l i s m  and d i s c o n te n t  with e x i s t i n g  economic and s o c ia l  
c o n d i t io n s ."  The source of t h i s  r e v o lu t io n a ry  fe rv o r  a rose  
from " long-range  ind igenous problems" which would con tinue  
to  p lague A sia  f o r  decades and which quick  panaceas cou ld  n o t
so lv e .  To a  c e r t a i n  e x te n t ,  the  Communists had c ap tu red  t h i s
20r e v o lu t io n a r y  movement.
The most im portan t  f a c t  in  d e te rm in ing  the  U.S. p o s i ­
t io n  i n  A sia  would be the  b a s ic  a t t i t u d e  of the people  of 
A sia  toward th e  United S t a te s .  That a t t i t u d e  would be 
shaped l a r g e ly  by U.S. p o l ic y  and a c t io n s  in  reg a rd  to  the 
Asian r e v o lu t io n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in  how the  United S ta te s  t r e a te d
19^ P h i l ip  C. Je s su p ,  The B i r th  o f  N a tions  (New York: 
Columbia U n iv e rs i ty  P r e s s ,  1974), 29 .
20Memo by Je ssu p  to  Ache son, November I 6 , 1949,
FR. 1949. V II (2 ) ,  1209-1214.
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problems in  the a re a s  where i t  assumed prim ary re s p o n s i ­
b i l i t y —Japan, the P h i l i p p in e s ,  and Korea. One immediate 
U.S. o b jec tiv e  was to  check the  spread o f  S o v ie t  Communism, 
but because of the r e v o lu t io n a r y  n a tu re  of the  movement in  
A sia , t h i s  o b je c t iv e  had to be reached " p r in c ip a l ly  by means 
o th e r  than arm s." In  d e a l in g  w ith  c o u n t r ie s  f i rm ly  Commu­
n i s t - c o n t r o l l e d ,  the  United  S t a te s  had to  meet the s i t u a t io n
"by a  r e c o g n i t io n  of r e a l i t i e s  r a t h e r  th an  by a f r u i t l e s s
21a ttem p t to  r e v e rse  o r  ignore  th e  t id e  o f  e v e n ts ."
Jessup  b e l ie v e d  th a t  in  d e a l in g  with d i r e c t  ag g res­
s io n  a g a in s t  Asian c o u n t r ie s  n o t  covered  by t r e a t y ,  the 
United S ta te s  should a c t  th rough  the machinery of the  United 
N a tions . To combat i n d i r e c t  a g g re s s io n ,  America should imp­
lement programs of p o l i t i c a l  and economic supp o rt ,  b u t tre s se d  
by an expanded propaganda program. The United S ta te s  a lso  
should work r a p id ly  toward r e c o g n i t io n  o f  Communist China, 
should b u i ld  up Japan  to  r e l i e v e  the p r e s e n t  U.S. burden, and 
should continue  to  support Korea "as  a  y a rd s t ic k  of U.S. 
a b i l i t y  to  cope w ith  Asian p rob lem s."  I n  g e n e ra l ,  the  United
S ta te s  should work toward deve lop ing  common a c t io n  and in te -
22r e s t s  among the non-Communist n a t io n s  o f  A sia .
While Ache son picked up many o f  J e s s u p 's  conclusions 
and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  h i s  p aper  was n o t  f u l l y  accep ted  as 
U.S. p o l ic y .  On June 10, S e c re ta ry  of Defense L ouis Johnson
^ ^ I b i d . .  1 2 1 0 .  ^ ^ I b i d . .  1 2 1 2 - 1 2 1 4 .
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had sen t  a  memorandum to the N a tio n a l  S e c u r i ty  Council 
s t a t i n g  t h a t  he was very concerned about the course  of e v en ts  
in  Asia and e s p e c i a l l y  about the success  of the  Chinese Com­
m un is ts . These developments had a f f e c te d  U.S. s e c u r i ty  s e r i ­
ously  and he wanted the N a tiona l  S e c u r i ty  Council to  p repa re  
a  course o f  a c t io n  f o r  the U nited  S ta te s  to  undertake  in  
A sia . The r e s u l t  o f h i s  r e q u e s t  was NSC 48/2 , which Truman 
approved on December 3 0 , 194-9. Four bas ic  s e c u r i t y  o b jec ­
t i v e s  in  A sia  were o u t l in e d :  f i r s t ,  to  develop Asian n a ­
t io n s  in  conform ity  w ith  U.N. C h arte r  p r i n c i p l e s :  second, to 
develop m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g th  in  c e r t a i n  non-Communist Asian n a ­
t io n s  to  m a in ta in  i n te r n a l  s e c u r i ty  and to  p rev e n t  f u r t h e r  
communist encroachment: t h i r d ,  to  reduce g ra d u a l ly  and even­
t u a l l y  to  e l im in a te  the  p reponderan t power and in f lu en ce  of 
the  S ov ie t  Union in  A sia so t h a t  i t  could n o t  th r e a te n  the  
United S t a te s  and i t s  a l l i e s  in  t h a t  a re a :  f i n a l l y ,  power r e ­
l a t i o n s h i p s  in  A sia  t h a t  would th r e a te n  U.S. s e c u r i ty  were 
to  be p rev e n ted .
Some of the components designed to  achieve  these  
p o l ic y  g o a ls  were : support o f r e g io n a l  a s s o c ia t io n s  of
non-Communist Asian s t a t e s ;  development and s t r e n g th e n in g ,  
w ith in  a v a i la b le  means, of the s e c u r i t y  of the  a re a  from
23
Johnson to  NSC, June 10,1949, U.S. S ta te  D epart­
ment, F ore ign  R e la t io n s  of the  United S ta te s .  194-9: N a tio n a l
S e c u r i tv  A f f a i r s . Volume I(W ashington: GPO, 1976);
Memo by NSC, s u b j . :  The P o s i t io n  of the United S ta te s  w ith
Respect to  Asia,NSC 48 /2 , December 30,1949, FR ,1949, V II (2 ) ,  
1215-1220.
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Communist a g g re ss io n  through p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and m i l i ­
t a r y  a id ;  m u l t i l a t e r a l  o r  b i l a t e r a l  arrangem ents to  combat 
Communist subv ers io n ; con tinue  to  support South Korea and 
continue  to  reco gn ize  N a t io n a l i s t  China u n t i l  the s i t u a t i o n  
was f u r t h e r  c l a r i f i e d ;  continue the p o l ic y  of a ttem p tin g  to  
deny Formosa and the  Pescadores  to  the  Chinese Communists 
through d ip lo m a tic  and economic means; p lace  prim ary s t r a ­
te g ic  em phasis on s t re n g th e n in g  the o v e ra l l  U.S. p o s i t io n  in  
the  P h i l i p p in e s ,  th e  Ryukyus, and Japan ; and f i n a l l y ,  t r y  to  
to  re s o lv e  the  c o l o n i a l - n a t i o n a l i s t  c o n f l i c t  in  Asia in  such 
a way a s  to  g a in  f r i e n d s  in  the a re a  while n o t  h u r t in g  the 
c o lo n ia l  powers who were Am erica 's European a l l i e s .
The b a s ic  p o s i t io n  of NSC 48/2  was aimed toward 
the containm ent of communism in  A s ia ,  and h o p e fu l ly  to  
r o l l i n g  back the re d  t i d e .  But u n d e rly in g  the  p o l ic y  was 
a firm  commitment to  b a lan c in g  ends and means. While no­
th in g  in  the study committed America to  a p a r t i c u l a r  course 
of a c t io n  in  the event o f ag g ress io n  in  Korea, n o th in g  
ru le d  ou t the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of armed in t e r v e n t io n .  The major 
concern o f  U.S. p o l ic y  makers was i n t e r n a l  subvers ion , n o t  
o v e r t  a g g re s s io n .  F i n a l l y ,  the r e p o r t  r e i t e r a t e d  a f irm  
U.S. commitment to  the  o ffsh o re  l i t t o r a l  d e fense  of A sia  
t h a t  MacArthur had f i r s t  o u t l in e d  in  1948 to  George 
Kennan and again  in  June , 1949, and which Dean Ache son
^^NSC 48/2, FR.1949. VII(2), 1215-1220.
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r e s t a t e d  in  h i s  famous N a tiona l  P re s s  Club speech.
On January  12, 1950, S e c re ta r y - o f  S ta te  Dean Acheson 
gave h i s  c o n tro v e rs ia l  N a tiona l  P re s s  Club speech. Speaking 
f o r  over an hour from a  s in g le  page o f  rough n o te s .  Acheson 
o u t l in e d  the  problems fa c in g  the  U nited  S ta te s  in  A sia . A 
n a t i o n a l i s t i c  f e rv o r  t h a t  symbolized a  growing r e b e l l i o n  
a g a in s t  bo th  fo re ig n  dom ination and the  normal c o n d it io n  of 
l i f e  i n  the  a re a  was sweeping a c ro s s  A s ia .  The danger was 
t h a t  R ussian  im peria l ism , employing the  new methods, s k i l l s ,  
and concep ts  o f Communism, would su b v e r t  the n a t i o n a l i s t  
movement to  R u s s ia 's  advantage.
I n  o u t l in in g  A m erica 's  de fense  p e r im e te r  in  A sia , 
Acheson re p e a te d  both MacArthur and NSC 48/2 , by p la c in g  the 
emphasis in  A sia  on an o ffsh o re  l i t t o r a l  de fense . But he 
added t h a t  no one p e rson  could gu a ran tee  a g a in s t  a  m i l i ta r y ,  
a t t a c k  in  the  P a c i f i c .  Such a g u a ra n te e ,  however, "was 
h a rd ly  s e n s ib le  or n e ce ssa ry  w i th in  th e  realm o f  p r a c t i c a l
2<
-^Report by th e  D i r e c to r  o f th e  P o l ic y  P lann ing  
S ta f f (K e n n a n ) , March 25, 1948, FR.1948. VI, 709; New York 
Times, March 2, 1949. In  a May 4 , 1949 paper e n t i t l e d  "The 
S t r a t e g i c  Importance o f  the F ar E a s t  to  the  United S ta te s  
^ d  the  U .S .S .R . ,"  the  CIA concluded t h a t  "U.S. s t r a t e g i c  
i n t e r e s t s  in  the  Far E a s t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a re  immediate and con­
t in u in g ,  even i f  l im i te d  to  denying  c o n so l id a te d  Sov ie t 
c o n t r o l  o f  th e  re g io n .  Key to  t h i s  d e n ia l  i s  in te g r a te d  
U.S. c o n tro l  of the  o ffsh o re  i s l a n d  ch a in  ex tend ing  from 
th e  P h i l ip p in e s  to  Ja p an ."  See CIA F i l e ,  Modern M i l i t a r y  
Branch, N a tio n a l  A rch ives, Washington, D.C.
26P r in c e to n  Seminars, Dean Acheson P ap e rs ,  Harry S. 
Truman l i b r a r y ;  U.S. Department o f  S t a te ,  American Foreign  
P o l i c y .  1955: Basic Documents. 2 v o l s .  (Washington: GPO,
1957). I I ,  2311- 2320.
-  161 -
r e l a t i o n s h i p . "  When a t t a c k s  occu rred  the  i n i t i a l  r e l ia n c e  
had to  be on the  people a t ta c k e d  to  r e s i s t  and then  upon 
" the  commitments of the  e n t i r e  c i v i l i z e d  world under the  
C h a r te r  of the United N ations , which so f a r  has no t proved 
a  weak reed  to  le a n  on by any people  who are determined to 
p r o t e c t  t h e i r  independence a g a in s t  o u ts id e  a g g re s s io n ."
Acheson, however, r e f l e c t e d  the  tone of NSC 48/2 when he 
warned a g a in s t  becoming obsessed w ith  m i l i t a r y  conside­
r a t i o n s .  The major f e a r s  he expressed  were about i n t e r n a l
27t h r e a t s  r a t h e r  than  e x te rn a l  ones.
Acheson added a c le a r  warning about Korea. The 
U nited  S ta te s  had given South Korea " g re a t  he lp  in  g e t t i n g  
e s ta b l is h e d "  and the P re s id e n t  was a sk in g  Congress to  con­
t in u e  to  help u n t i l  the Republic o f Korea was e s ta b l is h e d  
f i rm ly .  In  A cheson 's view, "The id e a  t h a t  we should scrap  
a l l  o f  t h a t ,  t h a t  we should s top  ha lf-w ay  through the 
achievement of th e  e s tab l ish m en t o f t h i s  country  seems to  
me to  be the most u t t e r  d e fea t ism  and u t t e r  madness in  our 
i n t e r e s t s  in  Asia."^®
On January  31, 1950, the  same day he a u th o r ized  the 
Atomic Energy Commission to  proceed  w ith  development o f  the 
hydrogen bomb, Truman s e t  in  motion a  re -exam in a tion  of 
American o b je c t iv e s  in  peace and war, and the  e f f e c t  on these
27 S ta te  Department, B asic  Documents, I I ,  2311-2320. 
^®Ibid.
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o b je c t iv e s  "o f  the  probable f i s s i o n  bomb c a p a b i l i ty  and pos-
29s ib le  therm onuclear c a p a b i l i t y  of the S o v ie t  Union."
Truman's r e q u e s t  r e s u l te d  from more th an  S ov ie t  exp los ion  of 
an atomic bomb, which he had announced on September 23 , 1949. 
The " l o s s  of C hina", and the  subsequent S ino -S ov ie t t r e a t y ,  
had shocked and alarmed many Americans. China became a  b i t ­
t e r  b i p a r t i s a n  i s s u e  t h a t  p u t  the Truman A d m in is tra t io n  on 
the  d e fe n s iv e .  S ov ie t  p o sse s s io n  of th e  atomic bomb, e s ta b ­
l ish m en t  o f  the P e o p le 's  Republic of China in  O ctober, 1949, 
S in o -S o v ie t  n e g o t i a t io n s  in  December, 1949, and in c re a sed  
domestic f u r o r  ove r Communism, le d  Truman to  r e q u e s t  a 
r e - e v a lu a t io n  of U.S. fo re ig n  p o l ic y  o b je c t iv e s .
The r e p o r t  Truman re q u e s te d  was produced on A p r i l  7, 
1950, and l a t e r  became NSC 68. This paper concluded t h a t  the 
h i s t o r i c a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power in  the  world had been ba- . 
s i c a l l y  a l t e r e d .  As a  r e s u l t  o f WWII, power had g ra v i t a t e d  
to  the S o v ie t  Union and the United S t a te s .  R e d is t r ib u t io n s  
of power, however, had occurred  b e fo re .  What made t h i s  s i t u ­
a t io n  d i f f e r e n t  was t h a t  the  S ov ie t Union was "an tim ated  by 
a  new f a n a t i c  f a i t h ,  a n t i t h e t i c a l  to  our own, and seeks to  
impose i t s  a b so lu te  a u th o r i ty  over the  r e s t  of the  w orld ."  
Thus c o n f l i c t  had become endemic and was waged "on the  p a r t  
of the S o v ie t  Union by v io le n t  or n o n -v io le n t  methods, in
29^ Truman to  Ache so n , January  31. 1950, U.S. D epart­
ment o f  S t a t e , F o re ign  R e la t io n s  of the  United S ta te s .
1950: N a tio n a l  S e c u ri ty  A f f a i r s , Volume I(W ashington: GPO,
1977 ) ,  1 4 1 - 1 4 2 .
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accordance with the  d i c t a t e s  o f  ex ped iency .” The develop­
ment o f n u c le a r  weapons th re a te n e d  world a n n ih i l a t io n  and 
any s u b s ta n t ia l  e x te n s io n  o f  p r e s e n t  Sov ie t h o ld in g s  would 
r a i s e  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  no adequate c o a l i t i o n  could  be 
formed to  co n fro n t  the Sov ie t Union w ith a  g r e a t e r  s t r e n g th ,  
making war very l i k e l y .  Thus, the  United S t a te s ,  a t  the 
p o in t  of i t s  g r e a t e s t  s t r e n g th ,  was a lso  in  i t s  d eep es t  
p e r i l .
The Sov ie t Union b e liev ed  t h a t  to  r e t a i n  i t s  abso­
l u t e  power in  R uss ia  and in  the a re a s  i t  p r e s e n t ly  h e ld ,  i t  
was n e ce ssa ry  to  expand dynam ically  in  o rder  to  e l im in a te  any 
e f f e c t i v e  o p p o s i t io n  to  i t s  a u th o r i ty .  The S o v ie t  d e s ig n  
c a l le d  " f o r  the complete subvers ion  o r f o r c ib le  d e s t r u c t io n  
o f the  machinery o f government and s t r u c tu r e  o f s o c ie ty  in  
the c o u n t r ie s  of the non-S ov ie t world . . .To t h a t  end Sovie t 
e f f o r t s  a re  now d i r e c te d  toward the  domination o f the 
E u ra s ia n  land  m ass." As th e  p rim ary  c e n te r  o f o p p o s i t io n  to  
S o v ie t  expansion, the  U nited  S ta te s  was R u s s ia 's  p r i n c i p a l  
enemy, and A m erica 's  i n t e g r i t y  and v i t a l i t y  had to  be sub­
v e r te d  o r  destroyed  i f  the Kremlin was to  achieve  i t s  
fundam ental p o l ic y  g o a ls .
The Sov ie t Union viewed the  United S t a te s  as  i t s
^^Report to  tie NSC by the  E xecutive  S e c re ta ry  (Lay), 
NSC 68, U.S. O b jec t iv e s  and Programs f o r  N a tio n a l  S e c u r i ty ,  
A p r i l  14, 1950, I b i d . .  237-238.
31lb id . .  238-.
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g r e a t e s t  enemy because the im placable  purpose of the s lave  
s t a t e  was to  e l im in a te  the  ch a llen g e  of freedom. This f a c t  
p laced  the two g re a t  powers a t  opposite  p o le s .  The id e a  of 
freedom was the most co n tag iou s  id e a  in  h i s to r y ,  more so • 
than  the id e a  of submission to a u th o r i ty .  This exp la ined  
why the e x is te n c e  and p e r s i s t e n c e  of the id e a  of freedom was 
a permanent and con tinuo us t h r e a t  to  the foundation  of the  
S ov ie t  "s lave  s o c ie ty ."  The r e s u l t  was the Sov ie t U n io n 's  
c o n tin u a l  h o s t i l i t y  to  f r e e  s o c i e t i e s .  The K rem lin 's  a s ­
s a u l t  on " f re e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  was now worldwide," and " in  the  
co n tex t  o f the p r e s e n t  p o l a r i z a t io n  of power a d e fe a t  o f  f ree  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  anywhere i s  a  d e fe a t  everywhere." Thus, 
A m erica 's  f r e e  s o c ie ty  u n w il l in g ly  found i t s e l f  "m o rta l ly  
cha lleng ed  by the  Sov ie t system.
The only way the f r e e  world could meet the ch a llen g e  
was to  develop i t s  m a te r ia l  and moral s t r e n g th .  In  the ab­
sence of an a f f i rm a t iv e  d e c is io n  on A m erica 's  p a r t ,  the r e s t  
of the f r e e  world was alm ost c e r t a i n  to become dem oralized . 
Force should be a p p lie d  to  compel Sov ie t acceptance of term s 
c o n s i s t e n t  w ith U.S. o b j e c t i v e s .  To achieve t h i s ,  the  United 
S ta te s  had to  be ab le  to  apply power on both a  worldwide 
b a s is  and on a l im i te d  l o c a l  b a s i s .
The S o v ie t  U n ion 's  p o sse s s io n  of atomic weapons and 
a r e a l i z a t i o n  on i t s  p a r t  of the  im p ro b a b il i ty  of the U nited
^^ Ib id . , 239-240. % b i d . .  242, 255.
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S ta te s  p ro s e c u t in g  a p rev en tiv e  war, pu t  a premium on p ie c e ­
meal a g g re ss io n  a g a in s t  o th e r s .  The r i s k  of having no b e t t e r  
choice  than  to  c a p i tu l a t e  o r  to p r e c i p i t a t e  a  g lo b a l  war a t  
any of a  number of p re s su re  p o in ts  was a danger t h a t  was 
m u l t ip l i e d  by the weakness i t  imparted to  the  U.S. p o s i t io n  
in  the  Cold War. I n s te a d  of appearing s tro n g  and r e s o lu te ,  
the  United S t a te s  was c o n t in u a l ly  on the verge of appearing  
and being  a l t e r n a t e l y  i r r e s o l u t e  and d e sp e ra te .  When r e l a t e d  
to  the  world s i t u a t i o n  .con fron ting  the United S t a te s ,  i t  was 
c l e a r  t h a t  A m erica 's  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g th  was dangerously  in ade­
quate  . A program was needed to  b u i ld  up the s t r e n g th  of the 
f r e e  world to  support a  f i rm  p o l ic y  in tended  to  check and 
r o l l - b a c k  th e  K re m lin 's  d r iv e  f o r  world dom ination.
NSC 68 concluded t h a t  "S o v ie t  domination of the  po­
t e n t i a l  power of E u ra s ia ,  whether achieved by armed a g g re s ­
s io n  o r  by p o l i t i c a l  and subversive  means, would be s t r a t e ­
g i c a l l y  and p o l i t i c a l l y  unacceptab le  to  the U nited  S t a te s . "
I t  th u s  was im p era tiv e  f o r  America to  "organize  and e n l i s t  
the  e n e rg ie s  and r e s o u rc e s  of th e  f r e e  world in  a  p o s i t iv e  
program f o r  peace which w i l l  f r u s t r a t e  the Kremlin design  
f o r  world dom ination  by c re a t in g  a  s i t u a t i o n  in  the  f re e  
world to  which the  Kremlin w i l l  be compelled to  a d ju s t . "  The 
e x ecu tio n  o f  such a  b u i ld -u p  re q u ire d  a p o s i t iv e  program.
Not everyone, however, accep ted  the concep ts  o f
^^Ibid..  264. ^^Ibid., 282-283, 28?.
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NSC 68 in  A p r i l ,  1950. For example, George Kennan and 
C harles  Bohlen of the P o l ic y  P lann ing  S t a f f ,  both  opposed 
the document a s  be in g  s i m p l i s t i c a l l y  d a n g e r o u s . M o r e  im­
p o r ta n t ,  P re s id e n t  Truman was deeply  concerned about the 
co s ts  o f  the  program envisaged in  NSC 68. Paul N i tz e ,  Di­
r e c to r  o f the  P o l ic y  P lan n in g  S ta f f  and one of th e  au th o rs  
of NSC 68, r e c a l l s  t h a t  no one dared to  pu t in  any s p e c i f i c  
f ig u re s  because th ey  were th in k in g  a long  the  l i n e s  of $50 
b i l l i o n  a year  f o r  d e f e n s e . T h e  co n c lu s io n s  and th e o r i e s  
of NSC 68 needed a  c o n c re te  event to  prove t h e i r  v a l i d i t y .  
When the  Korean War came a long , U.S. p o l ic y  makers had a 
ready-made e x p la n a t io n  f o r  the  c o n f l i c t ,  w ith an a p p ro p r ia te  
response and course  o f a c t io n  to  fo llow  a t  hand. But u n t i l  
the N orth  Korean in v a s io n  occurred , the id eas  exp ressed  in  
NSC 48/2  and in  A cheson 's  January  12 speech, were o p e ra t iv e .
The ideas  exp ressed  in  those documents were th a t  
while K orea d id  n o t  have g r e a t  m i l i t a r y  va lue , i t  d id  have 
tremendous p o l i t i c a l  va lue  i n  the Cold War. The o f f i c i a l  
s ta tem en ts  made i n  1949 and 1950, o u t l in e d  in  t h i s  c h ap te r ,  
make i t  c l e a r  t h a t  a  f i rm  foundation  f o r  U.S. i n te r v e n t io n  
in  Korea had been l a i d  w ell  before  NSC 68 was w r i t t e n .
This unspoken commitment was based both  on the power
^ ^ e n n a n  t o  Acheson, February 17, 1950, I b i d . , l60- 
163; Bohlen to N itz e ,  A p r i l  5, 1950, I b i d . . 221-223.
37^ 'P r in c e to n  Sem inars, Dean Acheson P a p e rs ,  Harry 
S. Truman P r e s i d e n t i a l  L ib ra ry .
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and p re s t ig e  of the f l e d g l in g  United N ations , and on the ex­
i s te n c e  of a balance of s t r e n g th  between the  two K oreas. I t  
i s  im portant to  remember t h a t  what s u rp r is e d  the  U nited  
S ta te s  in  June , 1950 was n o t  N orth  Korean a g g re s s io n ,  but 
the  type of a g g re ss io n .  P o l ic y  makers expected  U.N. p ro te c ­
t io n  to  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p rev e n t  o v e rt  a c t s  of a g g re ss io n ,  
e s p e c ia l ly  by the S o v ie t  Union, and th ey  b e lieved  South 
Korea was capable  o f d e a l in g  w ith  in te r n a l  su b v e rs io n . Thus 
the  United S ta te s  expected t ro u b le  in  Korea, bu t  t r o u b le  of 
a c o v e r t  n a tu re ,  no t  an o u t r ig h t  in v as io n .  These p o in t s  were 
made se v e ra l  tim es in  1949 and 1950.
In th e  Senate h e a r in g s  on economic a id  f o r  Korea and 
China, Major General W.E. Todd l i s t e d  fo u r  p o s s ib le  a c t io n s  
t h a t  would be d e tr im e n ta l  to  South Korean s u r v iv a l .  F i r s t  
was the  i n d i r e c t  type o f  North Korean a g g re ss io n  ta k in g  place 
a t  t h a t  moment under d i r e c t i o n  of a Communist underground 
from North Korea. Second, were border c la s h e s  t h a t  had been 
go ing  on fo r  some tim e . T h ird , was ag g re ss io n  on the  p a r t  
of th e  North Korean Army. L a s t ,  was " d i r e c t  a c t io n  on the 
p a r t  o f  S o v ie t  armed f o r c e s .
The J o i n t  C h ie fs  of S t a f f  b e liev ed  t h a t  any d i r e c t  
S o v ie t  a c t io n  was the  most u n l ik e ly  o f  a l l  p o s s ib le  e v en ts .  
Any a c t io n  on the p a r t  o f  th e  North Korean Army a lso  was im­
probable  because n u m erica lly  the  fo rc e s  of the N orth  and
^®U.S. Senate , Economic A s s is ta n c e .  175'
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South were a lm ost eq u a l .  Without o u ts id e  armed a id ,  the 
N orth  Korean Army could n o t  "pay the  p r ic e "  of ag g re ss io n . 
Todd be liev ed  th a t  i f  " the  S o v ie ts  a t t a c h  any p r i o r i t y  to 
a re a s  in  which they would l i k e  to  move by means of armed ag­
g re s s io n ,  Korea would be a t  the bottom in  th a t  l i s t  of p r i ­
o r i t i e s . "  Todd a ls o  d id  n o t  f e e l  t h a t  the  Sovie t Union 
"would even encourage the  North Korean Army to invade South 
K orea."  He b e liev ed  th a t  R u ss ia  "would improve i t s  s t r a t e ­
g ic  p o s i t io n  very l i t t l e  in  the Far E a s t  by occupying 
South Korea.
Another f a c t o r  would make the S o v ie t  Union r e l u c ­
t a n t  to take ag g ress iv e  a c t io n — South Korea had been given 
"some degree o f  re c o g n i t io n  by the U nited  N ations . . . ." 
S ena to r Vandenberg agreed w ith  Todd, n o t in g  th a t  an a t ­
tack  on South Korea "would be a fundam ental challenge  to  
the e n t i r e  United N a tion s , and I  doubt whether t h a t  w i l l  
be l i g h t l y  undertaken  . . . ." At a n o th e r  p o in t ,  he ob­
served t h a t  a  Sov ie t a t t a c k  "would be a  f r o n t a l  a t t a c k  on 
the  United N ations  and I  do n o t  b e l ie v e  they  are going  to  
do any such th in g .  There a re  too many o th e r s  p la c e s  where 
they  can ope ra te  w ithou t t h a t  moral handicap  . . .
Ambassador Muccio r e i t e r a t e d  t h i s  opinion on Au­
g u s t  20, in  a  d isp a tc h  to  Acheson. Muccio noted t h a t  since 
A m erica 's  p o l ic y  was to  support South Korea d ip lo m a tic a l ly ,
39 lb id ., 175- 177. ^°Ib id ..  179-182.
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econom ically , and m i l i t a r i l y ,  i t  was of prime importance t h a t  
the United N ations "should  remain se ized  w ith  the Korean 
problem . . . Muccio wanted some kind of U.N. commission 
p re s e n t  in  Korea, because "Apart from ev idencing  the moral 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of the  United N a tion s  to  Korea, the  primary 
value  of the U.N. Commission i s  to  se rve  a s  a  b a r r i e r  to  Com­
m unist a g g re ss io n ."  The U.N. b le s s in g  of South Korea had ex­
e rc i s e d  a profound in f lu e n c e  on b o th  s id e s  o f  the  p a r a l l e l  
and served to  make N orth  Korea and th e  S ov ie t  Union h e s i t a n t  
to  invade the Republic of Korea.
The sense of the Senate h e a r in g s  and M uccio 's 
August 20 d isp a tc h  was th a t  i t  was v e ry  improbable th a t  the 
Sov ie t Union would invade South K orea. The s t r a t e g i c  value 
of South Korea did n o t  outweigh i t s  l i a b i l i t i e s  f o r  R ussia  
in  l i g h t  of South K o re a 's  c lo se  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to the  United . 
N a tio n s . A North Korean inv as ion  was d iscoun ted  because 
m i l i t a r y  p a r i t y  supposedly e x is te d  between the  two c o u n tr ie s .  
Both Acheson's speech and J e s s u p 's  p ap e r  agreed about the 
im p ro b a b il i ty  of an in v as io n  a s  th e y  p laced  t h e i r  emphasis 
on the  t h r e a t  of i n t e r n a l  su b v e rs io n . Acheson, Je ssu p , and 
Muccio b e liev ed , or wanted to  b e l ie v e ,  t h a t  th e  United Na­
t i o n s  would serve as a  break a g a in s t  a  p o s s ib le  in v as io n .
The United S t a te s  evinced l i t t l e  a larm  about a
^^Muccio to  Acheson, August 20, 19^5i FR. 1949, 
V II (2 ) ,  1068.
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4 2p o s s ib le  in v as io n  of South Korea. The b e l i e f  t h a t  the 
f o r c e s  of the two c o u n t r i e s  were balanced was a key elem ent 
in  e x p la in in g  t h i s  f e e l in g .  The United S t a te s  in  1949 had 
l e f t  behind $110 m i l l io n  in  m a te r i e l ,  enough to  equip 
50,000 men—t h i s  was, however, a l l  t h a t  South Korea was to  
r e c e iv e  before  June , 1950. Colonel John B a ird , A cting C hief 
of the  Korean M i l i t a ry  A dv ise r  Group, informed Muccio in  Oc­
to b e r ,  1949, t h a t  " the  type and q u a l i t y  o f m a te r ie l  a v a i l ­
ab le  to  South Korea was inadequate  f o r  war." South Korea
43was outnumbered in  e v e ry th in g  but in d iv id u a l  weapons.
Muccio informed Washington on November 6, 1949, t h a t  
something had to be done " to  enable  the  ROK to  pu t up an e f ­
f e c t iv e  defense a g a in s t  expanding N orth Korean a i r  power. " 
Without such a id .  South Korean s e c u r i ty  would be jeo p a rd ized  
and "we w i l l  conseq uen tly  r i s k  l o s s  of our o b je c t iv e s  in
K orea."  He follow ed on the 10 th , w ith  a  p le a  f o r  more and
44h e a v ie r  a r t i l l e r y  and a  s t r e n g th e n in g  of the c o a s t  guard .
hp
In  February , 1949, the  CIA concluded th a t  "W ithdra­
wal o f U.S. fo rc e s  from Korea in  the  sp r in g  of 1949 would 
p ro bab ly  in  time be fo llow ed by an in v as io n ,  timed to  c o in ­
c id e  w ith Communist-led South Korean r e v o l t s ,  by the N orth  
Korean P e o p le ’ s Army, p o s s ib ly  a s s i s t e d  by small b a t t l e -  
t r a in e d  u n i t s  from Communist M anchuria." I t  f u r t h e r  was con­
c luded South Korean s e c u r i t y  f o r c e s  could  n o t  r e s i s t  such an 
a t t a c k  in  the  sp r in g  of 1949, and p robab ly  n o t  before  January  
1950. See CIA-ORE 3-49, February , 1949,"Consequences of U.S. 
Troop Withdrawal From Korea in  Spring , 1949," in  CIA f i l e s .  
Modern M i l i t a r y  Branch, N a tio na l*A rch ives ,  Washington D.C.
^^Schnabel, P o l i c y , 3 6 .
44Muccio to  Acheson, November 8 and 10, 1949,
FR,1949, V II (2 ) .  1094-1095.
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On November 28, 1949, the  S tate  Department responded 
to  the p le a s  o f Muccio and General W illiam R oberts , C hief of 
Korean M i l i t a r y  A dvisory  Group, th a t  a id  f o r  Korea n o t  be r e ­
duced to  $10 .23  m i l l io n ,  as  proposed. Seoul was to ld  t h a t  
d e c is io n s  had to  be based on both o v e ra l l  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  
and on e v a lu a t io n s  o f the  comparative r i s k s  of an inadequate  
program in  one co u n try  a s  a g a in s t  a s im i la r  s i t u a t i o n  in  an­
o th e r  c o u n try .  The S ta te  Department wanted to  know i f  the  
r i s k s  invo lved  in  implementing only a $ 10.23 m il l io n  program 
in  Korea were u n a c c e p ta b le .  I f  so, what minimum in c re a se  was 
needed to  make th e  r i s k s  accep tab le?  I f  the  $10.23 m il l io n  
could n o t  be in c re a s e d ,  should the M i l i t a r y  Defense A s s is ­
tance  Program f o r  Korea be abandoned? The S ta te  D epartm ent’ s 
no te  was n o t  designed  to  encourage con tinued  c r i t i c i s m  about 
the in ad eq u ac ie s  of U.S. a id .  Muccio informed Washington 
th a t  while the  money was i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  meet a l l  the  con­
t in g e n c ie s  invo lved  in  r e p u ls in g  an a l l - o u t  a t t a c k ,  i t  was
ZlC
s t i l l  a  sum t h a t  would be very v a lu a b le . ^
On A p r i l  20, 1950, the  Charge i n  Korea, E v e re t t  
Drum right, p o in te d  o u t  t h a t  the  r e c e n t ly  approved $110 m il ­
l i o n  m i l i t a r y  a id  program f o r  Korea d e l iv e re d  only $108 of 
a id  in  1950. T h is  was e s p e c i a l l y  s e r io u s  because " a l l  ve-= 
h i d e  and weapons spare  p a r t s  and a l l  powder and p rim ers  f o r
4*5^A cting  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  to  Embassy In  Korea, 
November 28, 19^9, I b i d . ,  1102; Muccio to  Acheson, Decem­
ber 1, 1949, I b i d . .  1102- 1103.
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the  a rs e n a l  program a re  scheduled f o r  d e l iv e ry  in  FY 
1952." The p a r t s  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  the South Korean Army was 
e q u a lly  d i s tu r b in g  to  G eneral R oberts .  On May 5. he r e ­
po rted  t h a t  "The s ix  months supply o f  p a r t s  i s  exhausted and 
i t  i s  e s t im a te d  t h a t  10-1555 of the weapons, and 30-3555 of 
the  v e h ic le s  a re  u n s e r v ic e a b le ."  R oberts  be lieved  i t  was 
s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  spare  p a r t s  f o r  South Korea were no t  sched­
u led  to  a r r iv e  u n t i l  1952 , because u n le s s  "prompt, e f f e c t iv e  
and v igorous measures" were tak en , the  Army would be dan­
g e ro u s ly  reduced in  f i re p o w e r ,  m o b il i ty ,  and l o g i s t i c a l  sup­
p o r t .  The b e s t  f i g h t i n g  t ro o p s  were " v i r tu a l l y  w orth less"  
i f  they  could n o t  su p p o rt  them selves l o g i s t i c a l l y .^ '^
General R oberts  informed G-3 in  March, 1950, t h a t  the 
South Korean Army would do an e x c e l l e n t  job a g a in s t  " i n f e r i o r  
ground fo r c e s  o f  North Korea . . . , "  bu t i f  the  North Korean 
Army a t ta c k e d  w ith i t s  s u p e r io r  a i r  fo rc e ,  "South Korea would 
take  a bloody n o se ,"  and the people would fo llow  the winner 
and "South Korea would be gobbled up to  be added to  the r e s t  
of Red A s ia ."  On June 6 , Muccio to ld  a  Senate Committee 
t h a t  the  m a te r ie l  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  the North Korean Army would 
provide the margin of v i c t o r y  i n  any c o n f l i c t  between the two 
K oreas. On the I 4 th ,  w hile  c i t i n g  su p e r io r  South Korean
46Drumright to  Acheson, A pril  20, 1950, U.S. D ep art­
ment of S ta te ,  F o re ign  R e la t io n s  of th e  United S ta te s .  1960; 
K orea . Volume VII (Washington: GPG, 1976), 4?.
47'Muccio to Acheson, May 5, 1950, I b id . . 93-96.
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t r a i n in g ,  le a d e rs h ip ,  m orale, and b e t t e r  small arms, Muccio 
was fo rced  to  r e p o r t  th a t  N orth  K o re a 's  a i r  power, tan k s , and 
h eav ie r  a r t i l l e r y  gave i t  the preponderance of s t r e n g th .
O p tim is t ic  r e p o r t s ,  however, balanced the  p e s s im is t ic  
ones t h a t  s t ru c k  a t  a  key assum ption of p o l ic y  makers. One 
such o p t im is t ic  r e p o r t  was from Ambassador a t  Large P h i l i p  
Je ssup , on January  14, 1950» a f t e r  an o n - th e - s p o t  in s p e c t io n .  
While acknowledging the  need f o r  a t  l e a s t  a  few a i r c r a f t ,  
a n t i - a i r c r a f t  guns, and l i g h t  tan k s ,  o v e ra l l  Je ssu p  gave the 
South Koreans high marks. A d d i t io n a l ly ,  on s e v e ra l  occasions 
both Muccio and R oberts  undercu t o r back ed -o ff  e a r l i e r  e s t i ­
mates and re q u e s ts  f o r  in c re a sed  m i l i t a r y  a id .  General 
Roberts a lso  o f te n  c o n tra d ic te d  h i s  p e s s im is t i c  r e p o r t s .  
F in a l ly ,  William F o s te r ,  of the Economic C ooperation Admini­
s t r a t i o n ,  informed the same Senate Committee t h a t  Muccio had 
t e s t i f i e d  before on June 6, t h a t  the South Korean Army could 
meet any North Korean c h a l le n g e .
48R oberts to  General B o l te ,  G-3, March 8 , 1950, Re­
c e n t ly  D e c la s s i f ie d  Documents on Korea, Modem M i l i t a r y  
Branch, N a tiona l  A rch ives; Muccio to  Acheson, June 14, 1950, 
FR.1950. VII, 105; Schnabel, P o l i c y , 39- I n  1949, 20,000 
combat-seasoned Koreans were re le a s e d  from the  Chinese Com­
munist Army to  r e tu r n  to  N orth  Korean. I n  a d d i t io n ,  40,000 
d r a f t e e s  were added to  the  North Korean Army in  1949. By the 
time of the in v as io n . North Korea had 150,000-200,000 men in  
i t s  army, in c lu d in g  40,000 Korean r e tu r n e e s  from C h in a 's  . 
army. See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in  K orea , I I ,  392-3-
4q^Jessup to  Acheson, Jan uary  14, 1950, FR,1950, VII, 
1-3 ; Memo of C onversation  by O f f ic e r  in  Charge o f  Korean Af- 
fa i r s (B o n d ) ,  May 10, 1950, I b i d . . 79; Memo by A cting  D ire c to r  
o f the Mutual Defense A ss is tan ce  Program(Ohly) t o  Rusk,
May 10, 1950, I b i d . , 82; Schnabel, P o l i c y , 40.
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The l a s t  p re - in v a s io n  CIA e v a lu a t io n  of the c u r re n t  
c a p a b i l i t i e s  of the North  Korean regim e, however, could n o t 
have in sp ire d  confidence among U.S. o f f i c i a l s .  According 
to  the  CIA, North Korea was a " f i rm ly  c o n t ro l le d  Soviet 
s a t e l l i t e  t h a t  e x e r c i s e s  no independent i n i t i a t i v e  and de­
pends e n t i r e l y  on the su p po rt  o f the U.S.S.R. f o r  e x is ­
te n c e ."  North  Korea was capable of c o n tin u in g  and in c r e a s ­
ing  i t s  p re s e n t  program of i n t e r n a l  su b v e rs io n , but t h i s  
would no t be s u f f i c i e n t  to  achieve i t s  goal of co n tro l  o f 
a l l  o f  Korea so lo n g  as U.S. economic and m i l i t a r y  a id  to  
South Korea was con tin ued .
But the  CIA warned t h a t  the  c a p a b i l i t y  o f the North  
Korean Army f o r  both  s h o r t  and lo n g - te rm  o v e r t  m i l i ta r y  ope­
r a t i o n s  was being  f u r t h e r  developed. North Korea possessed  
a  " s u p e r io r i t y  in  armor, heavy a r t i l l e r y  and a i r c r a f t . "
Thus i t s  armed fo rc e s  "had the  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a t t a i n i n g  l im ­
i t e d  o b je c t iv e s  a g a in s t  South Korea, in c lu d in g  cap ture  of 
S eou l."  D esp ite  the N orth  Korean s u p e r io r i t y ,  i t  was un cer­
t a i n  th a t  they  could c o n tro l  South Korea w ithout the a c t iv e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of Sov ie t o r  Chinese m i l i t a r y  u n i t s .  This was 
u n l ik e ly ,  a s  the t h r e a t  o f  a  g en e ra l  war would r e s t r a i n  
R uss ia  from in te rv e n in g ,  and because Moscow would oppose 
Chinese in te rv e n t io n  as be ing  a t h r e a t  to  S o v ie t  co n tro l
^^Memo by the  CIA, C urren t  C a p a b i l i t i e s  o f the N orth  
Korean Regime, June 19, 1950, FR.1950. VII, 109-120.
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over North Korea.
The CIA made i t  c le a r ,  however, t h a t  the  "u l tim a te  
o b je c t iv e  of the  S ov ie t  Union and o f  th e  North Korean regime 
was the  e l im in a t io n  of the ROK and the  u n i f i c a t io n  of the 
Korean p e n in s u la  under Communist d om ina tion ."  Open in v as ion  
had " th us  f a r  been delayed in  fa v o r  of a coord ina ted  campaign 
in v o lv in g  p o l i t i c a l  p ressu re  w ith in  South Korea, subversion , 
propaganda, in t im id a t io n ,  economic p r e s s u r e ,  and m i l i t a r y  ac­
t io n  by i n f i l t r a t i o n  of g u e r i l l a  f o r c e s . "  So f a r ,  a lthough  
t h i s  campaign had n o t  been d e c i s iv e ,  i t  had been su ccess fu l  
in  damaging s e r io u s ly  the South Korean economy a t  a  r e l a -  
t i v e l y  s l i g h t  c o s t  to  the Communists.
The CIA e v a lu a t io n  was no t an o p t im is t ic  one. An 
in v as io n  was n o t  ru le d  out i f  p r e s e n t  Communist t a c t i c s  
f a i l e d ,  and the  CIA was l e s s  than  c o n f id e n t  about South 
K o re a 's  a b i l i t y  to  r e s i s t  a  North Korean inv as ion  under the  
p re s e n t  c o n d i t io n s .  Yet in  the  f i n a l  a n a ly s i s ,  the CIA saw 
no need to be on guard a g a in s t  an imminent in v as io n .
While the  CIA r e p o r t  d id  n o t  r e f l e c t  the  c u r re n t  
f e e l in g s  o f  outward confidence then  e v id e n t  in  Washington
^^I b i d . , 109- 111. ^^I b i d . . 120.
^^ I b i d . A G-2 r e p o r t  of June 19» p re sen te d  s tro n g  
evidence o f  North  Korean p lans  to  invade South Korea. But 
t h i s  r e p o r t ,  l i k e  most o th e rs  in  the  sp r in g  of 1950, which 
showed s i g n i f i c a n t  troop  movements and c o n c e n tra t io n s  around 
the  38t h  p a r a l l e l ,  were "poorly  e v a lu a te d  in  the f i e l d  and 
a t  the  h ig h e r  e ch e lo n s ."  See Schnabel, P o l i c y , 62-64.
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abou t South K o re a 's  f u tu r e ,  the  o f f i c i a l  a t t i t u d e  toward 
South Korean e s t im a te s  o f  N orth  Korean s t r e n g th  d id .  These 
e s t im a te s  were r o u t in e ly  d ism issed  a s  being 50^-70^ too 
large-^^, though as i t  tu rned  out they  were much more accura te  
th an  U.S. e s t im a te s .  The United S t a t e s  a l s o  d ism issed  the 
a n x ie ty  t h a t  A cheson 's January  12 speech had c re a te d  in  South 
K orea. Korean Ambassador John Chang on Jan u ary  20 sa id  t h a t  
A cheson 's  s ta tem en t when combined w ith  the  House r e j e c t i o n  
on January  19 of the  Korean a id  b i l l ,  r a i s e d  a  s e r io u s  ques­
t i o n  as to  whether the  U nited  S t a te s  was abandoning South
Korea.
Chang, in  an A p ri l  3 d is c u s s io n  w ith  Rusk and N i le s  
Bond of the  S ta te  Departm ent, wanted " to  im press  upon the  De­
partm ent the  importance which the  Korean Government and 
people  a t tac h ed  to  t h e i r  ap p aren t e x c lu s io n  from the defense 
p la n s  of the  United S ta te s  in  the  F a r  E a s t . "  Rusk informed 
Chang th a t  he should n o t  p u t  " too much f a i t h  in  what he read  
in  the  new spapers." A f te r  d e n ig r a t in g  the  s ig n i f ic a n c e  of 
th e  " s o -c a l le d  'd e fen se  l i n e ' " .  Rusk added t h a t  the  " in f e ­
rence  th a t  the  United  S ta te s  had dec ided  to  abandon the ROK 
to  i t s  enemies was s c a rc e ly  w arran ted  . . .
ch.
Drumright to  Acheson, May 11, 1950, FR.1950. VII, 
83; I b i d . .  May 11, 1950, I b i d . . 84.
^%emo o f  C onversa tion  by John W illiam s o f  the  O ffice  
o f  N o rth eas t  Asian A f f a i r s ,  Ja n u ary  20, 1950, I b i d . .  12.
^^Memo of C onversa tion  by N i le s  Bond, A p r i l  3, 1950, 
I b i d . . 64-65.
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South Korean confidence was no t f o r t i f i e d  when Sena­
t o r  Connally on May 5i sa id  t h a t  abandonment of South Korea 
was go ing  to  happen, "whether we want i t  to  or n o t  . . .When­
ever  North  Korea ta k e s  a  n o t io n  to ,  she can j u s t  overrun
c.n
Korea . . . Rhee regarded  C o n n a lly 's  remarks as "an
open i n v i t a t i o n  to  the Communists to  come down and take over 
South K orea."  According to  Drumright, "Rhee' s f a i t h  in  the 
d e te rm in a tio n  of the United S ta te s  to  a s s i s t  Korea in  event 
of North Korean a g g re ss io n  had been shaken to  an ap p rec iab le  
e x te n t  by Senato r C o n n a l ly 's  rem arks." The U.S. f a i l u r e  to  
meet South K o re a 's  r e q u e s t  f o r  a i r  support and the apparent 
f a i l u r e  to  supply Korea w ith  m i l i t a r y  su p p l ie s  and equipment 
under the  terms of the  Mutual Defense A ss is tance  program had 
f u r t h e r  shaken R hee 's  f a i t h .  Drumright be liev ed  t h a t  these  
f a c t o r s ,  when coupled w ith  p e r s i s t e n t  " ta lk "  t h a t  Korea was 
o u ts id e  the  U.S. P a r  E a s te rn  s t r a t e g i c  defense zone, was 
having a very  u n s e t t l i n g  e f f e c t  on Korean o f f i c i a l s  and 
the  p u b l ic .
How u n s e t t l i n g  these  remarks had been, was made c l e a r  
in  a  May 12 p r e s s  c o n fe ren ce , d u ring  which Rhee po in ted  ou t 
t h a t  N orth  Korean t ro o p s  were c o n c e n tra t in g  nea r  the  38th  
p a r a l l e l —and n o t  to  invade Japan o r  China. Rhee c a u s t i ­
c a l l y  no ted  th a t  the  "In  South Korea the United S ta te s  has
^^Rusk to  Webb, May 2 , I 950, I b i d . . 64-65.
^®Memo of C onv ersa tion  by Drumright, May 9, 1950, 
I b i d . .  77-78.
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one fo o t  in  South Korea and one fo o t  o u ts id e  so th a t  in  case
o f  an unfavorable  s i t u a t i o n  i t  could p u l l  o u t ."  Rhee f e l t
t h a t  i f  the  United S ta te s  wanted to  a id  South Korea, i t  
should go beyond mere " l i p  s e rv ic e .
In  p a r t ,  John F o s te r  D u l le s '  s topover in  Korea, 
while v i s i t i n g  Jap an , was in tended  to  g ive  some rea ssu ran ce  
to  the  South Korean government. D u lle s  to ld  the South 
Koreans t h a t  formal p a c t s  were n o t  n ecessa ry  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  to  
common a c t io n  a g a in s t  a  common foe and th a t  the im portan t 
th in g  was f o r  a government to  prove by i t s  a c t io n s  t h a t  i t  
was in  f a c t  a lo y a l  member of the f r e e  world, in  which case 
i t  could count on the  support of the o th e r  members of the 
f re e  world a g a in s t  an a c t  o f communist ag g re ss io n .
The success  of D u l le s '  e f f o r t s  to  re a s su re  the  Korean
le a d e rs h ip  i s  a moot p o in t ,  s ince  in  l e s s  than  one week North
Korea launched i t s  in v a s io n  of South Korea. Not only the
invas ion , but i t s  sw if t  and overwhelming success  came as  a
shock to  U.S. o f f i c i a l s .  Some o f f i c i a l s ,  however, had n o t  
been e n t i r e l y  honest w ith  them selves, a s  they  ignored c l e a r  
s ig n s  of weakness in  the South Korean m i l i t a r y  and they  
d is reg a rd ed  the  growing s t r e n g th  of the North Korean Army.
To do so made i t  p o s s ib le  to  avoid making hard d e c is io n s
about fu tu re  U.S. a c t io n s  i n  Korea.
^^Footnote 2, I b i d . , 85 .
^^Memo of C onversa tion  by D i r e c to r  of the O ffice  of 
N ortheast Asian A f f a i r s ( A l l i s o n ) , June I b i d . , IO8- 9 .
1 7 9  -
In a memorandum p repared  on June 29, 1950, D u lle s  
d id  an e x c e l l e n t  job of summing up why the United S ta te s  
had been su rp r ise d  and why South Korea had done so poorly  
in  defending  i t s e l f .  D u lle s  b e lieved  th e re  were fo u r  basic  
rea so n s  f o r  the la rg e  i n i t i a l  success of the N orth  Koreans. 
F i r s t ,  the South Korean Army was, by U.S. d e c is io n ,  w ithout 
combat p la n e s ,  tan k s , and heavy a r t i l l e r y ,  a lthough  the 
U nited  S ta te s  was aware t h a t  the  enemy possessed  these  
weapons in  s u b s ta n t ia l  q u a n t i ty  and in  good q u a l i t y .  Se­
cond, th e re  was a f a i l u r e  to  ev a lu a te  p ro p e r ly  i n te l l i g e n c e  
in fo rm a tio n ,  which showed t h a t  over sev e ra l  weeks th e re  had 
been a  g radual c o n c e n tra t io n  of tro o p s  and tank  fo rm ations  
a long  the 38th  p a r a l l e l .  T h ird ,  the re  was a  mood of com­
p lacency  on the  p a r t  of U.S. m i l i t a r y  a d v is e r s ,  the r e s u l t  
of overconfidence in  the morale and d i s c ip l in e  of the South 
Korean Army. F in a l ly ,  Tokyo was no t  informed prom ptly, and 
when informed d id  n o t  e v a lu a te  the a t ta c k  as s e r io u s  u n t i l  
the  t h i r d  day when Seoul was w ith in  the enemy’ s g rasp .
D u l le s '  assessm ent was probably  c o r r e c t ,  bu t i t  was 
n o t  t e r r i b l y  p e r t i n e n t  on June 29 , 1950. The q u e s t io n  t h a t  
had to  be d e a l t  w ith im m ediately was what response the  
U nited  S ta te s  would make to  the  North Korean in v a s io n .  I n  
I 949- I 950, numerous American o f f i c i a l s  had s t r e s s e d  both 
South K o rea 's  con tinued  e x is te n c e  as a symbol o f U.S.
^^Memo by D u lle s ,  C o n su ltan t  to  the S e c re ta ry  of 
S t a t e ,  June 29, 1950, I b i d . . 237-238.
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c r e d i b i l i t y  in  A sia  and t h a t  America could n o t  a f fo rd  to  
abandon South Korea to  Communist a g g re s s io n .  Given the 
importance p laced  on South K o re a 's  s u rv iv a l  and on the  ro le  
o f the  United N a tio n s  as the  morsil fo rce  underp inn ing  th a t  
s u rv iv a l ,  the U.S. response  in  June , 1950, was p re d ic ta b le  
and alm ost i n e v i t a b l e .
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CHAPTER VII
INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR
At 4:00 a .m .,  June 25, 1950, North Korean fo rc e s  i n ­
vaded South Korea.^ C oord inated  columns of Russian-made 
ta n k s  and R u ss ia n - t r a in e d  tro o p s  fo llow ed massed a r t i l l e r y  
f i r e  and " r o l l e d  back the  South Korean defenders ,  engu lf ing  
and d e s t ro y in g  whole u n i t s  in  a  w e ll-con ce iv ed  and c a r e f u l ly
prepared  m i l i t a r y  o p e ra t io n .  N orth  Korean p lan es ,  g iv in g
2
t a c t i c a l  su p p o r t ,  were v i r t u a l l y  uncha lleng ed ."
At 9:26 p .m ., June 24, the  S ta te  Department r e ­
ce ived  M uccio 's  f i r s t  r e p o r t  of th e  a t t a c k .  W ithin the  
hour, A s s i s t a n t  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  Dean Rusk and S ec re ta ry  
of the  Army Frank Pace a r r iv e d  a t  the  S ta te  Department—to  
be jo ined  s h o r t ly  by Deputy U n d e r-S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  Freeman 
Matthews, Ambassador a t  Large P h i l i p  Jessu p , A s s i s ta n t
Korean time i s  13 hours ahead of W ashington's time. 
D ates  c i t e d  in  documents i n  the  fo o tn o te s  correspond to  
th e  se n d e r ' s t im e .
2
Schnabel, P o l i c y , 6l . Captured and a u th e n t ic a te d  
North  Korean a t t a c k  o rd e rs  leav e  no doubt about North Korean 
i n i t i a t i o n  of the a t t a c k .  See G eneral Maxwell Taylor, G-3, 
to  CINCUNC (Ridgway), A p r i l  28, 1951. DA 89832, Box 31, 
Records of the U.S. J o i n t  C h iefs  o f  S t a f f ,  Geographic F i le  
(Korea), 1951-1953. Record Group 218, Modern M i l i t a r y  
Branch, N a tiona l  A rch ives, Washington D.C.
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S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  f o r  the United N a tion s  John H ickerson, 
Ruth Bacon o f F a r  E a s te rn  a f f a i r s ,  and Theodore A c h i l le s  of 
o f  the Western European A f f a i r s  D iv is io n .^  At around 
11:00 p .m .,  t h i s  group made the i n i t i a l  r e p o r t  and recom­
mendation to Acheson, who was spending the  weekend a t  Hare- 
wood Farm, t h a t  th e  m a t te r  be brought be fo re  the U.N. Se­
c u r i t y  C ounc il .  Acheson informed Truman, and suggested 
t h a t  the S e c u r i ty  Council meet, to  which Truman agreed 
i f  Acheson b e liev ed  i t  was n e c e s s a ry .^
The d e c is io n  to  p lace  the problem before  the United 
N ations  was made on the  s t r e n g th  of M uccio 's  f i r s t  te legram , 
a s  a l l  a t tem p ts  to  ga in  f u r t h e r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  f a i l e d .  By 
2:00 a .m .,  June 25, Acheson approved the  d e c is io n  to  go to  
the  S e c u r i ty  Council in  o rd e r  t h a t  bo th  news of the a t t a c k  
and of the  d e c is io n  to  submit the case to  the United N ations 
could appear in  the  morning papers.-^ While Acheson was no t 
a g re a t  s u p p o r te r  of the United N a tio n s ,  viewing i t  a s  "an 
a rena  f o r  t ro u b le m a k in g ," h i s  d e c is io n  was in  keeping with 
the  te n o r  of U.S. p o l ic y  in  Korea s ince  19^?.^  The United
^Muccio to  Acheson, June 25, 1950, FR, 1950, VII, 
125; E d i t o r i a l  N ote, I b i d . . 167-12?.
h.
Memo, A cheson 's  Phone C all to  the P re s id e n t ,  June 
24, 1950, George E lsey  P apers ,  Harry S. Truman L ib ra ry ;  
E d i t o r i a l  Note, FR, 1950, VII, 12?.
E d i t o r i a l  Note, FR. 1950, V II , 12?.
^Gaddis Smith, The American S e c r e t a r i e s  of S ta te  
and T he ir  Diplomacy:' Dean Acheson, Volume XVI (New York: 
Cooper Square P u b l i s h e r s ,  1972), 583.
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S ta te s  had t ie d  South K o re a 's  e x is te n c e  to  the  United 
N ations and had r e l i e d  on the o rg a n iz a t io n  as a d e te r r e n t  
to  a c t io n s  p r e c i s e ly  such as North Korea had taken . To 
ignore the  United N ations now would have been im p o l i t i c ,  
i f  n o t  i l l o g i c a l .
Ruth Bacon and David Wainhouse completed the  U.S. 
d r a f t  r e s o lu t io n  f o r  the S e c u r i ty  Council a t  2:00 a .m .,
7
June 2 5 . The r e s o lu t io n  was p rep a red  i n  h a s te ,  w ithout the 
a id  o f  a  f u l l - s c a l e  p o l ic y  d is c u s s io n  o r  review , and as  such, 
i t  rep resen ted  only  a temporary measure designed to  "make 
do" u n t i l  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  of the  h ig h e s t  rank could d e t e r ­
mine the best American course of a c t io n .
While th e  United S ta te s  was p re p a r in g  to  go before 
the  United N a tions , the s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea continued to  de­
t e r i o r a t e .  Muccio informed MacArthur t h a t  South K o re a 's
O
ammunition supply would run  out in  te n  days. On h i s  own 
i n i t i a t i v e  MacArthur ordered supply sh ip s  to  Pusan under 
the  p ro te c t io n  of U.S. a i r  and n av a l  f o r c e s .  On June 25, 
in  a te le ty p e  confe rence , MacArthur informed Washington th a t  
t h i s  was an a l l - o u t  North Korean a ttem p t to  sub jugate  
South Korea and n o t  a l im i te d  o f f e n s iv e .^
^ E d i to r ia l  Note, FR. 1950. VII, 12?.
Q
Muccio to  Acheson, June 25, 1950, I b i d . . 129; 
Schnabel, P o l i c y , 65-66.
9
Memo o f  Teletype Conference, P repared  in  the  De­
partm ent of the Army, June 25, 1950, FR. 1950. VII, I 36.
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On Sunday a f te rn o o n ,  June 25, U.S. Deputy Repre­
s e n ta t iv e  to  the United N a tion s , E rn e s t  Gross, p laced  the  
American r e s o lu t io n  befo re  the S e c u ri ty  Council. The r e s o ­
l u t i o n ,  a f t e r  b r i e f l y  d e s c r ib in g  U.N. involvement in  Korean 
a f f a i r s ,  c a l le d  f o r  a l l  h o s t i l i t i e s  to  cease immediately and 
f o r  the North Koreans to  withdraw behind the  38th  p a r a l l e l .  
The r e s o lu t io n  a ls o  c a l l e d  upon "All members to  re n d e r  every  
a s s i s ta n c e  to  the  U nited  N a tio ns  in  the  execu tion  of t h i s  
r e s o l u t i o n  and to  r e f r a i n  from g iv in g  a s s i s ta n c e  to  th e  
N orth  Korean a u t h o r i t i e s . "  The r e s o lu t io n  passed 9 -0 , s ince  
the  S o v ie t  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  was absen t because of a  d isp u te  
over the  s e a t in g  of Communist China.
The U.S. r e s o l u t i o n  was open-ended in  i t s  p o t e n t i ­
a l i t i e s —the phrase  " to  ren d e r  every a s s i s ta n c e "  in  exe­
c u t in g  the r e s o lu t i o n  p resen ted  a number of p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  
in c lu d in g  commitment of U.S. ground f o rc e s  to  Korea. The 
J o i n t  C h iefs  in  a  June 25 te le ty p e  conference w ith  MacArthur 
in d ic a te d  th a t  they  d id  n o t  b e liev e  the  r e s o lu t io n  s u f f i ­
c i e n t  f o r  such a c t io n .  MacArthur was t o ld  th a t  he might be 
c a l l e d  on to  employ U.S. ground and nava l  fo rc e s  " to  s t a b i ­
l i z e  the  combat s i t u a t i o n ,  in c lu d in g  i f  f e a s ib le  the r e s t o ­
r a t i o n  of the  o r i g in a l  boundaries  a t  38 degrees p a r a l l e l , "  
i n  the  even t the  S e c u r i ty  Council c a l l e d  on member n a t io n s
^^R eso lu tion  Adopted by the U.N. S e c u ri ty  C o u n c il ,  
June 25, 1950, I b i d . .  155-156.
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to  take d i r e c t  a c t io n  in  Korea.
At the time the  f i r s t  U.N. r e s o lu t io n  was p repared  
and p re s e n te d ,  U.S. p o l ic y  makers had no t reached  a d e c is io n  
on a p ro p e r  course  o f  a c t io n .  John F o s te r  D u l le s  expressed  
a  g e n e r a l ly  held  hope when he s a id ,  " I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  the 
South Koreans them se lves  may c o n ta in  and re p u ls e  the a t t a c k ,  
and, i f  so , t h i s  i s  the  b e s t  way." MacArthur’ s e s t im a te
12t h a t  South Korea would be able  to  hold r e in fo rc e d  t h i s  hope.
A more w ide ly  h e ld  f e e l in g ,  however, was t h a t  the  
U nited S ta te s  would be re q u ire d  to  take some s o r t  of a c t io n .
At 11:30 a .m .,  June 25, a  h ig h - le v e l  S ta te -D efense  D e p a r t­
ment conference  was h e ld ,  d u ring  which John D avies of the  
P o l ic y  P lan n ing  S t a f f  no ted  th a t  the extreme Russian  move 
in d ic a te d  the  S o v ie t  Union " though t a l l  the  Far E a s t  t h e i r  
' o y s t e r ' " , and added t h a t  " i f  they  could g e t  away w ith  t h i s  
move they  would p ro b ab ly  move in  o th e r  a r e a s ."  The g e n e ra l  
consensus o f those  p r e s e n t  was t h a t  the  U.S. r e a c t io n  would 
be c r i t i c a l  and t h a t  h a lf -m easu re s  would n o t  s u f f i c e .
The U.S. Ambassador in  Moscow, Alan G. K irk ,  and 
S p e c ia l  R e p re se n ta t iv e  John F o s te r  D u lle s ,  then  i n  Tokyo,
^^T ele type  Conference w ith  MacArthur, 7 :30  p .m .,  
June 25, 1950, E ls e y  P a p e rs .
12A cting  P o l i t i c a l  A dviser in  Japan (Seb a ld )  to  
Acheson, June 25, 1950. FR, 1950. V II, 140; Glen P a ig e , The 
K o r e ^  D ecis ion :  June 25-30, 1950 (New York: F ree  P re s s ,
1968) .  100; Seb a ld ,  MacArthur, 184.
^ & d ito r ia l  Note, FR. 1950. VII, 143.
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r e i t e r a t e d  the need f o r  a c t io n .  K irk saw the aggress ive  
North Korean m i l i t a r y  move as  a  c l e a r - c u t  S o v ie t  challenge, 
"which in  our considered  o p in ion  the  United  S ta te s  should 
answer f i rm ly  and s w if t ly  as i t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  d i r e c t  th r e a t  
to  our l e a d e r s h ip  of th e  f r e e  world a g a in s t  S o v ie t  Communist 
im p e r ia l i s m ." The S o v ie t  Union was co u n tin g  on a U.S. i n ­
c l i n a t i o n  to  a llow  " n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  the  c o n f l i c t  so t h a t  
n u m er ica l ly  su p e r io r  North Korean t ro o p s  could  ga in  a v i c ­
to r y ."  The Embassy be liev ed  th e  S ov ie t  Union was n o t p r e ­
pared to  r i s k  a  f u l l - s c a l e  war over Korea. South Korea 
should be a ided  with a l l  the  means a t  A m erica 's  d isp o sa l .  
D u lle s  spoke in  a s im i la r  fa s h io n ,  n o t in g  t h a t  i f  South 
Korea could  n o t  stop  th e  in v a s io n ,  "U.S. fo rc e  should be 
used even though t h i s  r i s k s  R ussian  c o u n te r  moves." I f  the 
United S ta te s  s a t  back while an unprovoked armed a ttack  
overran  South Korea, i t  "would s t a r t  a  d i s a s t r o u s  chain of
Ik
ev en ts  l e a d in g  most p robably  to  world war."
L a te  in  the a f te rn o o n  of the  25 th , Rusk, George 
Kennan, and o th e r  members of the  P o l ic y  P la n n in g  S ta ff ,  r e ­
ce ived  from the E s t im a te s  Group of the  S ta te  Department, a  
len g th y  in te l l i g e n c e  e v a lu a t io n  of th e  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  was 
the  judgment of the E s t im a te s  Group t h a t  N orth  Korea in­
tended to  a t t a i n  a d e c i s iv e  v i c to r y  in  South Korea w ithin 
the  n e x t  seven days. South Korea, m i l i t a r i l y  i n f e r i o r
^ \ i r k  to  Acheson, June 25, 1950, I b i d . . 139;
Sebald  to  Acheson, June 25, 1950, I b i d . ,  140.
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because of i t s  lack  of a i r ,  armor, and heavy a r t i l l e r y ,  
could  o f f e r  only l im i te d  r e s i s t a n c e .  L im ited a id  only in  
l i e u  of a  f u l l  U.S. commitment, would in su re  the end of 
o rgan ized  r e s i s t a n c e .
The S ta te  D ep artm en t 's  i n t e l l i g e n c e  es t im ate  con­
cluded t h a t  North  Korea was under S ov ie t  co n tro l  com plete ly . 
I t  was im possib le  t h a t  the  in v a s io n  had occurred w ithout 
p r i o r  i n s t r u c t i o n s  from Moscow. T h is  open aggress ion , while 
" in  l in e  w ith  the in c r e a s in g  m il i ta n c y  t h a t  has marked 
S o v ie t  p o l ic y  d u r in g  the p a s t  e ig h t  m onths," was unique in  
t h a t  i t  c l e a r l y  c a r r i e d  w ith  i t  th e  r i s k  of invo lv ing  U.S. 
f o r c e s  and hence the  r i s k  o f  g e n e ra l  war. The only exp la ­
n a t io n  p o s s ib le  f o r  the in v a s io n  i n  l i g h t  o f  "the apparen t 
U.S. commitment to  South Korea . . . " ,  was th a t  Sovie t 
g lo b a l  s t r a te g y  must have r e q u ire d  the a t t a c k .
E l im in a t io n  of South Korea would f i t  Sov ie t g lobal 
s t r a te g y  in  s e v e ra l  ways. F i r s t  i t  o f fe re d  a t e s t  on m i l i ­
t a r i l y  fa v o ra b le  grounds of the U .S. commitment to  i t s  r e ­
c e n t ly  announced p o l ic y  o f  " t o t a l  diplom acy". The outcome 
o f  t h i s  t e s t  p robab ly  would in f lu e n c e  both  Russian and Chi­
nese  moves to  support Ho Chi Minh, and Burmese and Malaysian 
Communists, a s  w ell as S o v ie t  moves a g a in s t  Yugoslavia,
^ ^ I n te l l ig e n c e  E stim a te  P repared  by the E s t im a te s  
Group, O ffice  o f I n t e l l i g e n c e  R esearch , Department of S ta te ,  
June  25, 195Q. I b i d . .  148-149-
^ ^ I b id . .  149.
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Germany, o r  I r a n .  Second, a severe  blow would be d e a l t  to  
U.S. p re s t ig e  throughout A sia  and converse ly  S o v ie t  advances 
would appear i n e v i t a b l e .  T h ird , S ov ie t  c o n tro l  o f South 
Korea would "secure  the approaches to the  U .S .S .R ."
F in a l ly ,  S ov ie t  dom ination of South Korea would be a  v i t a l  
weapon fo r  " the  in t im id a t io n  of the  Japanese  in  connection  
w ith  J a p a n 's  f u tu re  a lignm ent w ith the United S ta te s .
The consequences o f  the  in v as io n  would be most im­
p o r ta n t  in  Japan and secondly in  Western Europe. J a p a n 's  
r e a c t io n  would depend alm ost e n t i r e l y  upon what the  United 
S ta te s  did o r d id n o t  do i n  Korea. Rapid and u n h e s i ta t in g  
U.S. support f o r  South Korea would re a s s u re  Japan and would 
weaken e x i s t i n g  d e s i r e s  f o r  n e u t r a l i t y .  In  Europe, a suc­
c e s s fu l  S ov ie t-sponsored  in v a s io n  in  Korea would se v e re ly  
damage U.S. p r e s t i g e ,  because "the c a p a c i ty  of a small 
S o v ie t  s a t e l l i t e  to  engage in  a m i l i t a r y  adventure c h a l ­
len g in g  as  many Europeans see i t ,  the  might and w i l l  o f the 
U nited S ta te s ,  can only le a d  to  a  s e r io u s  q u e s t io n in g  of 
t h a t  might and w ill."^®
Well befo re  the f i r s t  m eeting of h ig h - le v e l  govern­
ment o f f i c i a l s  a t  B l a i r  House a t  8:00 p .m .,  on June 25, the  
g e n e ra l  te n o r  of th in k in g  among im p o rtan t  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  
was tak in g  d e f i n i t e  form. The in v a s io n  was perce ived  as 
S o v ie t - in s p i r e d ,  r e q u i r in g  from America a  p o s i t iv e  and
^ ^ I b i d . .  150 - 151 . l ^ I b i d . .  15I - I 54 .
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immediate r e a c t io n .  As the f i r s t  B la i r  House m eeting began, 
the c h a ra c te r  and degree of t h a t  r e a c t io n  was undeterm ined.
During the  meeting th e re  was a  ram bling exchange of 
assessm ents  and op in ions from the v a r io u s  C hiefs and Secre­
t a r i e s  p r e s e n t .  At the  o u t s e t ,  Truman p u t  o f f  S e c re ta ry  of 
Defense Jo h n so n 's  and General B ra d le y 's  a ttem pt to  make 
Formosa the keystone of the d isc u s s io n .  Acheson made a 
s e r i e s  of recommendations, among which were a u th o r iz a t io n  
f o r  MacArthur to  supply arms and ammunition, to  p rov ide  U.S. 
a i r  cover f o r  evacua tion  of women and c h i ld re n  from Seoul, 
and to  send a  survey team to  Korea. F in a l ly ,  Acheson recom­
mended th a t  the  ? th  F le e t  be p laced  in  the  Formosa S t r a i t s  
t o  p re v e n t  an a t t a c k  on or from Formosa. He added t h a t  in  
so do ing , the  U nited  S ta te s  should no t become involved  w ith
Chiang K ai-shek  and th a t  the  United N ations should determine.
19Form osa 's  f u tu r e .  Acheson 's Formosa recommendation "flowed 
d i r e c t l y  from the  com plicated d e l ib e r a t io n s  of the  p rev iou s  
e ig h te e n  months du ring  which time Taiwan underwent the  t r a n s ­
fo rm ation  from a  t e n t a t i v e  major i n t e r e s t  to  a f u l l - f l e d g e d
one ."  Thus, the  shock of th e  Korean War became "more the  oc-
20cas io n  f o r  U.S. in te rv e n t io n  than  the reason  fo r  i t . "
19Memo o f  C onversa tion  by Jessu p , June 25, 1950,
I b i d . .  157- 158.
20R u sse l l  D. B uhite , " 'M ajor I n t e r e s t s ' :  American
P o l ic y  Toward China, Taiwan, and Korea, 1945- I 950," P a c i f i c  
H i s to r i c a l  Review ( F a l l ,  1978), 459-440. For a complete d i s ­
cu ss io n  of t h i s  q u e s t io n ,  see the  e n t i r e  a r t i c l e .
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General Bradley  expressed the consensus opinion
t h a t  the  United S ta te s  had to draw the l i n e  somewhere on
Communist expansion . R uss ia  was n o t  ready  f o r  a  genera l war
and Korea o f fe re d  a s  good occasion a s  any f o r  dem onstra ting
American d e te rm in a t io n .  He added t h a t  the U nited  S ta te s
"should  a c t  under the  gu ise  of a id  to  th e  U.N." While
Bradley  and the  r e s t  o f  the m i l i t a r y  o f f i c i a l s  p re s e n t
agreed to  the need f o r  a c t io n ,  they a l l  exp ressed  keen
doubts about th e  a d v i s a b i l i t y  of committing U.S. ground 
21fo rc e s  to  Korea.
P re s id e n t  Truman accepted  A cheson 's  recommendations, 
excep t the  one concern ing  Formosa. MacArthur was ordered  
to  send s u p p l ie s  and a survey team to  Korea. P la n s  were 
to  be drawn to  d e s t ro y  Sov ie t a i r  bases i n  the  F a r  E a s t  
and U.S. a i r  and naval fo rc e s  were to  p re v e n t  th e  North 
Korean Army from i n t e r f e r i n g  with the  ev acu a tio n  of U.S. 
dependents from the Seoul-Inchon a re a .  F in a l ly ,  i t  was 
im pera tive  t h a t  p o s s ib le  fu tu re  Sov ie t moves be a s se ss e d .  
Truman emphasized t h a t  s ince  the U nited  S t a te s  was "working 
e n t i r e l y  f o r  th e  United N a t io n s ,"  f u r t h e r  a c t io n s  would 
be considered  only i f  and when the "U.N. o rd e r  was 
f lo u te d .
Je ssu p  Memo, June 25, 1950, FR. 1950. VII,
I 5 8 - I 6 O .
^^Ibid. . 160-161.
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The d e c is io n  to  employ U.S. a i r  and nav a l  fo rc e s  in  
m a in ta in in g  the  Se o u i -Inchon a re a  was reached w ithou t r e f ­
e rence  to  the  United N a tio n s .  In h e re n t  in  t h i s  d e c is io n  was 
the  very  r e a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  combat w ith  North Korean 
f o r c e s .  I t  a ls o  was an a c t io n  t h a t  " e s ta b l is h e d  a p re c e ­
den t f o r  the l a t e r  commitment of U.S. ground tro o p s .
The s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea soon outdated  W ashing ton 's  
i n i t i a l ,  l im i te d  s t e p s .  Muccio, e a r ly  on the 26th , informed 
the  S ta te  Department o f a dangerous, r a p id ly  d e t e r io r a t i n g  
s i t u a t i o n ,  w ith  imminent c o l la p se  of South Korea a p o s s i ­
b i l i t y .  Acheson f e l t  compelled to  urge another B l a i r  House
p h .
m eeting in  l i g h t  o f S e o u l 's  i n a b i l i t y  to  make a s tand .
P r i o r  to  t h a t  m eeting, Truman had a r e v e a l in g  co n v ersa t io n  
w ith  h i s  p e rso n a l  s e c r e t a r y ,  George E lsey .  Truman to ld  
E lse y  t h a t  "Korea i s  th e  Greece of the  Far E a s t .  I f  we are  
tough enough now, i f  we stand up to  them l ik e  we did in  
Greece th re e  years  ago, they  w on 't take any n ex t  s tep  . . . 
There i s  no t e l l i n g  what t h e y ’l l  do i f  we d o n 't  p u t up a 
f i g h t  now." E lsey  b e liev ed  t h a t  Truman was determ ined " to  
go very  much f u r t h e r  th an  MacArthur' s i n i t i a l  o rd e rs .
At the  June 26 m eeting . Acheson suggested t h a t  a l l
^^Schnabel, P o l i c y , 70.
24Muccio to  Acheson, June 26, 1950.FR.I9 6 0 . VII, 170; 
Notes on B l a i r  House M eeting ,June 26, 1950, E lsey  P apers .
25Memo of C o n v e rsa tio n  Between Truman and E lsey , by 
George E ls e y ,  June 26, 1950, E lsey  P apers .
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r e s t r i c t i o n s  be waived on a i r  and nava l  o p e ra t io n s  in  South 
Korea and t h a t  f u l l  support be g iven  to  South Korean fo rc e s  
to  d e s tro y  North  Korean ta n k s ,  guns, and t ro o p s .  T h is  could 
be done in  conform ity  w ith  the  June 25 S e c u r i ty  Council 
r e s o l u t i o n .  Truman approved the a c t io n ,  adding t h a t  as y e t  
no a c t io n  was to  be taken n o r th  of the  38th  p a r a l l e l .  Ap­
p ro v a l was g iven  to  in c r e a s in g  U.S. m i l i t a r y  fo rc e s  in  the 
P h i l ip p in e s  and to  a c c e l e r a t i n g  a id  and sending  a s tro n g  
m i l i t a r y  m ission  to  In doch in a . F i n a l l y ,  Truman agreed to 
p lace  the  7 th  F l e e t  i  . the Formosa S t r a i t s .  P lacem ent, 
however, was p u re ly  v e rb a l ,  s ince  th e  u n d e rs t re n g th  F le e t  
was needed f o r  the Korean c o n f l i c t .  Not u n t i l  October,
19501 d id  the  ? th  F l e e t  e n te r  the Formosa S t r a i t s ,  and even 
then  i t  p robab ly  was n o t  in  s t r e n g th  s u f f i c i e n t  to  p rev en t  
an in v a s io n  of Formosa. Ache son was c a r e f u l  once again  to  • 
add t h a t  the  United S ta te s  should n o t  g e t  mixed up in  the 
q u e s t io n  of Chinese a d m in is t r a t io n  of Formosa.
While th e re  was agreement o ver  these  moves, the 
m i l i t a r y  con tinued  to  exp ress  doubts about comm itting ground 
fo rc e s  to  K orea. The U.S. Army, under the  p r e s s u re s  of a 
penn y -p inch ing , i r r e s p o n s ib le  Congress and an uninformed 
p u b l ic ,  had been cu t  to  an a c t iv e  s t r e n g th  o f  591,000 men
26Memo of C onversa tion  by J e s s u p ,  June 26, 1950, 
FR,1950, V II, 178- 180; Robert Simmons, The S tra in e d  Al­
l ia n c e  (New York; Free P r e s s ,  1974), 145; Malcolm Cagle, 
and Frank Manson, The Sea War in  Korea (Annapolis: U.S.
Naval I n s t i t u t e ,  1957), 3J*
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in  June , 1950. Bradley b e liev ed  th a t  the United S ta te s  
could n o t  e n te r  Korea and s t i l l  c a rry  out o th e r  commitments 
w ithout m o b il iza tio n .  Truman in s t ru c te d  the J o i n t  C hiefs 
to th in k  about t h a t  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  but made i t  c le a r  t h a t  the 
United S ta te s  was going to  do every th in g  i t  could  i n  Korea 
" fo r  the  United N ations.
While claim ing to  be w i l l in g  to  j u s t i f y  fu tu re  ac­
t io n s  under the f i r s t  U.N. r e s o lu t i o n ,  U.S. p o l ic y  makers 
f e l t  the need fo r  a  much c l e a r e r  r e s o lu t io n  to  provide  a 
veneer o f  l e g a l i t y  to  those  a c t io n s .  An a d d i t io n a l  r e s o lu ­
t io n  a ls o  might i n c i t e  o th e r s  to  a c t  w ith  the United S ta te s .  
The r e s u l t  was a June 2? S e c u r i ty  Council r e s o lu t io n  which 
c a l le d  on members o f  the U nited  N ations  "to  f u r n i s h  such 
a s s i s ta n c e  to  the ROK as may be n ecessa ry  to  r e p e l  the  armed
a t ta c k  and to  r e s to re  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i ty  to 
28the a r e a ."  The b e l i e f  t h a t  R ussia , because of i t s  cumber­
some bureaucracy , s t i l l  would be ab sen t  from the June 27 
S e c u r i ty  Council m eeting, undoubtedly aided the d e c is io n  to 
seek t h i s  r e s o lu t io n .^ ^
Once more the pace of even ts  i n  Korea fo rced  the
I b i d . ,  iS 3 . James Schnabel has descr ibed  the  U.S. 
Army on the eve of the Korean War as  " f labby  and s o f t ,  s t i l l  
hampered by an in fe c t io u s  l a s s i t u d e ,  unready to  respond 
s w if t ly  and d e c is iv e ly  to  a  f u l l - s c a l e  m i l i t a r y  emergency." 
See Schnabel, P o l ic y , 45, 60.
28R eso lu tion  Adopted by the United N ations  S e c u r i ty  
C ouncil, June 27, 1950, FR. 1950, VII, 211.
^^Dean Ache son, P r e s e n t  a t  the  C rea tion  (New York: 
S ig ne t  E d i t io n ,  1969), 531*
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United S ta te s  to  go beyond the d e c i s io n s  reached a t  the 
June 26 B la i r  House meeting. MacArthur, in  compliance with 
h i s  o rd e rs ,  s e n t  General John Church and a survey team to 
Korea on June 2?. On the 28th, Church rep o r ted  t h a t  the 
United S ta te s  would have to  commit ground fo rc e s  to  s t a b i ­
l i z e  and r e s t o r e  the  s i t u a t i o n .  MacArthur, on re c e iv in g
30t h i s  r e p o r t ,  decided to  survey the  s i t u a t i o n  h im se lf .^
While MacArthur was in  K orea, Truman approved 
ano ther  e s c a l a t i o n  in  A m erica 's  involvem ent. At the u rg ing  
o f the J o i n t  C h ie fs  he agreed to  a u th o r iz e  a i r  a t t a c k s  
a g a in s t  m i l i t a r y  t a r g e t s  i n  North Korea and to  use U.S. 
t ro o p s  to secure  the  a re a  around Pusan . At the  same time 
he r e je c te d  a  Defense Department d i r e c t i v e  to  MacArthur be­
cause i t  im plied  t h a t  the United S t a te s  was ready  to  go to 
weir with the S o v ie t  Union. Truman s t a te d  th a t  "We must be 
damn c a re fu l  . . .We want to  take any s te p s  we have to  to  
push the N orth Koreans behind the l i n e ,  but I  d o n ' t  want us
overcommitted to  a whole l o t  of o th e r  th in g s  t h a t  could 
31mean war."^
MacArthur was au th o r ize d  on June 30, to  bomb m i l i ta r y  
t a r g e t s  n o r th  o f the  38th  p a r a l l e l ,  though he was ordered 
to  s ta y  "well c le a r "  of the  Manchurian and S ib e r ia n  borders .
30Roy Appleman, South to the  Naktong, North to the 
Yalu (Washington: O ffice o f  the C hief of M i l i t a r y  H is to ry ,
Ï W ) ,  43-43.
^^Notes on the June 29, 1950, B l a i r  House Meeting, 
E lsey  Papers.
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In  a d d i t io n ,  MacArthur was au th o r ize d  to  employ U.S. fo rc e s  
to  guard Pusan. He was c a u t io n e d ,  however, t h a t  t h i s  mea­
sure did n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  "a  d e c is io n  to  engage in  war w ith  
the Sov ie t Union i f  S o v ie t  f o rc e s  in te rv e n e d ."  But the de ­
c is io n  had been reached w ith  c f u l l  r e a l i z a t i o n  of the r i s k s  
involved. I f  S o v ie t  fo r c e s  d id  in te rv e n e ,  MacArthur*s 
troop s  were to  defend them se lves , be ing  sure to  take no ac ­
t io n  th a t  would aggrava te  th e  s i t u a t i o n .  Washington was to  
be informed im m ediately  o f  the  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  a  d e te rm in a tio n  
of p roper  cou rses  o f a c t io n .
The m i l i t a r y  was w i l l i n g  to  employ U.S. a i r  and 
naval fo rc e s  to a id  South K orea, bu t i t  c o n s i s t e n t ly  ex­
p ressed  doubts about u s in g  U.S. ground fo rc e s  in  Korea—the  
United S ta te s  had l im i te d  r e s o u rc e s  and Korea was of l i t t l e  
m i l i t a r y  s ig n i f ic a n c e .  G enera l C h arles  B o ité ,  head of G-3. 
re in fo rc e d  t h i s  op in ion  a s  l a t e  as June 28, when he informed 
the S e c re ta ry  of the  Army t h a t  the commitment of major U.S. 
ground fo rc e s  to  Korea could  have s e r io u s  e f f e c t s  on the 
o v e ra l l  U.S. m i l i t a r y  p o s i t i o n . B u t  a d i f f e r e n t  view was 
rece iv ed  on June 29, from the  J o i n t  S t r a te g ic  Survey 
Committee.
^^JCS to  MacArthur, June 30, 1950, FR. 1950. V ll ,  
240-241 ; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur; His Rendezvous With 
D estiny (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1956), 326.
^^General B o ité  (G -3). to the  S e c re ta ry  of the Army, 
Memo, " S i tu a t io n  in  th e  F a r  E a s t , "  June 29, 1950, C a r ro l l to n  
P re s s ,  D e c la s s i f ie d  Documents Reference System. DDRS 64D.
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The J o i n t  C h ie fs  were informed t h a t  South Korean 
c a p i tu l a t i o n  to  N orth  Korea was unaccep tab le  p o l i t i c a l l y  to  
the U nited  S ta te s  because of the r e s u l t a n t  lo s s  of p r e s t ig e  
and le a d e r s h ip  t h a t  would occur. MacArthur should be o r ­
dered to  d r iv e  the  N orth  Koreans n o r th  o f  the ]8 th  p a r a l l e l ,  
employing a l l  the fo r c e s  under h i s  command, as  w ell as  o th e r  
a p p ro p r ia te  f o rc e s  which should be made a v a i la b le  to  him.^^ 
This r e p o r t ,  su g g e s t in g  the  n e c e s s i ty  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  con­
s id e r a t io n s  to  o v e rr id e  m i l i t a r y  ones, was an im portan t f a c ­
to r  i n  g a in in g  m i l i t a r y  acquiescence  to  the  use of U.S. 
t ro o p s  in  Korea. The Sov ie t Union’ s r e p ly  to  an American 
note o f  June 25 and M acA rthur's  a ssessm ent of the s i t u a t i o n ,  
however, were more im p o rtan t  f a c t o r s .
On June 25, the  United S ta te s  se n t  a note to  the 
S o v ie t  Union, a sk in g  them to disavow any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
" fo r  t h i s  unprovoked a t t a c k  and t h a t  i t  w i l l  use i t s  i n ­
f lu en ce  w ith N orth  Korean a u t h o r i t i e s  to  withdraw t h e i r  i n ­
vading  fo rc e s  im m edia te ly ."^^  On June 29, the  S o v ie t  Union 
r e p l i e d  t h a t  South K orea had i n i t i a t e d  th e  a t ta c k  and th e r e ­
fore  Seoul had to  a cc ep t  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  even ts  
now o c c u r r in g .  The S o v ie t  Union added t h a t  i t  adhered "to
34Report by th e  J o i n t  S t r a te g ic  Survey Committee 
to  th e  JCS, "U.S. Courses of A ction  in  K orea ,"  June 29, 
1950, DDRS 250E.
33^•^Acheson to  the Embassy in  the  S o v ie t  Union, 
June 25, 1950, FR. 1950. VII, 148.
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the p r in c ip le  of the  im p e rm is s ib i l i ty  of in te r f e r e n c e  by 
fo re ig n  powers in  the i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  of K o r e a . C o n ­
s u l t a n t s  to  the N a tio n a l  S e c u r i ty  Council concluded t h a t  • 
t h i s  answer "was re a s s u r in g  in  i n d ic a t in g  t h a t  the USSR was 
n o t  d i r e c t l y  in v o lv in g  i t s e l f  . . . " i n  the  Korean h o s t i l i ­
t i e s ,  though the same could n o t  be sa id  f o r  Communist 
C h i n a . M o s c o w ' s  r e p ly ,  d i s a s s o c i a t in g  i t s e l f  from any 
involvement in  th e  Korean s i tu a t io n ,e n c o u ra g e d  the b e l i e f  
t h a t  th e re  would be no Sov ie t i n te r v e n t io n  in  Korea.
MacArthur' s p e ssm is t ic  e v a lu a t io n  of c o n d i t io n s  in  
Korea, based on f i r s t - h a n d  o b se rv a t io n ,  reached  Washington 
in  the e a r ly  morning hours of June 30. The only  way to  hold 
the  p re s e n t  l in e  in  Korea and to  r e g a in  l o s t  t e r r i t o r y  was 
"th rough  in t r o d u c t io n  of U.S. ground combat f o r c e s  in to  the 
Korean b a t t l e  a r e a ."  Unless o therw ise  d i r e c te d ,  he in tended  
to  move imm ediately a reg im en ta l  combat team to  South Korea 
and to  fo llo w  t h i s  l a t e r  w ith two d i v i s io n s  from Japan . 
MacArthur was g iven  alm ost immediate P r e s i d e n t i a l  approval 
to  send the reg im en ta l  combat team, bu t any f u r t h e r  bu ild -up  
was postponed u n t i l  the P re s id e n t  and h i s  top  a d v is e r s  could 
give c a r e f u l  c o n s id e ra t io n  to  the r e q u e s t .
i r k  to  Acheson, June 29, 1950, I b i d . . 229.
^^Memo of NSC C o nsu ltan ts  M eeting, June 29, 1950, 
FR,1950, I ,  327.
^^MacArthur to  Acheson, June 30, 1950, FR.1950, VI, 
248-249 ; Memo of T ele type  Conference P repared  in  the  D epart­
ment of the Army, June 30, 1950, I b i d . . 250-252.
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At 9 0 0  a .m . , June 30, the P re s id e n t  met again  w ith  
h i s  a d v is e r s  a t  B la i r  House. No o p p o s i t io n  was expressed  to 
the d e c is io n  to  approve the re in fo rcem en t of U.S. t ro o p s  a l ­
ready committed to  Korea. The J o i n t  C h ie fs  d id  n o t  speak 
in  fav o r  of the p ro p o sa l ,  but they voiced  no o b je c t io n s .
At 1:22 p .m ., June 30, MacArthur was informed t h a t  he could
u t i l i z e  in  Korea a l l  U.S. Army fo rc e s  a v a i la b le  to  him, sub-
40j e c t  only  to  J a p a n 's  s e c u r i ty .  A sh o r t  time l a t e r ,  the  
United N ations  and South Korea p laced  t h e i r  tro o p s  under 
U.S. command, and America became th e  U. N. ' s  agen t in  Korea.
The commitment o f U.S. ground fo rc e s  to  Korea, a 
p o l i t i c a l  d e c is io n  r a t h e r  than one which m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i t y  
r e q u i r e d ,  was made over the i n i t i a l  o b je c t io n s  of the m i l i ­
t a r y ,  which had long  opposed the  use of U.S. t ro o p s  on the  
Asian mainland. The m i l i t a r y  acquiesced only a f t e r  Truman 
and Ache son made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  the U nited  S ta te s ,  f o r  p o l i ­
t i c a l  rea so n s ,  could n o t  a llow  South Korea to  f a l l .  General 
B radley , in  h i s  June , 1949 memorandum, had fo re see n  t h a t  
such a p o l i t i c a l  d e c is io n  might become n e ce ssa ry .
John F o s te r  D u lle s ,  f iv e  weeks before  the  a t t a c k ,  
expressed  the k ind of th in k in g  t h a t  would l a t e r  le a d  the
39^ E d i t o r i a l  Note, I b i d . , 255; L ouis Johnson T e s t i ­
mony, U.S. Congress, Senate , M i l i t a ry  S i tu a t io n  in  the F a r  
E a s t . 82nd Congress, 1 s t  Session  (Washington: GPO, 1951),
258%.
40JCS to  MacArthur, June 30, 1950, FR. 1950. VII, 
263; Schnabel, P o l i c y , 100-101.
-  199 -
United S ta te s  to  in te rvene  in  Korea. In  a  memorandum to  
Dean Rusk and Paul N itze ,  D u lle s  w ro te - th a t  the  United 
S ta te s  faced a new and c r i t i c a l  pe riod  in  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  
the r e s t  of the  world. The l o s s  of China had had tremendous 
re p e rc u s s io n s  throughout the world and had marked a s h i f t  
in  the  balance of power in  fav o r  of the S ov ie t  Union.
D u lles  b e liev ed  th a t  i f  U.S. conduct in d ic a te d  a  con tinued  
w i l l in g n e s s  to  f a l l  back and a llow  d o u b tfu l  a re a s  to  f a l l  
under S ov ie t  c o n tro l ,  then many n a t io n s  would f e e l  confirmed 
in  the  im pression  t h a t  the United S ta te s  d id  n o t  exp ec t  to 
s tand  f i rm  s h o r t  of the  NATO a re a  and reg io n s  which the  
Monroe D octrine  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  covered. I f  U.S. conduct 
confirmed t h i s  conc lusion , then  an a c c e le ra te d  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
o f  U.S. in f lu e n ce  in  the  M edite rranean , N o rth eas t  A sia , and 
the  P a c i f i c  was in e v i t a b le .  The s i t u a t i o n  in  Japan , the  
P h i l ip p in e s ,  Indones ia ,  and the  Middle E a s t  were no t p la c e s  
f o r  "good ho ld ing  o p e ra t io n s  once the  people f e e l  t h a t  
Communism i s  the wave of the  fu tu re  and t h a t  even we a re  r e ­
t r e a t i n g  before  i t . "  D u lles  f e l t  t h a t  i t  might be p o s s ib le  
t o  p re v e n t  a s e r i e s  o f  d i s a s t r o u s  lo s s e s  i f  " a t  some doubt­
f u l  p o in t  we qu ick ly  tak e  a  dram atic  and s t ro n g  s tand  t h a t  
shows our confidence and r e s o lu t io n .
D u l le s '  type o f  th in k in g  dominated among U.S. o f f i ­
c i a l s  i n  l a t e  June, 1950, The United S ta te s ,  a s  the
D u lles  to N itze  and Rusk, May 18, 1950. PR, 1950, 
I ,  314-316.
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p r in c ip a l  c e n te r  o f the f r e e  world, could n o t  a llo w  South 
Korea to  f a l l ,  f o r  as NSC 68 p u t  i t ,  in  the m o rta l  c o n f l i c t  
then in  p ro g re s s  between the S o v ie t  s lave  s o c ie ty  and the 
f r e e  world, "a  d e fe a t  o f f re e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  anywhere i s  a  de­
f e a t  everyw here." In  the  p r e s e n t  b ip lo a r  world of good and 
e v i l ,  i t  was a b s o lu te ly  n e c e ssa ry  th a t  the U nited  S ta te s  
make a stand  in  Korea and check the  advance of e v i l  before  
i t s  momentum overwhelmed the f re e  world. S tep by s te p ,  as  
South Korean r e s i s t a n c e  d i s in te g r a t e d ,  the U n ited  S ta te s  was 
drawn in to  a  lan d  war i n  A sia . The d e c is io n  was p re d ic ta b le  
and c e r t a i n  g iven  p a s t  U.S. p o l ic y  in  Korea and i t s  p re s e n t  
p e rc e p t io n  of a  world d iv id e d  between a "good" f r e e  world 
and an a g g re s s iv e ,  e x p a n s io n is t i c  S ov ie t  s lave  s o c ie ty .
Whether t h a t  p e rc e p t io n  was c o r r e c t  i s  open to  
q u e s t io n .  N ik i ta  Khruschev has sa id  t h a t  the id e a  fo r  the 
in v as io n  o r ig in a te d  w ith  North K o re a 's  Kim I I - s u n g  and th a t  
S t a l i n  agreed to  i t  a f t e r  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  Mao T ase-tung . 
According to  Khruschev, "We were in c l in e d  to  th in k  t h a t  i f  
the  war were foug h t s w i f t ly  . . . th e n  in te r v e n t io n  by the 
USA would be av o id ed ."  I t  has been suggested  t h a t  the 
t im ing  of the war can b e s t  be understood in  term s o f  i n ­
digenous c o n d i t io n s  on the  Korean p e n in su la .  While the 
S o v ie t  Union c e r t a i n l y  armed the  North Koreans and expected 
a  war, the  s p e c i f i c  t im in g  of the  in vas ion  "was caused by 
in te n se  in tra -K o re a n  W orker 's  P a r ty  r i v a l r y  i n  the  North ,
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combined w ith  ap p ea ls  from South Korean-based g u e r i l l a s  who
had powerful su p p o r te rs  in  the N o r th ." These p r e s s u re s  may
have fo rced  Kim I l - s u n g  in to  war before the  d a te ,  p robab ly
August 7, on which h i s  S o v ie t  mentors had agreed . N orth
Korea then  "was n e i t h e r  a  com plete ly  pass iv e  'g u n ' f o r  an
i tc h y  S o v ie t  t r i g g e r  f i n g e r  nor a  m onolith ic  system t o t a l l y
42su b se rv ie n t  to  Moscow."
The p re c i s e  o r ig in s  o f  the  in v as io n  may never be known, 
but th e re  can be l i t t l e  doubt about American p e rc e p t io n s  or 
t h a t  the S ov ie t  Union did  l i t t l e  to d iscourage  North K o re a 's  
a t t a c k .  One can only guess about Sov ie t m otives, bu t some 
of the re a so n s  g e n e r a l ly  advanced fo r  i t s  approval o f the  
a t t a c k  in c lu d e :  a d e s i re  to  p rev en t the  m i l i t a r y  and i n ­
d u s t r i a l  resu rg en ce  of Japan on the s ide  of the f r e e  world; 
a  d e s i r e  bo th  to  r e g a in  the  i n i t i a t i v e  in  Asia from the  r e ­
c e n t ly  v i c t o r io u s  Chinese Communists and to  compensate fo r  
the l o s s  o f Manchuria; and f i n a l l y ,  the  withdrawal of U.S. 
t ro o p s  from Korea, as  w ell a s  A m erica 's  f a i l u r e  to  in te rv en e
N i k i t a  Khruschev, Khruschev Remembers (Boston: 
L i t t l e  Brown, 1970), 368; Simmons, S tra in e d  A l l i a n c e , 103, 
121. N orth  K o re a 's  prem ature in v as io n  e x p la in s ,  Simmons 
b e l ie v e s ,  why s u p p l ie s  from the  Sov ie t Union were s t i l l  in  
the p ip e l in e  on June 25, why North Korea was no t t o t a l l y  
m obilized , why the  R ussians were absen t from the S e c u r i ty  
Council, why both the R ussian  and Chinese propaganda ma­
ch ines  were slow to  r e a c t  a t  the  beg inn ing  of the war, 
why China d id  n o t  a ttem p t an a t t a c k  on Taiwan before  t h i s  
more in c e n d ia ry  e v e n t ,  and f i n a l l y ,  why the R ussians 
d id  no t o f f e r  a s  much a id  a s  N orth  Korea wanted, and why 
China was slow to  o f f e r  a s s i s t a n c e .  See Simmons, S t ra in e d  
A l l i a n c e . 128.
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when China f e l l ,  l e d  the  S o v ie t  Union to  conclude t h a t  South 
Korea could be taken  s w if t ly  and without a U.S. response .
Whatever th e  Sov ie t m otives, i t  i s  c le a r  t h a t  the 
United S t a te s  p e rc e iv e d  them as  ha rsh  confirm atio n  o f  the 
p rem ises o f NSC 68. On September 30, Truman approved the 
conc lu s ion s  of NSC 68 "as a  s ta tem en t  of p o l ic y  to  be f o l ­
lowed over the  n e x t  f o u r  o r  f iv e  y e a rs ."  The immediate r e ­
s u l t  was an in c re a s e  i n  the defense  budget f o r  1951 from 
$13 '5  b i l l i o n  to  $48 b i l l i o n ,  and in  the long  run , v a s t ly  
expanded defense  e x p e n d i tu re s .  Acheson, N itz e ,  and o th e rs  
b e liev ed  t h a t  w ith o u t  the o n se t  o f the Korean War, the  p ro ­
gram envisaged in  NSC 68 could  never have been implemented.^^
Some Washington o f f i c i a l s ,  the most a r t i c u l a t e  
be ing  George Kennan and C harles  Bohlen, opposed the  p re ­
v a i l i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the Korean h o s t i l i t i e s .  Kennan 
d id  no t b e l ie v e  Moscow had launched the Korean o p e ra t io n  "as 
a  f i r s t  s tep  in  a world war o r  a s  the  f i r s t  o f a s e r i e s  of 
l o c a l  o p e ra t io n s  des igned  to  d r a in  U.S. s t r e n g th  in  p e r ip h ­
e r a l  t h e a t e r s . "  The S ov ie t  Union simply wanted c o n tro l  of 
South Korea, saw what looked l i k e  a favo rab le  s e t  of circum­
s ta n c e s  in  which t o  achieve i t ,  and fea red  t h a t  i f  i t  was
^ I r i y e ,  Cold War, 177-178; Ulam, Expansion , 518- 
519; Ulam, The R i v a l s . 170-171; C harles  Bohlen, W itness to  
H is to ry ,  1929-1969(New York: Norton, 1973), 293.
44Report t o  th e  NSC by the E xecutive  S e c re ta ry (L a y ) , 
September 30, 1950, FR ,1950. I ,  400; B ert Cochran, Harry S. 
Truman and the C r i s i s  P residency  (New York: Funk&Wagnalls,
1973), 290; Acheson. C re a t io n , 346-547: P r in c e to n  Seminars, 
Dean Acheson P a p e rs ,  Harry S. Truman L ib ra ry .
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k<5no t achieved now, time might run  ou t.
Kennan and Bohlen were, however, in  the m in o r i ty .
NSC 73f f i r s t  subm itted J u ly  1, 1950, no ted  th a t  while the 
S o v ie ts  were not p repared  to  engage in a g en era l  war, they 
would "make every e f f o r t  to  probe the  f irm ness  of our p u r­
pose and our nerves a t  o th e r  s e n s i t iv e  p o in ts ,  above a l l  in  
Germany and A u s tr ia  . . . ."  A r e a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  e x is te d  
th a t  Moscow would u t i l i z e  i t s  " s a t e l l i t e " .  Communist China, 
n o t  only in  Korea but in  A sia  g e n e ra l ly ,  " to  em barrass us 
in  every conceivable  way . . . On August 1, the J o i n t
Serv ice  S e c r e ta r i e s  in  the Defense Department s t a te d  t h a t  
" the  Korean in c id e n t  has c l e a r l y  revea led  the new p a t t e r n  
of Sov ie t agg ress ion  and dem onstra tes  t h a t  the  S o v ie ts  have 
moved openly in to  the  use of fo rce  through puppets in  t h e i r  
a t ta c k  on the  non-Communist world." The U.S. Ambassador in  
the Sov ie t Union be lieved  the  Russians "were prepared  to  . 
fo llow  up a  quick and complete v ic to ry  in  Korea w ith  an o th e r  
a t ta c k  where th e re  were adequate p ro sp e c ts  fo r  l o c a l i z in g  
the  c o n f l i c t  or f o r  a g r e a t  d isp la y  of sab er  r a t t l i n g  a t  
s e n s i t iv e  p o i n t s . T h e s e  men r e f l e c t e d  the  th in k in g  ex­
p ressed  in  NSC 68 about S o v ie t  d e s i r e s  f o r  world hegemony.
^■^ennan to Ache son, August 8, 1950, FR.1950, I ,  
361; Bohlen, W itness. 291-292.
LA
Report to  the  NSC by the Executive  S e c re ta ry  
(Lay), NSC 73, J u ly  1, 1950. FR.1950. I .  331-338.
47Memo by Pace, Matthews, and F i n i e t t e r  to  Johnson, 
August 1, 1950, I b i d . . 353-355; Kirk to Acheson, August 1, 
1950, I b i d . . 367- 368.
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The e f f e c t s  o f  the  Korean s i t u a t io n  immediately
touched o th e r  a re a s  o f U.S. p o l ic y .  In  September, Truman
in s t r u c te d  Acheson to  propose t h a t  Germany be e n l i s t e d  in
48a p lan  fo r  the in te g r a te d  defense of Europe. He a lso  to ld  
Acheson to begin n e g o t i a t i o n s  to  conclude a peace t r e a ty  
w ith  Japan , which the  U.S. m i l i t a r y  had long  opposed.
J a p a n 's  rearmament a l s o  was to  be a c c e le ra te d .  Kennan has 
suggested t h a t  the Korean War destroyed the s l i g h t  chances 
t h a t  might have e x i s te d  f o r  a  "Russian-American unders tand ing  
in  r e l a t i o n  to  the problem s of t h a t  reg io n  based on the
liQ
n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  and d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  of Jap an . The e f f e c t s  
on Sino-American r e l a t i o n s  were even g r e a t e r .  P o l i t i c a l  
c o n s id e ra t io n s ,  a d e s i r e  to  keep the  c o n f l i c t  in  Asia from 
sp read ing  to  a n o th e r  f r o n t ,  the need to keep Formosa from 
becoming an advance base f o r  an ti-A m erican  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and 
a  d e s i r e  to  g a in  m i l i t a r y  acquiescence i n  committing U.S. 
ground fo r c e s  to  Korea, le d  Truman to p lace  the  ? th  F le e t  
in  the  Formosa S t r a i t s .  The d e c is io n  was a departu re  from
Law rence S. Kaplan has suggested  t h a t  the Korean 
War r e s u l t e d  in  a t r a n s fo rm a t io n  o f  a "vague commitment o f 
American a s s i s ta n c e  to  Western Europe in  the even t of a t ­
tac k  . . . "  in to  " s p e c i f i c  g u a ran tee s  of American in v o lv e ­
ment . . . ."  The NATO system was transform ed in to  an o r ­
g a n iz a t io n  capable of defend ing  Europe from a S ov ie t  ground 
a t t a c k .  Kaplan concludes t h a t  the  major impact of the 
Korean War was in  Europe. See Lawrence Kaplan, "The Korean 
War and U.S. F ore ign  R e la t io n s :  The Case of NATO," in
F ra n c is  H e l le r ,  ed . .  The Korean War: A 25-Year P e rsp e c t iv e
(Lawrence: Regents P r e s s ,  1977), 36-70.
49^Acheson, C r e a t io n , 533, 556-557; Kennan, Memoirs, 
416-417; I r i y e ,  Cold War. 182.
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the  e x p e c ta t io n s  expressed  in  NSC 48 /2  t h a t  Formosa was 
bound in e v i ta b ly  to  f a l l  to  Communist China u n le s s  the 
United S ta te s  d i r e c t l y  in te rv e n e d ,  which was considered  
m i l i t a r i l y  unsound. NSC 48/2  had emphasized t h a t  U.S. 
p o l ic y  should be d i r e c te d  to  e x p lo i t in g  r i f t s  between the  
Chinese Communists and the S ov ie t  Union, to  A m erica 's  
ad v an tage .
The U.S. announcement of th e  p lacem ent of the  ? th  
F l e e t  in  Communist C h in a 's  p a th  to  Formosa was made even 
more p rov oca tiv e  s ince  i t  was a p u re ly  v e rb a l  im p o s it io n .  
S e c re ta ry  of Defense Johnson acknowledged in  J u ly  th a t  the  
F l e e t  might n o t  be ab le  to  p rev en t a  su c c e s s fu l  Communist 
in v a s io n ,  because i t  lack ed  the power to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  
both  Korea and the Formosa S t r a i t s . T h i s  a c t io n  could n o t  
h e lp  but provoke the  C hinese, y e t  Acheson con tinued  to be­
l i e v e  throughout the summer of 1950. t h a t  a  c o n f l i c t  would
COdevelop between R uss ia  and China e v e n tu a l ly .^  He does n o t  
seem to have pe rce iv ed  the  way China would i n t e r p r e t  the  
U.S. r e v e r s a l  of p o l ic y .  In  the  B l a i r  House m eetings,
Acheson could d isc la im  any in t e n t io n  of becoming involved 
w ith  Chiang K ai-shek , bu t  the  Chinese Communists could see
^°NSC 48/2 , FR.1949.V I K 2 ) .1219; I r i y e . Cold War, 79-
^^JCS to  Johnson, J u ly  23, 1950, and Johnson to 
Acheson, J u ly  29, 1950, U.S. Department o f  S t a t e ,  Foreign  
R e la t io n s  of the United S t a te s .  1950; E a s t  A sia  and the 
P a c i f i c . Volume VI(Washington: GPO. 1976). 193. 4 o i .
^^Smith, Acheson. 201-202.
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only the  a c t io n ,  which appeared to  them a s  "new prem edita ted  
agg re ss io n  o f  American im p eria l ism  a g a in s t  the Asian 
p e o p le ."  The Chinese viewed American p o l ic y  a s  "the major 
o b s ta c le  in  th e  way o f  C h in a 's  emergence as a power."
Acheson c l e a r l y  u n d eres tim a ted  the  " re v o lu t io n a ry  fe rv o r ,  
the id e o lo g ic a l  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  and the m ental image of the 
United S ta te s "  t h a t  shaped C h in a 's  view of the  world.
When the  Chinese in te rv e n e d  in  Korea, an angry Acheson con­
c luded th a t  Peking was a  puppet o f  S o v ie t  im peria lism , and 
th u s  should be t r e a t e d  a c c o rd in g ly .  The r e s u l t  was aban­
donment of an i n t e n t io n  to  rea ch  a modus v ivend i with 
Communist China.
The d e c is io n  to  in te rv e n e  in  Korea, th en , had im­
m ediate and e x te n s iv e  e f f e c t s  on U.S. fo r e ig n  p o l ic y .  Yet 
the d e c is io n ,  made by degrees and w ith c a u t io n ,  was c a r r ie d  
out w ith  a  f u l l  awareness of the p o s s ib le  r i s k s  involved i f  
S ov ie t  or Chinese f o r c e s  should e n te r  th e  c o n f l i c t .  This 
was apparen t when Truman denied  M acA rthur 's  re q u e s t  fo r  a i r  
reconnaisance  of D a iren , P o r t  A rth u r ,  V lad ivos tok , and the. 
K u r i l e s ,  because such o p e ra t io n s  "would r a i s e  p o l i t i c a l  
q u e s t io n s  of the g r a v e s t  importance . . . Also
^^Tang Tsou, A m erica 's  F a i lu re  in  China, 1941-1950, 
Volume 2(Chicago: U n iv e rs i ty  of Chicago P re s s ,  1963)»
563-564; I r i y e ,  Cold War, 183-185.
^^Smith, Acheson, 218; Robert F e r r e l l , " D e a n  Acheson" 
in  M e rl i  and Wilson, Makers o f  American Diplomacy, I I .
^^Memo of T e le typ e  Conference P repared  in  the De­
partm en t o f  th e  Army, Ju ly  6, 1950, FR.1950. VII, 311.
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r e f l e c t i n g  an awareness o f the  d e l ic a c y  of the s i t u a t i o n  was 
D u l le s '  r a t h e r  p r e s c i e n t  recommendation t h a t  P re s id e n t  
Truman should , in  o rd e r  to  p rev e n t  the Korean c o n f l i c t  from 
develop ing  in to  a  world war, emphasize to  MacArthur the 
d e l i c a t e  n a tu re  o f the  dual r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  he was now 
c a r ry in g  on b e h a lf  o f  the United S ta te s  and on b e h a lf  of the 
United N a t io n s .  I t  was v i t a l  t h a t  MacArthur i n s t r u c t  h i s  
s t a f f  " to  comply sc ru p u lo u s ly  w ith  p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  
l i m i t a t i o n s  and i n s t r u c t i o n s  which may be s e n t ,  the  reason  
f o r  which w i l l  o f te n  have behind them p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e ra ­
t io n s  o f g r a v i ty .
The United S ta te s  e n te re d  the  Korean War ca lm ly  and 
c a u t io u s ly ,  with an awareness of the  r i s k s  invo lved . While 
c e r t a i n  im ponderables un d e rlay  U.S. p o l ic y ,  a t  the h e a r t  of 
the  Korean involvement was the  is su e  of American c r e d i b i l i t y .  
While i t  was n o t  e s s e n t i a l  to  stand  in  South Korea "because 
i t s  de fense  was m i l i t a r i l y  f e a s ib l e  or se n s ib le  in  term s of 
the o v e r a l l  g lo b a l  s t r a t e g y , "  i t  was v i t a l  to  r e s i s t  be­
cause abandonment of so u th  Korea would have s ig n i f i e d  " a 
la c k  of w i l l ,  d e te rm in a t io n ,  and confidence to  b o l s t e r  up 
the  s t r u c tu r e  of A s ia n -P a c i f i c  in t e r n a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s  which 
had begun to  be r e d e f in e d  by the U nited  S ta te s  a f t e r  the 
f a l l  of China to  th e  Communists.
^^D ulles to  Acheson, J u ly  7,1950, I b i d . . 328 .
^ ^ I r iy e ,  Gold War. 178 .
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CHAPTER V III 
THE DECISION TO UNIFY KOREA:
THE DEBATE OVER CROSSING THE 38TH PARALLEL
The s tead y  d i s in te g r a t io n  of South Korean r e s i s t a n c e  
l e d  to  the American dec is ion  to  commit U.S. tro o p s  to  the 
Korean War. The s i t u a t i o n  was so c r i t i c a l  and the  re so u rce s  
a v a i la b le  to  the U nited  S ta te s  f o r  employment in  Korea so 
l im i te d ,  t h a t  a t  th e  ou tse t  there  was doubt whether enough 
a id  would a r r iv e  in  time to p rev en t North  Korea from cap­
tu r in g  a l l  o f  Korea. The m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  a t  the end of . 
the f i r s t  s ix  weeks of f ig h t in g  found "the U.S. and ROK 
fo rc e s  compressed in to  the Pusan p e r im e te r  and s t i l l  
f i g h t in g  d e s p e ra te ly  to  s t a b i l i z e  the s i t u a t i o n .
D esp ite  the  r a th e r  tenuous p o s i t io n  of the United 
S ta te s  in  Korea, the  beginning of J u ly  marked the  o n se t  of 
a  len g th y  and in te n se  debate among U.S. p o l ic y  makers about 
the u l t im a te  goal o f  U.N. o p e ra t io n s  i n  Korea. The complex 
debate cen te red  on what should be done i f  and when North  
Korean f o r c e s  were d r iv e n  or re t r e a t e d  back of the 38th
^Appleman, Naktong, 32.
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p a r a l l e l .  Should th e  p a r a l l e l  be c rossed  and Korea u n if ie d  
by m i l i t a r y  fo rce?  The answer to  t h i s  q u e s t io n  involved an 
assessm ent of S o v ie t  and Chinese r e a c t io n s  and in te n t io n s ,  
and the meaning of an invas ion  of North Korea to  continued 
U.N. suppo rt .  The g e n e ra l  f e e l in g  in  Ju ly  fav ored  the 
s t a tu s  quo ante  b e llu m . and John A l l is o n  and Dean Rusk 
played key r o l e s  in  s u s ta in in g  a d eba te ,  in  th e  e a r ly  s tages  
of the  war, i n  f a v o r  o f  c ro s s in g  the 38th  p a r a l l e l .
On J u ly  1, John  A ll iso n ,  D ir e c to r  of th e  O ffice  o f 
N o rth eas t  Asian A f f a i r s ,  r a i s e d  the q u e s t io n  of whether the 
u l t im a te  o b je c t iv e  o f  the United S ta te s  ought n o t  be the r e ­
u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  K orea. In  a memorandum to  Dean Rusk, A ll iso n  
noted th a t  some su g g e s t io n s  had been made t h a t  Truman in ­
clude in  an upcoming speech on Korea, a  s ta tem en t t h a t  U.S. 
fo rc e s  would a t tem p t only to  d r ive  the  North Koreans back 
of the 38th  p a r a l l e l  and no f u r th e r .  This should  no t be
done, s ince  i t  n o t  o n ly  would d es tro y  rem aining South Korean
2
m orale, in  the  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t io n  i t  was u n r e a l i s t i c .
A l l i s o n  b e l ie v e d  th a t  the second S e c u r i ty  Council 
r e s o lu t io n ,  c a l l i n g  f o r  ap p ro p r ia te  a c t io n  to  r e s to r e  peace 
and s t a b i l i t y  to  the  a re a ,  allowed ample room f o r  the United 
S ta te s  to  c ro s s  the 38th  p a r a l l e l .  There could be "no 
permanent peace and s t a b i l i t y  in  Korea as long  as  the a r t i ­
f i c i a l  d iv i s io n  a t  th e  38th  p a r a l l e l  c o n t in u e d ."  A ll iso n
^ A lliso n  to  Rusk, Ju ly  1,1950, FR.1950. VII, 2?2. 
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f e l t  i t  was time to  be bold and w i l l i n g  " to  take even more 
r i s k s  th an  we a lre ad y  have . . . While n o t  advocating  
th a t  the speech should announce t h a t  the  United S ta te s  was 
going  to  proceed beyond the 38th p a r a l l e l ,  n e v e r th e le s s ,  
th e re  should be no commitment a t  the  p r e s e n t  time no t to  do 
so. I f  p o s s ib le ,  and A l l is o n  was n o t  sure  i t  was p o s s ib le ,  
America should continue on up to  the  Manchurian and S ib e r ia n  
bo rder , and then  c a l l  f o r  a U.N. su p e rv ised  e l e c t i o n  f o r  a l l  
o f  Korea. A l l is o n  thought t h a t  any a c t io n  which would i n h i ­
b i t  such a  fu tu re  move would be most unwise. Rusk agreed 
com plete ly  w ith  A l l i s o n 's  memorandum.^
A l l is o n  continued  h i s  campaign when he drew R usk 's 
a t t e n t i o n  to remarks an Army spokesman made in  Korea on 
J u ly  13, to  the e f f e c t  t h a t  the United S ta te s  was f ig h t in g  
only  to d r iv e  the North Koreans back o f  th e  38th  p a r a l l e l  
and would employ fo rce  to  p re v e n t  South Korea from c ro s s in g  
t h a t  l i n e .  As a  r e s u l t ,  Acheson o rdered  t h a t  no o f f i c i a l  
s ta te m e n ts  should be made on the course  o f a c t io n  to  be 
taken  subsequent to  .expe lling  the  N orth  Koreans f o r  South 
Korea. Truman r e i t e r a t e d  t h i s  p o in t  a t  a  p r e s s  conference , 
when he no ted  t h a t  the  d e c is io n  to  c r o s s  the  38th  p a r a l l e l  
would be made when i t  became n e c e s s a ry .^
^ I b id .
\ l l i s o n  to  Rusk, J u ly  13.1950, I b i d . . 373; Acheson 
to  Embassy in  Seoul, J u ly  14, 1950, I b i d . , 387; P u b lic  Pa­
p e rs  of the  P re s id e n ts ;  Harry S. Truman, 1950, 523.
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News th a t  the  P o l ic y  P lan n in g  S ta f f  was co n s id er in g  
the  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  i s s u in g  a s ta te m e n t  committing the 
United S ta te s  to  s to p p in g  a t  th e  ] 8 th  p a r a l l e l ,  moved John 
F o s te r  D u lles  to  e n te r  the d e b a te .  D u lle s  was t o t a l l y  op­
posed to  any such move. The 38t h  p a r a l l e l  was no t in tended  
as a  p o l i t i c a l  l i n e  and i t s  con tinued  e x is te n c e  would p e r ­
p e tu a te  f r i c t i o n  and th e  r i s k  of war in  the a r e a .  The 
United S ta te s  i f  p o s s ib le  ought " to  o b l i t e r a t e  the l i n e  as  
a  p o l i t i c a l  d iv i s io n  . . . i n  the  i n t e r e s t  o f  peace and se ­
c u r i t y  in  the a r e a . "  In  so do ing , the  North  Korean Army 
should be d es tro y ed , even i f  t h i s  r e q u i re d  c ro s s in g  the  38th  
p a r a l l e l .  No s ta tem en t  should be made ty in g  th e  hands of 
the United S ta te s  and the d e c is io n  to  c ro ss  the  p a r a l l e l  
should be made when p r a c t i c a l i t y  demanded i t ,  which could 
be months in  the  f u tu r e  under c ircum stan ces  t h a t  no one 
could p red ic t.-^
Some S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s  b e liev e d  th a t  
b reach ing  the 38th  p a r a l l e l  p re s e n te d  unaccep tab le  r i s k s .  
C harles  Bohlen, while n o t  a d d re s s in g  h im se lf  d i r e c t l y  to  
t h i s  q u e s t io n ,  did  warn a g a in s t  a c t io n s  t h a t  would p re s e n t  
the S o v ie t  Union w ith  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  e i t h e r  o f a llow ing  
U.S. power " to  come up to  the  S o v ie t  f r o n t i e r "  n ex t to  v i t a l  
p o r t s  and m i l i t a r y  f a c i l i t i e s  o r  of reoccupying  North Korea
^D ulles to  N i tz e ,  D i r e c to r  o f  the  P o l ic y  P lann ing  
S t a f f ,  J u ly  14, 1950, FR. 1950, V II, 386.
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w ith  Soviet fo rc e s  a s  U.N. tro o p s  approached the  38th  
p a r a l l e l . ^
Herbert F e is  of the  P o l ic y  P lanning  S t a f f  urged the 
United S ta te s  to  " p o s i t iv e ly  and p u b l ic ly  d i s a s s o c i a t e  i t ­
s e l f "  from any n o t io n  th a t  the North  Korean in v as io n  had 
o b l i t e r a t e d  the 38t h  p a r a l l e l .  To c ro s s  in to  N orth  Korean 
t e r r i t o r y  would a f f e c t  a d v e rse ly  the  a t t i t u d e  of our a l l i e s  
and would encourage Chinese o r  S ov ie t  in te r v e n t io n .  F e is
concluded th a t  the  S o v ie t  Union would no t a l lo w  s u b s ta n t ia l
7
U.S. armed fo r c e s  to  rea ch  the R ussian  f r o n t i e r .
The p re v a le n t  view of th e  P o l ic y  P lanning  S t a f f  op­
p o s ing  a  c ro s s in g  of the  38th  p a r a l l e l ,  brought A l l i s o n 's  
most f o r c e f u l  s ta tem en t of d i s s e n t .  A l l iso n  d isa g ree d  com­
p l e t e l y  with  a J u ly  5 P o l ic y  P lan n in g  S ta f f  study which 
recommended t h a t  MacArthur p u b l ic ly  announce t h a t  n e i t h e r  
U nited  N ations n o r  South Korean tro o p s  would c ro ss  the 
p a r a l l e l .  To do t h i s  would make i t  im possible  to  c a r r y  out 
the  June 26 U.N. r e s o l u t i o n .  P e rp e tu a t io n  of what was i n ­
tended to  be only  a tem porary d iv id in g  l in e  would in su re  
t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i t y  in  the a re a  would
o
n ev er  be r e s to r e d .
^Bohlen to  the  Deputy U nder-S ecre ta ry  of S ta te  
(Matthews), J u ly  7, 1950, I b i d . . 367.
^A llison  to  RuSk, J u ly  15, 1950, I b i d . . 393.
^ I b id . .  J u ly  15, 1950, l U d ' ,  394.
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According to  A l l i s o n ,  the m a jo r i ty  view in the N orth ­
e a s t  Asian A f f a i r s  D iv is io n  of the S ta te  Department and 
among r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of the Embassies of A m erica 's  a l l i e s ,  
was t h a t  a r e t u r n  to  the s t a t u s  quo ante  bellum would be un­
r e a l i s t i c .  A program of persuasion c a r r ie d  on through d ip ­
lom atic  channe ls ,  the U.S. Inform ation S e rv ice , and the 
Voice of America, could obv ia te  any o p p o s i t io n  t h a t  existed.^
A l l is o n  b e liev e d  the  minimum o b je c t iv e s  of the 
United S ta te s  should be to  make c le a r  t h a t  ag g re ss io n  would 
no t go unpunished, and th a t  the North Korean Army should be 
d es tro y ed . No s ta te m e n ts  to  the con tra ry  ought to  be made. 
A l l iso n  b e liev e d  t h a t  one reason  fo r  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
America faced in  Korea was th a t  the United S t a te s  had 
" f a i l e d  to  r e a l i z e  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e s  would be more com­
p e l l i n g  than m i l i t a r y  and hence did n o t  i n s i s t  upon our 
m i l i t a r y  e s ta b l is h m e n t  being  prepared to  implement the 
p o l i t i c a l  d e c is io n  we made when the t e s t  came." A ll iso n  
hoped th a t  America would r e a l i z e  th a t  " p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty  
w il l  compel us to  a c t  in  such a  way as to b r in g  about a 
r e a l  r e s t o r a t i o n  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i ty  in  
Korea . . . ."  A l l i s o n  adm itted  th a t  the  r i s k s  were g r e a t ,  
but i n  h i s  o p in ion , the r i s k s  o f accep ting  a p a r t i a l  so lu ­
t io n  or a compromise were " i n f i n i t e l y  g r e a t e r .
While the  debate  developed i n  S ta te  Department
9lb id .. 393. ^^Ib id ., 394-393.
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c i r c l e s ,  General MacArthur was inform ing the Defense D epart­
ment t h a t  he in tended  n o t  only to  d rive  the North Koreans 
back of the  38th  p a r a l l e l ,  but .a lso  to  d e s tro y  a l l  North 
Korean fo rc e s  and to  occupy a l l  of Korea i f  n e ce ssa ry .  
MacArthur' s  e v a lu a t io n  of the n e c e s s i ty  fo r  doing t h i s  un­
doubtedly c a r r ie d  g r e a t  weight in  Defense Department d i s ­
cu ss io n s ,  g iven the  t r a d i t i o n a l  unbending support f o r  the 
f i e l d  commander's o p in io n .
With these  d i f f e r i n g  op in ions sw ir l in g  about him, 
Truman req u e s te d  on J u ly  1? t h a t  the N a tio n a l  S e c u ri ty  
Council p repare  a  r e p o r t  on the  p o l ic y  t h a t  America should 
pursue a f t e r  N orth  Korean fo rc e s  had been d r iv e n  beyond the 
38th  p a r a l l e l .  On J u ly  22, George B u t le r  of the  P o l ic y  
P lann ing  S t a f f  produced the  l a t e s t  study on the  su b je c t .  
B u t le r  b e liev ed  t h a t  the  problem was t h a t  as  U.N. fo rc e s  ap­
proached th e  38t h  p a r a l l e l ,  d e c is io n s  and a c t io n s  of 
Washington and Moscow would determ ine whether the Korean 
h o s t i l i t i e s  would e s c a l a t e  in to  a  world war o r  would remain 
i s o l a t e d  to  Korea. The prim ary purpose of U.S. m i l i t a r y
a c t io n  in  Korea was the  c e s s a t io n  of h o s t i l i t i e s  and the
12withdrawal of N orth  Korean fo rc e s  from South Korea.
Memo, Colonel Dickson f o r  General B o l te ,  J u ly  15. 
1950, s u b j . :  Report o f  a Trip  to  the Far E a s te rn  Command,
J u ly  10-15. 1950, JCS Geographic F i l e .
^^em o by Lay to  the NSC, J u ly  17, 1950, FR.1950. 
V II, 410; D ra f t  Memo P repared  by B u t le r ,  Ju ly  22, 1950, 
I b i d . .  4 49 .
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As the  North Korean d e fe a t  became a p p a ren t ,  the  
Kremlin would be fo rced  to  decide  on a  new course  of a c t io n .  
In  the opin ion  of the  P o licy  P lanning  S t a f f ,  th e r e  was ample 
evidence of the  high s t r a t e g i c  importance the Kremlin p laced  
on the Korean p e n in s u la ,  and t h i s  made i t  ex trem ely  u n l ik e ly  
t h a t  R ussia  would accep t the e s tab l ish m en t in  N orth  Korea of 
a  regime th a t  i t  could n o t  dominate and c o n t r o l .  The P o l ic y  
P lann ing  S ta f f  b e lieved  th a t  once i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  North 
Korean ag g re ss io n  was going to  be d e fe a te d ,  th e re  might be a 
S ov ie t-N orth  Korean agreement "which would mean in  substance  
th a t  U.N. m i l i t a r y  a c t io n  n o r th  of the 38th  p a r a l l e l  would 
r e s u l t  i n  c o n f l i c t  w ith  the USSR or Communist China.
F u r th e r  compounding the  problem was the  l ik e l ih o o d  
t h a t  m a jo r i ty  su pp o rt  could  n o t  be gained in  the  United  
N a tio ns  fo r  con tinued  U.N. m i l i t a r y  a c t io n  to  impose a s e t ­
tlem en t invo lv ing  a u n i f i e d  Korea. Opinion in  South Korea, 
a s  w ell a s  p u b l ic  and Congres s io n  op in ion  in  America, how­
e v e r ,  p robably  would be d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith  "any co n c lu s io n  
f a l l i n g  s h o r t  o f  what i t  would c o n s id e r  a ' f i n a l *  s e t t le m e n t  
o f  the problem. A sen tim ent to  con tinue  o p e ra t io n s  beyond 
the  38th  p a r a l l e l  might c re a te  se r io u s  problems f o r  the
• 1 it
execu tio n  of U.S. p o l ic y ."
^ ^B u tle r  Memo, J u ly  22,1950, I b i d . .  450-451.
^ ^ I b i d . . 452.
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The P o l ic y  P lan n in g  S ta f f  reached s e v e ra l  co nc lu ­
s io n s . F i r s t ,  t h a t  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n  n o r th  of the  38th 
p a r a l l e l  f o r  rea so n s  o th e r  than t a c t i c a l  n e c e s s i t y  would 
in crease  the  danger of Sovie t o r  Chinese i n te r v e n t io n  
g r e a t ly .  Second, from the  view point o f U.S. m i l i t a r y  com­
mitments and re s o u rc e s ,  the United S ta te s  should r e s t r i c t  
ground o p e ra t io n s  to  sou th  of th e  38t h  p a r a l l e l  in  o rd e r  to 
end h o s t i l i t i e s  and to  work f o r  a  s i t u a t i o n  r e q u i r in g  a  min­
imal commitment o f  U.S. re so u rce s  in  South Korea. Third , 
U.N. a c t io n  n o r th  of th e  38th  p a r a l l e l  would re q u ire  a new 
S ecu ri ty  Council r e s o l u t i o n ,  which might be d i f f i c u l t  to  
o b ta in .  F o u r th , the r i s k s  of b r in g in g  major c o n f l i c t  with 
Russia  o r  China outweighed the p o l i t i c a l  advantages to  be 
gained from m i l i t a r y  a c t io n s  n o r th  of the  38t h  p a r a l l e l .
Thus i t  was recommended th a t  the United S ta te s  make c l e a r  • 
to  the world t h a t  i t  in tended  only  to  r e p e l  a g g re ss io n  and 
end the h o s t i l i t i e s  in  Korea. Withdrawal of N orth  Korean 
fo rc e s  to  n o r th  o f  the  38t h  p a r a l l e l  would be r e q u ire d  and 
fu tu re  measures i n  regaxd to  Korea would be l e f t  to  the  
d i s c r e t io n  of the U nited  N ations .
A l l i s o n  em p h a tic a l ly  d is s e n te d  from the  philosophy 
and co n c lu s io n s  of B u t l e r ' s  s tudy , because i t  d id  l i t t l e  
more than inform the  a g g re sso r  t h a t  a l l  he had to  f e a r  from 
aggress ion  was being  compelled to  s t a r t  over ag a in .  A ll iso n
^^Ib id ..  453.
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s t a te d  t h a t  B u t le r  had g iven  only cu rso ry  a t t e n t i o n  to  the  
f e e l in g s  of twenty m il l io n  South Koreans who were the ob­
j e c t  of North Korean a g g re s s io n .
While the paper  was c o r r e c t  in  n o t in g  K o re a 's  s t r a ­
te g ic  importance to  R u ss ia ,  A l l i s o n  be liev ed  i t  f a i l e d  to  
p o in t  out t h a t  the  rea so n  f o r  K o re a 's  importance was th a t  
u l t im a te ly  i t  would make i t  e a s i e r  to  conquer Japan . No­
th in g  in  the paper acknowledged the  s t r a t e g ic  importance 
of a  Korean regime h o s t i l e  to  Japan . To A l l is o n ,  t h i s  paper 
seemed both  to  recommend appeasement and to  advocate a 
" t im id ,  h a l f -h e a r te d  p o l ic y  designed  n o t  to  provoke the 
S o v ie ts  to  war." No advantage could be gained by compro­
m is ing  "w ith  c l e a r  moral p r i n c i p l e s  and a  s h i rk in g  of our 
du ty  to  make c l e a r  once and f o r  a l l  t h a t  ag g re ss io n  does 
n o t  pay . . .
A l l is o n  recommended t h a t  the  United S ta te s  adopt a 
p o l ic y  designed to  e l im in a te  the  North Korean Army, to  imp­
lem ent p rev iou s  U.N. r e s o l u t i o n s  c a l l i n g  f o r  an independent, 
u n i f ie d  Korea, and to  m a in ta in  o rd e r  in  Korea u n t i l  she 
could  provide f o r  h e r  own s e c u r i t y .  This was the  minimum 
p o l ic y  a c c e p ta b le ,  f o r  A l l i s o n  b e liev e d  t h a t  th e  is su e  
c l e a r l y  was whether "we should decide to  stand up to what
^^Allison to Nitze, July 24, 1950, Ibid . .  458-459.
l?Ib id .. 460.
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our P re s id e n t  has c a l le d  'raw  ag g ress ion ' , o r  we should ad­
mit t h a t  S o v ie t  Communism has won and be prepared  to take
18the consequences."
A l l i s o n 's  comments and R u sk 's  support o f  them ap­
p a re n t ly  c a r r i e d  w eight, a s  on J u ly  25, B u t le r  d ra f te d  a new 
p o s i t io n  p ap e r  in  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  P h i l ip  Je ssu p , Max 
Bishop, the S ta te  Department re p re se n ta t iv e  on the N ationa l 
S e c u ri ty  C ouncil ,  and r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of the F ar  E a s te rn  and 
U.N. D iv is io n s  of the S ta te  Department. T his p aper  con­
cluded th a t  w hile  U.S. p o l ic y  was aimed toward e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of an independent, u n i f ie d  Korea, th e re  was no commit­
ment to  accomplish t h i s  through m il i ta ry  fo rc e .  Korea had 
to be d e a l t  w ith  w ith in  the wider framework of the Cold War 
s t r u g g le . In  o rd e r  to  m ain ta in  a r e a l i s t i c  balance between 
U.S. m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g th  and U.S. commitments and r i s k s ,  to -  . 
g e th e r  w ith  the  need fo r  a d d i t io n a l  inform ation , i t  was im­
p o ss ib le  a t  th e  p r e s e n t  time to  make decis ions reg a rd in g  
Am erica's f u tu r e  course of a c t io n  in  Korea. A f l e x i b l e ,  un­
f e t t e r e d  p o l ic y  would b e s t  serve  n a tiona l  s e c u r i ty  and 
n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  The b a s ic  recommendation was t h a t  de­
c is io n s  concern ing  the  course o f a c t io n  t o  be fo llow ed when 
U.N. fo rc e s  reached the  38th  p a r a l l e l  "should be d e fe r re d  
u n t i l  m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  developments provide a d d i t io n a l  
in fo rm a tio n ."  T his would enable  the  United S ta te s  to  reach
l ^ i b i d . .  4 6 1 .
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a d e c is io n  based on the  e x i s t i n g  world s i t u a t i o n ,  would a l ­
low f o r  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  U.N. members supporting  the  Se­
c u r i t y  Council r e s o lu t io n ,  and.would keep U.S. m i l i t a r y  
c a p a b i l i t i e s  and commitments in  a  safe  ba lance .
A l l is o n ,  whom Rusk had designa ted  "as  the r e s p o n s i ­
b le  o f f i c e r  to  a c t  as  s t e e r in g  member fo r  the S ta te  D ep ar t­
ment’ s s tu d ie s  on f u tu re  U.S. p o l ic y  with r e s p e c t  to  N orth  
K orea,"  g e n e ra l ly  approved the  new study though the co n c lu ­
s io n s  and recommendations d id  n o t  go as f a r  as he p e rs o n a l ly  
would have l i k e d .  While he went along w ith  the p re s e n t
20s tudy , A l l i s o n  s t r e s s e d  the  need f o r  continued s tu d ie s .
The P o l ic y  P lann in g  S ta f f  paper of J u ly  25 came up 
f o r  d is c u s s io n  a t  a  r e g u l a r ly  scheduled S ta te  Department 
m eeting which U nd er-S ecre ta ry  of S ta te  Webb c h a ired .  Those 
p re s e n t  agreed to  the  recommendation to  put o f f  any d e c is io n  
concern ing  c ro s s in g  the  38 th  p a r a l l e l .  I t  a ls o  was agreed 
t h a t  the  N orth  Koreans "should  n o t  be l e f t  in  e x a c t ly  the 
same p o s i t io n  they  were be fo re  they  s t a r t e d . "  R ep resen ta ­
t i v e s  of the  S ta te  D epartm ent’ s U.N. D iv is io n  agreed t h a t  
U.N. support o f a  move a c ro s s  the  p a r a l l e l  was p o s s ib le .
A ll  o f those  p re s e n t  agreed t h a t  the  p o l ic y  j u s t  adopted 
would make i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  conduct an e f f e c t iv e  p u b l ic  cam­
paign  of p e rsu a s io n .  F in a l ly ,  the S ta te  Department
^^D ra ft  Memo by PPS, Ju ly  25» 1950, to  be Forwarded 
to  NSC S ta f f  f o r  A ppropria te  P ro cess in g , I b i d . . 4?2.
^*^Allison to  Rusk, J u ly  27, 1950, I b i d . . 480-481.
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o f f i c i a l s  agreed t h a t  while U.S. p u b lic  and C ongressiona l
opin ion  would no t be s a t i s f i e d  with the s t a tu s  quo an te
bellum , i t  a ls o  was u n l ik e ly  they  would support e l im in a t io n
21of the 38th  p a r a l l e l  a s  a U.S. war o b je c t iv e .
At the  end of J u ly  1950, the o p p o s i t io n  of A l l is o n  
and Rusk had m odified , i f  only p a r t i a l l y ,  the  g e n e ra l  ten o r  
of o p posit ion  in  the S ta te  Department to  c ro s s in g  the  38th  
p a r a l l e l ,  as  expressed  in  e a r l i e r  P o l ic y  P lann ing  S t a f f  p a ­
p e r s .  In s te a d  of an o u t r ig h t  commitment to  e i t h e r  c ro s s in g  
or n o t  c ro s s in g  the p a r a l l e l ,  a  "w ait  and see" a t t i t u d e ,  
which was in tended  to  be f l e x i b l e  and o p p o r t u n i t i s t i c  
was adopted. Caution remained the  byword even among those  
who favored c ro s s in g  the  p a r a l l e l .  John F o s te r  D u l le s ,  f o r  
example, b e liev ed  th e re  was every  reason  f o r  c ro s s in g  the 
38th  p a r a l l e l  except one, "and. t h a t  i s  our c a p a c i ty  to  do 
so and the  f a c t  th a t  the  a ttem pt might involve  us more
deeply  in  a s t ru g g le  on the A s ia t ic  mainland with S o v ie t
22and Chinese Communist manpower . . . ."
While the  S ta te  Department c a u t io u s ly  s h i f t e d  i t s  
p o l ic y  views, the Defense Department was p re p a r in g  i t s  
e s t im a te s  o f p o ss ib le  U.S. co u rses  o f  a c t io n  in  Korea. In  
the  Defense D epartm en t 's  op in ion  the p re s e n t  m i l i t a r y
^^Memo fo r  the F i l e s  o f  a  Meeting Held in  th e  O ffice  
o f U nder-Secre tary  of S t a t e , J u l y  28, 1950, I b i d . . 486. For 
a  rev ised  d r a f t ,  see B u t le r  to  Bishop, August 1, 1950,
I b i d . .  514-316.
^ ^ u l l e s  to  N itz e ,  August 1, 1950, I b i d . .  514.
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o b je c t iv e  o f  the U nited  S ta te s  was to  d e fe a t  N orth  Korean 
fo rc e s  and to  r e s to re  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i t y  to  
th e  a re a .  In  accom plishing t h i s ,  n o th ing  in  th e  S e c u r i ty  
Council r e s o lu t io n s  l im i te d  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n s  to  sou th  of the 
38th  p a r a l l e l .  The m i l i t a r y  b e l ie v e d  ,th a t  the  38th  p a r a l l e l  
had no more s ig n i f ic a n c e  than  any o th e r  m erid ian . The p r i n ­
c ip le  d e te r r e n t  to  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n  n o r th  of the  p a r a l l e l  was
23th e  chance of major Chinese o r  S o v ie t  in te r v e n t io n .  ^
The Defense Department saw th re e  p o s s ib le  cou rses  
o f  a c t io n  which would be in  consonance with the  U.N. r e s o lu ­
t i o n s  of June 25 and June 2?. F i r s t ,  the minimum e f f o r t  
would be to  d rive  the North  Koreans back of the  38t h  p a r a l ­
l e l —t h a t  i s ,  put the U nited  N a tio n s  back where i t  stood on 
June 24. A r e tu rn  to  the  s t a tu s  quo ante bellum would n o t  
in su re  s e c u r i ty  n o r  would i t  p ro v id e  f o r  the u n i f i c a t i o n  
which a l l  Koreans d e s p e ra te ly  d e s i r e d .  But t h i s  a c t io n  
would make l e s s  l i k e l y  any m i l i t a r y  a c t io n  on the  p a r t  of
the  S ov ie ts  or Chinese and might le a d  to  a n e g o t ia te d  
24se t t le m e n t .
A second a l t e r n a t i v e  o b je c t iv e  would have MacArthur 
occupy Pyongyang and v i c i n i t y ,  g e n e ra l ly  a long the  3 9 th -4 0 th  
p a r a l l e l  l i n e s .  An occupied d e m i l i t a r i z e d  zone could be 
s e t  up in  dep th  along the  Chinese and Sov ie t f r o n t i e r s .
^^D raft Memo by Department o f Defense, For NSC S ta f f  
C o n s id e ra t io n  Only, August 7, 1950, I b i d . . 528- 529 .
^^ Ibid. .  529.
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thus  a l l a y in g  t h e i r  su s p ic io n s .  Korea, however, would s t i l l  
n o t  be u n i te d  and the s e c u r i ty  problem would be a s  g r e a t  
i f  no t g r e a t e r  than e v e r .  The f i n a l  a l t e r n a t iv e  was p a c i ­
f i c a t i o n  and occupation  of a l l  Korea.
The Defense Department based i t s  choice  of an ap­
p r o p r ia te  course  of a c t io n  in  Korea on twin assum ptions. 
F i r s t ,  t h a t  the United S ta te s  would m obilize  and employ s u f ­
f i c i e n t  re so u rc e s  to  rea ch  i t s  Korean o b je c t iv e s ,  while 
b u i ld in g  i t s  s t r e n g th  f o r  ex ec u tio n  of emergency war p la n s .
A second assumption was th a t  the  S o v ie ts  o r Chinese would
n o t  e n te r  o v e r t ly  in to  the h o s t i l i t i e s  in  Korea o r i n i t i a t e  
26a  g e n e ra l  war.
According to  the  Defense Department, the  Korean s i t ­
u a t io n  p rov ided  the United S ta te s  and the f r e e  world w ith  
i t s  f i r s t  chance to  r e g a in  t e r r i t o r y  from the Sovie t b lo c .  
T his  would be in  keep ing  w ith the  American p o l ic y  of 
checking and r o l l i n g  back the p reponderan t power of R uss ia  
in  A sia  and elsew here , a s  s t a t e d  i n  NSC 48 /2 . P e n e t r a t io n  
o f the S o v ie t  sphere "would d i s t u r b  the p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, 
and m i l i t a r y  s t r u c tu r e  which th e  U.S.S.R. i s  o rg an iz in g  . . . 
The bonds of Manchuria, p iv o t  o f  t h i s  complex o u ts ide  the 
U .S.S.R. would be weakened." I n  A s ia ,  the  e f f e c t s  of U.N. 
u n i f i c a t i o n  of Korea would be i n c a lc u la b le .  The Japanese 
would be encouraged and Communist China might be in c l in e d  to
^^Ibid.. 529-530. ^^Ibid.. 530.
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q u es t io n  i t s  dependence on Moscow. A ll  of A s ia  would 
27take hope.
A ll o f these  advantages fo r  the  free  world, of 
course , were d isad v an tag es  f o r  R ussia , and th u s  i t  was 
probable t h a t  the  Kremlin would t r y  to  p reven t the  t o t a l  
l o s s  o f  Korea. At any time the Sovie t Union could  launch 
a v igo rous  m edia tion  a t tem p t,  o r  could deploy Russian or 
Chinese fo rc e s  to  ho ld  N orth Korea. But the r e a l  p o s s i ­
b i l i t y  remained t h a t  R ussia  would no t jeopa rd ize  " i t s  un­
completed s t r a t e g ic  arrangem ents in  th e  Far E a s t  to  r i s k  a 
g enera l  war to  p re v e n t  a f u l l - f l e d g e d ,  rap id , ' and determined 
U.N. e f f o r t  to  u n i te  Korea.
The Defense Department concluded th a t  the  p o l i t i c a l  
value t o  the United S ta te s  o f e s t a b l i s h in g  a f r e e ,  u n i te d  
Korea j u s t i f i e d  the c u r r e n t  m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t .  This e f f o r t  
should be d i r e c te d  toward e s ta b l ish m e n t  o f a u n i te d  Korea as  
envisaged in  the  U.N. r e s o lu t i o n s  of November, 19^7 and 
October, 1949. The P r e s id e n t ,  a t  an a p p ro p r ia te  tim e, 
should announce t h a t  A m erica 's  aim was a u n i te d ,  f r e e ,  i n ­
dependent Korea; U.N. acceptance of t h i s  o b je c t iv e  ought to  
be g a ined . The m i l i t a r y  should occupy a l l  of Korea and d e ­
f e a t  N orth  Korean fo r c e s  w ithou t regard  to  the  38th p a r a l l e l .  
U n ti l  the  m i l i t a r y  was p repared  to c a r ry  out t h i s  a c t io n ,  
no s ta tem en ts  about g e n e ra l  o b je c t iv e s  should be made—
2?Ibid. .  533- 2^Ib id .
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"Great cau t io n  and d i s c r e t io n  should be taken  in  p u b l ic  d i s ­
cuss ion  of the 38th  p a r a l l e l . "  F in a l ly ,  the United S ta te s  
should f o r e s t a l l  any Sov ie t m ediation  e f f o r t s  t h a t  f a l l  
sh o r t  of complète u n i f i c a t i o n  of Korea on a  f r e e  and re p ­
r e s e n ta t iv e  b a s is  under U.N. d i r e c t io n .
In  e a r ly  August, 1950» the S ta te  Department and the 
Defense Department had d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t io n s  on c ro s s in g  the 
38t h  p a r a l l e l .  The S ta te  Department, a rgu ing  on m i l i t a r y  
grounds, fea red  the S ov ie t Union would not t o l e r a t e  the 
damage to  i t s  Far  E a s te rn  p o s i t io n  which would r e s u l t  from 
a c ro s s in g  the  38th  p a r a l l e l ,  and wanted the  d e c i s io n  put 
o f f  a s  long as  p o s s ib le .  The Defense Department, a rgu ing  
on p o l i t i c a l  grounds, favored a  p o l ic y  d i r e c te d  to  the  c r e ­
a t io n  of a  f r e e ,  u n i f ie d  and independent K orea. These d i f ­
f e r e n t  a t t i t u d e s  could be seen a lso  in  o p in io n s  concern ing  • 
m i l i t a r y  t a c t i c s —s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the August 12 bombing of 
Rashin and the  August 14 bombing of N a i j in ,  bo th  about 17 
m iles  sou th  of the Manchurian border.
On August 12, B-29S d e l iv e re d  550 to n s  of bombs on 
Rashin . Deputy U nder-S ecre ta ry  of S ta te  Freeman Matthews 
informed L t .  General L a u r is  N orstad , A cting  V ice-C hief of 
S t a f f ,  U.S. A ir Force, th a t  t h i s  a c t io n  was ve ry  d i s tu r b in g .  
The R ussians were touchy about m i l i t a r y  m iss ions  n e a r  t h e i r  
f r o n t i e r s .  Most im portan t,  Matthews f e l t  t h i s  a c t io n  d id
^ ^ I b i d . .  534 - 535 .
- 225 -
n o t  comply w ith  M acArthur's June 29 d i r e c t iv e  to  s ta y  "well 
c le a r "  of the Manchurian and S ib e r ia n  b o r d e r s . O n  
August 16, a f t e r  the N a i j in  bombing, U nder-Secre ta ry  of 
S ta te  Webb informed S e c re ta ry  of Defense Louis Johnson th a t  
extreme concern e x is te d  in  the S ta te  Department as a r e s u l t  
of the r e c e n t  bombings, which, he f e l t ,  d id  n o t  comply with 
the  d i r e c t iv e  s e n t  to  MacArthur.
Johnson r e p l ie d  th a t  the  bombings were well w i th in  
the  terms of th e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  d i r e c t i v e .  The S e c re ta ry  be­
l ie v e d  th a t  when war o p e ra t io n s  were undertaken , " they  must 
be conducted to  win." He in te r p r e te d  the nebulous e x p re s ­
s io n  "well c le a r "  to  mean t h a t  U.S. p lan es  must no t v io la t e  
Sovie t f r o n t i e r s ,  which they  had n o t  done.^^ Jo h n so n 's  
views were n o t  rec e iv e d  w ell in  the S ta te  Department. Webb 
be lieved  the  l e t t e r  should no t be answered, as co n tin u in g  
the d isc u ss io n  would serve no u se fu l  purpose. The Defense 
D epartm ent 's  l e t t e r ,  Webb f e l t ,  "showed a  lack  of u nder­
s tand ing  o f  the  im portan t is su e  involved and a lack  of 
w i l l in g n e ss  to  i n te g r a te  m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  p o l i c i e s . "  
He recommended to  Acheson th a t  the S ta te  Department do no­
th in g  t h a t  "could be i n te r p r e t e d  as in te r f e r e n c e  in  the  
conduct o f m i l i t a r y  o p e ra t io n s .
^^Memo by Matthews, August 12,1950, I b i d . . 5 6 6 .
^^Webb to  Johnson, August 12, 1950, I b i d . , 588- 589.
32Johnson to-Acheson, August 21 ,1950 ,I b i d . , 613-14.
^^ I b id . , Footnote 1, 6 l4 .
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The S ta te  D epartm en t 's  f e a r s ,  as r e f l e c t e d  in  t h i s  
exchange, were echoed to  a degree  in  an August 18 CIA e s t i ­
mate e n t i t l e d  "F a c to rs  A f fe c t in g  the  D e s i r a b i l i t y  of a  U.N. 
M i l i t a ry  Conquest of A ll  o f K orea."  The CIA s ta te d  i t s  con­
c lu s io n s  f i r s t —t h a t  a l th o u g h  a U.S. in v as io n  of North Korea 
could b r in g  se v e ra l  im p o r tan t  advantages, grave r i s k s  would 
be involved in  such a  c o u rs e .  The m i l i t a r y  success of such 
an o p e ra t io n  could n o t  be a ssu re d  because co o p era tio n  of 
non-Communist U.N. members was n o t  g u a ran teed . There was a  
grave r i s k  of g en e ra l  war should U.N. fo rc e s  become involved
•3/j,
i n  h o s t i l i t i e s  w ith  S o v ie t  o r  Chinese t ro o p s .
The advantages o f a  move a c ro ss  the p a r a l l e l  f o r  
u n i f i c a t i o n  were the  ones u s u a l ly  mentioned— i t  would be a 
major d ip lom atic  d e fe a t  f o r  R u ss ia  and a d e c is iv e ,  i n s p i r in g  
v ic to ry  f o r  the West. The p r e s t i g e  of the  U nited  N ations 
and the United S ta te s  would be in c re a sed  g r e a t ly ,  and the  
s ta te d  p o l ic y  of bo th  would be ach ieved . F in a l ly ,  a  p o ten ­
t i a l  t h r e a t  to  Japan would be removed and a wedge in to  Com­
munist t e r r i t o r y  would be e s tab l ish ed .^ -^
There were, however, grave r i s k s .  The U nited  S ta te s  
might n o t  be ab le  to  g a in  th e  support of i t s  a l l i e s  and 
o th e r  non-Communist n a t io n s  f o r  such an a c t io n  s ince  they  
had no d e s i r e  to  become more deeply  involved  in  Korea.
^ \e m o  P repared  by th e  CIA,August 18,1950, I b i d . . 600. 
3^Ibid. ,  601.
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Thus, any U.S. a c t io n  would g ive  the  S ov ie t  Union a weapon 
to  se p a ra te  the United S ta te s  from i t s  Western European a l ­
l i e s .  Invas ion  a lso  would a larm  a  number of h a b i tu a l ly  
d i s t r u s t f u l  Asian n a t io n s  and perhaps c re a te  an image of 
an a g g re s s iv e , s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  America.-^
The r i s k  th a t  invad ing  fo rc e s  might become involved 
w ith  Chinese tro o p s  was e q u a l ly  grave . The Sov ie t Union 
would welcome a c o n f l i c t  between the  United  S ta te s  and 
China, s in ce  the  United  S t a te s  would be t i e d  down in  A sia  
and d is s e n s io n  would be c re a te d  among A m erica 's  a l l i e s .  The 
CIA b e liev e d  "the U.S.S.R. might use Chinese Communist 
tro o p s  a t  any s tage  in  the  f i g h t i n g  . . . ." Of co u rse , 
involvement w ith  S ov ie t  f o r c e s  a ls o  was a  p o s s i b i l i t y .
Since the  in vas ion  of N orth  Korea would be a s t r a t e g i c  
t h r e a t  to  R ussia , the S ov ie t  Union, in  a  h igh s t a t e  of m i l i ­
t a r y  r e a d in e s s ,  might decide  t h a t  now was the time fo r  a 
f u l l - f l e d g e d  t e s t  of s t r e n g th .
The f i n a l  r i s k  involved  w ith  in v as io n  was t h a t  t ru e  
u n i f i c a t i o n  and s t a b i l i t y  could never be a t t a in e d .  The 
S ov ie t Union undoubtedly would withdraw North Korean fo rc e s  
in to  Manchuria, and from th e re  use them to  th r e a te n  and i n ­
f i l t r a t e ,  an a c t io n  t h a t  would re q u i re  th e  con tinued  p r e ­
sence of U.S. t ro o p s .  R hee 's  la c k  of p o p u la r i ty  and h i s  
q u e s t io n a b le  a b i l i t y  to  ex tend h i s  a u th o r i ty  to  a l l  of
^^ Ib id . 3f lb id .,  602.
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Korea, i f  done on a  po pu lar  b a s is ,  added to  the problem.
In  a memorandum f o r  Dean Acheson w r i t te n  sh o r t ly  be­
fo re  he l e f t  the S ta te  Department, George Kennan g e n e ra l ly  
expressed some of the same f e a r s  mentioned in  th e  CIA e s t i ­
mate. Kennan be lieved  t h a t  the  United S ta te s  was on a  
course "so l i t t l e  prom ising and so f r a u g h t  w ith  danger th a t  
I  could not h o n e s t ly  urge you to  continue to  take  re s p o n s i ­
b i l i t y  f o r  i t . "  The U nited  S ta te s  had n o t  achieved a c le a r ,  
r e a l i s t i c ,  and g e n e ra l ly  accepted view of American o b jec ­
t i v e s  in  Korea. C e rta in  s e c to r s  of American p u b lic  and o f ­
f i c i a l  op in ion  were engaged in  "em otional m o r a l i s t ic  a t t i ­
tudes toward Korea" which could lead  e a s i l y  to  r e a l  con­
f l i c t  w ith  the  Sov ie t Union, th us  p re v e n t in g  a r e a l i s t i c  
agreement about the  a re a .  MacArthur’ s r e t e n t i o n  of a "wide 
and r e l a t i v e l y  u n c o n tro l le d  l a t i t u d e  in  de term in ing  our 
p o l ic y  in  n o r th  A sia  and Western P a c i f i c  a re a s  . . . , "  was 
e q u a lly  dangerous. Washington d id  n o t  have r e a l  c o n tro l  
over MacArthur, le a d in g  to  s ta tem en ts  be ing  made and a c t io n s  
being taken  in  W ashington 's name, w ithou t p r i o r  approval. 
F in a l ly ,  the  United S ta te s  in  Indochina was g e t t in g  in to  a 
p o s i t io n  to  guaran tee  a French undertak ing  "which n e i th e r  
they no r we, no r  both of us to g e th e r ,  can w in ."^^
In  Kennan’s op in ion , the o b je c t iv e  o f  U.S. p o l ic y
3Glbid.
3 0
■^ M^emo by Kennan to  Ache son, August 21, 1950,
Ib id ..  623- 624.
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should be to  " te rm ina te  our involvem ents on the  mainland of 
A sia  a s  ra p id ly  a s  p o s s ib le  and on the  b e s t  terms we can 
g e t . "  This e s p e c ia l ly  was v i t a l  in  Korea, because i t  was 
"beyond our c a p a b i l i t i e s  to  keep Korea perm anently  out of 
the  Soviet o r b i t . "  The United S ta te s  could t o l e r a t e  a nomi­
n a l l y  independent Korea amenable to  S o v ie t  in f lu e n c e ,  i f  a 
s t ro n g  and s ta b le  Japan e x is te d  to  coun te rba lance  the  s i t u a ­
t i o n .  While supporting  the  U.S. d e c i s io n  to  in te rvene  in  
l i g h t  of the  type of a g g re ss io n  the  S o v ie ts  employed, Kennan 
s t i l l  be lieved  i t  was no t e s s e n t i a l  f o r  an a n t i - S o v ie t  r e ­
gime to  be extended to  a l l  of Korea f o r  a l l  time
Kennan concluded t h a t  U.S. p o l ic y  should c o n s i s t  of; 
a  w i l l in g n e s s  to  a b s ta in  from a  d e c is io n  to  se a t  Communist 
China in  the  United N a tion s ;  adoption  of a m i l i t a r y  p o l ic y  
of r e a d in e s s :  a  d e te rm in a tio n  to  s t re n g th e n  and equip Japan 
to  take  care  of i t s e l f ;  and an approach to  the  Formosa ques­
t i o n  based on a  U.N. p l e b i s c i t e .  Kennan knew, however, th a t  
a ttem p ts  to  proceed along th ese  l i n e s  would meet " v io le n t  
and outraged o p p o s i t io n  both  w ith in  s e c to r s  of the  Executive 
branch and in  Congress." D espite  t h i s ,  th e re  was a problem 
of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  involved t h a t  demended a t t e n t i o n .
Kennan's memorandum d id  no t have widespread i n f l u ­
ence because Acheson ordered  t h a t  i t  n o t  be c i r c u la t e d  w ith ­
in  the  S ta te  Department. I t  i s  u n l ik e ly  t h a t  i t  would have
^^Ib id . , 625- 626. ^^Ib id . .  627- 628.
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had much e f f e c t  s ince  the momentum in  th in k in g  had s h i f t e d  
s l i g h t ly  in  the opposite  d i r e c t i o n ,  a s .a n  August 24 N a tiona l  
S ecu rity  Council S ta f f  A s s i s t a n t s  m eeting dem onstra ted. At 
t h i s  meeting, o b je c t io n s  were expressed  to  the S ta te  D epart­
m en t 's  in con c lu s iv e  "w ait and see" a t t i t u d e  about the 38th  
p a r a l l e l .  The S ta te -D efense  d i f f e r e n c e s  could be re c o n c i le d  
i f  the  S ta te  Department could  b r in g  i t s e l f  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  
now in  making the  e s s e n t i a l  d e c is io n .  Delays meant p o s t ­
ponement of the n ecessa ry  m i l i t a r y  b u ild -u p  should the de-
42c is io n  be made to  c ro ss  th e  38th  p a r a l l e l .
While a d e c is io n  was e s s e n t i a l ,  th e  confe rees  d id  
n o t  have a  f irm  view of what t h a t  d e c is io n  should be. The 
consensus was t h a t  ground o p e ra t io n s  n o r th  of the  38th  
p a r a l l e l ,  a f t e r  N orth  Korean w ithdraw al, probably  would lead  
to  d i r e c t  involvement of S o v ie t  o r  Chinese fo rc e s  in  the  
h o s t i l i t i e s .  An im portan t q u e s t io n  then  was whether th e re  
was some in te rm e d ia te  l i n e  n o r th  of the 38t h  p a r a l l e l ,  but 
w ell sh o r t  of th e  Manchurian and S ib e r ia n  b o rd ers ,  which the 
United N ations could hold w ithou t provoking a Sov ie t o r 
Chinese respon se . The th in k in g  was t h a t  such a  l in e  would 
be l e s s  p ro v o ca t iv e .  Those p re s e n t  agreed t h a t  the Sen io r 
S ta f f  of the  N a tio n a l  S e c u r i ty  Council should decide whether 
a l l  of Korea would be occupied and whether North Korean
^ ^ o o tn o te  1, I b i d . . 623; Memo by McConaughy to  
Jessup , August 24, 1950, I b i d . . 641-642.
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4 3fo rc e s  should be e l im in a te d  wherever lo c a te d .
The Senior S t a f f  met on August-25, 1950, to  c o n s id e r  
the  q u e s t io n s  r a i s e d .  S e c re ta ry  Thomas K. F in ie t t e r  of the 
A ir  F o rc e , f e l t  the  group should adopt the  p o s i t io n  th a t  
there  was no d i f f e re n c e  between a i r ,  sea ,  and ground opera­
t io n s  n o r th  of the p a r a l l e l .  P h i l i p  Je ssu p  added the  cav ea t  
th a t  such o p e ra t io n s  should s ta y  well c l e a r  of the  S o v ie t  
or Chinese b o rders .  O p e ra tio n s  in  the a re a  between the 
38 th -39 th  p a r a l l e l s  would be p e rm is s ib le ,  though c o n s u l ta ­
t io n  w ith  the United N a tio n s  would be n e ce ssa ry  befo re  p ro ­
ceeding . I f  U.N. t ro o p s  were in  h o t p u r s u i t  o f  enemy 
fo rc e s  when the p a r a l l e l  was reached , they  should proceed 
while m inim izing U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and maximizing t h a t  of 
South Korean fo rc e s .  While n o t  seek ing  a  f irm  r e s t r i c t i o n  
on use of U.S. t ro o p s  above the  p a r a l l e l ,  the  need to  mini-, 
mize t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was deemed d e s i r a b le  a s  any conno­
t a t i o n  of a  U.S. occupa tion  of Korea was to  be avoided.
The co n fe ree s  a l l  agreed th a t  the Korean War should 
n o t  be p e rm itted  to  e s c a l a t e  in to  a  genera l  war. I f  China 
e n te red ,  NSC 73/4 would gu ide  p o l ic y —t h a t  i s ,  no g en era l  
war w ith  China, bu t  the  a c t io n  in  Korea would be continued 
as long  a s  the re  was a  rea so n a b le  chance of success . I f  
the S o v ie t  Union in te rv e n e d ,  the  United S ta te s  should go to
^^ I b i d . .  642-643.
44Memo by McConaughy of J e s s u p * s 'S t a f f ,  August 25, 
1950, I b i d . .  649-650.
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the United N a tions . In  no case  would America become f u r t h e r  
involved i f  Sovie t fo rc e s  reoccuppied  North Korea p r i o r  to  
U.N. fo rc e s  reach in g  the  ] 8 th  p a r a l l e l .  I f  e i t h e r  Chinese 
o r  S o v ie t  t ro o p s  e n te re d  the  c o n f l i c t  unannounced, they 
were to  be t r e a te d  as North  Korean tro o p s .
The genera l  p r i n c i p l e s  agreed to  were t h a t  the U.N. 
o f fe n s iv e  should no t be stopped suddenly a t  the 38th  p a r a l ­
l e l ;  t h a t  S ov ie t  o r  Chinese in te r v e n t io n  should be r e f e r r e d  
to  the United Nations? and f i n a l l y ,  in  case of "com plica­
t io n s"  r e q u i r in g  U.N. a c t io n ,  "defend, lo c a l i z e  and s t a b i  
l i z e "  u n t i l  Washington and i t s  a l l i e s  could be c o n su l te d .
With a l l  of the  d i s c u s s io n  th a t  had occurred  s ince  
A l l i s o n 's  f i r s t  memorandum of J u ly  1, i t  might be thought 
th a t  some consensus would have been reached . The NSC Sen io r 
S ta f f  m eeting seemed to  in d ic a te  t h a t  the  N a tio na l  S e c u r i ty  
Council p o l ic y  d e c is io n  t h a t  Truman had requested  would be 
one fa v o r in g  a c ro s s in g  o f  the  38 th  p a r a l l e l  in  p u r s u i t  of 
North Korean t ro o p s .  Yet a t  t h i s  p o in t  a  d i f f i c u l t y  a r i s e s  
when c o n s id e ra t io n  i s  g iven  to  August 30 and August 31 S ta te  
Department memoranda p rep a red  f o r  NSC c o n s id e ra t io n .
^^ I b i d . . 650-52. For NSC 7 3 A  see FR.1950. I ,  375-89-
^ ^ I b id . , 652. P r i o r  to  the  August 25 NSC Senior 
S ta f f  m eeting , a S ta te  Department meeting was h e ld  to  d e t e r ­
mine the  S ta te  D ep artm en t 's  p o s i t io n .  Those p re s e n t  i n c l u ­
ded Rusk, Matthews, Je s su p ,  B u t le r ,  H ickerson, McConuaghy, 
S a n d e fir ,  Merchant, Emmerson, and Barco. The d is c u s s io n  and 
the co n c lu s io n s  reached a t  the NSC Senior S ta f f  meeting were 
n e a r ly  i d e n t i c a l  to  th o se  reached  a t  t h i s  S ta te  Department 
m eeting. See Memo of C o nversa tion  by Mr. James A. Barco, 
S pec ia l  A s s i s t a n t  to  Je ssu p ,A u g u s t  25,1950, I b i d . , 646-648.
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The August 30 d r a f t ,  with no acknowledged a u th o r ,  i s  
a bold s ta tem en t of the A l l iso n  p o s i t io n .  While acknow­
ledg ing  the  r i s k s  of p o s s ib le  Sov ie t in te r v e n t io n ,  t h i s  p a ­
pe r  concluded t h a t  i t  was very d e s i r a b le  t h a t  MacArthur be 
given the maximum degree of l a t i t u d e  in  s t r a t e g i c  and t a c ­
t i c a l  d e c is io n s  so as  to  c a r ry  out h i s  m ission in  a minimum 
of time and a t  a minimum of c o s t .  The U.N. Commander im­
m ediate ly  should be a u th o r ize d  a t  h i s  d i s c r e t i o n  to  c a r ry  
out o p e ra t io n s  n o r th  of the 38th p a r a l l e l .  The only r e ­
s t r i c t i o n  on the  U.N. o p e ra t io n s  would be t h a t  in  r o l l i n g  
back the N orth  Korean t ro o p s ,  MacArthur should, a s  m i l i ­
t a r i l y  ex ped ien t ,  employ South Korean fo rc e s  to  spearhead 
the mova n o r th .  The u l t im a te  goal of these  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n s
hn
would be the p a c i f i c a t i o n  and u n i f i c a t i o n  of Korea.
The August 31 d r a f t  memorandum was a  compromise be­
tween the two extremes. The only contingency under which 
U.N. fo rc e s  should be allowed to  c ro s s  the  p a r a l l e l  was i f  
the S o v ie ts  o r  Chinese had no t,  p r i o r  to  U.N. fo rc e s  reach in g  
the p a r a l l e l ,  in d ic a te d  an in te n t io n  in  any way to  p rev en t 
U.N. occupa tion  o f North Korea. Even then  a  r i s k  of g e n e ra l  
war would e x i s t .  Under no c ircum stances  should U.N. fo rc e s  
be used in  the  p rov inces bo rd er ing  S ib e r ia  and Manchuria. 
C urren t U.N. r e s o lu t io n s  d id  n o t  sa n c t io n  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n  
designed to  accomplish the  p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e  of u n ify in g
k7D ra f t  Memo-Prepared in  the Department o f S ta te  f o r  
NSC C o n s id e ra tio n  Only, August 30, 1950, I b i d . . 660-664.
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Korea, which would re q u ire  f u r th e r  U.N. r e s o lu t io n s .
T h is  paper concluded t h a t  no f i n a l  d e c is io n  could 
be reached a t  the p re s e n t  time. American a c t io n s  to advance 
th e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  would be based on the  " a c t io n  o r  i n ­
a c t io n  of the  Sov ie t Union and the Chinese Communists" and 
i n  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  the United N a tio n s . Any m ajor a c t io n  
to  occupy North Korea should n o t  be undertaken  w ithou t 
s p e c i f i c  p r i o r  a u th o r iz a t io n  from th e  P r e s id e n t ,  and then 
on ly  a f t e r  he had co n su lted  w ith  su p p o r t in g  U.N. a l l i e s .
The August 31 S ta te  Department d r a f t  was adopted a l ­
most t o t a l l y  as  NSC 8l .  This p o l ic y  paper acknowledged t h a t  
U.N. fo rc e s  had a l e g a l  b a s is  f o r  c a r ry in g  out o p e ra t io n s  
n o r th  o f th e  38th  p a r a l l e l  to  fo rc e  the  w ithdrawal or de­
f e a t  o f N orth  Korean fo rc e s .  I t  was concluded t h a t  the  U.N. 
Command "should be a u th o r ized  to  conduct m i l i t a r y  opera­
t i o n s  . . .n o r th  of the 38th  p a r a l l e l  f o r  the  purpose of de­
s t r o y in g  N orth  Korean fo rc e s ,"  p rov ided  the S o v ie t  Union or 
China had n o t  given any in d ic a t io n s  they would co u n te r  such 
o p e ra t io n s .  I n  a d d i t io n ,  p lan s  should be drawn f o r  a pos­
s i b l e  occupation  of Korea, which would be implemented only 
w ith  e x p l i c i t  approval o f the P r e s id e n t ,  dependent on h is  
p r i o r  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith the United N a tio n s .^^
48D ra f t  Memo Prepared in  the  Department of S ta te  f o r  
NSC C o n s id e ra t io n  Only, August 31, 1950, I b i d . . 67I - 674.
^^ Ibid.. 674-675.
^^Memo by Lay, s u b j . :  NSC 81, September 1 ,  1950,
I b i d . .  687..
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I f  North Korea was reoccup p ied , the  U.N. Command 
should conduct no ground o p e ra t io n s  n o r th  o f the 38th p a r a l ­
l e l ,  but bombing o p e ra t io n s  would con tinue  as b e fo re .  I f  
the Soviet Union occuppied North Korea and in  advance warned 
a g a in s t  a t t a c k s  on i t s  fo rc e s ,  the  m a t te r  should be r e f e r r e d  
to  the S e c u r i ty  C ouncil .  I f  c o o p e ra t io n  with the S ov ie ts  
proved im possib le , a  U.N. condemnation o f  the  R ussians (o r 
Chinese) would be sought. In  case  o f  S o v ie t  in te rv e n t io n  
sou th  of the 38th p a r a l l e l ,  th e  U.N. Commander should defend 
h i s  fo rc e s ,  n o t  aggravate  the s i t u a t i o n  and r e p o r t  to  
Washington. This would a lso  app ly  i f  U.N. fo rc e s  were ope­
r a t i n g  n o r th  of the p a r a l l e l  and major S o v ie t  u n i t s  i n t e r ­
vened. In  e i t h e r  e v en t ,  the United S ta te s  would opera te  on 
the assumption t h a t  g lo b a l  war was imminent.
I n  the  event Chinese fo rc e s  in te rv e n e d ,  the United 
S ta te s  would n o t  p e rm it  i t s e l f  to  become involved  in  a gene­
r a l  war w ith  China. The U.N. Commander would continue h is  
o p e ra t io n s  so long a s  they o f fe re d  a  rea so n ab le  chance of 
success . The m a tte r  would th en  be taken  to  the  United Na­
t io n s  to  have the Chinese condemned as aggressors.-^^
Perhaps more e x p re ss iv e  of w ish fu l  th in k in g  than 
r e a l i s t i c  c a l c u la t io n  was the r e q u e s t  f o r  p re p a ra t io n  of 
su rrend er  term s in  case  North Korean fo r c e s  c o llap sed  or 
r e t r e a t e d .  This id e a  envisaged s t a b i l i z i n g  a l i n e  a t  the
^^Ib id . . 689- 690. ^^ Ib id . . 690.
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38th  p a r a l l e l  while North Korea considered  the  terras o f fe re d .  
Only i f  re fu sed  and i f  no s ig n  of ou ts id e  i n te r v e n t io n  was 
seen , would the United N a tions  work to  develop support f o r  
a c t io n  n o r th  of the p a r a l l e l  to  accomplish u n i f i c a t i o n  of 
Korea. The r e s t  o f NSC 81 concerned i t s e l f  w ith l e n i e n t  oc- 
cu p a tio n  p o l i c i e s  which the United Nations was to  employ. 
A f te r  leng thy  e x p l i c a t io n  of the  i s su e s  invo lved , the de­
c i s io n  reached in  NSC 81 was n o t  to make any d e c is io n  a t  
the p re s e n t  tim e. Fu tu re  U.S. a c t io n s  would be made on the  
b a s i s  of S ov ie t  or Chinese a c t io n ,  and on th e  b a s is  of con­
s u l t a t i o n s  with f r i e n d ly  members of the United N ations .
NSC 81 was re v is e d  s l i g h t l y  on the recommendation of 
General B r a d l e y . T h i s  r e v i s io n  r e s u l te d  in  a  more co n ser­
v a t iv e  s ta tem ent concern ing  c ro s s in g  the 38th  p a r a l l e l .  The
phrase  "The U.N. Commander should be a u t h o r i z e d ................."
was a l t e r e d  to  read , " I t  would be expected t h a t  the  UNC 
would rece iv e  a u th o r iz a t io n  to  conduct m i l i t a r y  o p e ra t io n s  
n o r th  of the 38th  p a r a l l e l  f o r  the purpose o f  d e s t ro y in g  
N orth  Korean f o r c e s . "  A s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e v is e d  paragraph was 
added, n o t in g  th a t  s ince  o p e ra t io n s  n o r th  o f  the 38th  p a r a l ­
l e l  involved a  r i s k  o f  major war w ith  the S o v ie t  Union and 
d i r e c t l y  involved th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f o th e r  f r i e n d ly  govern­
ments, the U.N. Commander p r i o r  to  p u t t in g  any such p lan
^^ I b id . .  690- 691.
JOS to  Acheson, s u b j . ;  U.S. Courses of Action 
With Respect to  Korea, September ?, 1950, I b i d , , 707-708.
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in to  e x e c u tio n ,  should o b ta in  P r e s id e n t i a l  approval so th a t  
c o n s id e ra t io n  might be given a t  the time to  the va rio u s  e l e ­
ments inv o lved . U.N. o p e ra t io n s  were no t to  extend ac ro ss  
th e  Manchurian or Sov ie t b o rd ers  of Korea and American 
p o l ic y  should be n o t  to  inc lude  any non-Korean u n i t s  in  any 
U.N. ground f o r c e s  in  the n o r th e a s te rn  p rov in ces  bordering  
the  Sov ie t Union o r  in  the  a re a  a long the Manchurian bor­
d e r . B r a d l e y  had gained a  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of the  ground 
r u l e s  f o r  c ro s s in g  the  38th p a r a l l e l ,  but he d id  no t ga in  
the  p ro v is io n  he sought l i m i t i n g  the  fo rc e s  to  be used n o r th  
o f  the p a r a l l e l  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  South Korean troops .
Where d id  a l l  of t h i s  d is c u s s io n  leave  U.S. p o l ic y  
s ix  days be fo re  M acA rthur's Inchon land ing?  The United 
S ta te s  was l e f t  w ith  no c l e a r - c u t  d e c is io n  to  guide m i l i t a r y  
p lann ing  should  MacArthur succeed. No d e c is io n s  had been 
reached because th e re  were too many unknowns and because the 
r i s k s  involved  in  c ro s s in g  the  38th  p a r a l l e l  were perceived  
a s  being so grave t h a t  U.S. p o l ic y  makers wished to  de lay  
the  d e c is io n  and only  when faced  w ith  imminent need would 
i t  be made.
The b e s t  t h a t  those su p p o r t in g  the  A llison-Rusk po­
s i t i o n  had gained  was a compromise s ta tem en t t h a t  the U.N. 
Commander could expec t to  re c e iv e  perm iss ion  to  c ro ss  the 
p a r a l l e l ,  under a very  c l e a r  s e t  o f  c ircum stances and a f t e r
^^Report by the  N a tiona l  S e c u r i ty  Council to  the  
P r e s id e n t ,  NSC 81/1 , September 9, 1950, I b i d . . ? l6 .
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r e c e iv in g  P r e s id e n t i a l  a u th o r iz a t io n .  The August 30 S ta te  
Department memorandum had been r e j e c te d  in fav o r  o f the more 
c a u t io u s  and t e n ta t iv e  memorandum of August The m inutes
o f  the  August 25 NSC Senior S ta f f  meeting and the S ta te  De­
partm ent m eeting of the same day, in d ica ted  a d e f i n i t e  trend  
in  fav o r  of the August 30 memorandum. Higher rank ing  or 
more i n f l u e n t i a l  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  probably  opted f o r  the 
e a r l i e r  P o l ic y  P lanning  S ta f f  study , which had been modified 
from o p p o s i t io n  to  c ro ss in g  the  p a r a l l e l  to the p o s i t io n  of 
"w a it  and see" , as  the b es t  compromise so lu t io n .
The m inutes of the N a t io n a l  S ecu ri ty  C ouncil 
m eetings concern ing  NSC 81 a re  no t  a v a i la b le ,  so the d is c u s ­
s io n s  t h a t  led  to  the adoption  of the m oderate , compromise 
so lu t io n  remain obscure. In  l i g h t  o f the co n c lu s io n s  
reached in  NSC 8I / I ,  the A llison-R usk p o s i t io n  tak e s  on 
g r e a t e r  importance a s  an a m e lio ra tin g  in f lu en ce  on a c le a r  
tendency in  the S ta te  Department in  fav o r  o f  s to p p in g  a t  the 
38th  p a r a l l e l . The Defense Department supported the bo lder 
A llison-R usk  p o s i t io n ,  and ev en ts  in  Korea were soon to  t i p  
the s c a le s  in  fav o r  of c ro s s in g  the 38th  p a r a l l e l ,  n o t  only 
to  d e s t ro y  North Korean f o rc e s ,  but to  a t t a i n  the  p o l i t i c a l  
o b je c t iv e  of the r e u n i f i c a t io n  of Korea. This d e c is io n  
would s t a r t  a  chain  of even ts  th a t  would lead to  an en­
t i r e l y  new war.
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CHAPTER IX
THE 38th  PARALLEL BREACHED AND CHINESE INTERVENTION
E ar ly  in  the morning of September 15. O peration  
Chromite began. Marines landed a t  Inchon, com plete ly  su r­
p r i s i n g  weak North Korean fo r c e s —MacArthur*s d a r in g  and 
b r i l l i a n t  p la n  had pa id  o f f .  On September 23, the 8 th  
Army broke out of the Pusan p e r im e te r  and began the rou te  
o f  the N orth  Korean Army. By the 2 6 th , both  U.N. m i l i t a r y  
groups had converged on and l i b e r a t e d  S eou l.^  The ra p id  
success  of MacArthur' s o ffens ive  fo rced  Washington to  reach  
new d e c is io n s  and m i l i t a r y  success pushed the  balance in  
fa v o r  o f bold a c t io n .
On September 21, the Far E a s te rn  A f f a i r s  D iv is ion  
d ra f te d  a  memorandum e n t i t l e d  "Program f o r  B ring ing  Korean 
H o s t i l i t i e s  to  an End," which recogn ized  t h a t  the  oppor­
t u n i t y  e x is te d  "to  b r in g  about the  complete independence 
and u n i ty  o f  Korea . . . " ,  though t h i s  would depend on U.N. 
a u th o r iz a t io n  and n o n - in te rv e n t io n  on the  p a r t  of the  Sovie t 
Union and China. This paper envisaged an occupation  fo rce
^Schnabel, P o licy . 177-177.
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predom inantly  South Korean in  make-up, but under the U.N. 
Commander in  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  Seoul. .The p o s tu re  o f U.N. 
fo rc e s  was to be one of l i b e r a t i o n  r a t h e r  than  r e t a l i a t i o n .  
North K orea’s c i v i l  o f f i c i a l s  would m ain ta in  law and o rd e r  
u n t i l  South Korea could assume j u r i s d i c t i o n .  United N ations 
fo rc e s  rem aining in  the  p o s t - h o s t i l i t i e s  pe riod  would be 
Asian p r im a r i ly ,  as U.S. tro o p s  were to  be reduced and r e -  
moved as  soon as  p o s s ib le .  The Defense Department had no 
o b je c t io n s  to t h i s  program and informed the S ta te  Department 
t h a t  MacArthur f e l t  i t s  execu tion  was f e a s ib le  and p r a c -  
t i c a b l e . ^  The program was very a t t r a c t i v e  because i t  c a l le d  
f o r  a speedy re d u c t io n  of U.S. troo p  involvem ent.
On September 22, John P a t  on Davies, of the  P o l ic y  
P lann ing  S ta f f ,  d r a f te d  a memorandum c a l l i n g  f o r  an advance 
a c ro ss  the  3 8 th - p a r a l l e l  as soon as  p o s s ib le .  According to  
D avies, the Soviet Union must have become aware w ith in  the 
l a s t  few weeks th a t  " i t  could n o t  count on i t s  North  Korean 
stooges  to  hold North K o re a ." At t h a t  p o in t ,  the Kremlin 
had two ch o ices .  The f i r s t  was to  commit i t s e l f  in  some way 
to  the defense of North Korea. Given what the  S o v ie ts  must 
have regarded  a s  the  "m ercu ria l  American temperment," such 
an a c t io n  would c a r ry  a grave r i s k  o f  war w ith  the United
Deputy U nder-Secre ta ry  of State(M atthew s) to  the 
S p e c ia l  A s s is ta n t  to the  S e c re ta ry  o f  Defense f o r  F o re ign  
M i l i t a r y  A f fa i r s (B u rn s ) , September 22 ,1950 .PR.1950. V I I .755-5%
M arshall to Ache son, October 3.1950. Ib id . , 853-54.
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S ta te s  and a lso  would produce un favorab le  worldwide r e p e r ­
c u s s io n s .  R u s s ia 's  second choice  was to  remain uncommitted. 
The optimum time f o r  involvem ent had passed and any de lay  
i n  moving d e c is iv e ly  to hold N orth  Korea r a i s e d  the  r i s k s  
in v o lv e d . ^
The United S ta te s  could draw two a l t e r n a t iv e  con­
c lu s io n s .  F i r s t ,  t h a t  the  S o v ie ts  in tended  to  hold N orth  
Korea, a  course t h a t  d e l i b e r a t e l y  accep ted  an in c re a se d  r i s k  
o f  war w ith  the  United S t a t e s .  The second c o n c lu s io n  was 
t h a t  R uss ia  was p repared  to  accep t  the  l o s s  of N orth  Korea 
a s  i t  had t h a t  o f  A z e rb a ija n .  Davies concluded t h a t  the  
Kremlin was prepared  to  lo s e  N orth  Korea, though t h i s  did  
n o t  mean t h a t  the  S o v ie ts  would be p a s s iv e .  R uss ia  would 
a ttem p t to  p ro long  North Korean r e s i s t a n c e  and would p re s ­
sure  (o r  con tinue  to  p re s su re )  Pek ing  to  e n te r  the  co n fl ic t- ,  
while  seek ing  a d ea l  to  end the  h o s t i l i t i e s  before N orth  
K o re a 's  d e s t r u c t io n  was com pleted. The b e s t  course  to  f o l ­
low was one t h a t  t e s te d  S o v ie t  and Chinese i n te n t io n s  "by a 
p ro b in g  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n  w ell  n o r th  o f the 38th  p a r a l l e l . "
I f  th e re  were no r e a c t i o n s ,  U.N. fo rc e s  would hold and ex­
pand t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  p o s i t io n  while s im u ltaneously  announcing 
th e  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  peace, l i b e r a t i o n ,  and u n i f i c a t i o n .
4D ra f t  Memo by John D avies o f  the P o l ic y  P lan n in g  
S t a f f ,  September 22, 1950, I b i d . . 753*
^ Ib id .. 754- 755.
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On September 23, Dean Rusk, while b r i e f in g  A m erica 's  
U.N. r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s ,  noted  t h a t  the  problem now fac in g  
America was n o t  to  commit i t s e l f  p u b l ic ly  to  the war aim of 
u n i t in g  Korea, while a t  the  same time con tinu ing  to  seek 
U.N. a c t io n  in  fa v o r  o f u n i f i c a t i o n .  Washington be lieved  
th a t  the  United S ta te s  "should  l e t  the  S ov ie ts  make the de­
c is io n  f o r  us as much a s  p o s s ib le  so t h a t  United N ations 
fo rc e s  would c a r r y  on u n t i l  we g e t  some in d ic a t io n  of Sov ie t 
r e a c t io n  to  t h e i r  northward movement." MacArthur had r e ­
ceived  a u th o r i z a t io n  to  b road cas t  a  c a l l  to  North Korea to 
cease a l l  h o s t i l i t i e s  and to  l a y  down i t s  arms under super­
v is io n  o f  the U.N. Commission on K orea.^
On the same day, Great B r i t a i n ,  a f t e r  c o n s u l ta t io n  
w ith the  United S t a te s ,  subm itted  f o r  W ashington 's approval 
a U.N. d r a f t  r e s o lu t io n  c a l l i n g  f o r  e s tab l ish m en t o f  s t a ­
b i l i t y  and s e c u r i ty  th roughou t a l l  of Korea, to be follow ed 
by e le c t i o n s  designed to  c re a te  a " u n if ie d ,  independent,and 
dem ocratic government o f  a l l  K orea ."  Any U.N. fo rc e s  which 
en te red  North  Korea would remain only long  enough to  a t t a i n  
these  o b je c t iv e s .  The r e s o l u t i o n  inc luded  a  p ro v is io n  fo r  
a U.N. commission to  su p e rv ise  t h i s  p r o c e s s .?
M acA rthur 's  success  and S o v ie t  in a c t io n  a p p aren tly
^Memo of C onversation  by the  D i r e c to r  of the  O ffice  
o f U.N. P o l i t i c a l  and S e c u r i ty  A f f a i r s  (B a n c ro f t) ,  September
23, 1950, I b i d . .  760- 763.
^Minutes of S ix th  Meeting of U.S. D e lega tion  to  the 
U.N. General Assembly, September 25,1950, I b i d . , 768-774.
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was fo rc in g  a d e c is io n  on the United S ta te s  t h a t  i t  was r e ­
l u c t a n t  to  make. With B r i t a i n  tak in g  the  i n i t i a t i v e  to  ga in  
a  U.N. r e s o lu t io n  c a l l i n g  f o r  u n i f i c a t io n  of Korea, and w ith 
U.N. fo rc e s  d r iv in g  northward w ithout comment o r  a c t io n  from 
e i t h e r  China or R ussia , the  d e c is io n  seemed in e v i t a b le .  
N o n e th e le s s , th a t  d e c is io n  was n o t  made ra p id ly .  As of 
September 26, MacArthur s t i l l  had no t rece ived  a  new d i r e c ­
t iv e  based e i t h e r  on NSC 8l / l  o r  on h i s  m i l i t a r y  su c ce ss— 
a  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  alarmed General B olt^  of G-3- He f e l t  t h a t  
MacArthur needed a new d i r e c t i v e  before  he had to  pause a t  
the  38t h  p a r a l l e l ,  which would cause him to lo se  momentum
g
and the i n i t i a t i v e ,  g iv in g  the enemy a valuable r e s p i t e .
On the same day t h a t  B o l t l  se n t  h i s  memorandum. Gene­
r a l  M arsha ll  rece iv ed  approval from th e  P re s id e n t  to  send 
MacArthur a  new d i r e c t iv e  drawn up in  c o n su l ta t io n  w ith  the  
S ta te  Department. The i n s t r u c t i o n s  were n o t  f i n a l  s ince  d e ­
velopm ents could r e q u ire  m o d if ic a t io n s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  i f  a  
S o v ie t  o r  Chinese t h r e a t  developed. M acArthur's m i l i t a r y  
o b je c t iv e  was the d e s t r u c t io n  of the North Korean Army and 
to  a t t a i n  t h i s  o b je c t iv e  he was au th o rized  to  conduct m i l i ­
t a r y  o p e ra t io n s  n o r th  of the  38th  p a r a l l e l ,  provided th e re  
had been no in d ic a t io n  of any k ind of ou ts id e  in te r v e n t io n .  
He was to  use only South Korean fo rc e s  in  the n o r th e a s t
Q .
Memo from B olte  to  the  Chief o f  S ta f f ,  U.S. Army, 
September 27, 1950. JCS Geographic F i l e s .
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prov inces  bo rdering  China and the S o v ie t  Union, and he was
p ro h ib i te d  from supporting  h i s  o p e ra t io n s  w ith  a i r  or naval
a c t io n s  a g a in s t  Manchuria. I f  China in te rv en e d , MacArthur
was to  con tinue  the a c t io n  as long as  he had a  reasonab le
0
chance of su ccess .^
When organized r e s i s ta n c e  had ended, MacArthur was 
to  have South Korean fo rc e s  take the  lead  i n  d isa rm ing  any 
rem aining  North Korean u n i t s  and in  d e a l in g  w ith  any g u e r i l l a  
a c t i v i t i e s .  Circumstances would d i c t a t e  the  n e c e s s i ty  f o r  
and c h a ra c te r  of an occupation  of North  Korea. Any p lans  
f o r  occupation  should be forwarded to  the  J o i n t  C h iefs  of 
S ta f f  f o r  approval, as  w ell as  any p la n s  f o r  f u tu r e  opera­
t io n s  n o r th  of the 38th  p a r a l l e l .  At the S ta te  D epartm ent 's  
i n s i s t e n c e ,  a  p o l i t i c a l  guidance paragraph was added. 
MacArthur was in s t r u c te d  to  f a c i l i t a t e  r e s t o r a t i o n  of the 
South Korean government to  Seoul, b u t he was reminded t h a t  
South Korean sove re ign ty  was recognized only so u th  of the 
38t h  p a r a l l e l .  P o l i t i c a l  q u es t io n s  such as th e  form al ex­
te n s io n  of South Korean sovere ign ty  over North Korea had to  
aw ait  U.N. a c t io n .  The a c t io n s  of th e  Republic  of Korea in  
North Korea would be considered  U.N. a c t io n s .
T h is  d i r e c t iv e  rece ived  emphasis on September 29
^The Acting S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  to  the  U.S. Mission 
a t  the  U.N., September 26, 1950, PR.1950. VII, ?81.
^^Acheson to  the A cting  S ec re ta ry  o f  S ta te  (Webb), 
September 26 , 1950, I b i d . . 785.
-  245 -
when S ec re ta ry  of Defense M arshall informed MacArthur t h a t
"We want you to  f e e l  unhampered t a c t i c a l l y  and s t r a t e g i c a l l y
to  proceed n o r th  of the 3 8 th  p a r a l l e l . "  MacArthur was to ld
t h a t  the United N ations d id  n o t  wish to  vote on the  issue
of  o ross ing  the  p a r a l l e l ,  but r a t h e r  hoped t h a t  he would
11f in d  " i t  m i l i t a r i l y  necessary  t o  do so ."
The d e o is io n  had been made a t  l a s t .  MacArthur was 
au th o rized  to  c ro s s  the 3 8 th  p a r a l l e l  to  d e s t ro y  North 
Korean fo rc e s .  Any use o f  h i s  fo r c e s  f o r  the  p o l i t i c a l  ob­
j e c t iv e  of u n i fy in g  Korea would have to  aw ait U.N. a c t io n ,  
bu t h i s  d i r e c t i v e  s tro n g ly  suggested  t h a t  such a c t io n  would 
be forthcom ing soon. A fter extended debate  in  Washington, 
the  f i n a l  d e c is io n  was made on the b a t t l e f i e l d  in  Korea and 
on the b a s is  of the  r e a c t io n s  o f  Moscow and Peking.
M acA rthur's s tunn ing  success and the  lac k  of S o v ie t  or Chi­
nese  r e a c t io n s  to  the  rap id  U.N. northw ard  move, decided the 
i s su e  in  fav o r  of prooeeding in to  N orth  Korea. A fu tu re  de ­
c i s io n  to  u n ify  Korea m i l i t a r i l y  aw aited  U.N. app rova l.
The U.N. General Assembly, a l s o  in to x ic a te d  with 
M acA rthur's success , voted , on October 7, to  u n ify  
K orea. The B r i t i s h  re so lu t io n ,  ab ly  pushed by the  N e ther­
la n d s ,  A u s t r a l ia ,  the  P h i l ip p in e s ,  B r a z i l ,  and o th e r s ,  recom­
mended t h a t  "A ll ap p ropria te  s te p s  be taken  to  ensure 
c o n d it io n s  of s t a b i l i t y  th roughou t Korea" w ith  a view toward
^ H la rsh a l l  to  MacArthur, September 29, 1950, 
I b i d . .  826.
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es tab lish m en t under U.N. su p e rv is io n  o f  a u n i f ie d ,  indepen­
dent and dem ocratic  Korean governm ent. U.N. fo rc e s  would 
remain in  Korea only so long  as  necessa ry  to  achieve th ese
g o a ls .  The a c t io n  was taken  in  the General Assembly to
12avoid a  p o s s ib le  Sov ie t ve to  i n  the S e c u r i ty  Council.
The d e c is io n  having been made to  employ U.N. fo rc e s  
to  achieve the  p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e  of u n ify in g  Korea, the 
ta sk  o f  both Washington and the U.N. Commander was to be 
a l e r t  to  s ig n s  of Sov ie t o r Chinese i n te n t io n s  to  in te rv en e  
in  the h o s t i l i t i e s .  The a v a i la b le  evidence suggests  t h a t  
the g r e a t e s t  concerns were expressed  about Chinese d e s ig n s .
There were s ign s  as e a r ly  a s  J u l y f 1950, of Chinese 
troop movements from c e n t r a l  China to  Manchuria, where troop 
s t r e n g th  was e s t im ated  to be around 246,000. The U.N. Com­
mand d id  no t f e e l  t h a t  these  troops would be used fo r  a  mas­
sive in te r v e n t io n  in  K o r e a . O n  September 5, the Consul 
General in  Hong Kong re p o r te d  th a t  a Shanghai j o u r n a l i s t  had 
quoted Chou E n - l a i ,  Fore ign  M in is te r  o f  the P e o p le 's  Repub- 
l i e  of China, as saying  t h a t  i f  North Korean tro o p s  were 
pushed back to  the  Manchurian b o rder ,  China would f i g h t  "the 
enemy ou ts id e  C h in a 's  border  and no t aw ait u n t i l  the enemy 
came i n . "  Yet on September 22, t h i s  same source quoted
^ ^ d i t o r i a l  Note, I b i d . , 903; R eso lu tion  3?6, Adopted 
by the U.N. General Assembly, October 7 ,1950,I b i d . , 904-06.
13Memo of T eletype-C onference Prepared by the De­
partm ent o f the  Army, August 30, 1950, I b i d . . 659.
- 247 -
Chou a s  say ing  th a t  China would n o t  become involved in  the 
Korea War.^^ On September 27, the United S ta te s  i n d i r e c t l y  
rec e iv e d  in fo rm ation  from K.M. P ann ikar, Ind ian  Ambassador 
to  China, t h a t  suggested  China was p repa red  to  fo llow  a much 
more ag g re ss iv e  p o l ic y  in  Korea, w ith  d i r e c t  in te rv e n t io n  
expec ted . Hubert Graves, the  B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l  who brought 
P a n n ik a r 's  news to  W ash ing ton 's  a t t e n t i o n ,  sa id  he d id  no t 
take P a n n ik a t 's  f e a r s  too s e r io u s ly ,  because he be liev ed  
him to  be " v o l a t i l e  and an u n r e l i a b l e  r e p o r t e r . I n  Au­
g ust  and September a  p a t t e r n  was dev elop ing , a s  s ig n s  of 
C h in a 's  i n te n t io n  to in te rv e n e  in  Korea were balanced by 
r e p o r t s  c a s t in g  doubt on the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the  in fo rm a tio n . 
The r e s u l t  was a r e lu c ta n c e  to  rea ch  any firm  conclusions 
o r  d e c is io n s .
I n  l a t e  September, 0. Edmund Clubb, D i r e c to r  of the 
O ffice  of Chinese A f f a i r s ,  acknowledged t h a t  e lem ents of 
L in P i a b ' s  4 th  F ie ld  Army had moved to  Manchuria. Peking 
a lso  had rep o r te d  t h a t  " c e r t a i n  Korean personnel have r e ­
tu rned  to  Korea to  defend i t  . . . ." A most " i n t e r e s t i n g  
p o s s ib le  ex p lan a tio n "  was t h a t  t h i s  movement in d ic a te d  the 
Chinese were going  to  in te rv e n e  in  Korea. Clubb be liev ed  
i t  l i k e l y  t h a t  the  S o v ie t  Union would encourage such an
Consul General a t  Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to  Acheson, 
September 5» 1950, I b i d . , 698 ; W ilkinson to  Acheson,
September 22, 1950, I b i d . . 763 .
^^Memo of C onversa tion  by Merchant, September 27,
1950, I M É . ,  793- 794.
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a c t io n .  Though the  Chinese might be b lu f f in g ,  th e i r  m i l i ­
t a r y  a c t i v i t y  remained s tro n g  and had to  be watched.
R eports from sources o u ts id e  th e  United S ta te s  con­
c e rn ing  p o ss ib le  Chinese in te r v e n t io n  a r r iv e d  with reg u ­
l a r i t y .  On October 2, Dean Rusk re c e iv e d  an a la rm is t  t e l e ­
gram from the B r i t i s h  Fore ign  O f f i c e . The B r i t i s h  wanted 
to  remind the United S ta te s  t h a t  a  Chinese Communist m i l i ­
t a r y  occupation  of North Korea should n o t  be excluded, as  a 
p o s s i b i l i t y ,  as the p ro sp ec t  o f  e l im in a t io n  of the North 
Korean b u f fe r  s t a t e  could be p e rc e iv e d  as a se rious t h r e a t  
to  C h in a 's  s e c u r i ty .  In  a d d i t io n ,  the  Sov ie t Union might 
f e e l  t h a t  the chances of a dangerous expansion of h o s t i l i ­
t i e s  would be r e l ie v e d  i f  Chinese r a t h e r  than  Russian troop s  
were to  in te rv e n e .  Of course , see in g  the United S ta tes  in ­
volved in  a b igger Asian war, d r a in in g  i t s  resou rces , would, 
p lea se  the  Sovie t Union.
But more than  sp e c u la t io n  e l i c i t e d  the  B r i t i s h  t e l e ­
gram. An a n a ly s is  of P e k in g 's  i n t e r n a l  and ex te rnal propa­
ganda showed an in c re a s in g ly  v i o l e n t  emphasis on "U.S. ag­
g re ss iv e  a c t io n  both a g a in s t  Korea and China."  P ek ing 's  
n o te s  to  the United Nations were n o t  designed to  secure 
e a r ly  admission to  t h a t  body, b u t  to  "dem onstrate th a t  U.N. 
a c t io n  in  Korea i s  i l l e g a l  and i s  se rv in g  to  c loak U. S.
^^Clubb to  Rusk, September 27, 1950, I b i d . . 795- 
17The B r i t i s h  Embassy to  the Department of S ta te ,  
Given to  Rusk, October 2, 1950, I b i d . , 814.
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p lan s  f o r  ag g re ss io n ."  Yet the B r i t i s h ,  in  the  nex t b rea th ,
concluded th a t  China was n o t  l i k e l y  to  in te rv en e  since  i t
would r i s k  h o s t i l i t i e s  "on an issue  which would n o t  appear
to  be v i t a l  to  China." But i f  an in te r v e n t io n  in  Korea d id
1 8occur, China was more l i k e l y  to  do so than R uss ia .
On October 3» the  S ta te  Department r e c e iv e d  word 
t h a t  .Chou E n - la i  had informed Pann ikar th a t  i f  U.N. fo rc e s  
crossed  the  38th  p a r a l l e l ,  China would in te rv e n e ,  but would 
n o t  i f  only South Korean troo ps  c ro ssed  the p a r a l l e l .  The 
N etherlands Charge in  Peking confirmed t h i s  r e p o r t ,  a lthough 
he was in c l in e d  to  b e l ie v e  i t  was a b l u f f . T h e  S ta te  De­
partm ent r e a c te d  c a u t io u s ly ,  f e e l in g  t h a t  while i t  probably
was a b l u f f ,  the s ta tem ent v/as s t i l l  s e r io u s  enough to  be 
20concerned about. Some o f f i c i a l s  viewed P a n n ik a r ' s r e p o r t  
w ith  g r e a t  alarm. The Deputy D ire c to r  of N o r th e a s t  Asian 
A f f a i r s  b e liev ed  th a t  since  America was no t  committed to  
c ro s s in g  the 38th p a r a l l e l ,  i t  would be worthwhile "to  ex­
p lo re  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f using  e n t i r e l y  ROK fo rc e s  fo r  the  
su b jug a tion  of North Korea.
l ^ i b i d . .  814-816.
^^Charg^ in  the United Kingdon(Holmes) to  Acheson, 
October 3, 1950, I b i d . , 839: Ambassador in  th e  N etherlands 
(Chapin) to  Acheson, October 3, 1950, I b i d . . 858.
20Memo by Deputy A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  For 
F ar  E a s te rn  A f f a i r s  (Merchant) to Rusk, October 3, 1950, 
I b i d . , 848; Wilkinson to  Acheson, October 7. 1950, I b i d . ,
912-913.
21Johnson to Rusk, October 3, 1950, I b id . ,  849.
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Edmund Clubb agreed  t h a t  Chou 's s ta tem en t could n o t
be regarded  s a f e ly  as mere b l u f f ,  s in c e  i t  had to  be made
w ith  the  foreknowledge o f  the S o v ie ts .  I f  China and R ussia
were now p repared  to a ccep t  the dangers  o f a c la s h  w ith U.N.
fo r c e s ,  i t  meant they were ready to  r i s k  the  danger of WWIII.
I n  such a case the United S ta te s  could n o t  avoid  the danger
e i t h e r  by r e t r e a t i n g  from i t  o r  by su r re n d e r in g  to  P e k in g 's
t h r e a t s .  The United S ta te s  should con tinue  to  advance in
Korea i f  i t  had the support of the  U nited  N a tio n s  and i f  i t
2Pwas in  i t s  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  to  do so.
Chou's warnings c re a te d  enough alarm  f o r  Washington 
to  seek to  r e a s s u re  the  Chinese about U.S. in t e n t io n s .  In  
a  cable  to  the  U.S. Ambassador to  I n d ia ,  Loy W. Henderson, 
i t  was p o in te d  out t h a t  i t  was very  im po rtan t  f o r  Washington 
to  d isabuse th e  Chinese of any m isconcep tions  th ey  might 
hold  about U.S. o b je c t iv e s  in  K orea. The United S ta te s  had 
been fo rced  to  r e l y  f o r  in fo rm a tion  on the  so le  channel of 
th e  "dub iously  r e l i a b l e  in te rm ed ia ry  Pannikar"  and given 
P a n n ik a r ' s " p r e d i s p o s i t io n s  and f re e -w h e e l in g  p r o c l i v i t i e s , " 
Washington could never be sure what Chou E n - l a i  r e a l l y  had 
s a id .  The S ta te  Department hoped Henderson could a rrange  
through In d ian  in te rm e d ia r ie s  a m eeting w ith  the  Chinese Am­
bassador to  I n d ia  o r ,  i f  t h i s  was im p o ss ib le ,  to  convey to  
him through a secondary source th e  message t h a t  U.N.
22Clubb to  Merchant, October 4, 1950, I b id . . 864.
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o p e ra t io n s  in  Korea c o n s t i tu t e d  "no t h r e a t  whatsoever to
K o re a 's  n e ig h b o rs ,"  and t h a t  America sought "no sp e c ia l
p o s i t io n  whatever in  Korea."  The Chinese Ambassador r e -
23je c te d  a l l  of H enderson 's  e f f o r t s  to  c o n ta c t  him.
The United  S ta te s  was n o t  alone in  being  concerned 
about Chou's s ta te m e n ts .  The N e th e r lan d s  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  to 
the  United N ations  informed the U.S. r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  t h a t  h i s  
government had in s t r u c te d  him to  in trodu ce  a  r e s o lu t io n  in  
the  General Assembly t h a t  would suspend a l l  U.N. m i l i t a r y  
o p e ra t io n s  n o r th  of the  38th  p a r a l l e l  u n t i l  October 31, while 
an a ttem p t was made to  reach  a d ip lo m a tic  se t t le m e n t .  Webb 
in s t r u c t e d  the U.S. r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  to  the  N etherlands to  
p r o t e s t  t h i s  a c t io n  in  the  s t r o n g e s t  p o s s ib le  term s, making 
i t  c le a r  t h a t  the  United S ta te s  b e l ie v e d  th a t  C h in a 's  t h r e a t s  
were designed p r im a r i ly  to  d issuade  U.N. members from con­
t in u in g  to  support U.N. a c t io n  i n  Korea. The Dutch agreed 
n o t  to  in tro d u ce  the  r e s o lu t io n .
The b e l l i c o s e  r e p o r t s  concern ing  C h in a 's  in te n t io n s  
l e d  the J o i n t  C h ie fs  to  send MacArthur an a m p l i f ic a t io n  of 
h i s  p rev io u s  d i r e c t i v e .  He was reminded t h a t  in  case of 
Chinese i n te r v e n t io n  he was to  con tinue  h i s  o p e ra t io n s  so 
long  as th e re  was a  reasonab le  chance o f  success . He a lso
^ ^ e b b  to  Henderson, O ctober 4 ,1950, I b i d . , 875-76; 
Henderson to  Acheson, October 10, 1950, I b i d . . 921.
^^Acheson to  Webb, O ctober 3 ,1950, I b i d . . 883-84; 
Webb to  Embassy in  N e ther lan ds , O ctober 5, 1950, I b i d . . 
884-885; Footnote  1, I b i d . . 885.
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was reminded t h a t  he must o b ta in  a u th o r iz a t io n  from Washing­
to n  p r io r  to  ta k in g  m il i ta ry  a c t io n  a g a in s t  o b je c tiv e s  in  
C hina.
MacArthur, and of course W ashington, had access  to  
U.N. Command in te l l ig e n c e  e s tim a te s  concern ing  C h in a 's  in ­
te n t io n s .  On O ctober 5» G eneral C.A. W illoughby, M acA rthur's 
C h ief of I n te l l ig e n c e ,  no ted  th a t  re c e n t  r e p o r ts  about China 
were ta k in g  on "a  s i n i s t e r  c o n n o ta tio n ,"  and th a t  the  p o ten ­
t i a l  e x is te d  f o r  Chinese in te rv e n t io n  should  U.N. fo rc e s  
c ro s s  the  p a r a l l e l .  W illoughby b e lie v e d  th a t  r e p o r ts  o f a 
m assing of Chinese tro o p s  on the  M anchurian border were con­
c lu s iv e  and t h e i r  use in  Korea would s u i t  th e  S o v ie ts , since  
U .S. re so u rc e s  would be d ra in ed  w ith  l i t t l e  o r no c o s t  to  
R u ss ia . There a re  no in d ic a t io n s ,  however, th a t  W illoughby 
t r i e d  to  persuade e i t h e r  MacArthur o r W ashington to  reco n ­
s id e r  c ro s s in g  th e  38th  p a r a l l e l .  On O ctober 9» G eneral 
W alton W alk er's  8 th  Army began i t s  move on Pyongyang, w hile 
M acArthur b ro ad cas t a  c a l l  f o r  N orth Korean su rre n d e r. 
N egative  r e p o r ts  had n o t d issuaded  M acArthur o r W ashington 
from  d r iv in g  n o r th , as th e re  were p o s i t iv e  r e p o r ts  a v a ila b le  
to  ba lance the  n e g a tiv e  ones—th u s  j u s t i f y in g  the  move 
a c ro s s  the  38th  p a r a l l e l .
^^JCS to  MacArthur, O ctober 9, 1950, I b i d . . 915' 
Schnabel, P o l ic y . 200.
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Since fo r  some time M acA rthur's p u b lic  c r i t ic i s m s  of 
U.S. p o lic y  had s t r a in e d  the  P ré s id e n te s  p a tie n c e  w ith  h is  
su b o rd in a te , Truman decided  to  have a m eeting w ith  MacArthur 
on Wake I s la n d  fo r  the purpose of c la r i f y in g  h is  r e l a t i o n ­
sh ip  w ith  the G enera l. P h i l ip  Jessup  was concerned th a t  
such a m eeting would be p erce iv ed  in  China and R ussia  as 
foreshadow ing "some m ajor new American move in  the  F ar E as t."  
I f  the Chinese and S o v ie ts  r e a l ly  b e lieved  the  U nited S ta te s  
in tended  to  s ta y  in  K orea, t h i s  m eeting m ight be in te rp re te d  
a s  b earin g  upon U.S. p la n s  to  t h i s  end. While n o t a rgu ing  
t h a t  the  p ro je c t  should be abandoned, Je ssu p  f e l t  Truman 
should be aware o f the p o s s ib le  in te r p r e ta t io n s  and r e p e r ­
cu ss io n s  of th e  m eeting , and should  is su e  a very  c a r e fu l ly  
p repared  s ta tem en t in  advance em phasizing A m erica 's  d e s ire
to  lo c a l iz e  th e  c o n f l i c t ,  to  r e s to r e  peace, and to  withdraw.
28from Korea as soon as p o s s ib le .
P r io r  to  the  O ctober 15 m eeting a t  Wake I s la n d , the 
CIA p repared  e s t im a te s  on the th r e a t  of S ov ie t o r  Chinese 
in te rv e n t io n  in  K orea. The CIA b e liev ed  th a t  th e re  were no 
conv incing  in d ic a t io n s  o f a  Chinese in te n t io n  to  in te rv e n e  
in  la rg e  numbers in  N orth  K orea. While such a  maneuver would 
g a in  much p re s t ig e  fo r  bo th  China and world communism, a  war 
w ith  the  U nited S ta te s ,  even one l im ite d  to  K orea, would
^^Acheson, C re a tio n . 589-591.
^^Memo by Je ss  
FR,1950. V II, 915- 916.
28 up to Acheson, October 9, 1950,
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p lace  a s e r io u s  s t r a i n  on C h in a 's  economy and would ex acer­
ba te  i t s  dom estic problem s. W ithout S o v ie t a i r  and naval 
a id ,  Chinese in te rv e n t io n  would be extrem ely c o s t ly  in  term s 
o f manpower. The need f o r  S o v ie t re so u rc e s  to  f i g h t  such a  
war would in c re a se  C h in a 's  dependence on R ussia , which would 
be a  se r io u s  blow to  C h in a 's  p r e s t ig e .  These and o th e r  f a c ­
to r s  made i t  u n l ik e ly  th a t  China would in te rv en e  in  1950-^^
In  a d d it io n , the  CIA concluded th a t  R ussia  had g iven  no 
in d ic a t io n s  o f an in te n t io n  to  in te rv en e  since  i t s  p ro spec­
t iv e  lo s s e s  d id  n o t j u s t i f y  ta k in g  such a  grave r i s k .
S o v ie t in te rv e n t io n  would occur only when i t  was in  i t s  i n ­
t e r e s t  to  p r e c ip i t a te  a  g lo b a l w ar.^^
The m eeting a t  Wake I s la n d  covered a number of to p ­
i c s ,  in c lu d in g  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  and e le c t io n s  in  K orea. 
MacArthur assu red  Truman th a t  w hile in te r fe re n c e  in  the f i r s t  
o r  second months of the  war would have been d e c is iv e , he was 
no lo n g e r f e a r f u l  o f S o v ie t o r Chinese in te rv e n t io n . The 
Chinese had 300,000 men in  M anchuria, bu t they had no a i r  
fo rc e , and any a ttem p t to  move sou th  to  Pyongyang would r e ­
s u l t  in  " th e  g r e a te s t  s la u g h te r ."  Having re a ssu re d  the 
P re s id e n t, MacArthur sought assu ran ces from Truman th a t  the  
South Korean government would n o t be t r e a te d  on the same
^%emo by the  CIA, su b j: T hreat o f F u ll-S c a le
Chinese Communist In te rv e n tio n  in  Korea, October 12, 1950, 
I b i d . .  933-934.
30Memo by CIA, s u b j . :  T hreat of S o v ie t In te rv e n ­
t io n  in  K orea, O ctober 12, 1950, I b id . . 935-936.
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b a s is  as  N orth Korea in  th e  postw ar p e rio d , as he had i n ­
fe r r e d  from re c e n t s ta te m e n ts  from the U nited N a tio n s .
Truman agreed th a t  Am erica should make i t  c le a r  th a t  "we are  
su p p o rtin g  the  Rhee government and propaganda can go to  
h e l l . "  The conference ended w ith  Truman ap p aren tly  s a t i s ­
f i e d  th a t  he and MacArthur understood each o t h e r 's  view s.
The Chinese r e a c t io n  to  the  Wake Is la n d  m eeting was 
n o t  p o s i t iv e .  The Dutch Charge re p o rte d  the i n i t i a l  r e a c ­
t io n  as su sp ic io n  th a t  th e  m eeting was th e  f i n a l  phase 
le a d in g  to  U.S. a g g re ss io n  a g a in s t  China. An O ctober 17 r e ­
p o r t  from Hong Kong s t a t i n g  th a t  P e k in g 's  support of N orth  
K orea would be l im ite d ,  balanced  t h i s  r e p o r t . On the  2 0 th , 
the  same source passed on a  r e p o r t  th a t  a t  an emergency 
m eeting  in  Peking th e  p re v io u s  week, the Chinese had decided  
to  in te rv e n e  in  Korea and had 300,000 tro o p s  on the  Man­
c h u ria n  bo rder ready  to  c ro s s  in to  N orth K orea.
In  the th i r d  week o f O ctober, the  U.S. p o s i t io n  
v i s - a - v i s  a p o ss ib le  C hinese in te rv e n tio n  was th a t  i t  was 
u n lik e ly  to  occur since  th e  most fav o ra b le  moment f o r  o v e rt  
in te rv e n t io n  had passed . C urren t e s tim a te s  in d ic a te d  t h a t  
i f  in te rv e n tio n  d id  occu r, i t  would be l im ite d  in  amount and 
would be c o v ert r a th e r  th a n  o v e rt . P a n n ik a r 's  b ia s e s  and
Substance of S ta tem en ts Made a t  Wake I s la n d  Con­
fe re n ce  on October 13, 1950, Compiled by G eneral Omar 
B rad ley , I b i d . . $48-960.
32Chapin to  Acheson, O ctober 17, 1950, I b i d . , 974; 
W ilkinson to  Acheson, O ctober 17, 1950, I b i d . . 9?é-977.
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p o l i t i c a l  sym pathies l e f t  the accuracy  and o b je c t iv i ty  of 
h is  r e p o r ts  open to  s e r io u s  q u e s tio n .^ ^
While Chinese in te rv e n t io n  was estim ated  as u n lik e ly , 
the  United S ta te s  n o n e th e le s s  wished to  do n o th in g  to  i r r i ­
t a t e  China u n n e c e s s a r ily . The S ta te  Department wanted 
MacArthur to  is su e  a  r e p o r t  making i t  c le a r  th a t  h is  p re s e n t 
o p e ra tio n s  would n o t i n te r f e r e  w ith  the  Suiho H y d ro e le c tric  
Power complex on the Y alu. T his was to  be done in  consu l­
t a t i o n  w ith  Rhee, who should  understand  "the  im portance of 
do ing  e v e ry th in g  p o s s ib le  to  avoid a c la sh  w ith  Chi Commie 
fo rc e s  a t  t h i s  tim e.
MacArthur f e l t  i t  was in a d v isa b le  to  is su e  such a  
s ta te m e n t. He had no in te n t io n  of d is tu rb in g  any p e ac e fu l 
and reaso n ab le  a p p lic a t io n  of t h i s  power supply . Having the 
U.N. Commander to  p r e d ic t  p u b lic ly  fu tu re  p o l ic i e s ,  d e c i­
s io n s , and a c t io n s  was most u n w i s e . S i n c e  the J o in t  
C h ie fs  suggested , bu t d id  n o t o rd e r , t h a t  MacArthur issu e  
th e  s ta tem en t, i t  was n o t  done. In s te a d  of avo id ing  a c tio n s  
t h a t  m ight provoke the C hinese, MacArthur issu e d  o rd ers  in  
O ctober rem oving a l l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  use of U.N. fo rc e s  
in  N orth Korea and is su e d  in s t r u c t io n s  to  proceed w ith  a l l
^ ^ e p u ty  U n d er-S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  (Matthews) to  
S p ec ia l A s s is ta n t  to  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f Defense f o r  F oreign  
M il i ta ry  A ffa ir s (B u rn s ) , O ctober 19, 1950, I b i d . . 98O-98I .
Acheson to  th e  Embassy in  Seoul, O ctober 21,
1950, I b i d . .  987.
^•^MacArthur to JCS, October 22,1950, Ib id . , 991-992.
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a v a ila b le  tro o p s  to  the  n o rth e rn  f r o n t i e r  of N orth  Korea.
The J o in t  C h ie fs  p ro te s te d  t h i s  a c tio n  a s  being c o n tra ry  to  
M acA rthur's d i r e c t iv e  of September 27, b u t the  G eneral argued 
th a t  m i l i ta r y  n e c e s s i ty  re q u ire d  him to  l i f t  the r e s t r i c ­
t io n s ,  since  South Korean tro o p s  were incapab le  o f accomp­
l i s h in g  the  ta sk  a l o n e . O n c e  more, the  J o in t  C h iefs  bowed 
to  the  judgment of th e  commander in  the f i e l d .
F ive days a f t e r  MacArthur removed r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
the  use of U.N. tro o p s  in  N orth K orea, the  8 th  Army took 
i t s  f i r s t  Chinese p r is o n e rs .  The 8 th  Army b e lie v e d , however, 
t h a t  th e re  were no s iz e a b le  numbers of Chinese tro o p s  in  
K orea. L a te r  in fo rm a tio n  in d ic a te d  th a t  perhaps two r e g i ­
m ents o f Chinese Communists had en te red  the  8 th  Army s e c to r .  
South Korea fo rc e s  were m eeting s t i f f  r e s is ta n c e  in  the 
Onjong-Huichon a re a  th a t  might be C h inese-in sp ired .^"^  On 
O ctober 31» th e  Hong Kong C onsulate  passed  on the  r e p o r t  
th a t  a t  a p re lim in a ry  m eeting of the C e n tra l P e o p le 's  
Governing Council on O ctober 24, a d e c is io n  was reached  fo r  
China to  e n te r  the  Korean h o s t i l i t i e s .  T h is  same source i n ­
d ic a te d  th a t  f o r  the  p a s t  two months tro o p s  had been m assing 
in  M anchuria and v i t a l  machinery had been removed from th a t  
a re a  in  p re p a ra tio n  f o r  war. On November 1, however, the
^ ^ d i t o r i a l  N ote, I b i d . .  995-996.
^^Charg^ in  Korea (Drum right) to  Ache son , O ctober 
29» 1950, I b i d . , 1012; Drumright to  Acheson, O ctober 30» 
1950, I b i d . . 1014; Memo by W illiam  McAfee o f the O ffice  of 
Chinese A f fa ir s  to  Clubb, O ctober 31. 1950, I b i d . , IO I9 .
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U.S. Embassy in  Seoul and the  8 th  Army inform ed Washington 
th a t  the Chinese would avoid any o v e r t  in te rven tion .*^
Edmund Clubb o f the  Chinese A f f a i r s  D iv is io n  viewed 
th ese  v a rio u s  r e p o r ts  w ith g re a te r  concern  than  did Seoul or 
the  8 th  Army. With the  presence o f C hinese troops in  North 
Korea confirm ed, he concluded th a t  i t  was u n lik e ly  t h a t  i n ­
te rv e n tio n  would be in  such l im ite d  numbers th a t  China would 
be prom ptly b loodied  and thrown out by a  fo rce  i t  had con­
s i s t e n t l y  la b e le d  a s  a "paper t i g e r . "  The renewal o f propa­
ganda c a l l in g  fo r  " re s is ta n c e  to  a g g re ss io n  in  Korea" ap­
peared  to  in d ic a te  a  la rg e  e f f o r t  m ight be invo lved . Such 
in te rv e n t io n  probably  would n o t occur w ithou t c o o rd in a tio n  
w ith  and an u n d e rs tan d in g  o f ,  the  S o v ie t c o n tr ib u tio n  to  be 
made. Any " in te rv e n t io n  would be designed  . . . to  achieve 
some r e a l  measure o f v ic to ry ."  While firm  in fo rm atio n  was 
la c k in g , the  s a f e s t  assum ption was t h a t  Chinese in te rv e n tio n  
would be in  co n s id e ra b le  fo rc e  and would have th e  backing of 
the  S o v ie t Union. In te rv e n tio n  would n o t occur m erely to 
p r o te c t  the Suiho power complex.
John L eigh ton  S tu a r t ,  a lso  o f  the  Chinese A f fa ir s  
D iv is io n , was deeply  concerned about the  s i tu a t io n  to o . The 
growing p o s s ib i l i t y  of being p u lle d  in to  a war w ith China
^®Wilkinson to  Acheson, O ctober 31» 1950, I b i d . . 
1019-1021; Drum right to  Acheson, November 1, 1950, I b i d . ,  
1022 .
^^Clubb to  Rusk, November 1, 1950, Ib id . . 1023.
- 259 -
was d is tu rb in g  s in ce  i t  would be c o n tra ry  to  U.S. i n t e r e s t s  
and could  b e n e f i t  on ly  the  S o v ie t Union. The U nited S ta te s  
should leav e  no s tone  un turned  to  avoid  t h i s .  China should 
be c a l le d  on to  cease  i t s  ag g re ss io n  and the  United N ations 
should is su e  a ssu ra n c e s  th a t  C h in a 's  border would n o t be 
v io la te d . Rusk was ag reeab le  to  t h i s  l in e  o f th in k in g .
Edward B a rre t  of th e  P ub lic  A f fa ir s  D iv is io n  of the 
S ta te  Departm ent a ls o  expressed  concern . He f e l t  i t  n eces­
sa ry  to  be an a la rm is t  both  on the b a s is  of C h ina 's  propa­
ganda and on the  b u ild -u p  o f Chinese "v o lu n tee rs"  in  Korea 
and because of the  hundreds o f thousands of tro o p s they  had 
massed in  M anchuria. The on ly  p o ss ib le  e x p lan a tio n  was th a t  
in te rv e n tio n  would n o t be l im ite d  to  the  p re se n t number of 
Chinese tro o p s  in  K orea.
The CIA r e je c te d  th e  " a la rm is t"  v iew poin t, even 
though i t  agreed t h a t  Chinese tro o p s  were now opposing U.N. 
fo rc e s  in  K orea. A t o t a l  o f 15-20,000 tro o p s  were now in  
N orth Korea and th e  p resence  of S o v ie t-ty p e  j e t s  in d ic a te d  
th a t  the  K rem lin m ight be p ro v id in g  a t  l e a s t  l o g i s t i c  sup­
p o r t .  A f e a r  of a U.N. in v as io n  of M anchuria e x is te d  in  
Chinese minds d e s p i te  the  c le a r - c u t  d e f in i t io n  of U.N. ob­
je c t iv e s .  The p re s e n t  Chinese in te rv e n t io n , however.
^^Memo by A c tin g  O ff ic e r  in  Charge o f P o l i t i c a l  Af­
f a i r s ,  O ffice  of C hinese A f f a i r s ( S tu a r t ) ,  November 3,
1950, I b i d . .  1029- 1031.
ill
B arret to  Rusk, November 3, 1950, Ib id . , IO30.
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appeared to  be only  to  e s ta b l is h  a  "cordon s a n i ta i r e "  so u th  
o f  the Yalu to  guaran tee  the  s e c u r i ty  of the Manchurian bo r­
d e r  a g a in s t  " invad ing" U.N. fo rc e s  and to  in su re  the c o n tin -
42ued flow  o f e l e c t r i c  power from th e  Suiho power p la n ts .
The C IA 's calm ing e s tim a te  rece iv ed  support from 
o th e r  so u rc e s . The Consul General a t  Hong Kong acknowledged 
th a t  since O ctober 29 th e re  had been a sharp in c re a se  in  the  
q u a n ti ty  and th e  b e ll ic o s e  n a tu re  of Chinese propaganda. 
While i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to  a sse s s  p r e c is e ly  the  a v a ila b le  in ­
fo rm ation , the  C onsu late  s t i l l  b e liev ed  th a t  China "would 
n o t openly send Chinese tro o p s a c ro ss  the b o rd e r ."  The in ­
creased  propaganda re p re se n te d  a d e c is io n  to  in c re a se  a id  to
43N orth K orea, though i t  would n o t be a l l - o u t  in  n a tu re .
C a rry in g  g r e a te r  w eight was M acArthur*s November 4
assessm ent in  which he sa id  "I recommend a g a in s t  h as ty  con -,
e lu s io n s  which m ight be prem ature and b e liev e  th a t  a  f i n a l
appra isem ent should aw ait a  more com plete accum ulation  o f
m il i ta ry  f a c t s . "  MacArthur suggested  nowhere in  h is  message
th a t  f u l l - s c a l e  Chinese in te rv e n tio n  was l ik e l y ,  because he
was unaware t h a t  the Chinese, between O ctober 14 and
November 1, had se n t 180,000 tro o p s  from the e l i t e  F o u rth
44F ie ld  Army in to  N orth  K orea.
^^em o by D ire c to r  of CIA(Smith) to  the  P re s id e n t,  
November 1, 1950, I b i d . . 1025-1026.
^ % ilk in s o n  to  Ache son, November 3 .1 9 5 0 .Ib id . .1034-35  
44Schnabel, P o licy . 234-239; E d ito r ia l Note, FR.1950,
VII, 1036.
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The same day th a t  MacArthur expressed  h is  doubts 
about a m assive Chinese in te rv e n tio n , Clubb once more sounded 
a  warning. The Chinese in te rv e n tio n , viewed in  l i g h t  o f 
t h e i r  e a r l i e r  w arnings a g a in s t U.N. fo rc e s  c ro s s in g  the 
38th  p a r a l l e l ,  was a c a lc u la te d , w e ll-p re p a re d  move. At 
t h i s  p o in t  i t  was d o u b tfu l th a t  a r e tu rn  to  the  38th  p a r a l ­
l e l  would meet " th e  p re s e n t jo in t  d e s ig n s  of th e  Chinese 
Communists and th e  Moscow s t r a t e g i s t s  . . . ."  Clubb oon- 
cluded th a t  C h in a 's  in te rv e n tio n  was n o t l im ite d  to  p ro te c ­
t io n  o f the  Yalu power i n s t a l l a t i o n s  a n d /o r  the  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f a  cordon s a n i t a i r e ,  which would be l e s s  than  a m in i­
mum o b je c tiv e . The minimum o b je c tiv e  fo r  China was e i t h e r  
r e s to r a t io n  of th e  s ta tu s  quo an te  bellum  in  N orth  Korea or 
complete ex p u ls io n  of U.N. fo rc e s  from a l l  o f K orea. Clubb 
recommended th a t  th e  U nited  N ations m ain ta in  i t s  u n ite d  
f ro n t  and t h a t  th e  essence of M acArthur' s d i r e c t iv e s  rem ain 
unchanged u n t i l  th e  m il i ta r y  s i tu a t io n  was f u r th e r  c l a r i f i e d .  
Clubb added the  hopefu l thought th a t  " i f  a  sound drubbing 
could be ad m in is te red  to  the Chinese Communist fo rc e s ,  w ith  
th e  war lo c a l iz e d  w ith in  Korea, t h i s  cou ld  have on ly  a  
s a lu ta ry  e f f e c t  in  Asia."^-^
C lu b b 's  concern  r e f le c te d  a  g e n e ra lly  uneasy, bu t 
n o t  pan icked , a t t i t u d e  in  the S ta te  D epartm ent, where i t  had 
been decided  t h a t  the  m a tte r  of Chinese in te r v e n t io n  would
^^Clubb to  Rusk,November ^.1950.FR.1950.V II .1038-40.
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be brought befo re  the  U nited N ations in  hopes o f  lo c a l iz in g  
the f ig h t in g  in  K orea. The S ta te  Department f e l t  th a t  fo r  
the  p re s e n t  n o th in g  p ro v o ca tiv e  should be done, such a s  l a ­
b e lin g  China a s  an a g g re sso r o r seek ing  s a n c tio n s  a g a in s t  
China th ro u g h  the  U nited  N a t i o n s . T h u s  the  S ta te  D epart­
ment was concerned and i r r i t a t e d  when informed alm ost a c c i ­
d e n ta l ly  of M acA rthur's p lan s  to  bomb, on November 6, the  
i n te r n a t io n a l  b rid g es  a c ro ss  th e  Yalu on the M anchurian bor­
d e r , an a c t io n  a p p a re n tly  im pelled  by the  evidence of growing
kn
numbers o f Chinese tro o p s  in  N orth K orea. '
The problem  o f a i r  o p e ra tio n s  n ea r the  bo rder o f
M anchuria and S ib e r ia  o f te n  had been a sore p o in t  between
M acArthur and the  S ta te  D epartm ent. The a c c id e n ta l  bombing
on O ctober 8 o f a S o v ie t a i r f i e l d  100 k ilo m e te rs  from the
Korean b o rd e r , had brought a s tro n g  message from  Acheson to
L t. G eneral George C. S tra tem eyer, Commander o f the  A ir
Force in  the  F ar E a s t ,  in fo rm ing  him t h a t  such an a t ta c k
should n o t  reo c cu r under any c ircu m stan ces . The in c id e n t
brought an a ttem p t to  d e lim it  e x p l i c i t l y  a i r  o p e ra tio n s  in
48the v i c i n i t y  of N orth K o re a 's  b o rd e rs . The J o i n t  C h iefs
Acheson to  C e rta in  D ip lom atic  O ff ic e s , November 5» 
1950, I b i d . . 1049; Acheson the  Embassy in  the  U nited  Kingdom, 
November 6, 1950, I b i d . . 1052.
47Memo o f C onversa tion  by Acheson, November 6, 1950, 
I b i d . . 1050; Schnabel, P o l ic y , 241.
48Ambassador in  the  S o v ie t Union (K irk ) to  Acheson, 
O ctober 10, 1950, FR.1950. V II, 917; Memo by Acheson o f Con­
v e rs a t io n  w ith  L o v e tt, O ctober 10, 1950, I b i d . . 922.
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b e liev e d  th a t  th e  need fo r  a i r  i n te r d ic t io n  o p e ra tio n s  in  
a re a s  con tig u o u s to  N orth K o re a 's  boundaries was s u f f ic ie n t  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  no f u r th e r  im p o s itio n  of l im i ta t io n s .  
American ground fo rc e s  would be needed up to  the in te r n a ­
t io n a l  bo rders and i t  was u n d e s ira b le  to  deny them a i r  sup­
p o r t  in  those a re a s ;  the lo s s  o f l i v e s  could n o t be j u s t i ­
f i e d .  M oreover, a i r  reconnaisance  would be a  co n tin u in g  
req u irem en t. S ince MacArthur and h is  su b o rd in a te s  were 
aware of the need to  avoid v io la t io n s  o f  S o v ie t or Chinese
iiO
t e r r i t o r y ,  any f u r th e r  d i r e c t iv e  would be su p e rflu o u s .
With t h i s  in  mind, the S ta te  D ep artm en t's  co n ste rn a ­
t io n  i s  easy to  understand  when L o v e tt,  on h is  own i n i t i a ­
t iv e ,  informed Ache son and Rusk of MacArthur ' s p la n s  th ree  
hours before  th ey  were to  be im plem ented. L o v e tt d id  so be­
cause he f e l t  th e  bombing, from an o p e ra t io n a l ' v iew poin t, . 
would n o t in te r r u p t  t r a f f i c  a c ro ss  th e  Yalu d e c is iv e ly ,  and 
because the o p e ra tio n  c a r r ie d  the  r i s k  of bombing Antung on 
th e  M anchurian s id e  of the  Yalu. Rusk p o in te d  out th a t  the 
U nited S ta te s  had promised to  c o n su lt  the  B r i t i s h  p r io r  to  
any a c t io n  th a t  involved a t ta c k s  on th e  Manchurian side  of 
th e  Y alu . The U nited  S ta te s  was p u rsu in g  a  r e s o lu t io n  in  
the  U nited  N a tio n s  c a l l in g  on China to  cease i t s  Korean ac­
t i v i t i e s ,  in  an a ttem pt to  ga in  U.N. support f o r  fu tu re  ac­
t io n s  should th e  Chinese re fu se  to  heed th e  U nited N ations.
^^L ovett to  Acheson, November 4 ,1 9 5 0 .I b id . , 103?. 
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The proposed bombing would only inflam e the s i tu a t io n ,  and 
L o v e tt, Rusk, and Acheson agreed i t  should be postponed.
S e c re ta ry  of Defense M arshall was informed and he 
agreed  th a t  th e  bombing was an unwise move u n le ss  th e re  was 
a  mass movement o f Chinese tro o p s  a c ro ss  the  Yalu. The ac­
t io n  was o rdered  postponed u n t i l  the  P re s id e n t could be con­
s u l te d .  Truman, when inform ed, sa id  he would approve the 
a c t io n  i f  i t  was needed to  in su re  the  s e c u r i ty  of U.N.
tro o p s . The P re s id e n t  th en  in s tru c te d  Acheson to  q u e s tio n
MacArthur on what the  f a c t s  were, and fo r  L ovett and Acheson 
to  handle the  s i tu a t io n  s o le ly  on the  b a s is  of the f a c t s
th a t  bore on th e  s e c u r i ty  o f U.N. tro o p s .
The J o in t  C h ie fs  d ire c te d  MacArthur to  postpone a l l  
bombing w ith in  f iv e  m ile s  o f the  Manchurian border and to 
e x p la in  h is  rea so n s  f o r  o rd e rin g  such a  s t r ik e .  M acA rthur'5  
r e p ly  of November 6 was a n o ta b le  d ep artu re  from h is  Novem­
b er 4 e s t im a te . He inform ed W ashington th a t  "Men and ma­
t e r i e l  in  la rg e  fo rc e  a re  pouring  a c ro ss  a l l  b ridges over the  
Y ^ u  from M anchuria." T h is movement th rea te n ed  to  d e s tro y  
th e  fo rc e s  under h is  command. The only  way to  h a l t  t h i s  
movement was to  d e s tro y  the  b rid g es  and su b je c t a l l  enemy 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  in  the  n o r th , which were supporting  th e  ad­
vance, to  th e  maximum p o s s ib le  a i r  d e s tru c t io n .  MacArthur
^^Memo of C onversa tion  by Acheson, November 16 ,
1950, iM â - ,  1055- 1056.
^^I b i d . . 1056- 1057.
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warned t h a t  "Every hour th a t  t h i s  i s  postponed w il l  be pa id  
fo r  d e a r ly  in  American and o th e r  U nited N ations b lo o d ."  
MacArthur went on to  say th a t  the  r e s t r i c t i o n s  imposed on 
him would be d is a s t r o u s  and would r e s u l t  in  a  ca lam ity  of 
major p ro p o r tio n s  f o r  which he could n o t accep t re s p o n s i­
b i l i t y  w ith o u t the  P r e s id e n t 's  p e rso n a l and d i r e c t  under­
stan d in g  o f  the  s i t u a t i o n .  MacArthur req u ested  an immediate 
re c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  W ash ing ton 's decision .-^
The J o in t  C h ie fs  r e p l ie d  th a t  the s i tu a t io n  MacArthur 
d e p ic te d  had changed c o n sid e rab ly  from h is  r e p o r t  o f Novem­
ber 4 . In  l i g h t  of t h i s  new e v a lu a tio n , he was au th o rize d  
to  proceed w ith th e  p lanned bombing, though t h i s  d id  n o t in ­
clude bombing of dams o r power p la n ts  on the Yalu. The 
J o in t  C h ie fs  i n d i r e c t l y  c r i t i c i z e d  MacArthur when they  added 
th a t  th e  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  re q u ire d  t h a t  "we be k e p t informed 
of im p o rtan t changes in  the  s i tu a t io n  as they  o ccu rred ."  
M acArthur' s  e s tim a te  of the  p re s e n t s i tu a t io n ,  as  req u ested
CO
on November 6, was to  be subm itted  as soon as p o s s ib le
MacArthur r e p l ie d  on th e  ? th , n o tin g  th a t  in v io a b i l ­
i t y  o f M anchuria and S ib e r ia  had been c a rd in a l p r in c ip le s  of 
h i s  h e a d q u a rte rs  and would con tinue  to  be. He added th a t  
d e s tru c t io n  o f h y d ro e le c tr ic  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  had nev er been 
'con tem pla ted . As to  the  p re s e n t  s i tu a t io n ,  MacArthur
■^ J^CS to  M acArthur, November 6, 1950, I b i d . , 
1057- 1058; Truman, T r i a l , 375.
^^JCS to  M acArthur, November 6 , I 950, PR .1950,
V II, 1075- 1076.
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b e lieved  th a t  China had committed s u f f i c i e n t  fo rc e s  to  have 
se ized  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  in  the w estern s e c to r ,  and to  have de­
layed  m a te r ia l ly  th e  o ffe n s iv e  in  the e a s te rn  s e c to r .  The 
Chinese seemed to  be o p e ra tin g  on the p r in c ip le  th a t  t h e i r  
" fo rc e s  w ill  be used and augmented a t  w i l l ,  p robably  w ith o u t 
any form al d e c la r a t io n  o f h o s t i l i t i e s . "  Should re in fo rcem en t 
c o n tin u e , the p o in t  cou ld  be reached where "resum ption  of 
the  U.N. advance would be im possib le and m ight even be 
fo rced  in to  r e t r o g r a d e ."  The U.N. o ffe n s iv e  would be r e ­
sumed in  the w est, however, s in ce  t h i s  was the  on ly  way to  
measure the enem y's s tre n g th  a c c u ra te ly .
As a  r e s u l t  o f M acA rthur's l a t e s t  e s t im a te , more 
moderate than  h is  November 4 r e p o r t ,  and th e  r e p o r ts  and 
e s tim a te s  about p o s s ib le  f u l l - s c a le  Chinese in te rv e n t io n ,  a 
N a tio n a l S e c u rity  C ouncil rev iew  o f th e  Korea s i tu a t io n  was. 
c a lle d  f o r .  W ith th e  c r i t i c a l  m eeting scheduled fo r  Novem­
b er 9» John P. D avies o f the P o lic y  P lan n in g  S ta f f ,  p rep a red  
a  d r a f t  memorandum on November 7 fo r  c o n s id e ra tio n  and d i s ­
cu ssio n . D avies ad m itted  th a t  Chinese in te rv e n t io n  p o s s ib ly  
could rem ain a t  th e  p re s e n t  l e v e l  and th a t  the  Chinese were 
making a  token show o f fo rc e , seek ing  to  in tim id a te  the  
United N a tio n s in  hopes o f g a in in g  a n e g o tia te d  s e ttle m e n t 
p ro v id in g  fo r  a  b u f f e r  zone on t h e i r  f r o n t i e r .  O ther con­
s id e ra t io n s ,  however, suggested  the  s i t u a t io n  was more
^ \a c A r th u r  to  JCS, November 7 .1 9 5 0 ,I b id . . 1076-77.
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ominous than  t h i s .  The Chinese could  g re a t ly  expand t h e i r  
in te rv e n tio n , and id e o lo g ic a lly  they  had every rea so n  to  
f o s t e r  Korean Communist r e s is ta n c e  and to  expand on th e  pen­
in s u la .  The U nited S ta te s ,  a s  the  g u id in g  s p i r i t  behind 
the  U nited N atio n s presence in  K orea, was the  key f a c to r  in  
de te rm in ing  P e k in g 's  r e a c t io n s .  The C hinese, b e s id e s  
having an id e o lo g ic a l  a n tip a th y  to  Am erica, viewed th e  
U nited  S ta te s  w ith  a morbid d i s t r u s t  and h a tre d .
D avies b e liev e d  the  S o v ie ts  were encourag ing  C h in a 's  
in te rv e n t io n .  Both governm ents knew th e  r i s k s  in v o lv ed , as 
U.S. in te rv e n t io n  in  Korea had in d ic a te d  th a t ' th e  American 
people were very  u n p re d ic ta b le . Thus, the  Chinese were p re ­
pared  to  accep t a v io le n t  U.S. r e a c t io n .  The S o v ie ts , whose 
main i n t e r e s t  la y  in  Europe, were on ly  too  g lad  to  see the  
U nited  S ta te s ,  B r i ta in ,  and France drawn in to  a  deeper m i l i ­
ta ry  commitment in  A sia . W hatever R u ss ia  had to  pay to  i n ­
duce Chinese in te rv e n t io n  was w orth i t  to  the K rem lin .
D avies concluded th a t  on th e  evidence a t  hand, the  
U nited  S ta te s  could  n o t know what P e k in g 's  o r Moscow's 
course  would be in  the coming m onths, a s  the  s i tu a t io n  p r e ­
sen ted  a wide range o f p o ss ib le  developm ents. One th in g  was 
c le a r —C h in a 's  a c t io n s  were in  d e fia n ce  of the law -a b id in g  
members of th e  world community. The U n ited  S ta te s  had seve­
r a l  a l t e r n a t iv e s  open to  i t .  I t  could  w ithdraw i t s  fo rc e s
^^D avies D ra f t Memo, November 7 .1 9 5 0 .I b i d . . IO78 .
^^Ibid. .  1079-1080.
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in  o rd e r to  avoid p ro v o ca tio n s  and to  husband i t s  s tre n g th . 
T his might a l l e v ia te  the  p re se n t c r i s i s  but would lead  im­
m ed ia te ly  to  new dangers e lsew here. A nother a l t e r n a t iv e  was 
to  b re a k -o ff  c o n ta c t w ith  the enemy and go on th e  d e fe n s iv e . 
T his would be a  tem poriz ing  course a t  b e s t .  A th ir d  course 
was to  seek a n e g o tia te d  se ttle m e n t im m ediately , but th i s  
was a  weak and u n s a t is f a c to r y  co u rse . F in a l ly ,  the  United 
S ta te s  could  c a r ry  the h o s t i l i t i e s  in to  China and Manchuria 
p ro p e r, w ith th e  r i s k  o f a g en era l A sian w ar.^^
D avies b e liev ed  the  United S ta te s  should "seek a lo ­
c a liz e d  s o lu tio n  in  K orea and p repare  f o r  p o s s ib le  imminent 
ou tb reak  of WW I I I . "  T his p o lic y  should be developed and 
made p u b lic  s im u ltan eo u sly . In  o rd er to  lo c a l iz e  the  con­
f l i c t ,  th e  U nited S ta te s  had to  avoid any a c ts  th a t  would 
b r in g  the  Chinese o v e r t ly  in to  Korea—th e  same a p p lied  to  
th e  S o v ie t Union. T a c t ic a l ly  t h i s  meant the Manchurian 
bo rd er should n o t be v io la te d  on lan d  o r in  the  a ir .^®
What D avies had concluded, in  e f f e c t ,  was th a t  the 
U nited  S ta te s  should con tinue  i t s  p re s e n t  p o l ic y . Not un­
ex p ec te d ly , Edmiuid Clubb seconded t h i s  op in ion  in  a memoran­
dum to  Dean Rusk on November 7, in  which he urged th a t  
M acA rthur's d i r e c t iv e  o f October 9 be con tinued  pending de­
f i n i t i v e  developm ents. But any a l l - o u t  o f fe n s iv e s  should be 
abandoned in  fa v o r o f more wary, t e s t i n g  t a c t i c s  th a t  would
^ ? Ib id .. 1083. ^^ Ib id .
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a llo w  fo r  an o rd e r ly  w ithdraw al to  s tro n g  defensive  p o s i­
t io n s  i f  r e a l  danger th re a te n e d . In  e f f e c t ,  m il i ta ry  opera­
t io n s  should  be slowed so a s  to  t e s t  Chinese in te n t io n s  and 
in  o rd e r  t h a t  W ashington could  make p o l i t i c a l  e s tim a te s .
The J o in t  C h ie fs  inform ed MacArthur of the upcoming 
N a tio n a l S e c u rity  C ouncil m eeting. They thought th a t  the 
in tro d u c tio n  o f Chinese fo rc e s  to  the  e x te n t re p o r te d , con­
s t i t u t e d  a m ajor Chinese Communist e n try  in to  N orth Korea. 
T his new s i tu a t io n  meant th a t  M acA rthur's o b jec tiv e  of de­
s t r u c t io n  o f  N orth Korean armed fo rc e s  might have to  be r e ­
examined and M acA rthur's o p in ion  was d e s ire d .
M acA rthur's r e p ly  was immediate and firm  in  i t s  op­
p o s i t io n  to  any re -e x am in a tio n  of h is  m ission . The October 
d i r e c t iv e  f u l ly  covered th e  p re s e n t s i tu a t io n .  In  h is  opin­
io n , " i t  would be f a t a l  to  weaken the  fundam ental and basic, 
p o lic y  of th e  U nited N a tio n s  to  d e s tro y  a l l  r e s i s t in g  armed 
fo rc e s  in  Korea and b r in g  th a t  coun try  under a u n ited  and 
f re e  n a t io n ."  Even under the  p re s e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s  on h is  
use of a i r  power, M acArthur b e liev ed  he could deny Chinese 
re in fo rc e m e n ts  the  a b i l i t y  to  c ro s s  th e  Yalu in  numbers su f­
f i c i e n t  so a s  to  enable  him to  d e s tro y  those fo rc e s  now 
fa c in g  the  U nited N a tio n s . An a tta c k  to  achieve t h i s  goal 
would begin  November 17, w ith  U.N. fo rc e s  d r iv in g  to  the
^^Clubb to  Rusk, November ? , 1950.I b id . , IO88-IO 92.
^^JCS to  M acArthur, November 8, 1930, I b id . ,
1097- 1098 .
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b o rd er and se cu rin g  a l l  o f N orth K orea. To do an y th in g  l e s s  
"would com plete ly  d e s tro y  the m orale of my fo rc e s ,"  and would 
r e s u l t  in  "an in d e f in i t e  r e te n t io n  o f our m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  
a lo n g  d i f f i c u l t  d e fe n s iv e  l i n e s  in  N orth Korea . . . The 
U nited  S ta te s  should p r e s s  th e  U nited  N ations to  condemn 
Chinese a g g re ss io n  and should  c a l l  f o r  t h e i r  w ithdraw al on 
p a in s  of m i l i ta r y  s a n c tio n s  should  they  f a i l  to  do so .^^
The CIA a ls o  p re se n te d  an e v a lu a tio n  of th e  s i tu a t io n  
p r i o r  to  the  November 9 NSC m eeting . While e s t im a tin g  p re ­
s e n t  Chinese s tre n g th  in  K orea a t  only 30-40,000 men, the 
CIA b e liev ed  th e re  were some 700,000 tro o p s  in  M anchuria. 
These fo rc e s  were cap ab le  of h a l t in g  and re v e rs in g  th e  U. K. ' s  
advance and o f in s u r in g  th e  con tinued  e x is te n ce  o f a  Commu­
n i s t  regim e on N orth  Korean s o i l .  In  accom plish ing  t h i s ,  
the  Chinese p r e s e n t ly  r e ta in e d  f u l l  freedom o f a c t io n  and 
could  a d ju s t  th e i r  a c t io n s  to  meet developm ents in  K orea.
The CIA f e l t  t h a t  the Chinese Communist in te rv e n t io n  
in  K orea, undoubtedly  done w ith  S o v ie t suppo rt, was c a r r ie d  
ou t w ith  f u l l  r e c o g n itio n  of p o s s ib le  r e t a l i a t i o n  and a gene­
r a l  war—th u s , they  p robab ly  would ignore  an u ltim atum  r e ­
q u ir in g  t h e i r  w ithd raw al. The immediate reaso n  f o r  t h e i r  
in te rv e n t io n  was the  U .S. c ro s s in g  of the 38 th  p a r a l l e l  and 
the  r e s u l t i n g  sw if t  c o lla p s e  o f N orth  Korean r e s i s ta n c e .
^^MacArthur to  JCS, November 9 .1 9 5 0 .I b id . , 1107-09, 
^^em o  P rep ared  by CIA, November 8, 1950, I b i d . .
1101.
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W ithout Chinese in te r v e n t io n ,  U.N. fo rc e s  would soon have 
reached  the Yalu R iv e r and the Korean P e o p le 's  R epublic  
would have ceased  to  e x i s t .  China in te rv en ed  r a th e r  than  
acc ep t th e  p resence  o f an openly  u n fr ie n d ly  " U .S .-c o n tro lle d "  
regim e on i t s  b o rd e r . The Chinese f a i lu r e  to  in te rv e n e  
e a r l i e r  a t  two more c r i t i c a l  p h ases , when the U nited  S ta te s  
h e ld  only  th e  Pusan p e rim e te r  and l a t e r  when the  Inchon 
la n d in g s  were made, confirm ed t h i s  in te r p r e ta t io n .^ ^
The CIA d id  n o t th in k  S o v ie t in te rv e n t io n  was 
l i k e l y .  The S o v ie t Union p robab ly  b e liev e d  the U nited  S ta te s  
would n o t  r i s k  a  g e n e ra l war over Chinese in te rv e n t io n  a lo n e . 
Moscow r e a l iz e d  t h a t  the p r in c ip a l  r i s k  of a g e n e ra l war lay  
in  the  e x e rc is e  of S o v ie t in te rv e n t io n .  A d e c is io n  to  p u r­
sue enemy a i r c r a f t  in to  M anchuria and to  bomb tro o p  concen­
t r a t io n s  and a i r f i e l d s  th e r e ,  would n o t g r e a t ly  in f lu e n c e  a.
S o v ie t d e c is io n  to  a c t ,  bu t such maneuvers would in c re a s e
64m a te r ia l ly  th e  e x te n t  of C hinese in te rv e n t io n  in  K orea.
The l a s t  departm ent heard from befo re  the  NSC m eeting  
was the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  of S ta f f .  They b e liev e d  t h a t  only a 
determ ined  m i l i ta r y  e f f o r t  could  d e fe a t  the  Chinese then  
p re s e n t  in  K orea. C h in a 's  rea so n s  f o r  be ing  in  K orea were 
n o t  c le a r ,  b u t c e r t a in ly  inc luded  a  d e s ire  to  p r o te c t  the  
Yalu power i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  e s ta b lish m e n t o f a  cordon s a n i ta i r e
^^ I b id . .  1104.
64Memo by D ire c to r  o f  the  CIA (Sm ith) to  th e  NSC, 
November 9, 1950, I b i d . . 1122.
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in  North K orea, c o n tin u a tio n  o f  the  undeclared  war in  N orth  
Korea in  o rd er to  sap U.S. s t r e n g th ,  and a  d e s ire  to  d r iv e  
the  U nited  N ations o u t o f K orea. The U nited N ations should 
make ev ery  e f f o r t  to  re a s s u re  the  Chinese about the  hydro­
e le c t r i c  p la n ts  on the  Y alu .^^
The J o in t  C h ie fs  of S ta f f  b e liev e d  th a t  a su s ta in e d  
m il i ta ry  campaign in  Korea would be a  heavy d ra in  on U .S. 
m il i ta ry  p o te n t i a l .  A con tinued  U.S. commitment in  K orea 
would be a t  the expense of more u se fu l s t r a te g ic  deploym ent 
elsew here of the  fo rc e s  in v o lv ed . There appeared to  be 
th ree  c o u rse s  o f a c t io n  open: fo rce  the  a c tio n  to  a su c c e ss ­
f u l  co n c lu sio n ; e s t a b l i s h  a  d e fe n s iv e  p o s i t io n  sh o r t  o f the  
Korean b o rd er; o r w ithdraw , which " i f  conducted v o lu n ta r i ly  
would so low er th e  worldwide p r e s t ig e  o f the  U nited S ta te s  
th a t  i t  would be t o t a l l y  u n a cc ep tab le , and i f  conducted in - , 
v o lu n ta r i ly  could on ly  be accep ted  a s  the  p re lude  to  
g lo b a l w ar."^^
M acA rthur's argum ents d id  n o t e n t i r e ly  convince the  
J o in t  C h ie fs , s in ce  th ey  b e lie v e d  th a t  every  e f f o r t  "should  
be expended as a  m a tte r  of urgency to  s e t t l e  the  problem  of 
Chinese Communist in te rv e n t io n  in  K orea by p o l i t i c a l  means, 
p re fe ra b ly  through the  U.N................... " T h is e f f o r t  would i n ­
clude re a ssu ra n c e s  to  the  C hinese "w ith  r e s p e c t  to  our
^•^JCS to  M a rsh a ll, November 9 ,1950, I b i d . , 111?. 
^^Ibid..  1121.
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i n t e n t ,  d i r e c t  n e g o tia t io n s  through our A l l ie s  and the  I n ­
te r im  Committee w ith  the  Chinese Communist Government, and 
by any o th e r  a v a i la b le  means." Pending f in a l  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  
o f Chinese o b je c tiv e s  in  Korea, however, M acA rthur's Octo­
b e r 9 d i r e c t iv e  should  rem ain in  fo rce  and the  U nited  
S ta te s  "should  develop i t s  p la n s  and make i t s  p re p a ra t io n s  
on th e  b a s is  th a t  th e  r i s k  o f g lo b a l war i s  in c re a se d .
At the November 9 NSC m eeting, the J o i n t  C h iefs  
p o s i t io n  was b a s ic a l ly  accep ted . A cheson 's a ttem p t to  g a in  
acqu iescence  to  a b u f fe r  zone twenty m iles deep on each side  
of the  Yalu was u n su c c e ss fu l. While B radley agreed  t h a t  the 
chances of defend ing  a  l in e  w ell sou th  o f the  Yalu were b e t ­
t e r ,  he n o n e th e le ss  b e liev ed  th a t  any U.N. backward movement 
would low er p re s t ig e  and a f f e c t  the w il l  of South Korea to  
f i g h t .  The N a tio n a l S e c u rity  Council agreed t h a t  the U nited 
S ta te s  would seek a p o l i t i c a l  so lu tio n  to  the problem  of
C hinese in te rv e n t io n ,  but a t  the p re s e n t time would n o t
68a l t e r  M acA rthur's b a s ic  m ission .
In  h is  memoirs, Dean Acheson has sa id  t h a t  the U nited 
S ta te s  a t  t h i s  NSC m eeting , "m issed i t s  l a s t  chance to  h a l t  
th e  march to  d i s a s t e r  in  K orea. A ll the P r e s id e n t 's  ad­
v i s e r s  in  t h i s  m a tte r , c iv i l i a n  and m il i ta ry ,  knew th a t  
som ething was badly wrong, though what i t  was, how to  f in d
^^ Ib id .
68Memo by th e  NSC S ta f f ,  In te rim  R eport, November 14. 
1950, I b i d . . 1150; Schnabel, P o l ic y . 254-255-
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69o u t, and what to  do abou t i t ,  they m uffed." The in te n se  
a c t i v i t y  in  W ashington fo llo w in g  t h i s  NSC m eeting, up to  
the  time of m assive Chinese in te rv e n t io n ,  in d ic a te d  th a t  e f ­
f o r t s  were continued  to  d isc o v e r  what was "badly  wrong".
The U nited S ta te s ,  once i t  had decided  to  in te rv en e  
in  the  Korean War, bowed to  the  judgment of the m il i ta r y ;  
and the  m i l i ta r y ,  a s  was t r a d i t i o n a l ,  was bowing to  the  judg­
ment o f the commander in  the  f i e l d .  The a v a ila b le  evidence 
was c o n f l ic t in g .  A p o s i t iv e  r e p o r t  throw ing doubt on the 
chances of in te rv e n t io n  c o u n te red  every  n e g a tiv e  assessm ent 
w arning of imminent and m assive Chinese in te rv e n t io n . By 
November 9. however, th e re  could  be no doubt th a t  th e re  were 
huge Chinese troop  c o n c e n tra tio n s  on the Manchurian bo rd er. 
Nor could th e re  be any doubt th a t  China had a lready  committed 
tro o p s  to N orth K orea. These two f a c to r s  alone should have 
been enough to  d ic t a t e  a p o l ic y  o f extreme c au tio n  u n t i l  th e  
s i tu a t io n  was c l a r i f i e d .  But th ese  two f a c t s  d id  no t stand  
in  i s o l a t i o n ,  as  th e re  were o th e r  in d ic a t io n s  o f C h in a 's  i n ­
te n t io n  to  in te rv e n e  in  K orea, and more were forthcom ing.
One o f the s tra n g e r  s ig n s  to  ap p ea r, o r d isa p p ea r, 
was the  manner in  which C hinese tro o p s  seemed to  m elt away 
a f t e r  November 9, to  re a p p e a r  in  m assive numbers on Novem­
ber 25 . The Chinese backed o f f  and had gone o f the d e fen ­
s iv e .  American p r is o n e rs  were r e le a s e d  and one in te l l ig e n c e
69Ache son. C reation . 602.
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o f f ic e r  concluded th a t  t h i s  d e c is io n  on C h in a 's  p a r t  had to  
be made a t  a  h igh  l e v e l .  The Charge in  Seoul o ffe re d  th e  
view th a t  the Chinese m ight be t e s t i n g  U.N. d e te rm in a tio n  
to  continue i t s  northw ard advance . While t h i s  behav io r 
was very  p u z z lin g , no one seemed to  a t ta c h  very  g re a t  s ig ­
n if ic a n c e  to  i t  a t  the  tim e . Through h in d s ig h t i t  i s  
p robab ly  c o rre c t  to  say th a t  the  Chinese were g iv in g  the  
U nited N ations one l a s t  chance to  s to p  i t s  northw ard ad­
vance, while a t  the same tim e su c c e s s fu lly  draw ing an o v e r­
c o n fid e n t MacArthur in to  an in c re a s in g ly  d i f f i c u l t  t e r r a i n  
should the U nited N ations decide  to  con tinue  i t s  move n o r th .
I f ,  as Ache son b e lie v e d , U.S. p o lic y  makers sensed 
som ething badly wrong in  n o r th e rn  K orea, then  A m erica 's U.N. 
a l l i e s  were no l e s s  s e n s i t iv e .  G reat B r i ta in  in  p a r t i c u l a r  
was very  anxious about the s i tu a t io n .  The need fo r  the  
U nited S ta te s  to  p la c a te  i t s  a l l i e s  le d  the S ta te  D epartm ent 
to  w ithstand  f irm ly  p re s s u re s  from bo th  the  Defense D e p a rt­
ment and MacArthur to  a llo w  U.N. a i r  power to  pursue Chinese 
j e t s  in to  t h e i r  M anchurian s a n c tu a r ie s .  T his was a so re  
p o in t  w ith  MacArthur and a d e l ic a te  one w ith  A m erica 's  
a l l i e s ,  who expressed  a lm ost unanimous o p p o sitio n  to  th e  
"ho t p u rsu it"  c o n c e p t . I n  t h i s  c a se , the S ta te  D epartm ent
70Drum right to  Acheson, November 11 and 18, 1950,
PR,1950. V II, 1129 and 1184; Muccio to  Acheson, November 23, 
24, 25, 1950, I b i d . .  1216, 1218, 1233-
71Acheson to  U.S. M ission  a t  the U.N. ,  November 13, 
1950, I b id . , 1143. For the A l l ie s  r e p l i e s  see I b i d . ,  1151,
1156, 1159, 1173-1175.
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o v e rru le d  the  m i l i t a r y ,  and p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty  o v e rru led  
m i l i ta r y  p r a c t i c a l i t y .  By g iv in g  in  on t h i s  is s u e , the  
U nited S ta te s  could  keep a semblance o f su p p o rt among i t s  
a l l i e s  f o r  the  p o lic y  d e c is io n s  reached in  e a r ly  November.
While t r y in g  to  soothe i t s  nervous a l l i e s ,  the  U nited 
S ta te s  a lso  t r i e d  to  re a s s u re  China. On November 1j .  Acheson 
and Rusk, in  p u b lic  sppeches before a N a tio n a l C onference on 
F o re ig n  p o lic y , a ssu re d  China th a t  America had no u l t e r i o r  
d e s ig n s  concern ing  M anchuria or i n s t a l l a t i o n s  on th e  Yalu. 
C h in a 's  i n t e r e s t s  cou ld  be accomodated i f  i t s  goal was n o t 
dom ination  o f a l l  K orea. Truman, on th e  l6 th ,  s ta te d  th a t  
"So f a r  a s  the  U nited S ta te s  i s  concerned I  w ish to  s t a te  
u n eq u iv o ca lly  th a t  because o f our deep d ev o tio n  to  th e  cause 
o f  world peace and ou r lo n g -s ta n d in g  f r ie n d s h ip  f o r  the  
people o f China, we w il l  tak e  every  honorab le  s te p  to  p re ­
ven t any e x ten sio n  o f the  h o s t i l i t i e s  in  the  F ar E a s t ." ^ ^
While a tte m p ts  were being made to  re a s s u re  th e  Chi­
n e se , Ambassador a t  Large Jessu p  suggested  th e  id e a  o f a 
b u f fe r  zone as a co n cre te  way to  ach ieve t h i s .  On Novem­
b er 24, he adv ised  Acheson th a t  America had th re e  c o u rse s  
o f  m i l i ta r y  a c tio n  open: pursue the  p re s e n t  o ffe n s iv e  to
th e  com plete o ccupa tion  of Korea up to  th e  Y alu; e s t a b l i s h  
a  l im i t  on the  advance sh o rt of the  b o rd e r; o r  w ithdraw  to  
a  d e fen siv e  l in e  so u th  of p o s i t io n s  held  p re v io u s ly . I f
^ ^ d i to r i a l  Note, Ib id ..  I I 58 and I I 6I .
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e i th e r  the  second o r th i r d  course were ta k e n , MacArthur s t i l l  
could move a g a in s t  Korean u n i ts  n o r th  o f a l im i t in g  l i n e ,  i f  
i t  was judged m i l i t a r i l y  d e s i r a b le .  Je ssu p  added t h a t  the  
th i r d  course would have to  be fo llow ed i f  th e  Chinese com­
mitment was en la rg ed  d ram atically ."^^
Jessup  recommended th a t  the U nited S ta te s  su p p o rt 
th e  B r i t i s h  p ro p o sa l in  the  United N ations to  e s t a b l i s h  a 
d e m il i ta r iz e d  zone in  th e  a re a  n o r th  of the  Changju-Hankang 
l in e ,  under a U.N. commission re s p o n s ib le  f o r  the  zone.
The B r i t i s h  p ro p o sa l should be m odified  to  l i m i t  the zone to  
from 5-25 m iles in  dep th  on the Korean s id e  of the f r o n t i e r .  
While do ing  t h i s ,  the  U nited  S ta te s  should use every a v a i l ­
a b le  means to  gauge C h in a 's  in te n t io n s  in  K orea.
J e s s u p 's  memorandum was in  l in e  w ith  A cheson 's
75th in k in g . A nother m eeting w ith  the J o i n t  C h ie fs  had been 
scheduled f o r  November 21, and G eneral B o lte  o f G-3 le a rn e d  
th a t  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent was c o n s id e r in g  a  b u ffe r  zone p ro ­
p o sa l to  stop  m i l i ta r y  a c tio n  in  Korea and to  le s s e n  the  
chances f o r  world c o n f l i c t .  B o lte , in  a  memorandum to  th e  
C hief o f  S ta f f  o f the U.S. Army, J .  Lawton C o l l in s ,  ex p ressed  
h i s  complete o p p o s itio n  to  any such p ro p o sa l. From a p o l i ­
t i c a l  p o in t  of view , such a zone "would weaken the
^^Jessup to  Acheson, November 2 0 .1 9 5 0 .I b i d . , 1195- 
1196. America f i n a l l y  opposed the  B r i t i s h  DMZ p ro p o sa l and 
i t  was dropped. See I b i d . .  I I 9I ,1212,1213-1215,1228-1229.
^^ Ib id .
75^-^Battle to  Ache son, November 21,1950.Ib id . , 1201-03.
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fundam ental and b a s ic  p o lic y  of the U.N. to  make Korea a 
u n ite d  and fre e  n a t io n ."  While acknowledging th a t  on m i l i ­
ta ry  grounds i t  conceivab ly  m ight be wise to  s to p  sh o r t  of 
the  Yalu, U.N. o b je c tiv e s  in  Korea and U.S. n a tio n a l  o b je c ­
t iv e s  made such a  d e c is io n  unw ise. Bolte^, a rg u in g  on po­
l i t i c a l  grounds, urged th a t  M acA rthur's o rd e rs  should stand  
and a d e c is io n  to  h a l t  sh o r t of the n o r th e rn  f r o n t i e r  
"should  n o t be made on m il i ta r y  grounds.
The November 21, 1950, m eeting  between the  S ta te  and 
Defense D epartm ents opened w ith  R obert L o v e t t 's  o b se rv a tio n  
th a t  MacArthur had sa id  n o th in g  to  in d ic a te  t h a t  he could  no t 
accom plish  h is  m iss io n . He wondered, however, i f  the  U nited 
S ta te s  could count on the con tinued  su p p o rt of i t s  U.N. 
a l l i e s .  Both Ache son and Rusk agreed  th e re  was g re a t  a n x ie ty  
among f r ie n d ly  members o f the  U nited  N a tio n s  about becoming 
too  deep ly  invo lved  w ith  China. G eneral M arsha ll p o in ted  
o u t th a t  n o th in g  had been p re se n te d  in  th e  m eeting  th a t  
in d ic a te d  Acheson b e liev ed  MacArthur should  n o t push forw ard 
w ith  h is  o f fe n s iv e . T his was p ro p e r, because M arsha ll 
" p re fe r re d  to  c o n s id e r  f i r s t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n  based on 
th e  prem ise th a t  G eneral MacArthur w i l l  succeed in  h is  
pending m il i ta r y  o f fe n s iv e ."  Acheson agreed  bu t s t r e s s e d  the  
need to  f in d  a  way to  end C h in a 's  in te r v e n t io n .
^ B olte  to  C o llin s , s u b j . :  S ta te -D efen se  High Level
"^ "^ Memo of Conversation by Jessup, November 21, 1950,
M eeting on Korea, November 20, 1950, JCS Geographic F i l e . 
77 e nver 
FR.1950. V II, 1204-1205.
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G eneral B rad ley , G eneral C o l l in s ,  and General
Vandenberg, expressed  the b e l ie f  t h a t  "from  a  m il i ta ry  p o in t
o f  view . . . i t  would n o t be u se fu l to  hold the l in e  a t  the
R iv e r b u t r a th e r  the  high ground back o f the R iv er."
Acheson though t t h i s  a good id e a , e s p e c ia l ly  i f  America
could  g e t th e  Chinese to accep t by n e g o tia t io n  what the
U nited  S ta te s  in tended  to  do anyway. The m il i ta ry  f e l t  th a t
a  n e g o tia te d  se ttle m e n t should n o t be made under the burden
o f se lf-im p o sed  l im i ta t io n s ,  bu t added th a t  i t  was concerned
about ending  the  war q u ick ly  so U .S. tro o p s  could be d e -
78ployed  e lsew here . The consensus was t h a t  a  p o l i t i c a l  
s o lu t io n  was b e s t ,  bu t m i l i ta r y  su ccess  was a  n e ce ssa ry  
f i r s t  in g re d ie n t .
The m eeting r e s u l te d  in  agreem ent th a t  a  new p ro p o sa l 
should  be se n t to  M a c A r t h u r . P r e p a r e d  by Dean Rusk, w ith 
a  few a l t e r a t io n s  by General C o ll in s ,  t h i s  November p ro ­
p o s a l ,  n o t a  d i r e c t iv e ,  re p re se n te d  an a ttem p t to  ach ieve a 
cou rse  o f a c t io n  th a t  would accom plish  th e  U.N. goal o f u n i­
fy in g  Korea w hile reducing  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  more g e n e ra l 
engagement w ith  th e  C hinese, an a c t io n  t h a t  would s p l i t
80America from i t s  a l l i e s  and would be c o s t ly  m i l i t a r i l y .
M acArthur was informed th a t  th e re  was a chance th a t  
p ro p o sa ls  m ight be made in  the  U nited N a tio n s  to  r e s t r i c t
f G lb id . .  1206- 1207. ?9l b i d . .  1207.
O n
Schnabel, P o licy . 266-270.
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the  U.N. advance and to  s e t  up a d e m ilita r iz e d  zone. The 
consensus in  W ashington was t h a t  no change would be made in  
the p re se n t U.N. m ission , but th a t  immediate a c tio n  would be 
taken  to  fo rm u la te  a course o f a c t io n  t h a t  would u n ify  Korea 
and reduce the  r i s k  of a  more g e n e ra l war. The J o in t  C h iefs 
assumed th a t  M acA rthur's a t ta c k ,  launched  November 24, would 
be s u c c e s s fu l, and the  fo llo w in g  m easures were suggested  to  
reduce te n s io n . A fte r  advancing  to  o r  n e a r  the Yalu, he was 
to  secure a p o s i t io n  on t e r r a i n  commanding the approaches 
from the v a lle y  o f the  Y alu. The fo rc e s  used would be South 
Korean p r im a r ily , w hile U.N. fo rc e s  would be held in  r e a d i ­
n e ss  to  in su re  h o ld in g  th e  l i n e .  Such a  l in e  would be ex­
tended from the  Japan  Sea to  a l in e  e a s t  of the l ? th  In fa n ­
t r y ' s  p o s i t io n , w ith  an o u tp o s t a t  Chong j in —th is  b u ffe r
81zone would be th e  l im i t  f o r  th e  p re s e n t  advance.
The J o in t  C h iefs recogn ized  t h a t  from th e  v iew poin t 
of a  Commander in  the  f i e l d ,  t h i s  course  might le a v e  much to  
be d e s ire d , but th e re  were o th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n s  th a t  had to  
be accep ted . The p rocedu res o u tlin e d  would not se r io u s ly  
a f f e c t  the accom plishm ent o f th e  U.N. m il i ta ry  m iss io n . The 
J o in t  C hiefs d e s ire d  M acArthur’ s comments upon th e  course
Op
of a c tio n  o u tlin e d .
MacArthur r e p l ie d  t h a t  he shared  W ashington's d e s ire
81C o llin s  to  M acArthur, November 24, 1950, I b i d . . 
1222-1223; Schnabel, P o l ic y . 268-269.
82
C o llin s  to  M acArthur, November 24, 1950, FR.1950, 
V II, 1223-1224.
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to  confine  the  spread of Korean h o s t i l i t i e s ,  bu t the "sug­
g e s te d  approach would n o t  on ly  f a i l  to  achieve the  d e s ire d  
r e s u l t  but would be p ro v o ca t iv e  of the  very consequences we 
seek  to  a v e r t . "  His p e rso n a l  reconnaisance  o f  the  Yalu R iver 
l i n e  had convinced him t h a t  " i t  would be u t t e r l y  im possible  
f o r  us to  s top  upon commanding t e r r a i n  as  you suggest and 
th e re  be in  a p o s i t io n  to  ho ld  and e f f e c t i v e l y  c o n tro l  i t s  
l i n e s  of appoach to  N orth  K orea ."  MacArthur be lieved  t h a t  
"any f a i l u r e  on our p a r t  to  p ro se cu te  the  m i l i t a r y  campaign 
th rough  to the  achievement o f  i t s  p u b l ic  and o f t - r e p e a te d  
o b je c t iv e  of d e s tro y in g  a l l  enemy f o r c e s  sou th  o f  K o re a 's  
n o r th e rn  boundary . . .would be f r a u g h t  w ith  the most dan­
gerous consequences." A ll o f  A sia  would see t h i s  a c t io n  as 
a  s ig n  of weakness and of appeasement of China.
MacArthur then  p o in te d  out t h a t  e n try  of China in to  
th e  c o n f l i c t  was "a  r i s k  we knowingly took a t  the  time we 
committed our f o r c e s ."  His t ro o p s  were committed to  s e iz in g  
th e  e n t i r e  border reg io n ,  and in  the  e a s t  they  a lre a d y  oc­
cupied a s e c to r  of the Yalu. Only by meeting t h i s  commitment 
c o u ld 'S o v ie t  and Chinese a g g re ss iv e  des ig n s  . . .be checked 
b e fo re  these  c o u n tr ie s  are  committed to  a  course of a c t io n  
from which f o r  p o l i t i c a l  re a so n s  they  cannot withdraw.
The J o i n t  C hiefs  once more acquiesced  in  M acA rthur's
^&acArthur to JCS, November 25.1950.Ib id . .1232-33.
84
^ I b i d . .  1233.
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judgment, bu t be fo re  th a t  d e c is io n  could be debated , m i l i ­
t a ry  even ts  in  Korea made the  d is c u s s io n  pu re ly  academic.
On November 25, the 8th  Army ra n  in to  heavy enemy o p p o s i t io n ,  
e s tim ated  a t  200,000 men, in  the  w estern  and c e n te r  s e c to r s .  
On the 2 ? th ,  General Almond's X Corps in  the  e a s t  came under 
heavy a t t a c k  from Chinese t ro o p s .
On November 28, MacArthur informed Washington t h a t  
"We face  an e n t i r e l y  new w ar."  He b e liev e d  th a t  "our p r e ­
sen t  s t r e n g th  of fo rce  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  meet t h i s  unde­
c la re d  war by the  Chinese . . .The r e s u l t i n g  s i t u a t i o n  p r e ­
s e n ts  an e n t i r e  new p ic tu r e  which broadens the  p o t e n t i a l i ­
t i e s  to  world-embracing c o n s id e ra t io n s  beyond the sphere of 
d e c is io n  by the  T hea ter Commander." He planned to  pass  from 
offense  to  defense  and aw ait W ash ing ton 's  i n s t r u c t i o n s .
I t  was indeed an e n t i r e l y  new war and i t  must be 
concluded t h a t  U.S. p o l ic y  makers were l e s s  than b r i l l i a n t  
i n  handling  the  s i t u a t i o n .  Nobody in  Washington was w i l l in g  
to  take the  i n i t i a t i v e  and o v e rru le  MacArthur on e s s e n t i a l  
and c r i t i c a l  i s s u e s .  The U nited  S ta te s  seemingly d r i f t e d  
in to  a  m assively  en la rged  c o n f l i c t  with China because no one 
o f  s u f f i c i e n t  in f luence  w i th in  the  bureaucracy  was w i l l in g  
to  advocate a  p o l ic y  of l e s s  th an  t o t a l  v ic to ry .  The s ig n s  
by November 10 were c le a r  enought to  j u s t i f y  a  very  c a u t io u s
D u c c io  to  Acheson, November 27, 1950, I b i d . .
1235; Schnabel, P o l i c y . 274.
86MacArthur to JCS. November 28. 1950. PR. 1950. VII.
1237- 1238.
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p o l ic y .  The J o i n t  C h iefs  and the  Defense and S ta te  D epart­
ment were concerned in  November and a l l  agreed t h a t  some 
kind of p o l i t i c a l ,  t h a t  i s  n e g o t ia te d ,  s o lu t io n  was the  b e s t  
way to  keep the s i t u a t i o n  from dangerously  e s c a la t in g .  Yet 
no one would f l a t l y  o rd e r  MacArthur e i t h e r  to slow h i s  o f ­
fens ive  o r  to  s e t  up a b u f f e r  zone so th a t  an approach to 
the Chinese could a t  l e a s t  be a ttem p ted . While p o l ic y  makers 
adm itted  to  the  n e c e s s i ty  of a p o l i t i c a l  s o lu t io n ,  i t  had to  
be one made in  the  c o n tex t  o f  a  su c c e ss fu l  m i l i t a r y  o f fe n ­
s iv e —an o ffen s iv e  t h a t  the J o i n t  Chiefs f e l t  as  l a t e  as  
November 21, was n o t  n e ce ssa ry  m i l i t a r i l y .
The m i l i t a r y  had assumed p o l ic y  making r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
soon a f t e r  the  commitment of t ro o p s  to  Korea. The D ep ar t­
ment s e t  f o r t h  i t s  own p o l ic y  o b je c t iv e s  in  Korea and had 
them accep ted . But s t r a n g e ly  enough, whereas the m i l i t a r y  
had argued a g a in s t  the  commitment of U.S. ground f o rc e s  to  
Korea in  June on m i l i t a r y  grounds, they  now j u s t i f i e d  
M acA rthur's  northward d r iv e  in  the  face of p o ss ib le  Chinese 
i n te rv e n t io n  on p o l i t i c a l  g rounds. In  reach in g  the d e c i ­
s io n  to  c ro s s  the 38t h  p a r a l l e l ,  th e  m i l i t a r y  had combined 
both  m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  arguments to  ga in  acceptance of 
i t s  p o s i t io n .  Expediency, in  bo th  the  case of the  m i l i t a r y  
and the  S ta te  Department, had made arguments t h a t  were unac­
cep tab le  in  June, 1950, a cc ep tab le  in  November, 1950.
A f te r  the September 15 Inchon la n d in g s ,  the  momentum
-  2 8 4  -
of m i l i ta r y  success  determ ined p o l i t i c a l  po licy  o b je c t iv e s  
in  Korea, even when o f f i c i a l  Washington knew there  was some­
th in g  "badly wrong" in  n o r th e rn  Korea. With m i l i t a r y  suc­
cess  came the p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e  o f  the  u n i f ic a t io n  of 
Korea. While ap p a ren tly  hav ing  a  f irm  grasp of the p o s s i ­
b i l i t i e s  and r i s k s  invo lved , and o f  the a l t e r n a t iv e s  a v a i l ­
able in  f i r s t  c ro s s in g  the  p a r r a l l e l ,  and then in  co n tin u in g  
n o r th  d e s p i te  Chinese w arnings, no one seemed to  be w i l l in g  
to  do any th ing  more than observe th e  march of m i l i ta r y  
even ts  i n  Korea. A ll  p o l ic y  makers acknowledged t h a t  i t  was 
no t  in  A m erica 's  i n t e r e s t  to  become involved in  a war w ith 
China, but no one would take  the  i n i t i a t i v e  in  making de­
c is io n s  th a t  might have r e a s s u re d  the  Chinese, because to  
do so would be to  tamper w ith  a  s u c c e s s fu l  m i l i ta r y  campaign 
and a su c c e s s fu l ,  p o p u la r  and p o l i t i c a l ly - p o w e r f u l  g e n e ra l .  
I t  a lso  would have meant abandoning Acheson 's com forting 
view of Communist China. Faced w ith  f u l l - s c a l e  Chinese i n ­
te rv e n t io n ,  the  United S ta te s  would draw back from the 
grandiose  p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e  of u n ify in g  Korea by m i l i t a r y  
means, but would continue  in  December and January to  allow 
the pace of m i l i t a r y  even ts  i n  Korea to  determine p o l ic y .
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CHAPTER X 
THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT IS ALTERED
The massive in te r v e n t io n  of Chinese troops in  the 
Korean War c re a te d  an e n t i r e l y  new s i t u a t i o n  th a t  re q u ire d  
the  United S ta te s  to r e a s s e s s  a l l  a sp e c ts  of i t s  p o s i t io n  
in  Korea. The N a tiona l  S e c u r i ty  Council met -in the a f t e r ­
noon of November 28, 1950, and Bradley sketched the genera l 
s i t u a t i o n ,  s t a t i n g  t h a t  the  J o i n t  C h iefs  b e liev ed  t h a t  a t  
the  p re s e n t  time MacArthur d id  no t need a new d i r e c t iv e .  
B a t t l e f i e l d  c o n d it io n s  had to  be c l a r i f i e d ,  though B radley  
d id  no te  t h a t  a t  p r e s e n t  no a i r  s t r i k e s  should be contem­
p la te d  a g a in s t  the  l a r g e  a i r c r a f t  c o n c e n tra t io n s  in Man­
c h u r ia ,  because the  enemy could bomb U.S. a i r f i e l d s  in  
Japan . ^
The th re e  Defense Department S e c r e t a r i e s  had p re ­
pared a  memorandum in  which they  argued t h a t  th e  United 
S ta te s  had to  con tinue  to  a c t  th rough  the U nited  Nations and 
n o t  in d iv id u a l ly .  I f  p o s s ib le ,  a  l i n e  should be held some­
where in  Korea. The United S ta te s  ought n o t  become involved
^Memo of Conversation by Jessup, November 28,
1950, FR.1950. VII, 1242.
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in  a genera l  war w ith China, s ince  to  do so would be to  f a l l
in to  a c a r e f u l ly  l a i d  Russian t r a p .  Every p o ss ib le  economic,
p sy c h o lo g ic a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t  had to  be made
to  l o c a l i z e  the war, which meant t h a t  Chinese t e r r i t o r y
should  n o t  be v io la te d  and N a t i o n a l i s t  Chinese t ro o p s  should
n o t  be used in  Korea. F in a l ly ,  both  in  the  United S ta te s
and i n  Europe, an a c c e le ra te d  m i l i t a r y  b u ild -u p  was e s s e n t i a l
and a  supplemental budget re q u e s t  was v i t a l .  B rad ley  agreed
i n  g e n e ra l  w ith  these  views and added t h a t  no more N a tio na l
Guard u n i t s  should be a c t iv a te d  and t h a t  no more ground
t ro o p s  were a v a i la b le  f o r  use in  K orea; MacArthur a lre a d y
2
had enough t ro o p s .
Acheson fea red  t h a t  the  United S ta te s  was much c lo s e r  
to  th e  danger of a gen era l  war. The power behind the  Chinese 
move was the S ov ie t  Union, and thus  t h i s  new problem had to. 
be co ns idered  in  the co n tex t  o f  " the  worldwide problem of 
c o n fro n t in g  the  Sov ie t Union a s  an a n ta g o n i s t . "  He agreed 
w ith  M a r s h a l l 's  rem arks , but added t h a t  the  United S ta te s  
a t  a  minimum should t r y  to  have China branded a s  an aggres­
s o r .  Acheson adm itted  t h a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  could n o t  de­
f e a t  China i n  Korea, a s  they could "p u t in  more th an  we 
c a n ."  Acheson f e l t ,  however, t h a t  " i t  would be d i s a s t r o u s  
f o r  u s  simply to  p u l l  out of Korea a t  t h i s  s t a g e ."  He con­
c luded  t h a t  th e  United S ta te s  should f in d  "a  l i n e  t h a t  we
^ Ib id ., 1243-12#.
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can hold and hold i t . "  This would p la c a te  A m erica 's  a l l i e s  
and demonstrate t h a t  the  United S ta te s ,  was n o t  a g g re ss iv e  
and was aw aiting  the n e x t  Chinese move. Once MacArthur had 
determ ined what l in e  he could ho ld , the United S ta te s  should 
p r e s s  forward and tu rn  i t  over to  the  South Koreans a s  soon 
a s  p o s s ib le .  Outside Korea the  United S ta te s  had to  push 
h a rd e r  to  b u ild  i t s  s t r e n g th  and had to  l i q u i d a t e  the French 
o b je c t io n  to  the development o f an European Army.^
On November 29, the J o i n t  C h ie fs  informed MacArthur 
t h a t  h i s  p lan s  to  defend were approved and t h a t  any d i r e c ­
t i v e s  in  c o n f l i c t  w ith those  p la n s  were to  be d e fe r r e d .  On 
November 30, MacArthur r e p o r te d  t h a t  the  Chinese b u ild -u p  
con tinued  unabated and t h a t  the 8 th  Army would be fo rced  to 
con tinue  to  r e t r e a t .  He concluded th a t  C h in a 's  o b je c t iv e  
was " the  complete d e s t r u c t io n  o f U.N. fo r c e s  and the s e ­
c u r in g  of a l l  Korea.
The continued Chinese success  i n  Korea was ta k in g  a 
t o l l  o f Am erica 's nervous a l l i e s .  Acheson took g r e a t  p a in s  
to  re a s su re  B r i t a in  t h a t  the United S ta te s  would a c t  through  
the  United N ations and would c o n s u l t  c lo s e ly  w ith  B r i t a i n . ^  
Truman's November 30 p r e s s  conference  comments d id  r o t  a id
^ I b id . .  1246-1248.
h
JCS to  MacArthur, November 29, 1950, I b i d . . 1253» 
MacArthur to  the JCS, November 30, 1950, I b i d . . 1260.
^Acheson to  the  Embassy in  the United Kingdom, 
November 28, 1950, I b i d . . 1250.
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A cheson 's e f f o r t s .  Truman to ld  r e p o r t e r s  t h a t  c o n s id e ra t io n  
would be g iven  to  u s in g  a l l  a v a i la b le  weapons in  Korea and 
he l e f t  th e  im press ion  t h a t  the  use of atomic weapons in  
Korea would be a t  th e  d i s c r e t i o n  of the commander in  the 
f i e l d —MacArthur. T h is  was l a t e r  c l a r i f i e d ^ ,  but the  damage 
had been done. The p a n ic - s t r i c k e n  B r i t i s h  decided t h a t  
Prime M in is te r  Clement A tlee  had to  come to  Washington to 
d is c u s s  th e  Korean s i t u a t i o n  and o th e r  m a t te rs  w ith  Truman.
n
The conference  was s e t  fo r  December 4-8, 1950*
B r i t a i n  was n o t  alone in  g iv in g  ven t to  f e a r s  and 
doubts abou t U.S. p o l ic y  in  Korea. Nations of the  NATO p a c t  
e s p e c i a l l y  fea red  an e x te n s io n  of the war in  Korea because 
i t  might weaken U.S. commitments in  Western Europe a t  a  time 
when NATO was s t i l l  a  f l e d g l in g ,  powerless o rg a n iz a t io n .  
A m erica 's  a l l i e s  in  Europe p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i s t r u s t e d  the  ag­
g re s s iv e  and seemingly independent ten dencies  of MacArthur, 
though th ey  d id  so i n  a  f o r c e f u l  manner only a f t e r  he was
g
u n su c c e ss fu l  in  Korea.
Acheson recogn ized  t h a t  th e re  was an im pera tive  need 
f o r  a  program th a t  would s top  the  Chinese. MacArthur needed
E d i t o r i a l  N ote , I b i d . , 1261-1262.
^Charge in  the  United Kingdom(Holmes) to Acheson, 
November 30, 1950, I b i d . ,1 2 6 9 ;E d i to r i a l  Note, I b i d . . I 269 .
Q
U.S. R e p re se n ta t iv e  in  the  U .N .(A ustin )to  Acheson, 
November 30, 1950, I b i d . . 1273; I b i d . . November 30, 1950, 
I b i d . , 127O; Memo of C onversa tion  by Raynor, A dviser to  the 
U.S. D e leg a tio n  to  th e  U .N ., November 24, 1950, I b i d . . 1219; 
Footno te  1, I b i d . . 1225; S chnabel, P o l ic y , 287-288.
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to  f in d  a  s u i ta b le  l i n e  to  hold , and t h i s  l in e  then  should 
be given some kind of s a n c t i t y .  A program was v i t a l  because 
th e  United S ta te s  had to  g e t  i t s  a l l i e s  to g e th e r  and "put 
a l l  the backbone we could  in  t h e m . A t  a  December 1 
m eeting w ith  the m i l i t a r y  and the  CIA, Acheson r e f e r r e d  to  
th e  v i r t u a l  s t a t e  o f  p a n ic  "among our f r i e n d s  in  the United 
N a t io n s ."  Many of them f e l t  t h a t  U.S. le a d e rs h ip  had f a i l e d  
and t h a t  the p re s e n t  problems in  Korea were M acA rthur's 
f a u l t .  The United S t a t e s  had to  r e s to r e  confidence and u n i ­
ty ,  and one way to  do t h i s  was to  e s t a b l i s h  a m i l i t a r i l y  ac ­
cep tab le  defensive  l i n e  and then  through p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n  
g ive  i t  s a n c t i t y .  I f  i t  was im possib le  to  hold a  l i n e ,  the 
U nited  S ta te s  would be confron ted  with a new s e t  of problems 
and would have to  p roceed  on d i f f e r e n t  assumptions.^*^
B radley  though t the  b a t t l e f i e l d  s i t u a t i o n  had no t 
c r y s t a l l i z e d  to the  p o in t  where a d e f in i t e  answer could be 
g iven  about ho ld ing  a l i n e .  General C o l l in s  suggested th a t  
someone should go to  Japan  and a s s e s s  the  s i t u a t io n  on the  
s p o t .  M arshall agreed  and in s t r u c te d  C o l l in s  to  leave  th a t  
day. The S e c re ta ry  of Defense went on to  note t h a t  i t  would 
be d i f f i c u l t  to  e s t a b l i s h  a  l i n e  a c ro ss  the w a is t  of Korea, 
bu t i t  would be p o s s ib le  to  hold se p a ra te  p o s i t io n s  in
Q
Memo by L uc iu s  B a t t l e ,  S pec ia l  A s s is ta n t  to  the  
S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  o f a  Meeting Held November 30, 1950, 
Compiled December 3, 1950, FR.19S0. V II, 1270-1271.
^^Memo o f  C on versa tion  by Je ssu p , December 1, 1950,
I b i d . .  1276- 1277.
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th e  e a s t  and west
General Smith, head of the  CIA, reported  t h a t  the  
l a t e s t  e s tim ate  was t h a t  R u ss ia  would never  accept a  Korea 
i n  h o s t i l e  hands. He be lieved  America should withdraw from 
Korea, though t h i s  would no t so lve  the  problem. Admiral 
F o r r e s t  P. Sherman added th a t  from a s t r a t e g i c  v iew poin t, 
th e  United S ta te s  should be on th e  i s l a n d s  o f f  th e  mainland, 
b u t  t h a t  abandonment of Korea would be dangerous to Japan . 
G en era lly ,  the m i l i t a r y  b e liev ed  t h a t  America should no t  
bomb Manchurian a i r f i e l d s  even i f  t h i s  meant " th a t  our
12ground fo rce s  must take some punishment from the a i r . "
L ovett  expressed  the  consensus when he d e sc r ib ed  
Korea a s  no t  be ing  d e c is iv e  in  m i l i t a r y  term s, when compared 
to  Western Europe, the prim ary c e n te r  o f  i n t e r e s t .  Yet i f  
p o s s ib le ,  Korea should be held f o r  p o l i t i c a l  reaons. Time 
was needed so t h a t  a  c e a s e - f i r e  o r t ru c e  might be gained. 
While the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  agreed t h a t  from a m i l i t a r y  viev.'point 
the  acceptance of a c e a s e - f i r e  and going back to the  38th  
p a r a l l e l  was the  b e s t  a v a i la b le  ch o ice , they b e lieved  t h a t  
agreement to  a c e a s e - f i r e  would be p rem ature . M arshall con­
cluded the m eeting by say ing  t h a t  "acceptance  of a  c e a s e - f i r e  
would r e p re s e n t  a g re a t  weakness on our p a r t . " ^ ^
E f f o r t s  a t  the United N a tion s  to  determ ine the  C h i­
nese p o s i t io n  were met w ith  in t r a n s ig e n c e  on C h in a 's  p a r t .
^4 b id . , 1277-78. ^^ Ib id . .1278. ^^ Ib id . .1279-81.
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The S o v ie ts  on November 30» vetoed a  six-pow er r e s o lu t io n  
c a l l i n g  fo r  c e s s a t io n  of h o s t i l i t i e s .  The United S ta te s ,  
fo rced  to  conclude th a t  "no f u r t h e r  f r u i t f u l  a c t io n  . . .can 
be taken  in  the  S ecu rity  C ounc il ,"  dec ided  to  work through 
the  General Assembly in  the fu tu re  to  b r in g  about a peace­
f u l  s e t t le m e n t .
Ache son d ispa tched  an o u t l in e  to  A m erica 's  U.N. r e p ­
r e s e n t a t i v e s  recommending a  s e r i e s  o f  s te p s  to  be taken in  
th e  U nited  N a tio n s .  F i r s t ,  immediate subm ission to  the Gene­
r a l  Assembly o f  a  six-power r e s o l u t i o n  e n t i t l e d  " In te rv e n t io n  
o f the  P e o p le 's  Republic o f C hina."  C oncurren t w ith t h a t ,  
an ex p lan a to ry  memorandum would be subm itted  in  a  form t h a t  
l e f t  open the  n a tu re  of the  r e s o l u t i o n  the  General Assembly 
might adop t. I f  the m i l i t a r y  r e q u i re d  an-immediate c ea se ­
f i r e ,  th re e  a l t e r n a t iv e  methods cou ld  be pursued . One, ap­
p roach  the S o v ie ts  o r  Chinese, o r bo th , in  any way p o s s ib le ,  
to  o b ta in  an immediate c e a s e - f i r e .  I f  t h i s  was im possib le , 
a  General Assembly r e s o lu t io n  c a l l i n g  f o r  a  c e a s e - f i r e  could 
be sought. A t h i r d  p o s s i b i l i t y  was in t ro d u c t io n  of the 
vetoed  six-pow er r e s o lu t io n .  G e n e ra l ly ,  the m i l i t a r y  agreed 
to  th ese  s te p s ,  but f e l t  no c e a s e - f i r e  should be proposed 
u n t i l  a f t e r  C o l l in s  rep o r te d  and A tlee  a r r iv e d .
^ Acheson to  C e r ta in  D ip lom atic  and Consulate 
O f f ic e s ,  December 1, 1950, I b i d . . 1298.
^^Acheson to  the U.S. M ission  a t  the  U.N., Decem­
b e r  2, 1950, I b i d . . 1276- 1277; Memo by B a t t l e  o f a  Meeting 
Held December 2, 1950, Compiled December 3» 1950, I b i d . .
1310-1311.
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The m i l i t a r y ,  in  a December 2 meeting with Truman 
and Acheson, ra is e d  the  q u es t io n  of what p r ic e  the Chinese 
would ask f o r  a n e g o t ia te d  se t t le m e n t .  M arshall be lieved  
the  p r ic e  was bound to  be high, in v o lv in g  U.S. evacu a tio n  of 
Korea, s e a t in g  China in  the United N a tio n s , abandonment of 
Formosa, and Chinese p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  a  Japanese peace 
t r e a t y .  America was in  a  g re a t  dilemma, M arshall b e liev e d ,  
having  to  determine how to  save "our t ro o p s  and p r o t e c t  our 
n a t io n a l  honor a t  the  same t im e ."  Acheson agreed t h a t  the 
U nited S ta te s  would have d i f f i c u l t y  abandoning South Korea 
in  good conscience . There a lso  was agreement t h a t  a  m i l i ta r y  
b u i ld -u p  should be a c c e le ra te d  and t h a t  Truman should make 
the  p u b l ic  aware of the  very s e r io u s  n a tu re  of the Korean 
s i t u a t i o n .  Developments in  Korea were c r i t i c a l  enough fo r  
a m eeting to be scheduled the n e x t  day between the  top  o f ­
f i c i a l s  of th e  S ta te  and Defense D epartm ents.^^
Before t h a t  meeting was h e ld , MacArthur s e n t  ano ther 
assessm ent o f the c u r r e n t  s i t u a t i o n .  MacArthur b e liev ed  
th a t  Washington did n o t  f u l l y  und ers tand  the b a s ic  changes 
t h a t  had occurred  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  C h in a 's  i n te r v e n t io n .
Since the  n a tu re  of the  t e r r a i n  reduced enormously the  normal 
b e n e f i t s  a cc ru in g  to  h i s  su p e r io r  a i r  fo rc e ,  i t  was ev iden t 
t h a t  u n le s s  major ground re in fo rce m en ts  were prom ptly  sen t .
I b i d . . 1311-1312; Annex, Memo by Je s su p ,  Supple­
ment to  Mr. B a t t l e ' s  Memo of December 3 Recording th e  Sec­
r e t a r y ' s  C onversation  w ith  the P r e s id e n t ,  General M arsha ll ,  
and General Bradley, I b i d . . 1312-1313.
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the  U.N. Command would " e i t h e r  be fo rced  in to  success ive  
withdrawal with d im inished powers of r e s i s t a n c e  . . . o r  w i l l  
be fo rced  to  take up beachhead b a s t io n  p o s i t io n s "  which a f ­
fo rd  l i t t l e  hope of any th ing  beyond a degree of p ro -
17longed r e s i s t a n c e ." ^
MacArthur emphasized t h a t  even ts  had outmoded the 
d i r e c t i v e s  he was o p e ra t in g  under. The s t r a t e g i c  con cep ts  
which guided o p e ra t io n s  a g a in s t  N orth  Korea had no a p p l i c a ­
t io n  a g a in s t  the overwhelming power he was fac in g .  The r e l a ­
t i v e l y  sm all U.N. fo rc e s  under h i s  command faced  " the  f u l l  
o f fe n s iv e  power o f  the Chinese Communist n a t io n  augmented 
by ex ten s iv e  supply of S o v ie t  m a t e r i e l . " MacArthur b e liev e d  
t h a t  "u n le s s  some p o s i t iv e  and immediate a c t io n  i s  taken , 
hope f o r  success cannot be j u s t i f i e d  and steady  a t t r i t i o n  
le a d in g  to  f i n a l  d e s t r u c t io n  can rea so n ab ly  be co n te m p la te d ." 
The p re s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  c a l l e d  " f o r  p o l i t i c a l  d e c is io n s  and
s t r a t e g i c  p la n s  i n  im plem entation th e re o f ,  adequate f u l l y
18to  meet the r e a l i t i e s  in v o lv e d ."
MacArthur' s gloomy e v a lu a t io n  was r e f l e c t e d  in  the  
m eeting between the  S ta te  and Defense Department o f f i c i a l s  
on December 3* D iscu ss io n  was narrowed q u ick ly  to  the b a s ic  
q u e s t io n  of whether a c e a s e - f i r e  was needed and what p r i c e  
should be paid  f o r  i t .  Ache son b e liev ed  the  United S t a te s
^"^MacArthur to JCS, December 3.1950,I b id . . 1320-21.
^^ Ib id .. 1321- 1322.
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had to  c o n s id e r  bo th  the s e c u r i ty  o f  i t s  t ro o p s  and the  e f ­
f e c t  of the  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  of A m erica 's  p o s i t io n  in  the 
Far E a s t  and the w orld . There .was a  danger t h a t  America 
might become the g r e a t e s t  of appeasers  i f  Korea were aban­
doned. To be fo rced  ou t o f  Korea in  Dunkirk fa sh io n  would 
be a  d i s a s t e r ,  bu t n o t  a  d i s g r a c e fu l  one. A c e a s e - f i r e  t h a t  
agreed to  w ithdrawal to  the  38th  p a r a l l e l  would be a c c e p t­
a b le ,  but th e  Chinese undoubtedly would want more, which 
would p re s e n t  the United  S t a te s  "w ith  a b i t t e r  c h o ic e ."  Ne­
g o t i a t io n s ,  Acheson f e l t ,  were ^ unavoidable and the  United 
S ta te s  could  expec t no a l l i e d  support on the q u e s t io n s  of 
Formosa and U.N. s e a t in g .  At p r e s e n t ,  the  tendency among 
o th e r  c o u n t r ie s  was to  c r i t i c i z e  America r a t h e r  than  China.
In  any ca se ,  i t  had to  be expected th a t  someone, perhaps
19A tle e ,  would propose a  c e a s e - f i r e .
General B rad ley  agreed t h a t  from a m i l i t a r y  view­
p o in t  a  c e a s e - f i r e  would be u s e f u l ,  but n o t  i f  the c o s t  of 
g a in in g  i t  was too g r e a t .  He d id  n o t  want a gen era l  war, 
which might r e s u l t  i f  the  United S ta te s  took d i r e c t  measures 
a g a in s t  China, bu t  t h a t  r i s k  had to  be weighed a g a in s t  the 
l o s s  of Korea and th e  r e s u l t a n t  l o s s  of U.S. p r e s t ig e  in  the  
world. Indoch ina  and Formosa c e r t a i n l y  would f a l l  and the 
d r i f t  to  appeasement among Europeans, a lre ad y  g a in in g ,  would
19^Memo of C onvesation  by Je ssu p , December 3,
1950, Ib id . .  1324- 1325.
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be a c c e le r a te d .  An e q u a lly  im portan t question  was how long
the American people would a llow  the p re s e n t  c o n f l i c t  to
20continue  w ithou t a d e c la r a t io n  of war a g a in s t  China.
Dean Rusk observed th a t  "The danger i s  t h a t  we might 
lo se  both  our p r i n c i p l e s  and our t r o o p s ."  In  o rd e r  to  main­
t a i n  the  i n t e g r i t y  of i t s  fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  the  United S ta te s  
had to  m ain ta in  the  U .N . 's  i n t e g r i t y .  Aggression i n  Korea 
must n o t  be rew arded. The United N a tio n s  would s o l i d i f y  be­
hind America i t  i f  stood f o r  a s e t t le m e n t  a t  the 3 8 th  p a r a l ­
l e l .  Any Chinese move a c ro s s  the p a r a l l e l  then would r e s u l t  
in  i t s  being l a b e le d  an a g g re sso r ,  th u s  denying China any 
p o l i t i c a l  p r o f i t  from ag g re ss io n .  Rusk be lieved  America 
could n o t  " s u s ta in  he r  theo ry  of an a b so lu te  p r i o r i t y  f o r  
Europe i f  we su r re n d e r  in  the  Far E a s t . "  The U nited  S ta te s  
should s tep  up the  c u r r e n t  a c t io n  g ra d u a l ly ,  w ithout s a c r i ­
f i c i n g  too many t ro o p s ,  a s  a middle course between appease-
21ment and f u l l - s c a l e  war.
B radley  agreed  w ith  R usk 's  assessm ent, add ing  t h a t  
two q u e s t io n s  had to  be answered. F i r s t ,  a  p o l i t i c a l  ques­
t io n  of whether a  c e a s e - f i r e  should be sought. Second, a 
m i l i t a r y  q u e s t io n  o f  whether U.N. f o rc e s  would f i g h t  or 
evacuate a f t e r  th ey  e s ta b l i s h e d  beachheads. Bradley b e liev e d
t h a t  f irm  beachheads should be s e t  up on the p r in c ip le  t h a t
21U.N. fo rc e s  would be withdrawn in  an o rd e r ly  fa sh io n .
^^ Ib id . .  1325- 26. ^^Ib id .,1327. ^^ Ib id ., 1329-31.
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No r e a l  consensus could be reached a t  the meeting 
beyond agreement t h a t  a  d i r e c t iv e  should be sen t inform ing 
MacArthur t h a t  h i s  prim ary c o n s id e ra t io n  was p re s e rv a t io n  
of h i s  fo rc e s  and t h a t  he should con tinue  h is  p la n s  to  con­
s o l id a te  h i s  t ro o p s  i n to  beachheads. G enera lly  the  m i l i t a r y  
be lieved  t h a t  th e  f i g h t i n g  should con tinue  and ev acua tion  
should occur in  an o rd e r ly  fa sh ion  t h a t  would p rese rve  the 
g r e a t e s t  number of M acA rthur 's  f o r c e s .
L a te r ,  a t  a  m eeting in  the S ta te  Department, Rusk 
n o ted  t h a t  s ince  the  m i l i t a r y  was dem oralized i t  was n eces­
sa ry  to  urge them to  make the  b es t  p o s s ib le  e f f o r t  to  con­
s o l id a te  the  U.N. p o s i t i o n .  He b e liev e d  the  Chinese should 
be fo rced  "to  make a r e a l l y  major e f f o r t  a t  g r e a t  co s t  to 
them selves i f  th ey  were to  g e t  us o u t o f Korea." America 
could n o t  bow o u t  because the  damage in  Europe and the  Far 
E a s t  would be too  g r e a t .  Before any su b s ta n t iv e  a c t io n s  
were tak en , p o l ic y  makers had to  have a " re a l  e s t im ate  from
pk
th e  M i l i t a ry  on i t s  c a p a c i ty  to  r e s i s t . "
Since General C o l l in s  had n o t  rep o r te d  on the s i t u a ­
t io n  in  Korea, the  S ta te  Department was forced  to  p repare  a 
p o s i t io n  paper f o r  the  Truman-Atlee t a l k s  w ithout a m i l i t a r y  
e s t im a te  on the  U nited  N a t io n s '  c a p a c i ty  to  r e s i s t .  The
I b i d . ; Footnote  5» I b i d . , 1333» Memo of Conversa­
t i o n  by the  D i r e c to r  of the Executive  S e c r e t a r i a t  
(McWilliams), December 3» 1950, I b i d . . 1335-
24Memo by B a ttle , December 4, 1950, Ib id . . 1343.
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p o s i t io n  paper suggested  t h a t  Truman d isc u ss  w ith  A tlee  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f g a in in g  a c e a s e - f i r e  based on the  38t h  p a r a l l e l  
before the Chinese reached  th a t  l i n e .  A d e m i l i t a r iz e d  zone 
would be s e t  up to  se p a ra te  the  two fo rc e s .  Arrangements 
f o r  a c e a s e - f i r e  would "not be cond itioned  on agreement on 
o th e r  i s s u e s ,  such as  Formosa, and the  Chinese se a t  in  the 
U.N." Truman a lso  was to  inform  A tlee  th a t  MacArthur would 
assemble h i s  f o rc e s  i n to  th re e  beachheads and t h a t  X Corps 
would be evacuated from Korea and moved to  Japan . The 8th  
Army would r e t i r e  to  th e  Seoui-Inchon a re a  but would no t 
evacuate u n t i l  c e a s e - f i r e  r e s u l t s  were known.
The S ta te  Department f e l t  t h a t  i f  China r e j e c te d  a 
c e a s e - f i r e  and moved sou th  o f  the 38t h  p a r a l l e l ,  the  8 th  Army 
would be faced w ith  fo rce d  evacua tion  from the Seoul-Inchon 
a re a s .  E vacuation , however, should r e s u l t  from m i l i t a r y  
n e c e s s i ty  on ly . I f  U.N. fo r c e s  were d r iv en  from Korea, the 
United N ations  should brand China an ag g re sso r  and m obilize  
p o l i t i c a l  and economic means to  p re s su re  Peking. H arassing  
m i l i t a r y  a c t io n  might be p e rm it te d ,  bu t the l a c k  of t ro o p s  
and acknowledgement t h a t  R u ss ia  would n o t  p e rm it  i t ,  p re -  
eluded a major m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t  a g a in s t  China.
The J o i n t  C h ie fs  d i s l i k e d  s e v e ra l  a sp e c ts  of the  
S ta te  D epartm en t 's  p o s i t i o n  p aper  and made a p p ro p r ia te
^^Bradley to  M arshall,December 24 .1950 .I b i d . . 1348.
2* Ib id . .  1349.
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r e v i s io n s  in  i t .  A c e a s e - f i r e  a t  th e  38th  p a r a l l e l  was ap­
p r o p r ia te  only i f  i t  d id  n o t  " impose c o n d it io n s  which would 
jeo p a rd iz e  the s a f e ty  of U.N. fo rc e s  and n o t  be cond it ion ed  
on agreement on o th e r  i s s u e s  . . . The Defense D epart­
ment e l im in a te d  a l l  r e fe re n c e  to  e v acu a tin g  X Corps and to  
moving the 8t h  Army to  a  s p e c i f i c  a re a ,  wishing n o th in g  to  
t i e  M acA rthur 's  hands t a c t i c a l l y  o r  which would s e t  up spe­
c i f i c  c o n d it io n s  f o r  w ithdraw al. MacArthur should be f re e
27to  evacuate  U.N. fo r c e s  a t  h i s  d i s c r e t io n .
The Defense Department b e liev ed  th a t  the United Na­
t io n s  immediately should have China branded as an agg resso r  
and should b ring  p re s su re  to  bear  t o  cease i t s  ag g re ss io n .
In  a d d i t io n ,  m i l i t a r y  harassment could be used, and the  De­
fense Department mentioned a naval b lockade, bombing com-
pO
m unication  l i n e s ,  and u t i l i z i n g  N a t io n a l i s t  Chinese f o r c e s  
The Defense D epartm en t 's  r e v i s io n  o f  the  s e c t io n  on m i l i t a r y  
a c t io n s  a g a in s t  China in d ic a te d  a d e f i n i t e  tendency to  ap­
p ly  some kind of r e t a l i a t o r y  measures to  China.
Truman met A tlee  on December 4 f o r  the f i r s t  of s ix  
m eetings. A tlee took the p o s i t io n  t h a t  th e re  was no choice 
bu t to  n e g o t ia te  w ith  China. The Chinese were c e r t a i n  to 
make demands t h a t  would in c lu d e  Formosa, a  s e a t  i n  the  United 
N a t io n s ,  and r e c o g n i t io n ,  which the  B r i t i s h  seemed w i l l in g  
to  concede. Truman made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  he would n ev e r  proceed
2? Ib id . .  1348. ZS ib id . .  1349.
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a long  t h i s  l i n e .  Both men agreed t h a t  U.S. p r e s t ig e  would
s u f f e r  i f  Korea was l o s t ,  but A t l e e 's  major concern was t h a t
America would become involved in  a dangerous and u n r e a l i s t i c
e x te n s io n  of h o s t i l i t i e s  with China. A tlee  assu red  Truman
29t h a t  B r i t a i n  was n o t  going to  d e s e r t  the  United  S ta te s .  ^
Acheson gave vent to  h i s  d is p le a s u re  with B r i t a in  
while b r i e f in g  S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s  a f t e r  the  f i r s t  
m eeting . The B r i t i s h ,  he sa id ,  b e liev ed  t h a t  i t  was p e r ­
m is s ib le  to  p u t down " l i t t l e  a g g re s s io n s" ,  but no t "b ig  
o n e s ."  Acheson had t r i e d  to  make i t  c l e a r  t h a t  "Americans 
would n o t  accep t su rre n d er  in  the  F ar E a s t  in ' accord with 
the  d e s i r e  of some of our A l l i e s  and th en  cooperate  in  Eu­
rope w ith  the same A l l i e s  v/ho have urged u s  to  be c o n c i l i a ­
t o r y  in  th e  F a r  E a s t . "  He f u r t h e r  p o in te d  ou t to the  B r i t i s h  
t h a t  i f  "we a c c e p t  su rren d er ,  Japan cannot be expected to
s ta y  w ith  u s ."  Then the United S ta te s  would have to  concede
30t h a t  R u ss ia  and China were the  r e a l  powers in  Asia."^
Acheson o u t l in e d  fo r  h i s  c o l le a g u e s  the  American 
p ro p o s a ls ,  which the  B r i t i s h  were r e l u c t a n t  to  accep t ,  as 
fo l lo w s :  one, f i g h t  a s  hard a s  p o s s ib le ;  two, i f  someone
p roposes  a c e a s e - f i r e ,  accep t i t  but pay n o th ing  f o r  i t ;  
t h r e e , i f  a  c e a s e - f i r e  f a i l e d  America would s t a r t  again  and
29'Memo by the  D ire c to r  o f th e  E xecu tive  S e c r e t a r i a t  
(McWilliams), December 5i 1950, I b i d . 1382; U.S. Delega­
t i o n  M inutes o f  the  F i r s t  Truman-Atlee M eeting, December 5> 
1950, I b i d . .  1401-1403.
^^ Memo of Conversation by McWilliams, December 5»
1950, I b id . .  1383.
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do the b e s t  i t  cou ld—i t  would n o t  run  ou t;  fo u r ,  i f  the 
United S ta te s  was thrown ou t o f  Korea, t r y  to  harass the 
Chinese a s  much as p o s s i b l e . .
At t h i s  p o in t ,  George Kennan advised  t h a t  America 
d id  n o t  have to  l im i t  i t s  e f f o r t  i n  the  F a r  E a s t  to  " a  p e tu ­
l a n t  e f f o r t  of annoyance to  the  C h in e s e .” China had com­
m itted  "an a f f r o n t  of th e  g r e a t e s t  magnitude to  the  United 
S t a t e s , "  one t h a t  would no t be f o r g o t te n  f o r  y e a rs .  He be­
l ie v e d  th e  United S ta te s  should take  i t s  time in  deciding 
what to  do. When a  course was chosen, A m erica 's  a l l i e s  
would have to  accep t and un ders tand  i t ,  and be w i l l in g  to  
coopera te  with the United S t a te s .
Ache son in je c te d  K ennan 's  th in k in g  in to  the  nex t 
Truman-Atlee m eeting. The U nited  S t a te s ,  Ache son sa id , had 
t r i e d  to  be f r i e n d s  w ith  China f o r  f i f t y  y ears  and now she 
a t ta c k e d  America. I t  might be a decade befo re  th e  American 
people were ready  to  fo rg e t  t h i s ,  and th e  a t t i t u d e  of the 
American people was v i t a l .  No a d m in is t r a t io n  could urge 
" the American people to  take  v ig o ro u s  a c t io n  in  i t s  fo re ig n  
p o l ic y  on one ocean f r o n t  while on the  o th e r  ocean they 
seemed to  be r o l l e d  back and a cc e p t  a  p o s i t io n  o f  i s o la t io n "  
Ache son be lieved  th a t  the  p u b l i c ' s  mind was n o t  d e l ic a te  
enough to  understand  such opposing  a t t i t u d e s  and "even i f
3 1 lb id .. 1383-1384.
32lbid.. 1385.
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i t  were, t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e  would be wrong." Acheson s t r e s s e d  
t h a t  i t  was improper to  t r y  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between b ig  and 
sm all ag g re ss io n s .  A tlee  a s s e r te d  t h a t  t h i s  had been done 
in  E a s te rn  Europe, to  which Acheson r e p l i e d  t h a t  th e re  was 
"a  g r e a t  d i f fe re n c e  between ' ta k in g  i t '  and l i k i n g  i t .
The f i n a l  Truman-Atlee m eeting was he ld  on Decem­
ber 8 .  By t h a t  time General C o l l in s  had re tu rn e d  from h i s  
t a l k s  w ith MacArthur and w ith  the  commanders o f  the  8 th  Army 
and X Corps, who had expressed  the b e l i e f  t h a t  they  could 
e s t a b l i s h  and hold beachheads f o r  some tim e, and could , i f  
n e ce ssa ry ,  evacuate  t h e i r  tro o p s  s a f e l y .^
MacArthur to ld  C o l l in s  t h a t  th e  f u l l  power of the 
U nited  N ations ought to  be used in  Korea. Reinforcem ents 
should be employed to  f i g h t  a s e r i e s  o f w ithdraw als designed 
to  i n f l i c t  maximum damage on the  enemy. But i f  r e i n f o r c e ­
ments were n o t  su p p lied ,  U.N. fo rc e s  should be evacuated .
In  any case , under h i s  p re se n t  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  evacuation  
would be fo rced  on him. The r e s t r i c t i o n s  MacArthur men­
tio n e d  included a  p r o h ib i t io n  on U.N. a i r  a c t io n  and a  U.N. 
nava l  blockade a g a in s t  China, and no re in fo rce m en ts  from 
N a t io n a l i s t  China o r  by s u b s ta n t ia l  numbers from America. 
With the  r e s t r i c t i o n s  withdrawn he could  hold a  l i n e  in
3 3
^U.S. D e lega tion  Minutes of Second Truman-Atlee 
M eeting, December 5,  1950, I b i d . . 1393.
3k
Memo, General C o l l in s  f o r  JCS, sub.j.:  Report on 
V i s i t  to  FECOM and Korea, December 4 -7 , December 8, 195^, 
JCS Geographic F i l e s .
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Korea. I f  on the o th e r  hand a c e a s e - f i r e  a t  the ]8 th  p a r a l ­
l e l  could be gained, t h i s  would be advantageous. MacArthur 
was t o ld  t h a t  re in fo rcem en ts  were out of the  q u e s t io n .  
C o l l in s ,  i n  h i s  re p o r t  to  th e  J o i n t  C h ie fs ,  noted t h a t  i f  
the  U.N. o f fen s iv e  i n  Korea was n o t  con tinued  and i f  China 
con tinued  the  a t ta c k ,  "MacArthur should be d i r e c te d  to  take 
the  n e c e ssa ry  s teps  t o  p re v e n t  the d e s t r u c t io n  of h i s  fo rc e s  
pending  f i n a l  evacuation  from Korea.
C o l l in s  re tu rn e d  to  Washington in  time to  g ive h is  
p e rso n a l  e s t im a te  of the  Korean s i t u a t i o n  to  the Truman-Atlee 
c o n fe re e s .  C o llin s  o p t i m i s t i c a l l y  re p o r te d  t h a t  U.N. f o r c e s  
"were n o t  in  a c r i t i c a l  c o n d it io n  to d ay ,"  and could defend 
them selves w ithout m ajor l o s s e s .  Withdrawal to  a p o s i t io n  
sou th  of Seoul was p o s s i b l e —perhaps  a long  th e  Han o r  Naktong 
R iv e rs .  He believed X Corps and the  8 th  Army could make a . 
ju n c t io n  and hold the Pusan b r idgehead  i n d e f i n i t e ly . ^ ^
T h is  rep o r t  b u t t r e s s e d  the d e c is io n  reached in  the 
December 7 Truman-Atlee m eeting  t h a t  the  U nited  N ations  
would hold in  Korea u n t i l  fo rc e d  to  le a v e .  A c e a s e - f i r e  
and a n e g o t ia te d  s e t t le m e n t  to  the Korean problem was to  be 
sought bu t only on honorable  term s which d id  n o t  inc lude  
g iv in g  up Formosa or s e a t in g  Red China in  th e  United N a tio n s . 
There could be no thought o f appeasement o r  o f  rew arding
^^ Ibid.
36U.S. D e lga tion  M inutes o f  S ix th  M eeting, Decem­
b e r  8, 1950, I b i d . . 14?0; Schnabel, P o l i c y , 292.
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a g g re ss io n .  In  a d d i t io n ,  the United S ta te s  would exhaust 
a l l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  to  avoid e n la rg in g  the  c o n f l i c t  w ith  China. 
F in a l ly ,  both c o u n tr ie s  agreed to  a c c e le ra te  the  b u ild -u p  
of t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s . ^ ^
The d e c is io n  having been made to  s tay  in  Korea u n t i l  
fo rced  ou t,  the  m a tte r  of a c e a s e - f i r e  remained. On Decem­
b e r  11, Acheson in s t r u c te d  A m erica 's  U.N. r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  
t h a t  an a ccep tab le  c e a s e - f i r e  would be one which d id  n o t  
p lace  U.N. fo rc e s  a t  a  m i l i t a r y  d isadvan tage , and which d id  
n o t  involve  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s .  I n  o rder to make any 
c e a s e - f i r e  work, th e re  had to  be U.N. su p e rv is io n  th rough­
out Korea of the  c e a s e - f i r e  op e ra tions .^®
On the 12th , the J o i n t  C hiefs l i s t e d  the necessa ry  
term s f o r  a c e a s e - f i r e  s e t t le m e n t  in  Korea. S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  
they  favored  a  d e m i l i t a r iz e d  zone on the  order of twenty 
m iles  in  w idth. Second, the  c e a s e - f i r e  would apply to  a l l  
opposing ground, n a v a l ,  and a i r  fo rc e s  in  Korea, wherever 
lo c a te d .  A U.N. C ease-F ire  Commission would appoin t m i l i t a r y  
o b se rv e rs  who would have freedom of movement everywhere in  
Korea. P r i s o n e r s  of war would be exchanged on a  one-for-one  
b a s i s  and re fu g e es  would n o t  be allowed to  m igrate in  e i t h e r  
d i r e c t i o n .  F in a l ly ,  the  J o i n t  C h iefs  be lieved  th a t  befo re  a
^^U.S. D elega tion  M inutes of F i f t h  Meeting, Decem­
b e r  7, 1950, FR,1950. V ll ,  1449-1461; S ix th  Meeting Minutes, 
I b i d . .  1476-1Ï79.
^®Acheson t o ' t h e  U.S. M ission a t  the U.N., Decem­
b e r  11, 1950, I b i d . .  1522.
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c e a s e - f i r e  was agreed  to ,  p ro v is io n s  f o r  a  C ease-F ire  
Commission had to  be accep ted .
By the  middle of December two bas ic  d e c is io n s  had 
been reached . F i r s t ,  t h a t  U.N. fo rc e s  would remain in  Korea 
u n t i l  fo rced  out (though  what t h i s  e n ta i l e d  was never sp e l le d  
o u t ) ,  and second, the  term s under which a c e a s e - f i r e  would 
be accep ted . Having decided to  s tay  i n  Korea, Truman on 
December 15 d e c la re d  a s t a t e  o f  n a t io n a l  emergency and an­
nounced p la n s  to  in c re a s e  d e fense  p ro d u c t io n ,  expand the 
armed fo rc e s ,  and s e t  up wage and p r i c e  c o n t r o l s .
On December 12, X Corps began seaborne evacua tion  
o f  N orth  Korea to  Pusan, th e r e  to  be p laced  under General 
Walton W alker 's  8 th  Army. While t h i s  was o ccu rr ing , the  8 th  
Army con tinued  i t s  w ithdrawal sou th , n o t  under Chinese p r e s ­
s u re ,  bu t in  o rd e r  to  e s t a b l i s h  "a con tinuous defen s ive  l in e ,  
a c ro s s  Korea a t  th e  most advantageous p o s i t io n . "  On Decem­
b e r  23, Walker was k i l l e d  in  a  v e h ic le  a c c id e n t ,  and General 
Matthew B. Ridgway, one of General C o l l i n s ’ key a id e s ,  was 
appo in ted  head of the  8 th  Army.
MacArthur' s choice o f  Ridgway tu rned  out to  be as 
wise a  d e c is io n  a s  the  Inchon lan d in g .  Ridgway's l e a d e rs h ip  
o f  fo rc e s  t h a t  had su f fe re d  a  month of r e v e r s a l s  was
^ % a r  s h a l l  to  Ache son, "U.S. P o s i t io n  Regarding 
Terms of Any U.N. General Assembly C ease-F ire  R eso lu tion  
f o r  the Korean War," December 12, 1950, I b i d . . 1529-1531-
^ * ^ d i t o r i a l  Note, I b i d . . 1548. 
Schnabel, P o l i c y , 300-305- 
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i n s p i r in g  and b r i l l i a n t .  MacArthur gave him the 8 th  Army 
and to ld  him to do w ith  i t  as he thought b e s t .  He could 
" a t t a c k ,  defend, o r withdraw, the  d e c is io n  was l e f t  to  him." 
Ir  e f f e c t ,  Ridgway was g iven  c a r t e  bla^r-che to  employ the  8 th  
Army as  he saw f i t ,  w ithout r e fe re n c e  to  Tokyo. Even w ith  
no re in fo rce m en ts ,  and re c e iv in g  l e s s  than  the promised num­
ber of rep lacem ents , Ridgway s t i l l  p lanned to  go on the o f ­
fe n s iv e  a s  soon as  he could r e i n s t i l l  the " a t t a c k  s p i r i t "
1x2
in  h i s  demoralized s t a f f  and t ro o p s .
On December 30, MacArthur was t o ld  t h a t  from a l l  
e s t im a te s ,  China had the c a p a c i ty  to  fo rce  the  United S ta te s  
from Korea. This might be p reven ted  by making i t  so c o s t ly  
t h a t  the  Chinese would abandon the  a ttem p t o r  by committing 
s u b s t a n t i a l  r e in fo rce m en ts .  MacArthur, however, should ex­
p e c t  no:' more t ro o p s —Korea was the  wrong p lace  to  f i g h t  a  
m ajor war and the United S ta te s  would n o t  commit i t s  r e ­
maining ground fo rc e s  to  Korea a t  a time o f  an inc reased  
t h r e a t  of a  g e n e ra l  war. The J o i n t  C h iefs  b e l ie v e d ,  though, 
t h a t  a su c ce ss fu l  r e s i s t a n c e  to  Chinese-N orth  Korean a g g re s ­
s io n  a t  some p o in t  in  Korea, and a  d e f l a t i o n  o f Chinese m i l i ­
t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  p r e s t ig e  would be of g r e a t  importance
ko
to  A m erica 's  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  ^
MacArthur was then  in s t r u c t e d  to  defend in  s tag es
^^Ibid . .  305-308.
A3
JCS to MacArthur, December 29, 1950. FR,1950.
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and to  i n f l i c t  as  much damage as  p o s s ib le  to  h o s t i l e  fo rc e s  
in  Korea. The C hiefs b e l ie v e d  t h a t  s ince  developments could 
fo rc e  U.S. withdrawal from Korea, i t  was im p o rtan t ,  p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  i n  view of the  con tinued  t h r e a t  to  Jap an , t o  determine 
in  advance the  l a s t  reasonab le  o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  an o rd e r ly  
ev ac u a tio n .  I t  seemed to  the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  t h a t  i f  MacArthur 
was fo rced  back to  p o s i t io n s  in  th e  v i c i n i t y  o f  th e  Kum 
R iv e r ,  i t  would be n e ce ssa ry  to  commence withdrawal to Japan . 
M acA rthur 's  views on e v acu a tio n  were req u e s te d  " in  l i g h t  of 
h i s  co n tin u in g  prim ary m ission  of defense  of Ja p an  fo r  
which only tro o p s  o f  the  E ig h th  Army are  a v a i l a b l e .
The J o i n t  C hiefs d i r e c t i v e  r e f l e c t e d  th e  d i f f e r e n t  
v iew poin ts  of the  Defense and S ta te  Departm ent. The J o i n t  
C h ie fs  and the  Defense Department viewed the s i t u a t i o n  p r i ­
m ar i ly  as one of sav ing  enough tro o p s  from Korea to  m ain tain  
J a p a n 's  s e c u r i ty .  Thus, MacArthur was t o ld  t h a t  h i s  ta sk  
was to  make a stand  in  Korea, su b je c t  only  to  th e  s e c u r i ty  
of h i s  t ro o p s—the only ones a v a i la b le  t o  c a r ry  ou t h i s  p r i ­
mary m ission  of the defense of Japan . The S ta te  Department, 
on the  o th e r  hand, viewed the  s i t u a t i o n  more i n  term s of the 
damage t h a t  would be done worldwide to  U.S. p r e s t ig e  i f  
Korea was l o s t .  The is s u e  of Japan  had to  be seen  as 
c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  K o re a 's  f a t e .  The S ta te  Department be ­
l ie v e d  t h a t  "a determined a t t i t u d e  in  Korea i s  p robably
^ ^ Ib id .. 1625- 1626.
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e s s e n t i a l  to  a  c a p a b i l i ty  to  defend Japan w ith  Japanese 
a s s i s t a n c e ."
The two departm ents c l e a r l y  had a  s im i la r  s e t  of 
p r i o r i t i e s ,  bu t each ordered  those  p r i o r i t i e s  d i f f e r e n t l y .  
Worldwide m i l i t a r y  c o n s id e ra t io n s  and the need to  salvage 
tro o p s  from Korea to  p r o t e c t  Japan re q u ire d  L ovett  to  wonder 
i f  th e re  was n o t  some way to  "withdraw from Korea with hon­
o r . "  The Defense Department d id  n o t  d i s re g a rd  the  is su e  of 
U.S. p r e s t i g e ,  i t  simply p laced  i t  below the m i l i t a r y  con­
s id e r a t io n  of adequate re s o u rc e s  to  meet more s t r a t e g i c a l l y  
im portan t i s s u e s .  The S ta te  Department acknowledged the  su­
p e r i o r  p r i o r i t y  of Japan over Korea, but worried more about 
th e  "chain  r e a c t io n  of d e fe a t ism  and d is i l lu s io n m e n t"  t h a t  
would r e s u l t  i f  the  United S ta te s  seemed to  tu r n  away from 
the  is su e  of a g g re ss io n .  The o p e ra t io n  i n  Korea should be 
con tinued  u n t i l  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i ty  re q u ire d  the  United N a t­
t i o n s  to  le a v e .  Thus the Defense Department favored an o r ­
d e r ly  ev acu a tio n  a t  some prede term ined  p o in t  to  p reserve  
U.S. t ro o p s  f o r  J a p a n 's  d e fe n se ,  while th e  S ta te  Department 
wished to  hold and i n f l i c t  c a s u a l t i e s  u n t i l  fo rced  o u t .^ ^  
MacArthur no ted  th e se  tw in s t r a n d s  of thought and 
he b e liev e d  them to  be in com p atib le .  He though t th a t
Memo of C onversa tion  by Rusk, and Annex: P o l i ­
t i c a l  F a c to rs  Involved in  a  V oluntary  Withdrawal from 
K orea, December 19, 1950, I b i d . .  1570-1576.
46Ib id . ; Truman, T r ia l , 280.
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a forced  withdrawal under the  p re se n t  c o n d it io n s  "would have 
the  most adverse e f f e c t  upon the peoples  of A sia , n o t  ex­
c ep t in g  the  Japanese , and a m a te r ia l  re in fo rcem en t o f the 
fo rc e s  now in  t h i s  t h e a t e r  would be mandatory i f  we are to
hold the L i t t o r a l  Defense Chain in c lu d in g  Japan a g a in s t
47determined a s s a u l t . "  '
MacArthur reminded th e  J o i n t  C h iefs  t h a t  evacuation  
of U.N. fo r c e s  would f re e  p r e s e n t ly  involved Chinese troops  
f o r  a c t io n  e lsew here . He b e lieved  t h a t  even h i s  p re s e n t  
small fo rce  was capable "of so d ra in in g  the enemy's r e ­
sources a s  to  p r o t e c t  the a re a s  to  the sou th ,"  which would 
be a g r e a t e r  c o n t r ib u t io n  th an  d i s p e r s a l  of h i s  fo rc e s  e l s e ­
where f o r  p u re ly  d e fens iv e  pu rposes . Defense in  success ion  
was the  only way to  accom plish evacuation  and in  execu ting  
t h i s  p la n ,  the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  would no t have " to  make an an­
t i c i p a t o r y  d e c is io n  f o r  ev acu a tio n  u n t i l  such time as  we may
48be fo rced  to  t h a t  beachhead l i n e . "  MacArthur, in  p a r t ,  
sided w ith  the  S ta te  D epartm en t 's  p o s i t io n  t h a t  the  b e s t  way 
to  p r o te c t  Japan was to  hold  in  Korea a s  long as  p o s s ib le ,  
i n f l i c t i n g  heavy damage on th e  enemy.
MacArthur req u es ted  in  h i s  December 30 r e p ly  to  the 
J o i n t  C h iefs  t h a t  he be allow ed to  blockade China, d e s tro y  
C h in a 's  war i n d u s t r i e s ,  and employ Chinese N a t io n a l i s t
^^MacArthur to  JCS, December 30, 1950, PR,1950,
V II, 1630- 1631.
^®Ibid.
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t ro o p s  in  Korea and in  d iv e r s io n a ry  o p e ra t io n s  a g a in s t  the 
Chinese mainland. MacArthur was to ld  th a t  these  a c t io n s  were 
re c e iv in g  c o n s id e ra t io n ,  bu t  fo r  the  p re se n t  they were con­
t r a r y  to  n a t io n a l  p o l ic y .  MacArthur could n o t  count on ac ­
t i o n s  o u ts id e  or in s id e  ( i n  the form of re in fo rcem en ts )  to 
r e l i e v e  the  p re s su re  on h i s  command. In s te a d ,  he was to ld  
to  con tinue  to  defend in  success iv e  p o s i t io n s ,  i n f l i c t i n g  
maximum damage to  h o s t i l e  f o rc e s ,  su b je c t  to  h is  prim ary 
m ission  of p r o t e c t in g  Japan . In  a d d i t io n ,  he was au th o rized  
to  withdraw a t  any time he f e l t  i t  necessary  to  do so .^^  
MacArthur was be ing  asked to  make the  d e c is io n  f o r  
Washington.
The General claim ed again  t h a t  these  o rd e rs  were i n ­
com patib le , s ince  i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  w ith h is  p re s e n t  i n s u f ­
f i c i e n t  s t r e n g th  he could  n o t  perform  both ta s k s .  This 
be ing  the  case , " s t r a t e g i c  d i s p o s i t i o n s  taken in  the  p re s e n t  
s i t u a t i o n  must be based upon the o v e rr id in g  p o l i t i c a l  p o l ic y  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  the r e l a t i v i t y  of American i n t e r e s t s . "
MacArthur f e l t  h i s  f o rc e s  could hold  out " fo r  any l e n g th  
of time up to  i t s  complete d e s t r u c t io n  i f  o v e r r id in g  p o l i ­
t i c a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s  so d i c t a t e d . "  The General wanted to 
know s p e c i f i c a l l y  how long to  ho ld— i n d e f i n i t e ly ,  f o r  some 
predeterm ined p e r io d ,  or u n t i l  he could  evacuate  i n  a way 
to  minimize h i s  l o s s e s .  I f  the  prim ary  i n t e r e s t  o f  the
^^JCS to MacArthur, JCS 86608, January  9, 1951»
DDRS 16d (75).
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United S ta te s  in  A sia  was ho ld ing  Korea and p inn ing  down a 
la rg e  segment of C h ina 's  m i l i t a r y  p o t e n t i a l ,  then the m i l i ­
t a ry  course was i m p l i c i t  in  p o l i t i c a l  p o l ic y  and the United 
S ta te s  should accep t whatever c a s u a l t i e s  r e s u l te d  and the 
hazard to  J a p a n 's  s e c u r i ty .  He recogn ized  t h a t  t h i s  i n ­
volved a  " d e c is io n  o f  the h ig h e s t  n a t io n a l  and in te r n a t io n a l  
im portance ,"  but he n o n e th e le ss  f e l t  e n t i t l e d  to  a c le a r ,  
p re c ise  d i r e c t i v e .
The J o i n t  Chiefs would n o t  answer MacArthur beyond 
saying  t h a t  i t  was im portan t f o r  A m erica 's  world p r e s t ig e  
t h a t  he should s tay  in  Korea as long  as he could , k i l l i n g  
a s  many Chinese a s  p o s s ib le ,  but as always, su b je c t  to  p ro ­
v id in g  f o r  J a p a n 's  s e c u r i t y . M a c A r t h u r * s  apparen t con­
fu s io n  was j u s t i f i e d  since  the  S ta te  and Defense Department 
d id n o t  agree on p r i o r i t i e s  them selves. But the d i r e c t i v e s  
he was re c e iv in g  were based on the e s t im a te s  of C o l l in s  and 
o th e rs  t h a t  MacArthur could hold in  Korea f o r  some time 
without heavy l o s s e s .  M acA rthur's  d is p a tc h e s  d isp u ted  these  
assum ptions and th u s  c re a te d  concern among o f f i c i a l s  in  
Washington.
Truman se n t  a p e rso n a l  message to  MacArthur, a s su r in g  
him t h a t  the  Korean s i t u a t i o n  was be ing  g iven  in te n se  study
^^MacArthur to JCS, C 5316?, January  10, 1951f 
Box 31» JCS Geographic F i l e s .
^^JCS to  MacArthur,JCS 80902,January  12,1950, I b i d .
^^Schnabel, P o l i c y , 324.
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in  Washington. P o l ic y  makers needed to  know what h i s  maxi­
mum e f f o r t  could be in  the U .N . 's  r e s i s t a n c e  to  Chinese ag­
g re s s io n .  I f  the  U nited N a tio n s  succeeded i t  would help  
b r in g  t h a t  o rg a n iz a t io n  through  " i t s  f i r s t  g r e a t  e f f o r t  a t  
c o l l e c t iv e  s e c u r i t y , "  and would produce "a  f r e e  world c o a l i ­
t i o n  of in c a lc u la b le  value to  the n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  i n t e ­
r e s t s  of the United S t a t e s . "  On the  o th e r  hand, Truman 
recogn ized  t h a t  "continued  r e s i s t a n c e  might n o t  be m i l i t a r i l y  
p o s s ib le "  w ith  the l im i te d  fo rc e s  a v a i l a b l e .  Even though 
l im i te d ,  i t  was n ecessa ry  to  p re s e rv e  these  fo rc e s  a s  an 
" e f f e c t iv e  in s tru m en t  fo r  the  defense  of Japan  and e l s e ­
where." Truman b e liev e d  t h a t  MacAthur had to  hold i n  Korea 
u n t i l  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i ty  fo rc e d  w ithdraw al upon him.^^
Truman was caught up in  the  S ta te -D efense  Department 
d isagreem ent over r e l a t i v e  p r i o r i t i e s .  MacArthur was n o t  
be ing  given c l e a r  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  On the one hand he was to ld  
to  hold in  Korea to  save the  world p r e s t i g e  o f  both  the 
United S ta te s  and th e  United N a tio n s  and fo r  the symbolic 
va lue  i t  would give to  U.S. commitments. Yet he a ls o  was 
t o ld  i t  was n e ce ssa ry  fo r  American s e c u r i ty  i n t e r e s t s  to  
p re se rv e  h i s  fo rc e s  f o r  use in  Japan  and elsew here . Which 
was more im portant?  Nothing i n  M acA rthur 's  d i r e c t i v e s  ev er  
made t h i s  c l e a r  and the  p e rc e n t  o f U.N. c a s u a l t i e s  which 
would c o n s t i t u t e  "ev acu a tio n  by m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i ty "  i s
53JCS to  M acArthur,Truman(Personal) f o r  MacArthur, 
JCS 81050, January  13, 1951, Box 31, JCS Geographic F i l e s .
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c e r t a i n l y  n ev er  d e f in e d .  I f  MacArthur was confused , i t  i s  
easy to  unders tand  why. Washington was n o t  confused , i t  
simply was incap ab le  o r  unw illing  t o  g ive  a  s t r a i g h t  answer 
to  M acA rthur's  i n q u i r i e s .  One could conclude t h a t  
Washington was aw ait ing  developments on the  b a t t l e f i e l d  to 
c l a r i f y  the s i t u a t i o n  and th u s  determine the d e c is io n  
f o r  them.
General C o l l in s  made a  second t r i p  to  the  Far E as t  
in  January  and h i s  r e p o r t  on the b a t t l e f i e l d  s i t u a t i o n  did 
much to  c l e a r  up f u tu re  p o l ic y .  C o l l in s  went to  Korea j u s t  
a s  Ridgway was launch in g  Operation Wolfhound, an o f fen s iv e  
a c t io n  d i r e c te d  n o r th  "to  k i l l  as many enemy s o l d i e r s  as 
p o s s ib le  and then  to  withdraw to  main p o s i t io n s  . . . ."
What C o l l in s  observed was s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  him to conclude 
th a t  the 8 th  Army could take care o f  i t s e l f .  He b e liev e d  
U.N. f o r c e s  were i n  good shape and morale was r i s i n g  d a i ly  
under Ridgway's e x c e l l e n t  le a d e rs h ip .  C o l l in s  concluded 
t h a t  "On the whole the 8 th  Army is now in  p o s i t io n  and p r e ­
pared to  pun ish  se v e re ly  any mass a t t a c k .
On h i s  r e t u r n  to  Tokyo, C o l l in s  r e p o r te d  h i s  
f in d in g s  to  MacArthur, who concurred t h a t  a  beachhead in  
Korea could  be he ld  i n d e f i n i t e l y .  With a i r  and n a v a l  super­
i o r i t y  to  h i t  C h in a 's  overextended supply and communications
^  C o l l in s  Memo fo r  the  JCS, sub j;  Report on V i s i t  
to  FECOM and Korea, Janu ary , 1951, I b i d . ; Schnabel,
P o l i c y . 325- 327.
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l i n e s ,  the  Chinese would be unable to  mass s u f f i c i e n t  fo rce  
to  d r ive  the U.N. f o r c e s  ou t o f K o r e a . C o l l i n s  p o s i t iv e  
e s t im ate  of the b a t t l e f i e l d  s i t u a t i o n  decided the S ta te -  
Defense Department s p l i t —U.N. fo rc e s  would be able  to  hold 
i n d e f i n i t e l y  in  Korea w hile  the United S ta te s  sought a 
p o l i t i c a l  s o lu t io n  to  th e  Korean c o n f l i c t .
While the  m i l i t a r y  leaned  toward an o rd e r ly  evacu­
a t io n  of Korea in  o rd e r  to  p rese rv e  U.S. tro ops  f o r  se rv ice  
i n  Japan , i t  was m i l i t a r y  success  o r  re trenchm en t in  Korea 
t h a t  re so lv ed  the  is su e  unequ ivoca lly  in  fav o r  o f a p o l i t i ­
c a l  d e c is io n ,  which Rusk had suggested  on December 3, to  
remain in  Korea and s lu g  i t  ou t w ith  the  Chinese. Washing­
ton  b e liev ed  t h a t  t h i s  course  would avoid the d i s a s t r o u s  
blow to  U.N. p r e s t ig e  t h a t  would r e s u l t  from being pushed 
ou t of Korea. Of n e c e s s i ty  t h i s  would c a l l  f o r  a  c o n s tan t  
review  of U.S. p o l ic y  o b je c t iv e s  in  Korea, d i r e c te d  toward 
de te rm in ing  the le n g th  and e x te n t  of the  U.S. commitment 
to  K o re a 's  s e c u r i ty .
^■^Schnabel, P o l i c y , 327; C o l l in s  Memo f o r  JCS, 
Janauary , 1951• JCS Geographic F i l e s .
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CHAPTER XI 
THE UNITED STATES SEEKS A CEASE-FIRE
L ate  in  January , 1951» General Ridgway had s t a b i ­
l i z e d  the  b a t t l e f i e l d  s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea so t h a t  forced 
evacua tion  was no longer th re a te n e d .  I n  February , he 
launched O perations Punch and K i l l e r ,  s u c c e s s fu l ly  designed 
to  i n f l i c t  heavy c a s u a l t i e s  on the  Chinese. O peration 
Ripper followed on March 7 and Seoul was recap tu red  e leven  
days l a t e r .  In  the  p ro ce ss ,  the  Chinese 4 th  and 3rd F ie ld  
Armies, t h e i r  b e s t  and most experienced  tro o p s ,  were s e r i ­
ously damaged. By A p r i l ,  the  8 th  Army in  a  s e r i e s  o f  "man­
power k i l l i n g  advances" had fough t i t s  way n o r th  to Line 
Kansas around the 38th p a r a l l e l ,  and Ridgway then s e t  about 
e s t a b l i s h in g  Line Wyoming and L ine Kansas as  s trong  d e fen ­
sive  p o s i t io n s .  These b a t t l e f i e l d  maneuvers removed the 
p re s s u re s  fo r  immediate p o l ic y  d e c i s io n s  and allowed the 
United S ta te s  more time to  ex p lo re  the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of a 
p o l i t i c a l  so lu t io n  to  the Korean h o s t i l i t i e s . ^
CIA I n te l l ig e n c e  R eport,  "Asian Communist Employ­
ment o f  N e g o t ia t io n s  as a  P o l i t i c a l  T a c t i c , "  November, 
1966, DDRS 3B(77)f 14-15; Ache so n . C re a t io n . 660; Schnabel, 
P o l i c y . 354.
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E f f o r t s  in  the United N ations in  December to  g a in  a 
c e a s e - f i r e  had f a i l e d  in  the face  of c o n s tan t  Chinese r e j e c ­
t io n s .  In  January , the  F i r s t  Committee of the Generaly As­
sembly produced a n o th e r  r e s o lu t io n  c a l l i n g  fo r  a  c e a s e - f i r e ,  
s taged  withdrawal of a l l  f o r e ig n  tro o p s ,  arrangem ents f o r  
an in te r im  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  Korea, and a conference i n c l u ­
d in g  B r i t a in ,  the United S t a te s ,  R ussia , and China to  d i s ­
cuss  F a r  E a s te rn  problems t h a t  would include  Form osa 's f u ­
tu r e  and C h ina 's  s e a t  in  the  United N ations . The United 
S ta te s  r e l u c t a n t ly  agreed to  th e  r e s o lu t io n ,  hoping both  
t h a t  the  Chinese would re fu se  and t h a t  i t s  support of the  
r e s o lu t io n  would re g a in  a l l i e d  s o l i d a r i t y  so t h a t  the  Korean 
a c t io n  would remain a p a r tn e r s h ip .  China r e je c te d  the  cea se ­
f i r e  a s  "a  b rea th in g  s p e l l"  f o r  U.N. fo rc e s ,  and t h i s  paved
the  way on February  1, 1951f f o r  the U.N. General Assembly
2
to  condemn China a s  an a g g re sso r .
With the  m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  s t a b i l i z e d  and w ith  a l ­
l i e d  support be ing  rega ined , th e  United S ta te s  could face  
the  question  of what i t s  o b je c t iv e s  in  Korea should be. 
C le a r ly  the  June 25 r e s o lu t io n  to  r e s to re  peace and s e c u r i t y  
to  the  a re a  was s t i l l  a  f e a s ib l e  o b je c t iv e .  E q u a lly  c l e a r ,  
however, was the  im p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  m i l i t a r i l y  b r in g in g  about 
a  u n i f ie d ,  independent, and dem ocratic  Korea. Trouble
2
Acheson, C re a t io n . 601; Schnabel, P o l i c y . 331-32; 
CIA R eport,"A sian  Communists,", DDRS 3B(77), l4 .
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developed when no one in  th e  S ta te  o r  Defense Department 
would take  the  lea d  in  de te rm in ing  a cou rse .
During a  February  13 m eeting o f  S ta te  and Defense 
Department o f f i c i a l s ,  the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  of S ta f f  sa id  t h a t  
while th ey  would l i k e  to  have U.S. t ro o p s  out o f Korea by 
w in te r ,  such a w ithdrawal was no t mandatory. B rad ley  be­
l ie v e d  the  s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea " re q u ire d  a  d e te rm in a tio n  of 
our p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e s .  Then m i l i t a r y  o b je c t iv e s  could 
be d e te rm in ed ."  United N a tions  fo rc e s  would be capable  of 
any th ing  bu t a m ajor o f fen s iv e  n o r th  o f the  38t h  p a r a l l e l .  
The J o i n t  C hiefs f u r t h e r  f e l t  t h a t  a  c e a s e - f i r e  was one f a c ­
t o r  in  an o v e ra l l  s e t t le m e n t ,  but was n o t  an o b je c t iv e  in  
i t s e l f .  Rusk saw th e  problem as one of a ch iev in g  m i l i t a r y  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  in  o rd e r  to  make p ro g re s s  toward p o l i t i c a l  
o b j e c t iv e s .  He was w i l l in g  to  say t h a t  U.N. o b je c t iv e s  were 
to  p u n ish  th e  enemy to g a in  a c e a s e - f i r e  and a r e t u r n  to  the  
s t a t u s  quo an te  be llu m .^ I n  s h o r t ,  each departm ent d e fe r re d  
to  th e  o th e r  fo r  a  s ta te m e n t  of o b je c t iv e s  befo re  they  would 
d e c la re  t h e i r  own o p in io n s .
At the  same m eeting, N itze  and Jessup  concluded t h a t  
th e r e  were s e v e ra l  p o s s ib le  cou rses  of a c t io n  open to  the  
United S t a t e s .  One course was u n i l a t e r a l  w ithdraw al, which 
would be a  s e r io u s  blow to  U.S.-U.N. p r e s t ig e .  A second 
course  was to  hold i n d e f i n i t e l y  in  Korea but t h i s  would
^Memo of State-JCS Meeting, February I 3 , 1951»
DDRS 16g(75).
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re q u ire  more t ro o p s .  A t h i r d  a l t e r n a t iv e  was to  withdraw 
in the e v e n t  of a  g en era l  war. The b es t  c o u rse ,  however, 
was a  p o l i t i c a l  arrangem ent a llow ing  the United  S ta te s  to  
withdraw. The m i l i t a r y  and the S ta te  Department agreed t h a t  
t h i s  would in vo lve  both  in c re a s in g  C h in a 's  c a s u a l t i e s  and 
judging  how long the  American people would accep t con tinued  
U.S. l o s s e s . ^
S e c re ta ry  Acheson on February  23, subm itted a t e n t a ­
t iv e  p o l ic y  paper f o r  d is c u s s io n  which in  h i s  words "was 
r a t h e r  t a r t l y  d e sc r ib e d  by the C h ie fs  as 'a n  unsound ap- 
p roach ' . . . Acheson o ffe red  the  memorandum because
U.N. fo r c e s  were n e a r in g  th e  38th p a r a l l e l  aga in , and in  the 
p ro cess  were r a i s i n g  f e a r s  among A m erica 's  a l l i e s  and some 
U.S. o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  the p a r a l l e l  would be c ro s se d .  Ache son 
recommended th a t  M acA rthur 's  d i r e c t i v e s  be re v is e d  to  l im i t ,  
sev e re ly  any advance a c ro ss  the p a r a l l e l .  The o b je c t iv e  of 
m i l i t a r i l y  u n i t i n g  Korea was out of the q u e s t io n  because the 
United S t a t e s  could  n o t  a f fo rd  e i t h e r  the  n e ce ssa ry  re so u rc e s  
or the in c re a se d  t h r e a t  of a  g en era l  war t h a t  would r e s u l t .
An e q u a l ly  c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r  was t h a t  A m erica 's  a l l i e s  in  the  
United N a tion s  opposed any move a c ro s s  th e  p a r a l l e l  and the  
United S t a t e s  could  n o t  a f fo rd  to  lo s e  t h e i r  suppo rt .  While 
a l l  of South  Korea was to  be rec ap tu re d ,  MacArthur should
^Ibid.
^Acheson, C re a t io n .  666-667.
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n o t  be allowed to make a  major c ro s s in g  of the 38th  p a r a l ­
l e l  excep t to  breakup enemy o ffe n s iv e  p re p a r a t io n s .  The 
S ta te  Department b e l ie v e d  t h a t  the  U.N. Command should i n ­
f l i c t  as  many c a s u a l t i e s  a s  p o s s ib le  on China so t h a t  she 
would be anxious to  n e g o t ia te  a  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t le m e n t  to  the 
war. But the  enemy should n o t  be pushed so f a r  back in to  
N orth  Korea t h a t  th ey  would no t be w i l l in g  to  n e g o t i a t e .^  
As p re v io u s ly  n o te d ,  the  J o i n t  C h iefs  thought t h i s  
approach to  be unsound. They b e liev e d  t h a t  the suggested  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on M acA rthur 's  t a c t i c a l  freedom to c ro s s  the  
p a r a l l e l  would prede term ine  fu tu re  m i l i t a r y  cou rses  w ithout 
c o n s id e ra t io n  o r  d e te rm in a t io n  of co n cu rren t  p o l i t i c a l  
co u rses  o f a c t io n  in  Korea. The contem plated r e s t r i c t i o n s  
would d i s c lo s e  a U.S. m i l i t a r y  d e c is io n  to  the enemy a l ­
lowing them to  a d ju s t  t h e i r  course of a c t io n  knowing 
American i n te n t io n s  in  advance. The J o i n t  C h iefs  b e liev ed  
t h a t  once U.S. p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e s  were reviewed and de­
veloped, the  m i l i t a r y  cou ld  analyze them and o f f e r  approp­
r i a t e  m i l i t a r y  cou rses  o f  a c t io n .^
The J o i n t  C h ie fs  f e l t  t h a t  as  lo n g  as the  p r e s e n t  
p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e s  of the  United N ations  were r e t a in e d ,  
U.N. m i l i t a r y  fo r c e s  should no t be fo rb id d en , f o r  p o l i t i c a l
^Schnabel, P o l i c y . 351-353- 
7
Bradley Memo f o r  M arsh a ll ,  "A ction  to  be Taken 
With Respect to  the 38th  P a r a l l e l , "  February  27, 1951, 
Box 31 , JCS Geographic F i l e .
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rea so n s ,  to  advance n o r th  o f  the 38th  p a r a l l e l .  The r e ­
s t r i c t i o n s  Ache son proposed would lea d  to  a  Communist b u i ld ­
up t h a t  o v e r t ly  o r  c o v e r t ly  could  jeo p a rd iz e  the s a fe ty  of 
U.N. f o rc e s .  While the J o i n t  C h iefs  supported a p o l i t i c a l  
s e t t le m e n t ,  they be lieved  i t  was prem ature fo r  a judgment 
to  be made w ith  r e s p e c t  to  the  38th  p a r a l l e l .  The p re s e n t  
course of a c t i ;  n in  Korea should be m ain tained  u n t i l  the 
S ta te  Department determined p o l i t i c a l  cou rses  o f a c t io n .
In  conclu sion , the J o i n t  C h ie fs  urged th a t  Acheson 's memoran-
g
dum n o t  be subm itted to  Truman—to  which M arshall agreed .
Not u n t i l  the middle of March, 1951» d id  the  S ta te  
Department f e e l  c o n fid en t enough about the  m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  
to  propose t h a t  an approach be made to  China about a  nego­
t i a t e d  se t t le m e n t .  O f f i c i a l s  of the  S ta te  and Defense De­
partm ent met on March 19, to  de term ine  the  m i l i t a r y ' s  p o s i ­
t io n  v i s - a - v i s  an a rm is t ic e  agreem ent. The Defense D epart­
ment be lieved  the enemy was now s u f f e r in g  e s p e c ia l ly  heavy 
c a s u a l t i e s  and a c e a s e - f i r e  would be to  t h e i r  advantage. 
Conversely, any agreement t h a t  l e f t  U.N. fo rc e s  in  Korea i n ­
d e f i n i t e l y  and d id  no t p re ju d ic e  the Communist p o s i t io n ,  
would be h ig h ly  d isadvan tageous to  th e  United S ta te s .  
T here fo re , '"an a rm is t ic e  arrangem ent of i t s e l f  would n o t  
c o n s t i tu t e  an accep tab le  s o lu t io n  of the  Korean s i t u a t i o n . "  
The J o i n t  C h iefs  d id  b e l ie v e  t h a t  " the  p re s e n t  m i l i t a r y
®Ibid.
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s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea may be conducive to  a  s a t i s f a c to r y  s o lu ­
t io n  of the immediate o v e ra l l  problem by p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ."  
This s o lu t io n ,  however, must occur only under the  a rm is t ic e  
terms o u t l in e d  in  t h e i r  December 12, 1950 memorandum. ^
With t h i s  i n  mind, the  S ta te  Department d ra f te d  and 
the  J o i n t  C h iefs  approved a P r e s id e n t i a l  s ta tem ent announcing 
t h a t  th e re  was a b a s is  f o r  peace in  Korea s ince  a g g re ss io n  
had been re p e l le d  and the  a g g re sso rs  had been d r iv en  back 
to  the  genera l  boundaries  t h a t  e x is te d  p r i o r  to  t h e i r  a t ­
tack . Truman was to  announce t h a t  the  United N a tions  Com­
mand was prepared  to  e n te r  i n to  t a l k s  f o r  a  c e a s e - f i r e  a r ­
rangement.^^ MacArthur was informed March 20 t h a t  the  S ta te  
Department was p lann ing  such an announcement and t h a t  time 
would be req u ire d  to  determ ine d ip lo m a tic  r e a c t io n s  and to  
perm it any n e g o t i a t io n s  t h a t  might develop . The J o i n t  
C h iefs  requested  t h a t  MacArthur make recommendations con­
c e rn ing  the degree of freedom of a c t io n  he would need in  the
upcoming weeks to  p rov ide  s e c u r i ty  f o r  h i s  fo rc e s  and to
11m ain ta in  con tac t w ith  th e  enemy. MacArthur recommended 
t h a t  "no f u r th e r  m i l i t a r y  i n h ib i t i o n s  o r r e s t r i c t i o n s  be 
p laced  on U.N. Command." He be lieved  t h a t  h i s  p re s e n t
Bradley Memo f o r  M arsh a ll ,  1776/201, "U.S. P o s i ­
t io n  Regarding An A rm istice  i n  Korea, March 27, 1951»
Box 31» JCS Geographic F i l e .
^^A cheson,Creation, 666-68; Schnabel, P o l i c y , 356.
^^JCS to MacArthur, JCS 86276, March 20, 1951,
DDRS 16F(?5).
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12d i r e c t i v e s  were adequate f o r  s e c u r i ty  of h i s  fo rce s .
Truman's s ta tem en t was never made, a s  on March 24, 
MacArthur is su ed  a p u b l ic  s ta tem en t  t h a t  Washington f e l t  
undercu t Truman's p lanned announcement. MacArthur in  e f ­
f e c t  sa id  t h a t  i f  the U nited  N a tio ns  departed  f o r  the  p r e ­
sen t l im i te d  m i l i t a r y  course o f a c t io n ,  "Red China would be 
doomed to the  r i s k  of imminent m i l i t a r y  c o l la p s e ."  T h is  
being the  case , agreement should  be easy to  reach  and he 
stood ready  to  co n fe r  in  the f i e l d  w ith  the enemy comman- 
de r .  ^ Washington was f u r io u s  a s  i t  viewed M acArthur's 
s ta tem en t as  an ultim atum  to  the  Chinese. M acArthur's d i ­
r e c t i v e s ,  however,had n o t  p r o h ib i te d  h i s  a c t io n ,  and in  
f a c t ,  e a r l y  in  the war he re c e iv e d  perm iss ion  to  is su e  
s ta tem en ts  c a l l i n g  f o r  the enemy to  la y  down i t s  a rm s.^^  
N e v e r th e le ss ,  Truman b e l ie v e d  h i s  a c t  was in  v io la t io n  of 
a  December 6, 1950, d i r e c t i v e  to  coo rd ina te  with Washington 
a l l  p u b l ic  s ta tem en ts  concern ing  Korea. MacArthur's p r o ­
nouncement a lso  alarmed A m erica 's  a l l i e s ,  who had c le a re d  
Truman's s ta te m e n t .  They wondered i f  a  new p o l ic y  had been
^S lacA rthur to  JCS, 0 58203, March 21, 1951,
DDRS 256B(75).
13Record of A c tions  by JCS R e la tiv e  to  the  U.N. Ope­
r a t i o n s  in  Korea from J u n e ,1950 to  A p r i l , 1951, DDRS 17B(75)-
14Deputy U n der-S ecre ta ry  of State(Matthews) to  the  
S pec ia l A s s i s t a n t  f o r  F o re ig n  M i l i t a r y  A f fa ir s (B u rn s ) , 
September 16, 1950, PR .1950. V II, 731-732; Acheson to  the  
Acting S e c re ta ry  of State(W ebb), September 26, 1950, I b i d . , 
785- 786; MacArthur to  JCS, September 28, I 950, I b i d . ,
976-977: Schnabel. P o l i c y . 359-
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fo rm ula ted  and wanted to  know who was making American 
p o l ic y .  What most enraged Truman was t h a t  M acA rthur's ac­
t io n  appeared to  be one more a c t  of in s u b o rd in a t io n  on the 
G e n e ra l 's  p a r t W i t h i n  two weeks th e  d e c is io n  was made
to  r e l i e v e  MacArthur from a l l  Far E a s te r n  d u t ie s  and to  r e -
1 6p lace  him w ith  General Matthew B. Ridgway. S u ff ice  i t  
to  say t h a t  the  bas ic  reason  f o r  M acA rthur 's  r e l i e f  was 
h i s  p u b l ic  d isagreem ent with U.S. p o l ic y  in  Korea. To ex­
p re s s  in  p r iv a t e  a d e s i r e  f o r  a  more v igo rous  p o l ic y  was 
n o t  o b je c t io n a b le ,  bu t M acArthur's p u b l ic  c r i t i c i s m s  of 
U.S. p o l ic y  only served to  confuse and confound f r i e n d  and 
foe a l i k e ,  le a d in g  them to wonder who was making p o l ic y  
fo r  the  U nited  S ta te s .
Before M acArthur's r e l i e f ,  Ridgway proposed a move 
beyond th e  38t h  p a r a l l e l .  MacArthur approved O peration 
Courageous and by March jO, Ridgway had c le a re d  South Korea 
of enemy fo r c e s  excep t fo r  a  sm all a r e a  in  the  west. 
MacArthur th en  approved Operation D a u n tle ss  which was de­
signed to  ach ieve  Line Wyoming, tw enty  m ile s  n o r th  o f  the 
38t h  p a r a l l e l .  Once t h i s  l in e  and L ine  Kansas s l i g h t l y  to
^-^Schnabel, P o l i c y . 359; Ache son. C re a t io n , 667-70.
^^Acheson, C re a t io n . 671-75; Schnabel, P o l i c y . 
365- 77. I t  i s  beyond the scope of t h i s  paper to d is c u s s  in  
d e t a i l  th e  Truman-MacArthur c o n tro v e rsy .  M acA rthur's  ro le  
in  t h i s  p a p e r  has been mentioned only a s  i t  a f f e c te d  p o l ic y  
fo rm a tio n .  For more on the c o n tro v e rsy  see W alter Hermes, 
Truce Tent and F ig h t in g  F ro n t(Washington; O ffice  of the 
Chief o f M i l i t a r y  H is to ry , 1966), p a s s im ; and John S pan ier , 
The Truman-MacArthur C ontroversy(New York: Norton, 1965)*
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th e  sou th  were e s ta b l i s h e d ,  Ridgway planned to  m ain ta in  con­
t a c t  w ith  the  enemy by p a t r o l s  of b a t a i l l o n  s i z e .  E x is t in g  
l o g i s t i c s ,  t e r r a i n ,  weather c o n d it io n s ,  and enemy s t r e n g th  
p rec lu d ed  any f u r t h e r  advance beyond the planned o b je c t iv e  
l i n e s ,  around which he planned h is  defense a g a in s t  an ex­
p e c ted  massive Chinese sp r in g  o f fen s iv e
Before th a t  Chinese o ffen s iv e  occurred , Ridgway on 
A p r i l  11 rep laced  MacArthur, and General James A. Van F le e t  
was appoin ted  commander o f  the  8 th  Army. Ridgway immediately 
had h i s  s t a f f  ev a lu a te  the  v a r io u s  d i r e c t i v e s  sen t  to  
MacArthur in  an e f f o r t  to  a s c e r t a in  p r e c i s e ly  h i s  m ission 
i n  Korea. Once t h i s  was done he i n s t r u c t e d  h i s  f i e l d  com­
manders t h a t  in  conducting  t h e i r  o p e ra t io n s ,  they  should r e ­
member t h a t  a c t io n s  in  Korea could e s c a la t e  in to  WW I I I  
e a s i l y .  Ridgway b e liev ed  th a t  i t  should be assumed t h a t  
China s t i l l  in tended  to  d r iv e  the 8 th  Army from Korea and 
t h a t  S ov ie t  in te r v e n t io n  was p o ss ib le  a t  any tim e . He i n ­
s t r u c te d  Van F le e t  "to  r e p e l  agg ress io n  a g a in s t  a s  much of 
the  t e r r i t o r y  o f  the  ROK as  you now occupy and, i n  c o l la b o ­
r a t i o n  w ith  the  Government o f the ROK to  e s t a b l i s h  and
1 8m ain ta in  o rd e r  in  said  t e r r i t o r y . "
Ridgway, in  examining the v a r io u s  d i r e c t i v e s  sen t
^^Schnabel, P o l i c y . 361-364.
l ^ lb i d . . 380-382; Ridgway to  Van F le e t ,  CX 60388, 
A p r i l  19, 1951. Box 311 JCS Geographic F i l e ; Ridgway to  JCS, 
C 60965, A p ri l  2 5 , 1951, I b i d .
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to  MacArthur, was no h a p p ie r  than  h is  p re d e c e sso r  about the 
i n a b i l i t y  o r u n w il l in g n e ss  of Washington to  decide which had 
the g r e a t e r  p r i o r i t y —to  s ta y  in  Korea o r  to  defend Japan . 
Ridgway, to o ,  be lieved  W ashing ton 's  d i r e c t i v e s  were incom­
p a t i b l e ,  and on A pril  17, he req u e s te d  a u th o r iz a t io n  from
the J o i n t  C h ie fs  to  withdraw from Korea a t  h i s  own d i s c r e t i o n
19to  defend Japan  should the  S o v ie t  Union a t t a c k .  Ridgway
probab ly  made t h i s  re q u e s t  in  o rd e r  to  fo rce  Washington to
d i s t i n g u i s h  between h is  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a s  U.N. Commander
20i n  Korea and as  U.S. F a r  E a s te rn  Commander.
The immediate r e p ly  of the  J o i n t  C h iefs  was t h a t  
w ithdrawal in  the  face o f  a S o v ie t  a t t a c k  would be appro­
p r i a t e .  He was informed, however, t h a t  su b je c t  to  the im­
mediate s e c u r i t y  o f h i s  fo rc e s  in  Korea and Japan, "you w i l l  
i n i t i a t e  m ajor withdrawal from Korea only upon i n s t r u c t i o n s  .
fu rn ish e d  you a f t e r  r e c e i p t  of in fo rm a tio n  from you as  to  the
21c o n d i t io n s  o b ta in in g ."  The J o i n t  C h ie fs  followed w ith  
an o th e r  d i r e c t i v e  Truman had approved on May 1, 1951*
The new d i r e c t i v e  o u t l in e d  Ridgway's o b je c t iv e s  in  
the  same fa s h io n  a s  p rev io u s  ones. He was in s t r u c te d  to  a id
l^Ridgway to JCS, C 60308, A p r i l  17, 1951. Box 31. 
JCS Geographic F i l e .
pn
^^Schnabel, P o l i c y . 383.
ZljCS to  Ridgway, JCS 88950, A p r i l  19, 1950, Box 31, 
JCS Géographie F i l e .
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South Korea in  r e p e l l i n g  ag g re ss io n  and r e s t o r i n g  peace and 
s e c u r i ty  to the  a re a .  His m i l i t a r y  o b je c t iv e  was to  d e s tro y  
the  enemy fo rc e s  s t i l l  o p e ra t in g  w ith in  South K orea’s boun­
d a r i e s .  In  p u rsu in g  these  o b je c t iv e s ,  he was cau tioned  to  
remember t h a t  h i s  primary m iss ion  as U.S. Far E a s te rn  Com­
mander was s e c u r i ty  of h is  fo rc e s  and the defense  o f  Japan . 
Once ag a in , then , th e re  was no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  made between 
the  needs  and powers o f U.S. F a r  E as te rn  Command and.U.N.
Command. Washington had "defined  these  u n c le a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s
22w ith  i n s u f f i c i e n t  p r e c i s io n ."
Ridgway was n o t s a t i s f i e d  with t h i s  d i r e c t i v e ,  and 
he continued to  a ttem pt to have i t  r e v is e d  in  a way t h a t  
acknowledged c l e a r l y  t h a t  h i s  primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was 
J a p a n 's  defense  ( t h a t  i s ,  by a llow ing him to  withdraw from 
Korea a t  h i s  d i s c r e t i o n ) R i d g w a y  was never s a t i s f i e d  in  
h i s  sea rch  f o r  a  compatible d i r e c t i v e ,  but adoption  of 
NSC 4 8 /5 , a l t e r i n g  A m erica 's  b a s ic  p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e s  in  
Korea, d id  somewhat ease h i s  d iscom fort w ith h i s  d i r e c t i v e s .
NSC 48 /5 , which Truman approved May 17, 1951• was 
the  r e s u l t  of p o l ic y  d is c u s s io n s  among the S ta te  and Defense 
D epartm ents, i n i t i a t e d  when major Chinese in te r v e n t io n  began. 
NSC 48/5 concluded t h a t  " in  view of the  Communist r e s o r t  to  
fo rc e  in  A sia , U.S. a c t io n  must be based on re c o g n i t io n  t h a t
~^JCS to  Ridgway, JCS 9000, May 1, 1951, DDRS 1?E 
(75 );  Schnabel, P o l i c y . 384.
^^Schnabel, P o licy , 384-386.
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the  most immediate o v e r t  t h r e a t s  to  U.S. s e c u r i ty  a re  c u r ­
r e n t l y  p re sen te d  in  t h a t  a r e a . " The c u r r e n t  S o v ie t  o b je c t iv e  
was " to  b r in g  the  mainland of E a s t  A sia and e v e n tu a l ly  Japan  
under S ov ie t  c o n t r o l ,  p r im a r i ly  through e x p lo i t a t io n  of the
re s o u rc e s  o f Communist China."  These o b je c t iv e s  re p re se n te d
24an u n accep tab le  t h r e a t  to  U.S. s e c u r i ty .
Two b a s ic  U.S. o b je c t iv e s  in  Korea v/ere s e t  in  
NSC 4 8 /5 .  F i r s t ,  the  United S ta te s  would continue a ttem p ts  
p o l i t i c a l l y  to  e s t a b l i s h  a dem ocra tic , u n ited  Korea w ithou t 
com m itting i t s e l f  to  do so by m i l i t a r y  means. Second, the 
U nited  S ta te s  would pursue th rough  a p p ro p r ia te  U.N. machinery 
a  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t le m e n t  to  the  Korean War accep tab le  to  the  
U nited  S t a te s .  U n t i l  th ese  o b je c t iv e s  could be reached , the 
U nited  S ta te s  would continue to  p e n a l iz e  the a g g re sso r  by i n ­
f l i c t i n g  on the enemy maximum p ersonn e l and m a t / r i e l  l o s s e s .  
I n  a d d i t io n ,  the J o i n t  C h iefs  were to p repare  d e ta i l e d  p lan s  
f o r  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n  a g a in s t  China should the Chinese fo rce  
the  U nited  N ations out of Korea o r  take agg ress ive  a c t io n  o u t­
s id e  the  Korean t h e a t e r .  F in a l ly ,  the United S ta te s  was to 
he lp  s t re n g th e n  and in c re a se  a s  r a p id ly  as p o s s ib le  South 
Korean m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s  i n  o rd e r  t h a t  they might r e p la c e  
U.N. fo r c e s  ( to  be withdrawn in  s ta g e s )  and be capable  o f 
r e p u l s in g  any fu tu re  North Korean ag g re ss io n .
pjk
NSC 48 /5 , U.S. O b je c t iv e s ,  P o l i c i e s ,  and Courses 
o f  A c tion  in  A sia , May 17 , I 951 , NSC F i l e s . Modem M i l i t a ry  
Branch, N a tiona l  A rch ives, Washington B.C.
Z^ Ibid.
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The J o i n t  C h iefs  sen t  Ridgway a new d i r e c t i v e  based 
on NSC 48/5 on May 31» 1951. This d i r e c t i v e  was d iv ided  in to  
tv/o p a r t s  t h a t  d e l in e a te d  Ridgway's re s e n s i b i l i t i e s  as  F ar  
E a s te rn  Commander and U.N. Commander. As U.N. Commander h is  
prim ary o b je c t iv e  was to  re p e l  agg ress ion  and r e s to r e  peace 
and s e c u r i ty  to  the a re a .  In  accom plish ing  t h i s ,  he was to 
" i n f l i c t  the  maximum personnel and m a te r ie l  damage on the 
f o r c e s  o f  North Korea and Communist China o p e ra t in g  w ith in  
Korea in  o rd e r  to  c re a te  c o n d it io n s  fa v o ra b le  to  a se t t le m e n t  
of the  Korean c o n f l i c t . "  Such a se t t le m e n t  a s  a  minimum 
would te rm in a te  h o s t i l i t i e s  under a p p ro p r ia te  a rm is t ic e  a r ­
rangem ents, e s t a b l i s h  South Korean a u th o r i ty  over an a re a  
sou th  of a m i l i t a r i l y  d e fe n s ib le  n o r th e rn  boundary (no l e s s  
than  a t  the 38th  p a r a l l e l ) ,  p rov ide  f o r  w ithdraw al of a l l  
non-Korean f o r c e s ,  and perm it the  b u i ld in g  of s u f f i c i e n t  
South Korean m i l i t a r y  power to  d e te r  o r  r e p e l  any renewed 
N orth  Korean a g g re ss io n .  In  so doing, he was ordered  n o t  to  
advance above a l i n e  g e n e ra l ly  fo llo w in g  th e  Kansas-Wyoming 
L in e .^ ^  L a te r  t h i s  was a l t e r e d  to  a llow  Ridgway to  opera te  
as f a r  n o r th  as h i s  re so u rce s  would p e rm it ,  so t h a t  in  the 
even t of e s tab l ish m en t of a  c e a s e - f i r e  and a d e m i l i t a r iz e d  
zone, U.N. f o r c e s  would be ab le  to  r e t i r e  to  p repa red  de­
fe n s iv e  l i n e s .
^^JCS to  Ridgway, JCS 92831, May 31, 1951, Box 31. 
JCS Geographic F i l e .
^^Schnabel, P o licy . 399-402.
- 328 -
P rev iou s  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on a c t io n s  in  and around Korea 
were re p e a te d .  Any r e t a l i a t o r y  a c t s  a g a in s t  the Chinese main­
lan d  in  response  to  a i r  or sea  a t t a c k  a g a in s t  U.S. fo rc e s  
o u ts id e  Korea were to  be taken only w ith  approval of the 
J o i n t  C h iefs . In  a d d i t io n ,  Ridgway was informed t h a t  i t  was 
U.S. p o l ic y  " to  develop dependable ROK m i l i t a r y  u n i t s  as 
r a p i d l y  a s  p o s s ib le  and in  s u f f i c i e n t  s t r e n g th  e v e n tu a l ly  to  
assume the major p a r t  o f  the burden of U.N. fo rc e s  in  K orea."  
Ridgway was to  keep t h i s  m a t te r  under study and was to  sub-
pO
m it a p p ro p r ia te  recommendations.
With a  new sta tem ent o f  o b je c t iv e s  in  Korea, the 
t a s k  of g a in in g  a n e g o t ia te d  end to  the  h o s t i l i t i e s  in  Korea 
could  begain  aga in . Ridgway informed Washington on May 30, 
t h a t  the  Chinese sp r in g  o f fen s iv e  had been b lun ted  and over 
170,000 c a s u a l t i e s  had been i n f l i c t e d  upon the enemy, w ith  
th e  r e s u l t  t h a t  an o f fen s iv e  on the s c a le  j u s t  a ttem pted 
could  n o t be mounted fo r  some tim e . Ridgway's e s t im a te  was 
t h a t  " fo r  the n e x t  60 days the U.S. Government should be ab le  
to  count w ith  reasonab le  assu rance  upon a  m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  
i n  Korea o f f e r in g  optimum advan tages in  support of i t s  d ip ­
lo m a tic  n e g o t i a t io n s ." ^ ^
Ridgway's o p t im is t ic  r e p o r t  encouraged Washington to
Z^ I b i d . ;  JCS to  Ridgway, JCS 92832, May 31, 1951, 
Box 32 , JCS Geographic F i l e .
Z^Ridgway to  JCS, C 63744, May 30, 1951, Box 32, 
JCS Geographic F i l e ;  CIA R eport,  "A sian  Communists", DDRS 
3B(77), 15-16.
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sound out the S ov ie t  Union about p o s s ib le  a rm is t ic e  nego­
t i a t i o n s .  Various a t t e u p t s  were made to  c o n ta c t  the S o v ie ts  
u n o f f i c i a l l y  in  o rd e r  to  ensure t h a t  R uss ia  understood 
A m erica 's  i n te n t io n s  and d e s i r e s  in  Korea. On May 17, Sena­
t o r  Edwin Johnson in troduced  a r e s o l u t i o n ,  widely p u b l ic iz e d  
i n  Moscow, c a l l i n g  f o r  an a rm is t ic e  a t  the  38th p a r a l l e l ,  
f o r  an exchange of p r i s o n e r s ,  and w ithdrawal of a l l  troops  
by th e  end of the y e a r .  On May 29, L e s te r  Pearson , P re s id e n t  
o f  the  U.N. General Assembly, announced t h a t  the goal of 
s topp ing  a g g re ss io n  was a s u f f i c i e n t  achievement f o r  U.N. 
f o r c e s .  Ache son, in  t e s t i f y i n g  a t  the  MacArthur Hearings on 
June 1 and June 2, l e t  i t  be known t h a t  the  United S ta te s  
would accept a c e a s e - f i r e  a t  or n e a r  the  38t h  p a r a l l e l .
At the same time these  s ta te m e n ts  were being made, 
the  S ta te  Department asked George Kennan, then  on a leave  of 
absence a t  P r in c e to n ,  to  meet i n  an u n o f f i c i a l  c ap ac ity  w ith  
th e  Soviet U.N. r e p r e s e n ta t iv e ,  Jacob M alik, to  exp la in  
A m erica 's  p o s i t io n  in  Korea. Kennan met w ith  Malik on May 31 
and d iscussed  the d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  a rm is t ic e  t a l k s  in  Korea. 
A f te r  co n su ltin g  w ith  Moscow, Malik was a b le ,  on June 5, to  
t e l l  Kennan t h a t  the  Sov ie t Union "wanted peace and a peace­
f u l  s o lu t io n  in  Korea a s  r a p id ly  a s  p o s s ib l e , "  though R uss ia  
"could  not a p p ro p r ia te ly  take p a r t  in  d i s c u s s io n s  of a c e a se ­
f i r e . "  Washington was u n c e r ta in  what the  s ta tem en t portended
^^CIA I n t e l l i g e n c e  R eport,  "Asian Communists,"
DDRS 3B(77), 20.
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and awaited c l a r i f i c a t i o n . ^ ^
M a lik 's  June 5 s ta tem en t to  Kennan was c l a r i f i e d  on 
June 23, when in  a  r a d io  ad d re ss  Malik suggested t h a t  i f  a  
s in c e re  d e s i re  f o r  peace e x is te d  i t  would be easy f o r  d i s ­
c u ss ion  to  begin between the  two b e l l i g e r e n t s  fo r  a  cea se ­
f i r e  and an a rm is t ic e  p ro v id in g  fo r  the mutual withdrawal of 
fo rc e s  from e i t h e r  s id e  of th e  38th  p a r a l l e l .  Malik d id  n o t  
inc lude  the  p rev io us  demands th a t  the  i s s u e s  of Formosa, a  
U.N. se a t  f o r  China, and withdrawal o f fo re ig n  t ro o p s ,  be 
included  i n  a rm is t ic e  t a l k s .  On June 28, a f t e r  U.S. in ­
q u i r i e s ,  Sov ie t Deputy F o re ig n  M in is te r  Andrei Gromyko f u r ­
t h e r  c l a r i f i e d  the  S ov ie t  p o s i t io n  when he in d ic a te d  t h a t  i t  
would be up to  the m i l i t a r y  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of the two op­
p o sing  fo rc e s  to  n e g o t ia te  th e  a rm is t ice  v/hich Malik en­
v isaged . This a rm is t ic e  v/ould include  a  c e a s e - f i r e  and would 
be l im i te d  s t r i c t l y  t o  m i l i t a r y  q u e s t io n s  w ithout in v o lv in g  
p o l i t i c a l  o r  t e r r i t o r i a l  m a t te r s .
On June 29, Ridgway was in s t ru c te d  to  b ro ad cas t  a  
message the  next day to  the  Chinese suggesting  t h a t  i f  th ey  
d e s ire d  a meeting to  d is c u s s  an a rm is t ic e ,  the  U.N. Command 
was w i l l in g  to  ap p o in t  a  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  to  meet aboard a 
Danish h o s p i ta l  sh ip  in  Wonsan H a r b o r . T h e  n ex t  day, the
^^Acheson, C re a t io n . 681-686.
^ ^ . S .  Department o f  S ta te ,  The Record on Korean 
U n if ic a t io n  (Washington: GPO, i 960) ,  125-126.
33^•^State Department, H i s to r ic a l  Summarv. 96 .
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J o i n t  C h ie fs  sen t  Ridgway i n s t r u c t i o n s  to  guide c e a s e - f i r e  
n e g o t i a t io n s .  He was to ld  t h a t  the prim ary i n t e r e s t  of the 
United N ations  was a c e s s a t io n  of h o s t i l i t i e s .  D iscuss ions  
w ith  the  enemy should be l im i te d  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  m i l i t a r y  mat­
t e r s  and the term s of an a cc ep tab le  a rm is t ic e  would follow  
the  p rev io u s  o u t l i n e s  of the J o i n t  C h ie fs .  The agreed to 
terms should be accep tab le  over a  long  pe rio d  of t im e, since 
i t  was expected  th a t  the  Chinese would be r e lu c ta n t  to  agree 
to  any p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t .^
On J u ly  1 , the  Chinese agreed to  meet r e p re s e n ta ­
t iv e s  o f  the U nited N ations  Command f o r  t a l k s  concerning  c es ­
s a t io n  of h o s t i l i t i e s  in  Korea. They suggested , however, 
t h a t  the  m eeting take  p lace  J u ly  10 a t  Kaesong, n e a r  the ]8 th  
p a r a l l e l .  Ridgway accep ted  both the l o c a t io n  and the  date  
f o r  the d is c u s s io n s .  With t h i s  agreem ent, the long , complex,
and t e r r i b l y  f r u s t r a t i n g  a rm is t ic e  t a l k s  began, and would con-
35t in u e  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  f o r  n e a r ly  two y e a rs .
From the beg inn ing , the  United S ta te s  b e liev ed  the 
t a l k s  were going  to  con tinue  f o r  an extended p e r io d ,  and in ­
deed, some were l e s s  than o p t im is t i c  t h a t  the  t a l k s  would suc­
ceed. One of the e a r ly  snags in  the d is c u s s io n s  hinged on 
the agenda to  be adopted . China wished the  f i r s t  p o in t  of
^^JCS to Ridgway, JCS 9535^. June 30, 1951.
Box 32, JCS Geographic F i l e .
^^Acheson, C re a t io n , 68?. For d e t a i l s  of the  v a r io u s  
i s s u e s  see Hermes, Truce Tent, and W illiam  V atcher, Panmun.jom; 
S tory  o f  the  Korean M i l i t a ry  A rm istice  N e g o tia t io n s  (New 
York; P ra eg e r ,  1958).
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d isc u s s io n  to  c e n te r  on a r e tu r n  to  the s ta tu s  quo ante  b e l -  
lum with a l l  fo re ig n  tro o p s  withdrawing from Korea.
The J o i n t  C h ie fs  informed Ridgway th a t  U.S. p o l ic y  
was t h a t  "We cannot withdraw U.N. fo rc e s  from Korea fo r  a 
long  time no r can we now undertake  a  commitment to  do so in  
the  f u tu r e . "  While a t  some fu tu re  d a te  a mutual red u c t io n  
o f fo rc e s  might be d isc u sse d  to  save the  t a l k s  from break ing  
down, fo r  the  p r e s e n t  th e  q u e s t io n  of troop w ithdrawal was 
considered  a p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e ,  o u ts id e  the purview  of p u re ly  
m i l i t a r y  d is c u s s io n s .  Acheson p u b l ic ly  s ta te d  a s im ila r  
theme when he s a id ,  " I f  th e re  i s  an e f f e c t iv e  a rm is t i c e ,  a 
U.N. fo rce  must remain in  Korea u n t i l  a  genuine peace has 
been f i rm ly  e s ta b l i s h e d  and the  Korean people have assurance 
t h a t  they  can work out t h e i r  fu tu re  f re e  from the  f e a r  of 
a g g re ss io n .
The J o i n t  C h ie fs ,  in  J u ly ,  requested  t h a t  in c reased  
m i l i t a r y  p re s su re  on China be considered  i f  the  c u r r e n t  arm i­
s t i c e  t a l k s  f a i l e d .  While n o t  in  response to th e  memorandum, 
Ridgway planned a  massive a i r  s t r i k e  a g a in s t  Pyongyang f o r  
J u ly  24. Washington was alarmed t h a t  such a  s t r i k e  was to  
occur two weeks a f t e r  th e  beginning  of n e g o t ia t io n s ,  and they  
informed Ridgway t h a t  h i s  proposed s t r i k e  had such " se r io u s
3^Ridgway to  JCS, DA IN 15062, Ju ly  16, 1951. 
Box 32, JCS Geographic F i l e .
^"^JCS to  Ridgway's A dviser, JCS 96802, J u ly  19.
1951. DDRS 18B(75).
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and f a r - r e a c h in g  p o l i t i c a l  im p l ic a t io n s "  t h a t  he should delay 
i t .^®  Ridgway p r o te s te d ,  n o t in g  t h a t  th e re  had been a sub­
s t a n t i a l  bu ild -up  of enemy o f fe n s iv e  p o t e n t i a l  since the f i r s t  
p o s i t iv e  s te p s  toward an a rm is t i c e .  He b e liev ed  t h a t  d e f e r ­
r a l  of the  a i r  a t t a c k  would r e s u l t  in  s e r io u s  and avoidab le  
l o s s e s ,  s ince  a su c ce ss fu l  a t t a c k  would i n f l i c t  s e r io u s  l o g i s ­
t i c a l  lo s s e s  and would m a te r i a l ly  reduce th e  enemy's o ffen ­
sive  c a p a b i l i t y . T h e  J o i n t  C h ie fs  approved the a t t a c k ,  but 
o rdered  t h a t  i t  should be g iven  l i t t l e  p u b l i c i ty  and should 
n o t  be p ic tu re d  as being out of th e  o r d i n a r y . T h e  United 
S ta te s  was anxious to  achieve a  p o l i t i c a l  se t t lem en t to the 
Korean War, bu t only i f  i t  would n o t  compromise the s e c u r i ty  
of i t s  fo rc e s  o r  of South Korea.
The n e g o t ia t io n s  con tinued  th rough  summer and f a l l  
w ith  l im i te d  success . D ispu tes  over a  demarcation l i n e  and 
a two month r e c e s s  f r u s t r a t e d  the  n e g o t i a to r s .  By December, 
the  J o i n t  C h iefs  b e liev ed  fo u r  b a s ic  i s s u e s  remained to be 
re so lv e d .  The f i r s t  was U.S. in s i s t e n c e  t h a t  there  be no in ­
c rease  in  p re s e n t  s t r e n g th  l e v e l s  and in  equipment v e rsu s  the 
Chinese p o s i t io n  of no in t r o d u c t io n  o f  new personnel or ma­
t e r i e l .  A second is su e  d e a l t  w i th  the  p ro h ib i t io n  and
^®JCS to  M arsha ll ,  JCS 1776/280, J u ly  13.1951.DDRS 
18A(75)i Ridgway to  JCS, C 67474, J u ly  21,1951, Box 33, JCS 
Geographic F i l e ; JCS to  Ridgway, JCS 96938,J u ly  21 ,1951 .I b i d .
^^idgway to JCS, C 67520, Ju ly  23, 1951, Ib id .
40JCS to  Ridgway, JCS 97723, Ju ly  25, 1951, Ib id .
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r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  of a i r f i e l d s  and o th e r  i n s t a l l a t i o n s - - t h e  
United S ta te s  was w i l l in g  to  forego a l l  bu t those  a i r f i e l d s  
capable  o f  handling j e t s .  A t h i r d  i s s u e  was U.S. in s i s te n c e  
t h a t  the  Chinese withdraw from o ffsh o re  i s l a n d s  below the 
chosen demarcation l i n e .  F in a l ly ,  th e r e  was a  d isp u te  over 
the  composition of c e a s e - f i r e  o b se rv a t io n  teams. As y e t ,  
the  J o i n t  Chiefs d id  n o t  see t h a t  the  i s s u e  o f  p r i s o n e r s  of 
war would be the major stum bling block to  su c c e ss fu l  n e g o t ia ­
t i o n s .  The J o in t  C h iefs  thought t h a t  an exchange would oc­
c u r  on a one-for-one  b a s i s  u n t i l  the  enemy's supply of p r i ­
soners  was exhausted, and then v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n  would
42come in to  e f f e c t .
The J o i n t  C h ie fs  be lieved  t h a t  a c o n t in u a t io n  of the  
s ta lem a ted  n e g o t ia t io n s  would r a i s e  severe  p u b l ic  opin ion  
problem s. They recommended th a t  a  d e te rm in a t io n  be made of 
the  e x te n t  o f U.S. re so u rc e s  t h a t  were to  be committed to  
Korea and whether the  concept of Chinese "v o lu n te e rs "  should 
con tinue  to  be accep ted . They adv ised  t h a t  the  N ationa l Se­
c u r i t y  Council undertake a  p o l ic y  rev iew  to  determine fu tu re
43a c t io n s  i f  the  a rm is t ic e  f a i l e d .  ^
The need to  f in d  a method to  r e s o lv e  the  s t a l l e d
^^JCS to  Ridgway, JCS 89173.December 10, 1951, 
Box 35, I b i d .
4?JCS to  Ridgway, JCS 90083, December 19, 1951, 
DDRS 18D(75).
^^JCS to Defense, November 3 ,1951, DDRS 18C(75). 
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n e g o t ia t io n s  included c o n s id e ra t io n  of the  use of the  atomic 
bomb in  Korea, under O peration  Hudson Harbor. An o f f i c e r  
team was sen t to  Tokyo and Seoul to  ev a lu a te  the s i t u a t i o n  
in  November, 1951- They concluded t h a t  the  p o l i c i e s ,  p roce­
du res ,  and means a v a i la b le  f o r  O pera tion  Hudson Harbor were 
inadequate  fo r  su ccess fu l  t a c t i c a l  employment of atomic 
weapons. The major problem la y  in  the t im e ly  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
of Isirge troop c o n c e n tra t io n s .  They concluded th a t  the 
atomic bomb should be used only i f  and when n ecessa ry  to  save 
the  8 th  Army o r  in  case of genera l  war. Ridgway was to  be 
in s t r u c te d  "to  draw up contingency p la n s  fo r  p o s s ib le  use 
of atomic weapons in  Korea."
This was n o t  the  f i r s t  time th a t  use of the  atomic 
bomb had been d i s c u s s e d O n  November 14, 1950, th e  Defense 
Department had r a i s e d  the  q u e s t io n  w ith  Paul N itze ,  D ire c to r  
o f  the  P o l ic y  P lann ing  S t a f f .  I t  was thought t h a t  the  atomic 
bomb, to  be used a g a in s t  tro o p  c o n c e n tra t io n s ,  might be a  de­
t e r r e n t  a g a in s t  f u r th e r  Chinese p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  Korea.
N itze  f e l t  t h a t  i t  d id  n o t  appear t a c t i c a l l y  u se fu l  to  employ 
the  bomb then, and i t  might help  arouse the  people o f  Asia
44G-3 to  the  Chief of S t a f f ,  U.S. Army, November 20, 
1951, DDRS 69A(75).
45^In  testim ony before  the Senate Fore ign  R e la t io n s  
Committe on February 10, 1953, B radley  sa id  t h a t  th e  United 
S ta te s  would have to  "cons ider  very s e r io u s ly  the  use of the 
atomic bomb i f  we found a s u i t a b le  t a r g e t  now in  Korea . . ." 
See U.S. Senate, Executive S ess ions  of the  Senate Foreign 
R e la t io n s  Committee, 1953, Volume V, 83rd Congress, 1 s t  Ses­
s ion  (Washington; GPO, 1977), 114.
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a g a in s t  the  United S ta te s .  The atomic bomb had the  s t a tu s  
o f  a  " p e c u l ia r  monster conceived by Am erica." The mass de­
s t r u c t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  from i t s  use in  Korea o r  China would dam­
age s e r io u s ly  both  A m erica 's  moral and a l l i e d  supp o rt .  I t  
was concluded t h a t  only o v e rr id in g  m i l i t a r y  c o n s id e ra t io n s
could  j u s t i f y  use of th e  atomic bomb, i n  l i g h t  of the p o l i t i -
U6c a l  damage th a t  would r e s u l t  from i t s  u s e .  I t  perhaps i s
an in d ic a t io n  of the growing f r u s t r a t i o n  among some o f f i c i a l s
t h a t  use o f atom ic weapons should even be considered  a t  a
time when n e g o t ia t io n s  were underway t o  end the  Korean War.
In  December, NSC 118/2 was produced, in  response to
the  J o i n t  C h iefs  r e q u e s t  f o r  a new assessm ent of U.S. p o l ic y
in  K orea in  l i g h t  of th e  s ta lem ated  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  NSC 118/2
concluded th a t  the  United S ta te s  should  con tinue  to  seek the
b a s ic  o b je c t iv e s  s e t  f o r t h  in  NSC 48/5 to  seek p o l i t i c a l l y ,
a s  an u l t im a te  o b je c t iv e ,  a  s o lu t io n  o f  the  Korean problem
which would p rov ide  f o r  a u n i te d ,  independen t, and democratic
Korea. As a  c u r re n t  o b je c t iv e ,  the  U nited  S ta te s  was to
seek through a p p ro p r ia te  U.N. m achinery, a  s e t t le m e n t  of the
47Korean c o n f l i c t  a ccep tab le  to  American s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s .
The N a tio na l  S e c u r i ty  Council b e liev e d  t h a t  i t  was
^emo by the  D i r e c to r  o f the  P o l ic y  P lann ing  S ta f f  
(N i tz e ) ,  November 4 ,19 50 .FR.1950. VII, 1 0 4 l ; Memo by the  
P la n n in g  A dviser, Burea of Far E a s te rn  A f f a i r s  (Emmerson) to  
Rusk, November 8, 1950, I b i d . . IO98-IO9 9 .
^^NSC 118/ 2 , U.S. O b jec tiv e s  and Courses of Action 
in  Korea, NSC F i l e s . •
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necessa ry  to  balance two c o u n te rv a i l in g  c o n s id e ra t io n s .
F i r s t ,  from a m i l i t a r y  p o in t  o f view, the  im m obiliza tion  of 
U.S. fo rc e s  in  " in co n c lu s iv e  o p e ra t io n s  in  Korea d u r in g  long 
and p ro t ra c te d  n e g o t i a t io n s  over an in d e f in i t e  p e r io d  of time 
w ith  the a t te n d a n t  a t t r i t i o n  of manpower and m a te r ie l  may be­
come u n accep tab le ."  C h in a 's  in c re a s in g  m i l i ta r y  power 
th rea te n ed  A m erica 's  b a s ic  s e c u r i ty  i n t e r e s t s  in  the  F a r  
E a s t .  In  the even t t h a t  a rm is t ic e  t a l k s  f a i l e d ,  i t  could  be 
expected th a t  U.S. p u b l ic  op in ion  would demand "adop tion  of 
m i l i t a r y  measures adequate to  achieve a p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  
d e c is io n  of the  Korean s t r u g g le . "
NSC 118/2 n o te d ,  however, t h a t  " the  p re s s u re  on the 
United S ta te s  to  rea ch  an e a r l y  s e t t le m e n t  in Korea through 
a c e a s e - f i r e  and an a rm is t ic e  a lso  were becoming s t r o n g e r ."
The presence o f  U.S. t ro o p s  in  Korea reduced the  power a v a i l ­
ab le  f o r  use in  Western Europe and the  Near E a s t .  A m erica 's  
a l l i e s  were p re s s in g  c o n t in u a l ly  f o r  an a rm is t ic e ,  were r e l u c ­
t a n t  to  apply a d d i t io n a l  p re s s u re s  to  China, and were unable 
or u n w illin g  to  c o n t r ib u te  any more f o r c e s  to Korea. The 
N a tio n a l  S e c u ri ty  Council concluded t h a t  on the b a la n ce ,  i t  
was apparent t h a t  both  America and R uss ia  would f in d  i t  ad­
vantageous no t to  a t tem p t a t  t h i s  time to  achieve t h e i r  r e ­
sp ec t iv e  maximum o b je c t iv e s  in  Korea by fo rce .
hc
I b i d . ; Annex to  NSC 118/2, NSC S ta f f  Study, 
December 20, 1951» I b id .
^^Ibid.
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One o th e r  p o in t  of s ig n i f ic a n c e  in  NSC 118/2 i s  the 
im p l ic a t io n  of a long, continued American p resence  in  Korea. 
One U.S. o b je c t iv e  t h a t  was c i t e d  was th e  development and 
equ ipp ing  of dependable South Korean m i l i t a r y  u n i t s  w ith  a  
view to  t h e i r  "assuming even tual r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  de­
fense  of K orea."  Following an a r m i s t i c e ,  the  p r i n c i p a l  U.S. 
o b je c t iv e  would be e s tab l ish m en t of South Korean a u th o r i ty  
over a l l  o f  Korea south of the d e m i l i t a r i z e d  zone and the de­
velopment o f s u f f i c i e n t  Korean m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g th  to  d e te r  or 
r e p e l  renewed North Korean a g g re ss io n .  U n t i l  c ircum stances
50p e rm it te d  th e re  would be no withdrawal o f  non-Korean f o rc e s .
T h is  p o in t  was emphasized to  Ridgway i n  Jan u ary ,
1952. Ridgway had informed Washington t h a t  c u r re n t  p la n s  
w ith  r e s p e c t  to  the composition o f  a  peacetim e South Korean 
Army were based on the  assumption th a t  a f t e r  i t s  w ithd raw al,. 
the  United S ta te s  would in te rv en e  in  th e  even t o f renewed 
Communist ag g ress ion  a g a in s t  Korea. The J o i n t  C h iefs  i n ­
formed Ridgway th a t  t h i s  concept ignored  a  key p r in c ip le  of 
NSC 118/ 2 , which s ta te d  th a t  u n t i l  South Korea was s tro n g  
enough m i l i t a r i l y  to  d e te r  o r  r e p e l  new a g g re ss io n  from North 
Korea, the  United S ta te s  would n o t  be p rep a red  to  withdraw. 
Thus any ag g re ss io n  t h a t  occurred  subsequent t o  American w ith ­
d raw al, i f  from North Korea a lo n e ,  should n o t  re q u ire  a u to ­
m atic  U.S. r e - e n t r y .  The United S ta te s  might, but n o t
^^Ibid., 10.
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n e c e s s a r i ly  would, renew i t s  in te r v e n t io n  in  the event of r e ­
newal of Communist aggress ion  a f t e r  U.S. withdrawal
The implementation of any p la n s  to  s tren g th en  the 
South Korean m il i ta ry  in the p o s t - a rm is t i c e  period  depended 
to  a  g re a t  e x te n t  on g a in in g  R hee 's  support fo r  an a rm is t ic e  
agreement. Since the October resum ption  of the t a l k s  a f t e r  
a two-month r e c e s s ,  Rh.ee had expressed  h i s  o p p o s it io n  to  them 
in  a  v a r i e ty  o f ways, the most common being  "spontaneous" de­
m o n s tra t io n s .^ ^  In  February , 1952, Ridgway requested  t h a t  
the  e a r l i e s t  poss ib le  c o n s id e ra t io n  be g iven  to  measures to  
c o u n te rac t  the  in c re a s in g ly  f re q u e n t  South Korean a t t a c k s  
a g a in s t  the  a rm is tice  agreem ents. Unless stopped, th ese  ac ­
t io n s  would g rav e ly  endanger achievement o f an agreement o r 
s e r io u s ly  handicap p o l i t i c a l  d i s c u s s io n s  fo llo w in g  the arm i­
s t i c e .  R hee 's  th re a t  to  withdraw h i s  t ro o p s  from the U.N. 
Command and to  f i g h t  in d ep en d en tly  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e r io u s  
because i f  an extended t ru c e  was to  be achieved. South Korean 
tro o p s  had to remain und er  U.N. c o n t r o l .  Ridgway be lieved  
the  United S ta te s  should t r y  to  g e t  a  fo rm al, w r i t te n  ag ree ­
ment with Rhee to  p revent South Korean w ithd raw al.
A f te r  c o n su l ta t io n  w ith  the  S ta te  Department, the
•^^ Memo by Chief of S t a f f ,  U.S. Army, fo r  the JCS, 
"Renewed U.S. In te rv e n t io n  i n  Korea in  the Event of P o s t  
A rm istice  Treaty  Communist A ggress ion ,"  JCS 1776/273,
January  10, 1952, Box 3 6 , JCS Geographic F i l e .
CO
Hermes, Truce T en t , 214.
^%idgway to JCS, F ebruary  25, 1952, DDRS l6 lA (75)- 
-  340 -
J o i n t  C h ie fs  informed Ridgway th a t  while they agreed th a t  
U.N. Command c o n tro l  over South Korean tro o p s  had to  be r e ­
ta in e d ,  they b e liev ed  no formal agreement to  in su re  c o n tro l  
should be made a t  the p r e s e n t  t im e . The r e s o lu t io n  of t h i s  
s e n s i t iv e  q u es t io n  might a f f e c t  adv erse ly  the a rm is t ic e  
t a l k s .  In  a d d i t io n ,  such n e g o t ia t io n s  a t  a  time when Rhee 
and the South Korean government were in  a  h igh ly  "em otional 
and u n s ta b le  s t a t e  o f op in ion" , might give then  the oppor­
tu n i t y  to  impose unaccep tab le  c o n d it io n s  on the U.N. Command. 
Ridgway as  an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  should t r y  to keep Rhee in  l i n e  
by p re s e n t in g  an a rm is t ic e  agreement as a  f a i t  accom pli.
Rhee then should be reminded th a t  f u l l  South Korean coopera­
t i o n  in e v i t a b ly  would in f lu en ce  the  q u a n t i ty  and q u a l i t y  of 
m i l i t a r y  a s s i s ta n c e  and t r a i n i n g  t h a t  the United S ta te s  would 
provide  f o r  South Korean t ro o p s .  F u l l  coop era tion  included 
r e t e n t i o n  of Korean t ro o p s  under th e  c o n tro l  of U.N. Command 
u n t i l  c o n d i t io n s  m erited  t h e i r  r e l e a s e .  The J o i n t  C h iefs , 
th en , wanted Ridgway to  use the promise of a  fu tu re  U.S. 
s e c u r i t y  commitment to  Korea to p re s su re  Rhëe in to  complying 
and c o o p e ra t in g  w ith  an a rm is t i c e .
Truman r e i t e r a t e d  the  substance of the J o i n t  C h iefs  
memorandum in  a  March 4 l e t t e r  to  Rhee. Truman, to o , t i e d  
fu tu re  a id  to South Korean co o p era t io n  and added t h a t  u n i ty
^^JCS to  Ridgway, JCS 902158, February  27, 1952, 
Box 37. JCS Geographic F i l e .
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of the Korean people and a  "devo tion  to  dem ocratic  id e a ls "  
should be m a i n t a i n e d . R h e e ' s  la c k  o f  devo tion  to  demo­
c r a t i c  i d e a l s ,  however, l e d  to  a  major c r i s i s  in  U.S.- 
Korean r e l a t i o n s .
N a tiona l  e l e c t i o n s  were scheduled in  Korea fo r  the  
summer of 1952. The Republic o f  K o re a 's  c o n s t i tu t io n  c a l le d  
f o r  the  N a tio na l  Assembly to  e l e c t  the  P r e s id e n t ,  and i t  was 
t h i s  body t h a t  con ta ined  R h e e 's  most v o c ife ro u s  c r i t i c s .
Rhee had n ev e r  won an overwhelming mandate from the people 
and he had r e l i e d  upon a c o a l i t i o n  to  keep h im self  in  power 
a f t e r  the 1950 e le c t io n s - -w h ic h  he had sought to  postpone 
u n t i l  U.S. p re s su re  fo rced  him to  r e l e n t .  As a  wartime 
P re s id e n t  h i s  p o p u la r i ty  had r i s e n  and Rhee was determined 
in  1952 to  change the c o n s t i t u t i o n  to  have the P re s id e n t  
e le c te d  by p opu la r  v o te ,  a  move which o p p o s i t io n  elements 
opposed b i t t e r l y .  Rhee, on May 24, d e c la re d  m a r t ia l  law in  
the  temporary c a p i t a l ,  Pusan, and had the  South Korean Army 
a r r e s t  approxim ately  30 assemblymen f o r  t r e a s o n .
Rhee' a c t io n s  p re se n te d  U nited N ations Command and 
the United S ta te s  w ith  a severe  dilemma. South Korea, since  
J u ly  14, 1950, had p laced  i t s  f o r c e s  un der  U.N. Command and 
u s in g  th e se  fo rc e s  f o r  dom estic  p o l i t i c a l  purposes seemed 
improper. Yet a t  the  same tim e, U.N. Command was aware t h a t
^^G-3 to  Ridgway, March 6, 1952, DDRS l6 lB (7 5 ) .
^^Hermes, Truce Tent. 345-346.
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i t  was in  Korea a t  the su f fe ran c e  of a sovereign  s t a t e .  The 
dilemma was i n t e n s i f i e d  because R hee 's  a c t io n s  th rea te n ed  
both th e  war a t  the  f r o n t  and the u n i ty  o f  A m erica 's  a l l i e s  
in  the  United N a tio n s .  R hee 's  use o f  the  army, done w ithout 
the knowledge or p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  C hief o f S ta f f  General Lee 
Chang Chan, could  produce a  s p l i t  in  South Korean Army ran k s .  
A l l ie d  support a lread y  was lukewarm a t  b e s t ,  and R hee 's  a n t i ­
dem ocratic  maneuvers would n o t  in c re a se  t h a t  suppo rt .  Another 
f a c t o r  was t h a t  Pusan was the  major p o r t  o f  South Korea and 
handled the g r e a t  m ajo rity  o f the  8 th  Army's s u p p l ie s .  The 
United S ta te s  could no t t o l e r a t e  any i n te r r u p t i o n  in  the  flow 
of su p p l ie s  to  U.N. tro ops  a t  the f r o n t .
On May 30, the J o i n t  C h ie fs  to ld  General Mark 
C lark^^, to  inform  Rhee t h a t  Washington was s e r io u s ly  d i s ­
tu rbed  over the  p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  im p l ic a t io n s  of South 
K o re a 's  i n t e r n a l  c r i s i s .  There was a  grave  danger to  the 
con tinued  success  of U.N. m i l i t a r y  o p e ra t io n s  in  Korea a s  a 
r e s u l t  of the in c re a s in g  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  in  South Korea. 
The U nited S t a te s  d id  n o t  b e l ie v e  th a t  the  f a c t s  j u s t i f i e d  a 
d e c la r a t io n  of m a r t ia l  law .^^  Both C lark  and Van F le e t  
ta lk e d  to  Rhee, b u t  w ithou t su ccess .
’^^ Ibid., 346.
In  A p r i l ,  C lark re p la c e d  Ridgway, who became Com­
mander of NATO fo rc e s .
^^Chief o f S ta f f ,  U.S. Army, to  C la rk , DA 910149,
May 30, 1952, Box 3 9 , ' JCS Geographic F i l e .
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The United S ta te s  was so d isp le a se d  and alarmed, 
t h a t  on June 25, C lark was informed t h a t  the s i t u a t i o n  could 
d e t e r i o r a t e  to  the p o in t  where " in  o rd e r  to  p rev en t  i n t e r ­
fe ren ce  w ith  U.N. m i l i t a r y  o p e ra t io n s ,  d i r e c t  in te r v e n t io n  
in  the  s i t u a t i o n  cannot be avo ided ."  C lark  was in s t r u c te d  
to  develop and submit, f o r  W ashington 's app rov a l,  a d e ta i l e d  
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  p lan  f o r  i n te r v e n t io n  i f  Rhee re fu se d  
to  l i f t  m a r t i a l  law . Such a p la n  h o p e fu l ly  would be im ple­
mented a t  th e  r e q u e s t  o f  the U.N. Commission f o r  the  U n i f i ­
c a t io n  and R e h a b i l i t a t io n  of Korea. T his would enable the  
U.N. Commander to  recommend the a c t io n  to  the United S ta te s ,  
which could c a r ry  ou t the  p lan  as the e x ecu tiv e  agen t of 
the United  N a tio n s  in  Korea.
C la rk ,  in  subm itting  h i s  p la n s  on J u ly  5» informed 
the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  t h a t  n e i th e r  the  S e c u r i ty  Council n o r  the  
U.N. Commission had been informed, f o r  f e a r  t h a t  the p la n s  
would become known prem ature ly , a llow ing  Rhee time to  o rganize  
r e s i s t a n c e  o r  to  withdraw South Korean t ro o p s  from U.N. Com­
mand a u th o r i ty .  C lark recommended t h a t  any a c t io n  sh o r t  of 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  a U.N. Command Government should p rese rv e  the  
symbol of South K o re a 's  government and t h a t  t h i s  a c t io n  
should be l a b e le d  a s  " a s s i s t a n c e ."  He f u r t h e r  b e liev ed  the 
South Korean Army should n o t  be used a s  " i t  might p r e c i p i t a t e
^®JCS to  Clark, JCS 912098, June 25, 1952, Box 40,
Ib id .
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a  c iv i l - t y p e  war.
C la rk 's  p lan  envisaged i n v i t i n g  Rhee to  v i s i t  Seoul 
o r  somewhere e lse  to  ge t him out of Pusan . At an appointed 
time U.N. fo rces  v/ould move in to  Pusan and se iz e  f iv e  c r  ten  
South Korean o f f i c i a l s  who had been l e a d e r s  o f "Rhee's  d i c t a ­
t o r i a l  a c t io n s ."  A ll  U.N. i n s t a l l a t i o n s  would be p ro te c te d  
and c o n tro l  over Pusan would be e s t a b l i s h e d  through imposi­
t i o n  o f m a r t ia l  law  through the C hief o f S t a f f  of the South 
Korean Army. Rhee then would be informed of the  f a i t  accompli 
and would have to  s ig n  a  p roc lam ation  l i f t i n g  m a r t ia l  law, 
p e rm i t t in g  the N a tio n a l  Assembly freedom of a c t io n ,  and e s t a b ­
l i s h i n g  freedom o f  p re s s  and r a d io .  I f  Rhee d id  n o t  agree , 
he would be held in  p r o te c t iv e  custody incommunicado and 
Prime M in is te r  Chang Taek-song would be approached. When 
agreement was reached, a s ta tem en t would be is su e d  j u s t i f y i n g  
the  a c t io n  on m i l i t a r y  grounds and as  the  r e s u l t  o f  the " re -
62q u e s t  of n a tio n s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  the  c o n f l i c t . "
C la rk 's  p lan  was never p u t  in to  e f f e c t ,  as nego­
t i a t i o n s  between Rhee and h is  opponents l e d  to  c o n s t i tu ­
t i o n a l  changes acc ep tab le  to  Rhee. M a r t ia l  law  f i n a l l y  was 
l i f t e d  on J u ly  2 8 . The p lan  to  in te rv e n e  in  Korean do­
m estic  a f f a i r s  c e r t a i n l y  was a  v iv id  example o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t
^^Glark to  JCS, Ju ly  5, 1952, DDRS 162D975).
^^Ibid.
^%ermes. Truce T en t, 346.
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a t  work in  a n a t i o n 's  fo re ig n  p o l ic y —and i t  was, a s  s h a l l  
be seen, an approach t h a t  would be co ns id ered  once more in  
1953 when t ro u b le s  with Rhee arose  a g a in .
The s t a b i l i z a t i o n  of the b a t t l e f i e l d  s i t u a t i o n  had 
allowed Washington the time to co n s id e r  c a r e f u l l y  i t s  fu tu re  
p o l ic y  i n  Korea. The near  t o t a l  d i s a s t e r  o f November and 
December, 1950, l e d  the United S ta te s  to  draw back from i t s  
p o l ic y  o f  u n ify in g  Korea m i l i t a r i l y ,  to  the  more l im i te d  
g o a ls  s t a t e d  in  NSC 48/5 of a t t a i n i n g  a  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t le m e n t  
to th e  Korean War and of seeking  p o l i t i c a l l y  to  e s t a b l i s h  a  
u n i te d  K orea. At the same time, NSC 118/2  c a r r i e d  the  c l e a r  
im p l ic a t io n  th a t  the American presence  in  Korea was go ing  to  
be an extended one. Not u n t i l  Korea was capable  of r e s i s t i n g  
renewed N orth  Korean agg ress io n  would the  United S ta te s  even 
c o n s id e r  withdrawing.
The United S ta te s  en te red  the a rm is t ic e  n e g o t i a t io n s  
w ith  the  Communists under d i f f i c u l t  c o n d i t io n s ,  because i t  
had been decided p r i o r  to  the  t a l k s  t h a t  th e re  would be no 
w ithdraw al o f U.S. troops from Korea f o r  some time w e ll  in to  
t h e . f u t u r e .  I t  a ls o  had been decided t h a t  such p o l i t i c a l  
i s s u e s  a s  Formosa o r  a U.N. se a t  f o r  Communist China would 
n o t  be d isc u sse d .  F in a l ly ,  i t  had been decided  t h a t  U.N. 
f o rc e s  would m ain ta in  a  l a r g e ly  d e fe n s iv e  p o s tu re  v i s - a - v i s  
ground o p e ra t io n s ,  thu s  le a d in g  to  a f r u s t r a t i n g  m i l i t a r y  
s i t u a t i o n  in  which the United S ta te s  t r i e d  to  s u b s t i t u t e  the 
panacea o f  a i r  power f o r  ground power. Since the United
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S ta te s  would n o t  n e g o t ia te  on many p o i n t s ,  i t  was necessa ry  
to  be f l e x ib le  on o th e r  i s s u e s .  For example, U.S. p o l ic y  on 
a i r f i e l d  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  s h i f t e d  from o u t r ig h t  p r o h ib i t io n ,  
to  l im i te d  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n ,  to  co n cess io n  on the is su e  to  gain  
a  compromise. The United S ta te s  r e f r a in e d  from ta k in g  any 
" f i n a l  s tands" t h a t  might le a d  to  a  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  the t a l k s .  
T his f l e x i b i l i t y  in  n e g o t i a t io n s  served  America w ell in  
keep ing  the t a l k s  a l i v e ,  u n t i l  a l l  bu t  one issue  had been 
re s o lv e d —t h a t  of the d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  p r i s o n e r s .  On t h a t  one 
i s s u e ,  both s id e s  m ain ta ined  a s tubborn , u n y ie ld in g  stand 
t h a t  c o s t  thousands o f  c a s u a l t i e s .
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CHAPTER XII
AN ARMISTICE ACHIEVED
The Korean a rm is t ic e  n e g o t i a t io n s  began on Ju ly  10, 
1951I a t  Kaesong and were moved to  Panmunjom in  October. 
P ro g re ss  was slow and b i t t e r  d i s p u te s  were common. By March, 
1952, agreem ents had been reached on a  dem arcation  l i n e  cor­
respond ing  to  b a t t l e f i e l d  p o s i t io n ,  on c r e a t io n  of an Armi­
s t i c e  Commission and on a  N eu tra l  N a tion s  S uperv iso ry  Commis­
s io n , on e s ta b l is h m e n t  of a d e m i l i t a r i z e d  zone and on le v e ls  
of troop  and m a te r ie l  rep lacem ent and r o t a t i o n .  The United 
S ta te s  had achieved th ese  agreem ents th rough  a  f l e x i b l e  
p o l ic y ,  w i th in  which th e  U nited  S t a te s  p layed  "The Communist 
game of s h i f t i n g ,  a d ju s t i n g ,  and maneuvering f o r  advantages 
and avo id ing  f ix ed  p o s i t i o n s  th a t  might p r e c i p i t a t e  a break 
in  the n e g o t i a t i o n s . "  The United S t a te s  b e liev e d  t h a t  as 
long  as  th e  U.N. Command was w i l l i n g  to  n e g o t i a t e ,  the  Com­
m unis ts  would h a v e . to  b e a r  th e  onus f o r  b reak ing  o f f  a t  the 
conference  t a b l e .^
There were th re e  rem ain ing  i s s u e s  to  be d e a l th  with 
befo re  an a rm is t ic e  could be agreed  to .  One is su e  was U.S.
^Hermes, Truce Tent, 130.
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o p p o s i t io n  to  c o n s t r u c t io n  of a i r f i e l d s  in  N orth  Korea d u ring  
the c e a s e - f i r e  p e r io d .  A second is su e  revo lved  around the 
composition of the  N eu tra l  N ations Superv iso ry  Commission— ' 
North Korea d e s i r e d  R uss ia  a s  a member. The t h i r d  problem 
was the  q u e s t io n  of v o lu n ta ry  versus fo rce d  r e p a t r i a t i o n  of 
p r i s o n e rs  o f  war.
On A p r i l  25, the U.N. Command o f fe re d  a  package p ro ­
posal t h a t  narrowed d isagreem ent to  one i s s u e .  C h in a 's  r e ­
p ly  on May 2 to  th e  U.N. p ro p o sa ls  paved the way f o r  a g re e ­
ment on the  com position  of the  N eu tra l  N a tions  Superv isory  
Commission, w ith  the Communists dropping th e i r '  demand f o r  
Soviet p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  The U.N. Command p rop osa l  dropped the  
p r o h ib i t io n  a g a in s t  a i r f i e l d  c o n s t ru c t io n  i f  v o lu n ta ry  r e ­
p a t r i a t i o n  was reco g n ized .  On May 22, 1952, Ridgway sa id ,
"The r e a l l y  fundam ental is su e  . . .was the p r i s o n e r  o f war 
th in g . That s t r i k e s  a t  a fundamental concept o f  the value 
of human l i f e  between the  Communists and the f r e e  world .
The p r i s o n e r -o f -w a r  is su e  was a  d i f f i c u l t  one f o r  
Washington to  d e a l  w ith .  As a s ig n a to r  of the Geneva Conven­
t io n  of 1949 (though the Senate had n o t  r a t i f i e d  i t ) ,  the  
United S t a te s  should have aocepted A r t i c l e  118, which p rov ided
^ a r k  C la rk , From the Danube to  the Yalu(New York: 
Harper and B ro th e r s ,  1954), 104.
3
U.S. Sena te , E xecutive  S ess ions  of th e  Senate 
Foreign  R e la t io n s  Committe. 1952. Volume IV, 82nd Congress, 
1 s t  and 2nd Sessions(W ashington: GPO, 1976), 133; C la rk ,
Danube, 104; V atcher, Panmun.iom, 111-112.
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t h a t  p r i s o n e r s  were to  be re le a s e d  and r e p a t r i a t e d  immediately 
a t  the end of the h o s t i l i t i e s .  The problem was th a t  la rg e  
numbers of the over 130,000 enemy p r i s o n e r s  d id  n o t  want to  
be r e p a t r i a t e d .  Many were South Korean Army personnel f o r ­
c ib ly  in co rp o ra te d  in to  the North Korean Army, some were d i s ­
enchanted North Koreans and Chinese, and some were Chinese 
N a t io n a l i s t  d e s e r t e r s  now d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith  l i f e  i n  C hina.^
In  such an in te n s e ly  and s t a r k ly  id e o lo g ic a l  c o n f l i c t  
as the Korean War, the  is su e  o f  what to  do w ith  p r i s o n e r s  who 
re fu sed  r e p a t r i a t i o n  in e v i t a b ly  became enmeshed in  ideo logy . 
The enemy could n o t  t o l e r a t e  the  p r i s o n e r s '  obvious and o ve rt  
r e j e c t i o n  o f  the  Communist way of l i f e — the  propaganda damage 
would be too  g r e a t .  The United  S t a te s ,  o f course , saw the 
obvious propaganda p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  C onversely , the United 
S ta te s  faced  s e r io u s  propaganda problems i f  i t  employed force  
to r e t u r n  these  p r i s o n e r s  to  a  Communist s t a t e .  Could such 
an a c t io n  be j u s t i f i e d  i d e o l o g i c a l l y ,  m o ra lly ,  or p r a c t i c a l l y ?  
The r e a l  dilemma came when Washington had to  co n s id e r  t h a t  
U.S.-U.N. fo rc e s  on th e  b a t t l e f i e l d  f r o n t  l i n e s  would be 
c a l le d  on to  make the u l t im a te  s a c r i f i c e  i f  the  United S ta te s  
re fu sed  to  concede on the p r i s o n e r  i s s u e .
The United S ta te s  a lm ost d r i f t e d  in to  i t s  commitment 
to  v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n .  General R obert McClure, Army 
Chief o f  P sy ch o lo g ica l  Warfare, i n i t i a l l y  proposed the  id ea
^Hermes, Truce T en t . 135-136.
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in  J u ly ,  1951. and Army Chief of S t a f f  C o l l in s  pushed the 
concept because the  m i l i t a r y  g e n e ra l ly  considered  v o lun ta ry  
r e p a t r i a t i o n  to  be a d e s i r a b le  o b je c t iv e .  Yet th e re  were 
those , in c lu d in g  the  new S e c re ta ry  o f  Defense, Robert L o v e tt ,  
who expressed u n c e r ta in ty  about whether the  is su e  should be 
adhered to  in  the face  of r ig o ro u s  Chinese o p p o s i t io n .  When 
the issue  came up f o r  d is c u s s io n  a t  Panmunjom in  December, 
1951, the United S ta te s  s t i l l  had no firm  p o l ic y  position .-^
The d e t a i l s  o f the decision-m aking  p rocess  t h a t  led  
the United S ta te s  to  propose v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n  on Janu­
ary  2, 1952, i s  unknown. S ta te  Department documents are no t 
a v a i la b le  and pu b lish ed  memoirs p rov ide  l i t t l e  he lp . At 
b e s t ,  one may re a c h  a  t e n t a t i v e  co n c lu s io n  on the sc an t  e v i ­
dence a v a i la b le .  In  the p e r io d  from December 11, 1951, when 
the issue  of p r i s o n e r s  was brought up in  the  t a l k s ,  to  Janu-. 
a ry  2, when Admiral Ruthven E. Libby p re se n te d  the p r in c ip le  
to  the  Communists, the United S ta te s  reached  a d e c is io n  to 
p re s s  f o r  v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n . ^ The d e c is io n  had to  be 
based i n  p a r t  on the propaganda value of thousands of 
p r i s o n e rs  r e fu s in g  to  r e t u r n  to  t h e i r  Communist homeland—but 
t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  e x is te d  in  December. In  p a r t ,  the d e c is io n  
was based on moral and hum an ita r ian  grounds, though these  
too e x is te d  in  December. In  p a r t ,  i t  was based on South
^ I b i d . . 136- 139; Acheson. C re a t io n . 832-833*
^Hermes, Truce T e n t . 142-144.
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Korean o p p o s i t io n  to fo rced  r e p a t r i a io n ,  though t h i s  was 
known a ls o  before the p r i s o n e r  is su e  came up f o r  d i s -
n
c u ss io n .  Opposing each o f  these  c o n s id e r a t io n s  was the 
t e r r i b l e  p ro sp e c t  of f u r t h e r  c a s u a l t i e s  i f  the  t a l k s  became 
s ta lem ated  over th e  i s s u e .
Given th e se  f a c t o r s ,  i t  i s  l o g i c a l  to  conclude t h a t  
the  a c t io n s  of th e  Communists in  the  December t a l k s  had a de­
c i s iv e  in f lu e n c e  on the  d e c is io n  the United S ta te s  reached . 
E a r ly  in  the  d is c u s s io n s  the  United S t a te s  had req u es ted  a 
complete accoun ting  of a l l  p r i s o n e rs  o f  war. The Communists 
agreed and d a ta  was exchanged. The r e s u l t s  shocked and 
angered American o f f i c i a l s .  The Communists had claimed in  
rad io  b ro ad c as ts  to  have cap tu red  65,000 of th e  enemy; the 
U.N. Command knew i t  had 99»000 men m iss in g ,  y e t  th e  Commu­
n i s t s  p re sen te d  a l i s t  o f only 11,599 p r i s o n e r s .  The Commu-. 
n i s t s  b l i t h e l y  d ism issed  t h i s  wide d isc rep a n cy  as r e s u l t i n g  
from having  " re -ed u ca ted  and re le a s e d "  thousands of p r i s o n e r s ,  
who e i t h e r  had vo lu n teered  to  jo in  the  N orth  Korean Army or 
had been re tu rn e d  to  U.N. l i n e s .  In  e f f e c t ,  th e  Communists' 
excuse was t h a t  they  had p r a c t ic e d  v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n .
The United S ta te  knew b e t t e r  than  t h i s —the  N orth  Korean Army 
had fo rced  South Korean pe rso n n e l to  j o in  i t s  m i l i t a r y  and
7
Acheson s t a t e s  i n  h i s  memoirs t h a t  the  d e c is io n  was 
made on hum an ita rian  grounds and fo r  propaganda p o t e n t i a l ,  
in  the face  of m i l i t a r y  o p p o s i t io n .  See Acheson. C re a t io n . 
833* The documents do n o t  s u b s ta n t ia t e  a  m i l i t a r y  o p p o s i t io n  
to  the  p r i n c i p le  o f v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n .
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and only a few p r i s o n e r s  had reached U.N. l i n e s .  The Commu­
n i s t s  had provided  " th e  U.N. Command with a  propaganda l e v e r . "  
While the  d o c tr in e  o f v o lu n ta ry  . r e p a t r i a t i o n  was unusua l,
" i t s  hum anitar ian  a s p e c ts  were bound to  appeal to  a  la rg e  
p a r t  o f  the  world."®
The United S t a te s  had found a  p r a c t i c a l  way to  imple­
ment an id e o lo g ic a l ly  and m ora lly  ap p ea lin g  p o l ic y .  The
p o l ic y ,  however, once accep ted , would almost be impossible 
t o  back away from, f o r  i t  s t ru c k  a t  th e  very essence  o f the 
Cold War c o n f l i c t .  The p ic tu r e  of a freedom -lov ing , demo­
c r a t i c  c o a l i t i o n  of th e  f r e e  world f o r c ib ly  r e tu r n in g  people 
t o  a  r e p r e s s iv e .  Communist " s lave"  s o c ie ty ,  was no t a p le a sa n t  
one f o r  the United S t a te s  to  con tem pla te .
The r e s u l t  of the  d e c is io n  to  p re s s  f o r  v o lu n ta ry  r e ­
p a t r i a t i o n  was a  s ta lem a te  in  th e  d is c u s s io n s .  Various ideas 
were p u t  f o r t h  to  break the  s t a l l e d  t a l k s .  One p ro p o sa l ,  
made in  l a t e  February , 1952, was to  r e le a s e  u n i l a t e r a l l y  
th ose  p r i s o n e r s  in  U.N. custody who v io le n t ly  opposed repa­
t r i a t i o n .  The Communists would be p re sen te d  w ith  a  f a i t  ac­
com pli. Ridgway opposed t h i s  p la n ,  f e e l in g  t h a t  adop tion  o f  
a  " su b te rfu g e"  would d e s t ro y  th e  p r e s t ig e  the U nited  N a tion s  
had gained in  su p p o r t in g  v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n  and would 
harm th e  chances f o r  a  sa fe  r e t u r n  of U.N. p r i s o n e r s .  He 
b e l ie v e d  the  b e s t  cou rse  was t o  p re s e n t  a package p roposa l
Q
Hermes, Truce Tent, 135-136.
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in v o lv in g  a t r a d e - o f f  on a i r f i e l d  c o n s t ru c t io n  f o r  v o lu n ta ry  
r e p a t r i a t i o n .  He f e l t  the  r e p a t r i a t i o n  issu e  was the  wrong 
one to  take  a f i n a l  s tand on, bu t he r e a l i z e d  a U.N. r e v e r s a l
Q
was unaccep tab le  a s  i t  would " ta rn i s h "  the U .N . 's  good name.
The J o in t  C h iefs  i n s t r u c t e d  Ridgway a t  an a p p ro p r ia te  
time " to  seek Communist accep tance  of the  p r in c ip le  of vo lun­
t a r y  r e p a t r i a t i o n  in  exchange f o r  UNC concess ions  on the  a i r ­
f i e l d  i s s u e . "  I f  t h i s  was u n a cc ep tab le ,  he was to ld  to  r e ­
move from "POW s ta tu s  those  p r i s o n e r s  who could be expected 
v i o l e n t l y  to  r e s i s t  r e p a t r i a t i o n  . . . " ,  and th en  a ttem p t 
to  have th e  Communists "agree to  an a l l - f o r - a l l  exchange on 
th e  b a s is  o f the  re v is e d  l i s t s .
As p re v io u s ly  n o te d ,  the  Communists r e j e c t e d  a 
t r a d e - o f f  on a i r f i e l d s ,  but conceded on membership in  the  
N e u tra l  N a tions  Commission. They f l a t l y  r e j e c te d  any a ttem p t 
to  d e le te  names from p re v io u s  l i s t s  and demanded fo rced  r e ­
p a t r i a t i o n  i f  n e ce ssa ry ,  which th e  United  S ta te s  re fu se d  to  
a c c e p t .  The p r i s o n e r  i s s u e  remained the  l a s t  unreso lved  
q u e s t io n  in  the n e g o t i a t io n s .  General Mark C lark  took over 
Ridgway’ s command a t  t h i s  tim e, and one of h i s  f i r s t  a c t s  
was to  endorse Chief U.N. N e g o t ia to r  Admiral Turner J o y ' s  
recommendation th a t  the  t a l k s  be suspended u n t i l  the  Communists
%idgway to  the JCS, C 64-383, February  27, 1952, 
R ecen tly  D e c la s s i f ie d  Documents on Korean War. Modem M i l i ­
t a r y  Branch, N a tio na l  A rch ives , Washington D.C.
^^Memo, Eddleman(G-3) to  the  C hief o f  S t a f f ,  U.S.
Army, March 4, 1952, I b i d .
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accepted  the U.N. package p ro p o s a l .  C lark  believed t h a t  to  
s i t  and l i s t e n  to  a "d a ily  f a r e  of i n s u l t ,  a rrogance , and 
v i tu p e r a t io n  could only s t r e n g th e n  the Communists in t h e i r  be­
l i e f  t h a t  we were so anxious f o r  a c e a s e - f i r e  in  Korea t h a t
11e v e n tu a l ly  we would knuckle under . . . ."
The S ta te  Department and the  Defense Department both
opposed such a  u n i l a t e r a l  move, a s  being "premature in  view
of the  confused a t t i tu d e  a t  home and among our A l l i e s  a s  a
12r e s u l t  o f the  Koje a f f a i r  . . . ." K oje-do, an i s l a n d  o f f  
sou thern  Korea, was the main Chinese p r iso n e r-o f -w a r  camp.
The p r i s o n e r s  were aware t h a t  th e  debate a t  Panmunjom would 
determ ine t h e i r  fu tu re .  The Communist p r i s o n e rs  organized 
them selves e f f e c t i v e ly  bo th  to  h a ra s s  those  p r i s o n e r s  n o t  de­
s i r i n g  r e p a t r i a t i o n  and to  p r o t e s t  t h e i r  delayed r e p a t r i a t i o n ,  
in  a manner designed to em barrass the United Nations s e v e re ly .  
The non-Communists then o rgan ized  and the  r e s u l t  was a bloody 
s t ru g g le  f o r  c o n tro l  of the  compounds. Under these  c o n d i t io n s  
i t  was ex trem ely  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the  United S ta te s  to  sc reen  
p r i s o n e r s  to  determine the  number of n o n r e p a t r ia te s  they  h e ld .  
One such a ttem p t in  February r e s u l t e d  in  7? p r i s o n e rs  be ing  
k i l l e d  and 150 o th e r  c a s u a l t i e s — and in  a  considerab le  amount 
of bad p u b l i c i t y  fo r  the United N a tio ns .
The S ta te  Department d id  give C lark  perm ission  to
^^C lark , Danube. 104-105. ^h b i d . ,  I 05.
^^Hermes, Truce T ent, 233-239. For a thorough d i s ­
c u ss io n  o f  the even ts  a t  K oje-do , see Chapter XI of Hermes.
-  355 -
r e c e s s  the t a lk s  f o r  up to  th re e  days a t  a time and he was 
au tho rized  to r e le a s e  27,000 c i v i l i a n  in te rn e e s ,  which he d id  
i n  June .^^  Throughout the summer, the  t a l k s  remained s t a l e ­
mated. On September 1, C lark  subm itted to  Washington a  l i s t  
o f  a l t e r n a t iv e  approaches which he though t should c o n s t i tu t e  
th e  f i n a l  U.N. approach to  the  Communists.
Clark b e liev ed  t h a t  any course o f  a c t io n  would re q u ire  
"a  continued d i s p la y  o f  f irm n ess  . . . supported a t  a l l  l e v e l s  
and by a l l  e lem ents of our Government.” The bes t  way to  
demonstrate f irm n ess  was to  con tinue  both  u n i l a t e r a l  r e c e s se s  
and the  p re s e n t  heavy bombing a t t a c k s .  In  developing the  
proposed course  o f  a c t io n ,  C lark  "assumed t h a t  the U.N. would 
n o t  r e t r e a t  from th e  p r in c ip le  o f no fo rced  r e p a t r i a t i o n . "  
C lark  l i s t e d  f iv e  p ro p o sa ls ,  b u t  th e re  were only tv/o b as ic  
ones, with v a r i a t i o n s .  Four o f  the  p la n s  envisaged tu rn in g  
o v e r  the p r i s o n e r s  to  v a r io u s ly  composed n e u tr a l  n a t io n s  f o r  
d i s p o s i t i o n .  The f i f t h  a l t e r n a t i v e  was to  d e l iv e r  a l l  nonre­
p a t r i a t e s  to  th e  d e m i l i t a r iz e d  zone, th e re  to  be re le a s e d  and 
"w ithou t i n t e r v i e V/ o r sc ree n in g ,  be f re e  to  go to the  side  
o f  t h e i r  ch o ic e ."  C lark  wanted General William K. H arr ison , 
th e  nev/ U.K. N e g o t ia to r ,  to  rev iew  p a s t  p ro posa ls  c a r e f u l ly  
and then p re s e n t  th e  new p ro p o sa ls  a s  the  b e s t  U.N. e f f o r t  
to  produce a  f i n a l  agreement. Acceptance would be c o n tin g en t
1A
C lark , Danube. 107-109; Hermes, Truce T e n t . 268- 69 .
^•^Clark to  the  JCS, C 54499, September 1, 1952, Box 
39f JCS Geogra-phic F i l e .
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upon f i r s t  s ign ing  an a rm is t i c e .
A f te r  H arrison  p re se n te d  the  new p ro p o sa ls ,  which 
were to  be given the w idest p o s s ib le  p u b l i c i t y  immediately 
fo l lo w in g  the  m eeting, he would r e c e s s  the  t a l k s  f o r  ten  
days so t h a t  the Communists might c o n s id e r  the  p ro p o sa ls .  
C o in c id en t  w ith  the r e c e s s ,  th e  U.S. Government should t r y  
to  have is su e d  s tro n g  su p p o r t in g  p u b l ic  s ta tem en ts  from a l ­
l i e d  and U.S. l e a d e r s .  I f  the  p ro p o sa ls  were r e j e c t e d ,  i t  
then would be apparen t t h a t  the  Communists d id  n o t  d e s i r e  an 
a rm is t i c e  on m utually  acc ep tab le  te rm s. At th a t  p o in t  the  
U.N. Command should r e c e s s  the  t a l k s  i n d e f i n i t e l y  u n t i l  the 
Communists subm itted w r i t t e n  p ro p o sa ls .  With a r e c e s s ,  C lark  
be liev ed  the  m i l i t a r y  a s p e c ts  of the  n e g o t i a t io n s  would be ■ 
ov er,  and t h a t  " i t  might then  be l o g i c a l  to  remove th e  ques­
t i o n  o f  peace in  Korea from the hands of the UNC." He f e l t  
t h a t  " F u r th e r  d is c u s s io n  on a  m i l i t a r y  b a s is  by the  UNC would 
be p o i n t l e s s  and would in  f a c t  f u r t h e r  c o n tr ib u te  to  the 
s e r io u s  l o s s  of p r e s t ig e  which we have a lre ad y  su f ­
fe re d  . . .
On September 9, the J o i n t  C h ie fs  informed C lark  t h a t
the  S ta te  Department was c o n s id e r in g  a  d i f f e r e n t  approach,
which would involve le a v in g  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  n o n r e p a t r i a te s
1 flto  l a t e r  n e g o t i a t io n s .  The impetus f o r  t h i s  p lan  l a y  in  
ï^ïb id . l^Ibid.
^^ddlem an(G -3) to  C h ie f  o f S t a f f ,  U.S. Army, "Summary 
o f  A c tio n s  w ith  Respect to  the  A rm sitice  N e g o t ia t io n s ,  Octo­
be r  6, 1952, Recently  D e c la s s i f ie d  Documents on Korean War.
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d is c u s s io n s  between r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of the  S ta te  Department 
and the  B r i t i s h  Foreign O ff ic e .  According to  Ache son, the  
May o u tb reak s  o f  v io lence  a t  K oje-do, which inc luded  the 
c ap tu re  of the  U.S. Commanding o f f i c e r ,  had shaken "our a l ­
l i e s  f a i t h  i n  the  good judgment and competence o f  our com­
mand, c re a t in g  doubt about our a b i l i t y  to  f u r n i s h  le a d e r ­
sh ip  . . . ."  The p r i s o n e r  i s s u e ,  i n  the f a l l  o f  1952, be­
came "the  p r i n c i p l e  q u e s t io n  before  the General Assembly."
In  an e f f o r t  to  break the s ta le m a te ,  the-’S ta te  Department 
and G reat B r i t a i n  agreed t h a t  P an n ik a r  should probe C h in a 's  
in t e n t io n s  on the  p r i s o n e r  i s s u e .  The r e s u l t  was a p lan  to  
hold n o n r e p a t r i a t e s  f o r  f u tu re  p o l i t i c a l  n e g o t i a t io n s  in  
the  p o s t - a r m is t i c e  p e r io d .
G eneral C lark was opposed to  the suggested  procedure
and b e liev ed  i t  should be accep ted  only a s  a l a s t  r e s o r t .
The J o i n t  C h ie fs  and the Defense Department supported C lark
in  o p p o s i t io n  to  the S ta te  D ep artm en t 's  p la n  to  have the
20P re s id e n t  i s s u e  a sta tem ent advoca ting  such a p rop osa l .
From September 15 to  September 17, the  S ta te  Department, the 
Defense Departm ent, and the J o i n t  C h ie fs  met in  an a ttem pt 
to  rea ch  a  consensus on p o l ic y .  The Defense Department 
and the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  opposed the p la n  f o r  th re e  reason s .
^^Acheson, C re a t io n , 835-836.
20Eddleman Memo, Summary A rm is t ic e ,  October 6, 1952. 
Acheson, in  h i s  memoirs, g iv es  the im press ion  th a t  the  S ta te  
Department opposed t h i s  p la n ,  when the  a v a i la b le  documents 
su g g es t  t h a t  he argued f o r  adop tion  o f  the  p la n .  See 
Acheson, C r e a t io n . 836.
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F i r s t ,  the  p lan  was such a  complete d ep a rtu re  from the  p r e ­
v ious  U.S. package p roposa l t h a t  the Communists in e v i ta b ly  
would view i t s  p r e s e n ta t io n  as an in d ic a t io n  o f  "a  weakening 
in  our p o s i t io n  from the  p r in c ip le  of n o n r e p a t r i a t io n  and 
th e re fo re  l e a d  the  Communists to  expect f u r t h e r  concessions 
on our p a r t . "  A second reason  f o r  o p p o s i t io n  was t h a t  ac­
ceptance would a llow  the Communists, du ring  the  a rm is t ic e  
p e r io d ,  to  "b u ild -u p  t h e i r  fo rc e s  in  overwhelming s t r e n g th  
and then  renew h o s t i l i t i e s  on the b a s is  of the  absence of 
a  r e s o l u t i o n  of the  q u e s t io n  of the POWs . . . ." They 
could , a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  e x to r t  f u r th e r  concess ions  from the 
U nited S ta te s  in  p o s t - a rm is t ic e  t a l k s  in  exchange f o r  ag ree­
ment on the  p r i s o n e r  i s s u e .  The t h i r d  reason  f o r  o p p o s i t io n  
was t h a t  w ith  the s ig n in g  of the a rm is t i c e ,  the  U.S. p u b lic  
would beg in  i t s  u su a l  demand "to b r in g  the boys home." The 
United S ta te s  m i l i t a r y  p o s i t io n  then  would d e t e r i o r a t e  and
subsequent n e g o t i a t io n s  w ith  the Communists would be c a r r ie d
21on a t  a  decided  m i l i t a r y  d isadvan tage .
Acheson d id  no t b e liev e  t h i s  l i n e  of argument was 
v a l id .  The major in c e n t iv e  in  the p la n  was t h a t  i t  would 
ga in  the  r e le a s e  of U.N. p r i s o n e r s .  I f  the  Communists wanted 
to  renew a g g re ss io n  in  Korea " th e re  were many o th e r  p r e x te x t s  
o th e r  than  the  p r i s o n e r  is su e  upon which they  could do so ."
21Memo of C onversation  in  the S ta te  Departm ent by 
A lex is  Johnson, "Future  T a c t ic s  in  Korean A rm istice  Nego­
t i a t i o n s , "  September 17, 1952, R ecen tly  D e c la s s i f i e d  Docu- 
ments on Korean War.
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Acheson thought t h a t  an a rm is t ic e  d id  n o t  depend on a subse­
quent r e s o lu t io n  of the p r i s o n e r  q u es tion . A Communist r e ­
sumption of h o s t i l i t i e s  would be " in  the face  of 'g r e a t e r  
s a n c t i o n s ' . "  Since the U.N. Command would r e t a i n  the  n o n re ­
p a t r i a t e s  pending a f i n a l  s e t t le m e n t ,  the re  was no compulsion 
to  reach  an agreement w ith  the  Communists. Acheson a lso  be­
l ie v e d  th a t  p o s t - a rm is t i c e  t a l k s  would be so clogged w ith  
problems th a t  the  a d d i t io n  of the  p r i s o n e r  q u es t io n  would no t 
be a  s i g n i f i c a n t  a d d i t io n a l  burden. The S e c r e t a r y 's  most 
p o in ted  argument f o r  the  p lan  was t h a t  i t  would, even i f  r e ­
je c te d ,  p lac e  the  U nited  S ta te s  " in  a much more fa v o ra b le  
p o s i t io n  in  the  U.N. General Assembly by having unm istakably  
dem onstrated t h a t  we have exhausted  every reasonab le  e f f o r t  
to  o b ta in  an a r m is t i c e . "  Noting t h a t  the United S ta te s  was 
under p re s su re  from se v e ra l  of i t s  a l l i e s  to  p re s e n t  such a 
p la n ,  Acheson f e l t  the United S ta te s  should submit the  p lan  
to  avoid having o th e rs  propose i t  in  the United N a tion s  and
to  avoid recommendations to  have the n e g o t ia t io n s  sw itched
22to  the  General Assembly.
The S ta te -D efense  Department t a lk s  d id  n o t  r e s u l t  in  
an agreement, l e a v in g  th e  d e c is io n  to  Truman, who decided  on 
September Zk in  favo r  o f  the Defense D epartm ent's  p o s i t i o n .
On the 25th , C lark  rec e iv e d  new in s t r u c t io n s  which l i s t e d  
th re e  p ro p o sa ls  in v o lv in g  a  n e u t r a l  n a t io n s ,  a Red C ross , o r
^^Ibid.
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a non-screened r e le a s e  of p r i s o n e r s .  These vo lun ta ry  r e ­
p a t r i a t i o n  p ro p o sa ls  were to  be p resen ted  to the Communists, 
who would be g iven  ten  days to  c o n s id e r  them. I f  r e j e c t e d ,  
the U.N. Command would r e c e s s  the t a l k s  i n d e f i n i t e ly ,  u n t i l  
the Communists subm itted  new w r i t te n  p ro p o sa ls .
Clark implemented the  new approach, w ith the r e s u l t  
t h a t  on October 8, the  U.N. Command rec esse d  the n e g o t ia t io n s .  
Clark, on Truman's o rd e rs ,  con tinued  the  m i l i t a r y  p ressu re  
on the Communists. Attem pts in  the p roceed ing  months f a i l e d  
to  shake the U.S. p o s i t io n ,  which both the S ta te  and Defense 
Departments f o r c e f u l l y  supported . Not u n t i l  March 28, 1953» 
d id  any th ing  o f  s ig n i f ic a n c e  occur i n  the s t a l l e d  t a l k s .
Truman's d e c is io n  to  support the  Defense Department 
a g a in s t  the S ta te  D epartm en t 's  p lan  f o r  a delayed determ ina­
t io n  of the n o n r e p a t r i a t e s '  f a t e  was a d i f f i c u l t  one f o r  th e .  
P re s id e n t  to  make. While th e re  was no guarantee  t h a t  China 
would accep t the  p la n ,  U.S. support would have had a p o s i t iv e  
a f f e c t  on A m erica 's  a l l i e s .  N e ith e r  th e  documents nor h is  
memoirs shed any l i g h t  on the  reasons  f o r  Truman's d e c is io n .
I t  seems l i k e l y  t h a t  he would have d e s i re d  an a rm is t ice  be­
fore  he l e f t  o f f i c e .  But t h a t  f a c t  i t s e l f  may have worked 
a g a in s t  sup po rtin g  the  S ta te  D epartm ent 's  p o s i t io n .  The sug­
gested  p ro p o sa l  was q u i te  a  d e p a r tu re  from the p rev io u s  U.S. 
p o s i t io n  on the  p r i s o n e r  i s s u e ,  a p o s i t io n  sold on moral and
^%ddleman Memo, Summary Armistice", October 6, 1952, 
Recently  D e c la s s i f i e d  Documents on Korean War.
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hum anitarian  grounds. Many would have in te r p r e te d  even the 
appearance of a  weakening of t h a t  s tand  a s  a p o l i t i c a l  move 
to  a id  the Democratic p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d id a te .  People could 
ask l o g ic a l l y  why t h i s  approach had n o t  been t r i e d  e a r l i e r  
before  thousands of U.S. t ro o p s  had been k i l l e d  or wounded.
Truman's very  tough a t t i t u d e  concern ing  n e g o t i a t io n s  
with the Communists was a n o th e r  in g re d ie n t  in  h is  d e c is io n .
He had been angered when the U.N. Command conceded on the 
is su e  of a i r f i e l d  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  and o th e r  c o n s t ru c t io n ,  be­
cause i t  r ep re se n te d  a p o t e n t i a l  t h r e a t  to  U.N. t ro o p s .
Truman a lso  was a l i f e - l o n g  adm irer o f most g e n e ra ls ,  and the 
opinion of the Defense Department and the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  t h a t  
the S ta te  D epartm en t 's  p lan  would weaken the  U.S. p o s i t io n  
and was u n d es irab le  from a m i l i t a r y  p o in t  of view, had to  
c a rry  g re a t  weight. F in a l ly ,  Truman's own experience  in  
d e a l in g  w ith the  Communists f o r  the p a s t  seven y e a rs  must 
have m i l i ta te d  a g a in s t  h i s  e v e r  conceding on the  is su e  in  
any way.
A f te r  E isenho w er 's  v i c to r y  in  the  November e l e c t i o n s ,  
i t  would have been u n r e a l i s t i c  f o r  the  United S ta te s  o r  the  
Communists to  make any major moves, i f  f o r  no o th e r  rea so n  
than the obvious one t h a t  the  enemy would w ait to  see what 
kind of deal they could g e t  from the new a d m in is t r a t io n .  So 
in  the  in te r im , both s id e s  con tinued  to  f i g h t  s p o ra d ic a l ly ,  
and the United S ta te s  kep t up a  c o n s ta n t ,  heavy bombing of
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Communist p o s i t i o n s .  Acheson 's e f f o r t s  in  r e l a t i o n  to  
Korea were l im i te d  to  a t te m p ts  to  keep A m erica 's  a l l i e s  in  
the United N ations  from undermining the  U.S. p o s i t io n  
a g a in s t  fo rced  r e p a t r i a t i o n .
I n d i a ' s  K rishna  Menon wanted to  in trodu ce  a U.N. re so ­
l u t i o n  to  tu r n  the  p r i s o n e r s  over to  a commission, which in  
Acheson 's op in ion  would have held the  n o n r e p a t r ia te s  as 
p r i s o n e r s  u n t i l  they  agreed to  be r e p a t r i a t e d .  This p lan 
was designed to  give th e  appearance of v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n .  
L e s te r  Pearson of Canada, and Selwyn L loyd, B r i t i s h  M in is te r  
of S ta te ,  were b e h in d - th e -sc e n e s  members of the  "Menon c a b a l ."  
Acheson worked a ss id u o u s ly  in  October and November in  opposi­
t io n  to t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n .  W ith the  t im e ly  a id  o f a b i t t e r  
Sovie t a t t a c k ,  Acheson had Menon's r e s o lu t io n  amended to  s e t  
up a  commission which would have 90 days to  d ea l  with the 
n o n r e p a t r i a te s .  The f a t e  of any rem ain ing  p r is o n e rs  would 
be l e f t  to  a p o l i t i c a l  con fe rence . The United Nations passed 
the  Ind ian  r e s o l u t i o n  on December 3 and. ten  days l a t e r  the 
Chinese r e j e c te d  i t  v ig o ro u s ly .  The r e s u l t  was a  propaganda 
v ic to ry  fo r  th e  United S ta te s .
While Acheson worked to  m a in ta in  the  U.S. p o s i t io n  
in  the  United N a tio n s , Eisenhower was i n  Korea re a f f i rm in g  
to  C lark  t h a t  th e  b a s ic  d e c is io n  to  seek a  p o l i t i c a l
oil
Hermes, Truce T en t . 330-332. 
^■^Acheson, C re a t io n . 89I - 898.
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s e t t le m e n t  in  Korea would be r e t a in e d .  Clark was no t g iven  
a  chance to  p re s e n t  d e ta i l e d  p la n s  designed to b r in g  in c re a sed  
m i l i t a r y  p re ssu re  on the  enemy in  o rder  to  break the s t a l e ­
mated b a t t l e f i e l d  s i t u a t i o n  and win the war. C lark had long  
chafed under the r e s t r i c t i o n s  p laced  on U.S. m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i ­
t i e s  in  Korea, b e l ie v in g  as David Rees has sa id ,  t h a t  the 
p u re ly  defen s ive  n a tu re  o f  the  U.N. e f f o r t  from the end of 
1951 onwards, removed the  only  in c e n tiv e  the  Chinese had to  
re a c h  a  s e t t le m e n t .  E isenhower made i t  c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  
he would continue  Truman's p o l ic y  and seek an honorable 
t ru c e
The new a d m in is t r a t io n  took o f f ic e  on January  20,
1953» w ith  John F o s te r  D u lle s  as  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te ,  C harles  
E. Wilson as S e c re ta ry  o f  Defense, and Admiral A rthur W. 
Radford a s  Chairman of th e  J o i n t  C hiefs of S t a f f .  One of 
E isenh ow er 's  f i r s t  a c t s  was to  rev e rse  one p a r t  o f Truman's 
p o l ic y ,  when he announced t h a t  the  ? th  F le e t  would no lo n g e r  
s h ie ld  China from a t t a c k s  from Formosa. In  a d d i t io n  to  "un­
le a s h in g  Chiang K a i-sh ek ,"  Eisenhower l e t  i t  be known in  d ip ­
lom atic  channe ls  t h a t  i f  a  t ru c e  was no t achieved soon, the  
United S ta te s  would "move d e c i s iv e ly  w ithout i n h ib i t io n  in  
ou r use o f  weapons,and would no lo n g e r  be re sp o n s ib le  f o r  con­
f i n in g  the  h o s t i l i t i e s  to  the Korean p e n in s u la ."  These 
t h r e a t s  p robably  d id  l i t t l e  to  move the  Communists c lo s e r
26C lark , Danube, 230-233? David Rees. Korea: The
Lim ited War (New York: S t .  M a r t in 's  P re s s ,  1964), 395*
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to  a s e t t le m e n t ,  but they  d id  succeed in  thorough ly  a larm ing
27A m erica 's  t im id  a l l i e s .
More im portan t than  t h r e a t s  in  g e t t i n g  th e  n e g o t i a ­
t io n s  moving aga in , was S t a l i n ' s  dea th  on March 5f 1953, 
which a c c e le r a te d  the  t ren d  begun in  1952 among th e  th ree  
Communist p a r t i c i p a n t s  toward ending th e  war. R uss ia  i n i ­
t i a l l y  had p r o f i t e d  from the Korean War, as  American t ro o p s  
were t i e d  down in  A sia  and TJ=S. r e s o u rc e s  were d ra in e d  away 
from p o t e n t i a l  use in  the  major a re n a  o f  concern—Europe.
By the middle of 1952, however, S t a l i n  probably  wanted to  
end the  war s in ce  i t  was a constan t d ra in  on S o v ie t  economic 
re s o u rc e s .  The c o n f l i c t  a lso  helped to  b u ild  up the Chinese 
m i l i t a r y  f o r  a  fu tu re  which S ta l in  f e l t  he could n o t  com­
p l e t e l y  m an ip u la te .  The war fu r th e r  provoked c o n t in u a l  i n ­
c re a s e s  in  the  b e l l ig e re n c y  of the  American m i l i t a r y  fo rc e s  
in  Europe and a ls o  was i t s e l f  in c o n s ta n t  danger of r e - e s c a ­
l a t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  S t a l i n  was p rep a r in g  f o r  a m ajor purge, 
which in  the  p a s t  had le d  "to  a lo w e r - p ro f i l e  fo re ig n  
p o l i c y . "28
China, to o ,  i n i t i a l l y  had p r o f i t e d  from the  Korean 
War, a s  i t s  p r e s t i g e  soared  and a s  i t s  armed f o r c e s  grew 
d ra m a t ic a l ly  w ith  S o v ie t  arms. These arms, however, were 
l e n t  and n o t  g iv en . The war thus became a  d r a in  on Chinese
27uiam, The R iv a ls .  199-200.
28 Simmons, S tra in e d  A l l ia n c e , 22?. 
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re so u rce s ,  which were needed d e s p e ra te ly  fo r  in te r n a l  recon­
s t r u c t io n .  In  1951f f o r  example, over 60^ of C h in a 's  tax  
revenues went to  th e  defense budget. The Korean War a lso  was 
a  d ra in  on t r a in e d  personnel who were needed u rg e n t ly  to  r e ­
b u ild  a  c iv i l -w a r  ravaged China. C h in a 's  f r i g h t f u l  c a su a l ­
t i e s  were a  f u r t h e r  burden, a s  by Ju n e , 1951•a lone , they had 
su ffe red  577,000 c a s u a l t i e s .^ ^  A f te r  the  war had been s t a l e ­
mated a t  th e  38th  p a r a l l e l ,  i t  became C h in a 's  b e s t  i n t e r e s t  
to  end the h o s t i l i t i e s ,  s ince  i t  had gained  the maximum in 
p r e s t ig e  and f u r t h e r  f ig h t in g  would g a in  only more c a s u a l t i e s .
North Korea had gained th e  l e a s t  from the  war. By 
1952 North Korea had su ffe red  t e r r i b l e  l o s s e s  among the m i l i ­
t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  p o p u lace . The land  i t s e l f  had been ravaged 
and North Korea found i t s e l f  in  c r i t i c a l  c o n d it io n .  S ta rv a ­
t io n  was staved  o f f  only by the  t im e ly  a r r i v a l  of food sh ip ­
ments from o th e r  Communist c o u n t r ie s —r a r e l y  from R ussia , 
however, which was a sore p o i n t . B y  1953. N orth  Korean 
morale "was dangerously  c lose  to the  b reak in g  p o in t . "  A sub­
s t a n t i a l  breakdown of d i s c ip l in e  had o ccu rred , b ring ing
31enormous p re s su re  on the government to  end the war.-^
With S t a l i n ’ s d e a th ,  th e se  t r e n d s  picked up renewed 
momentum. In March, the new S o v ie t  P rem ie r ,  Georgi Malenkov, 
announced th a t  "At the p re s e n t  time th e re  i s  no d isp u ted  or
^% b id . .  212. 30l b i d . , 214-215.
^^Scalapino and Lee, Communism in  K orea, 422-423.
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unresolved  q u es t io n  t h a t  cannot be s e t t l e d  p e a c e fu l ly  by 
mutual agreement of the  i n te r e s t e d  c o u n t r i e s . C o n c r e t e  
evidence o f  a w i l l in g n e s s  to  resume the search  f o r  peace 
soon a r r iv e d .
Clark had read  of a December 13 Red Cross r e s o l u t i o n  
recommending an exchange of s ic k  and wounded p r i s o n e r s  i n  ad­
vance o f  a  t ru c e .  He suggested  to  Washington t h a t  while  he 
d id  n o t  b e liev e  the Communists would accep t such a  p ro p o sa l ,  
i t  s t i l l  had a  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  and propaganda v a lu e .  On 
February 19, C lark  was informed t h a t  such a r e s o l u t i o n  might 
be in trodu ced  in  th e  United N a tio n s ,  and i t  was suggested  
t h a t  he make such a p ro p o sa l  in  advance of t h i s . ^ ^  He made 
the p rop osa l  on February  22 in  a  l e t t e r  to  the Communists.
I t  was n o t  u n t i l  March 28 t h a t  a  r e p ly  was re c e iv e d ,  a g re e in g  
to  an exchange of the  s ic k  and wounded and adding t h a t  t h i s  
exchange " should be made to  lea d  to  the smooth s e t t le m e n t  of 
the e n t i r e  q u e s t io n  o f  p r i s o n e r s  of war, th e reb y  a c h ie v in g  
an a rm is t ic e  in  Korea . . . ."  The Chinese then  proposed 
th a t  both s id e s  resume n e g o t i a t io n s  a t  Panmunjom.^^
Agreement was n o t  reached  w ithout d is p u te ,  but by 
A p ril  20, O peration  " L i t t l e  Switch" began, and when i t  ended
32W alter LaFeber, America. R uss ia , and the Cold War. 
1949-1979 (New York: Wiley and Sons, 3rd . e d i t i o n ,  1976),
147-194; Ulam, R iv a l s . 199-200.
qq
'- 'C la rk ,  Danube. 240; Hermes, Truce T e n t . 411; JCS to  
C lark , JCS 931724, February  19,1953, JCS Geographic F i l e .
^^Clark, Danube. 241-243.
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on May 31, 6,670 Communists had been exchanged f o r  684 U.N. 
p e rso n n e l .  Attem pts to  resume the  Panmunjom t a l k s  followed 
t h i s  f i r s t  s te p  fo rw ard . General W illiam  K. H a rr iso n ,  a t  an 
A p ril  17 l i a i s o n  m eeting  w ith  the  Communists, suggested  th a t  
Sw itzerland  o r  some o th e r  n a t io n  w ith  a t r a d i t i o n  of n e u t r a l ­
i t y ,  should be named a s  n e u t r a l  c u s to d ia n  of th e  nonrepa­
t r i a t e s .  He b e liev ed  a  s i x t y  day p e r io d  of e x p la n a t io n s  o r 
p e rsu as io n  was adequate , a f t e r  which time the  n e u t r a l  n a t io n  
would determ ine  the  d i s p o s i t i o n  of th e  rem aining  n o n r e p a t r i ­
a t e s .  T his o u t l in e  was g iven  so t h a t  the  Communists would 
know what the  United S ta te s  b e liev e d  to  be an a ccep tab le  
s e t t le m e n t .^ ^
The t a l k s  were resumed on A p r i l  26, and by May the 
Communist p o s i t io n  had moved g e n e ra l ly  t o  t h a t  expressed  in  
the  December 3 In d ian  U.N. r e s o lu t io n ,  ag ree in g  to  tu r n  over 
the  n o n r e p a t r i a te s  t o  a N eu tra l  N a tions  R e p a t r ia t io n  Commis­
s io n  in  Korea to  be composed of Poland, C zechoslovakia, 
S w itzerland , Sweden, and I n d ia .  They suggested a  p e rsuas io n  
p e rio d  of f o u r  months, down from the p rev io u s  f ig u re  o f s ix .  
The United S ta te s  wished only  the Chinese n o n r e p a t r i a te s  to  
be given over to  the  Commission, w ith  the  rem aining  Koreans 
to  be f ree d  as c i v i l i a n s  on a rm is t ic e  day. The U nited  S ta te s  
a ls o  wanted "c o n c re te ,  fo o lp ro o f  p rocedures  by which a  
p r i s o n e r  could  o b ta in  p o l i t i c a l  asylum." The Communists,
^ ^ Ib id .. 247-248.
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a lre ad y  having made se v e ra l  concessions, were outraged t h a t  
the  U.N. Command d id  n o t  o f f e r  any concess ions  in  r e tu rn ,  and 
in  f a c t  sought more co n cess io n s . This le d  to  a r e c e s s  in  the 
t a l k s  in  l a t e  May.^^
On May 16, C lark  suggested  to  the  J o i n t  C h iefs  t h a t  
th e  time had come " to  take  p o s i t iv e  s tep s"  e i t h e r  to secure 
an a rm is t ic e  w ith  the  Communists, o r "to  demonstrate to  th e  
world t h a t  they a re  a c t in g  in  bad f a i t h  i n  seeking  an arm i­
s t i c e  only on t h e i r  own term s by ex ac ting  f o r c ib le  r e p a t r i a ­
t i o n  of POWs." He recommended t h a t  K aesong 's  immunity a s  a 
n e u t r a l  s i t e  be dropped so t h a t  i t  could be bombed. He a ls o  
wanted a u th o r iz a t io n  to  r e le a s e  u n i l a t e r a l l y  North Korean
n o n r e p a t r i a t e s .  F i n a l l y ,  th e  U.N. Command should p re s e n t
37the  Communists w ith  some k ind  o f  a " f in a l  proposal."-^
The S ta te  and Defense Departments answered Clark on 
May 23 , in form ing  him t h a t  the United S ta te s  was "under i n ­
te n s iv e  p re s su re  from our a l l i e s  to  adhere c lo s e ly  to  the 
p r in c ip le s "  o u t l in e d  in  the December 3 In d ian  r e s o lu t io n .  
C lark  was ordered  to  agree to  th e  p lan ,  bu t was to  " s u s ta in
the  p r in c ip le  of no fo rced  r e p a t r i a t i o n  and in su re  t h a t  co­
e rc io n  and fo rce  n o t  be used a g a in s t  n o n r e p a t r i a te s . "  He 
a ls o  was in s t r u c te d  both  to  tu rn  over to  the  Commission a l l  
North Korean n o n r e p a t r i a te s  and to  agree to  a  m a jo r i ty  vo te
^^ I b i d . . 259-266; Hermes, Truce T e n t , 425«
^^Clark to  the  JCS, CX 62456, May I 6 , 1953. R ecen tly  
D e c la s s i f i e d  Documents on Korean War.
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on p rocedura l m a t te r s  on the  Commission. F in a l ly ,  he was 
to ld  to  l i m i t  the number o f Communist pe rsu ad e rs  to  be used 
and to  l i m i t  the  p e rsu a s io n  period to  90 days. I f  the Commu­
n i s t s  r e je c te d  t h i s  p ro p o sa l  and o ffe red  no c o n s tru c t iv e  a l ­
t e r n a t iv e s ,  he was informed that "we c o n s id e r  t h a t  nego­
t i a t i o n s  should be te rm in a ted  r a th e r  than  recessed  and a r ­
rangements a f f e c t i n g  the  Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan a re a  should 
be vo ided ."  Such a d e c is io n  would be made only a f t e r  con­
s u l t a t i o n  w ith  W ashington. Clark opposed the p la n ,  f o r  as 
s h a l l  be seen, he knew t h a t  Rhee's vehement opp osition  to  i t  
had n o t  been taken in to  account.
The U.N. Command p la n  was p re sen te d  on May 25 and ex­
cep t  f o r  a few minor changes the Communists agreed to  i t  on
June 4. On June 8, the term s of re fe ren c e  on p r iso n e r  ex-
40change were signed . The issue of v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n  
had been decided in  A m erica 's  favor a f t e r  18 months of both 
in te r m i t t e n t  t a l k s  and c o n f l i c t s  on the b a t t l e f i e l d .  The ad­
herence of th e  United S t a te s  to t h i s  p r in c ip le  in  the face  
of both enemy and o c c a s io n a l ly  A ll ie d  o p p o s i t io n ,  c o s t  the  
U.N. Command, acco rd ing  to  8 th  Army e s t im a te s ,  an e x t r a
125.000 c a s u a l t i e s  and th e  Communists over 250,000. Some
50.000 p r i s o n e rs  took advantage of the U.S. stand and re fu se d  
to  be re tu rn e d  to  t h e i r  homeland. Of the 21,014 Chinese
^®JCS to  C lark , JCS 937205,A p ri l  23 .1953.DDRS 193(75) 
^^01a rk ,  Danube. 268. ^°I b i d . .  275-2?6.
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p r is o n e r s ,  14,325 re fu sed  r e p a t r i a t i o n .^ ^
Whether the U.S. p o s i t io n  was worth i t  o r  n o t  i s  
open to  d eb a te .  What i s  im portan t to  unders tand  i s  the m oti­
v a t io n  behind the p r i n c i p l e .  The United S ta te s  from the be­
g inn in g  leaned  toward the  p r in c ip le  because of i t s  moral and 
propaganda appea l, but th e re  were many who d id  n o t  believe 
i t  to  be worth prolonged n e g o t ia t io n s .  The American people 
j u s t  as  well could have supported an a l l - f o r - a l l  exchange.
The d ish o n e s t  approach of the Communists to  the p r i s o n e r  i s ­
sue pushed the  s c a le s  in  fav o r  o f v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n .
Once adopted, the p r in c ip le  became ensnared  in  the  propaganda 
c o n f l i c t  t h a t  was c a r r i e d  out alm ost d a i l y  a t  Panmunjom.
Once adopted and in co rp o ra te d  in to  the p u b l i c ' s  mind on moral 
and hum anitarian  grounds, v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n  became a 
p r in c ip le  alm ost im possib le  to  back away from. The United 
S ta te s  w ithstood both  severe  p re s su re  from i t s  a l l i e s  and 
la rg e  numbers of c a s u a l t i e s ,  t h a t  might have been avoided, 
i n  o rder  n o t  to  concede to  the Communists on t h i s  p o in t .  I t  
i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  say whether the propaganda p o in ts  t h a t  were 
ga ined , were equal to  the  l i v e s  l o s t .
R eso lu tion  of the  p r i s o n e r  is su e  d id  n o t  b r in g  an im­
m ediate end to  the  Korean War. A m erica 's  t r o u b le s  with the 
enemy may have been n e a r  r e s o lu t io n ,  bu t  South Korea was j u s t
4 l Hermes, Truce T en t , 500; W illiam  C. Bradbury, Mass 
Behavior in  B a t t le  ajid C a p t iv i ty ;  The Communist S o ld ie r  in  
the  Korean War (Chicago: Chicago U n iv e rs i ty  P r e s s , 1968),v i .
-  371 -
beginning to  c rea te  t ro u b le s  fo r  the United S ta te s .  In  de­
te rm in ing  the  po licy  t h a t  le d  to  an agreem ent w ith  the  Com­
m unis ts , the United S ta te s  had p r a c t i c a l l y  ignored Syngman 
Rhee, a gentleman w ith  a  penchant f o r  c r e a t i n g  problems fo r  
America. The United S ta te s  would pay f o r  t h a t  m is take .
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CHAPTER X III 
CREATION OF THE BILATERAL SECURITY PACT
The Communist acceptance  on March 28, 1953. o f General 
C la r k 's  p roposa l  to  exchange s ick  and wounded p r i s o n e r s  as 
well as  t h e i r  su g g es tio n  t h a t  the  s ta le m a ted  n e g o t i a t io n s  
should be resumed, rev iv e d  Syngman R h e e 's  r e s i s t a n c e  to  an 
a rm is t ic e  agreement. Rhee found h im se lf  in  a d i f f i c u l t  p o s i ­
t io n .  His l i f e ' s  work had been d e d ic a ted  to  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a 
f re e  and independent Korea. He had foug h t a g a in s t  Japanese 
c o n tro l  of Korea and had fough t a g a in s t  d iv is io n  of h i s  
country  in to  two p a r t s .  With the e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f two p o l i ­
t i c a l l y  a n t i t h e t i c a l  Koreas, R hee 's  goa l became u n i f i c a t i o n  
of the  country  under h i s  l e a d e r s h ip .  He was wise enough to  
r e a l i z e  t h a t  South Korea could n o t  accom plish  t h i s  w ithout 
e x te rn a l  h e lp ,  so he t r i e d  d e s p e r a te ly  to  p rev e n t  the  United 
S ta te s  from withdrawing i t s  t ro o p s  from Korea in  1949.
The United  S t a te s ,  however, withdrew and l e f t  behind 
an in ad e q u a te ly  t r a in e d  and equipped South Korean Army th a t  
crumbled before  the N orth  Korean o n s lau g h t  in  June , 1950.
The United S ta te s  came to  South K o re a 's  a id ,  f i r s t  w ith  a i r  
and naval fo rc e s ,  th e n  w ith  ground f o r c e s .  A U.N. Command
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was e s t a b l i s h e d  to  co o rd in a te  the war e f f o r t ,  and Rhee, under 
W ashington 's prodding , p laced  South K o re a 's  armed fo rc e s  un­
der U.N. Command. M i l i t a r y  success  b rought rev ived  hopes of 
ach iev ing  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  Korea, but Chinese in te rv e n t io n  
promptly dashed these  hopes. As U.N. fo rce s  drove back up 
the p e n in s u la ,  hopes ro se  ag a in ,  but a t  the  38th p a r a l l e l  the 
United N a tio n s  went on the d e fe n s iv e .  The United S ta te s  
t r e a te d  South Korea a s  a  j u n io r  member in  a p a r tn e r sh ip  and 
c a te re d  to  i t s  U.N. a l l i e s —a l l i e s  whose c o n s id e ra t io n  f o r  
the enemy o f te n  gave th e  im press ion  t h a t  South Korea had 
p r e c i p i t a t e d  th e  war.
Rhee fea red  t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  again  might leave  
South Korea unprepared to  r e s i s t  a g g re ss io n .  While s t i l l  
f e r v e n t ly  d e s i r in g  u n i f i c a t i o n ,  Rhee was aware th a t  South 
Korea was dependent on the  United S ta te s  f o r  continued m i l i ­
t a r y  a id  and economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n .  Already the United 
S ta te s  had expanded and equipped South K o re a 's  Army to  new 
l e v e l s  of s t r e n g th  and e f f i c i e n c y .  But w ith  an a rm is t ic e  on 
the  h o r izo n , Rhee wondered what g u a ra n tee s  he had t h a t  the 
United S t a te s  would con tinue  to  be generous i n  the p o s t -h o s ­
t i l i t i e s  p e r io d .  R h e e 's  p o p u la r i ty  had r i s e n  ra p id ly  a f t e r  
the  s t a r t  o f  the  war, i n  p a r t  because of h i s  m i l i t a n t  s tance  
concern ing  r e u n i f i c a t i o n .  Domestic c o n s id e ra t io n s  would 
fo rce  him to  m ain ta in  t h a t  m i l i t a n t  s t a n c e .
The United S t a te s  was i n  a  d i f f i c u l t  p o s i t io n  to o . 
N a tiona l  p o l ic y  as  s e t  down in  NSC 48/5  and rea ff irm ed  in
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NSC 118/2, c a l l e d  f o r  a  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t le m e n t  of the  Korean 
War. T his s e t t le m e n t  was dependent upon the  conclusion  of a 
d u rab le  a rm is t ic e  agreem ent. Achievement of a workable arm i­
s t i c e  would be d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  no t im possib le , w ithout South 
K o re a 's  su p p o r t .  There were severa l methods Rhee could em­
p lo y  to  i n v a l id a te  an a rm is t ic e  agreement. He could withdraw 
th e  South Korean Army from under U.N. Command c o n tro l  and ac ­
t i v e l y  oppose an a rm is t i c e ,  o r  he could leave  h i s  tro o p s  in  
th e  U.N. Command and oppose the a rm is t i c e .  He a lso  could , 
and the  U nited  S ta te s  hoped he would, remain in  the  U.N. Com­
mand s t r u c tu r e  and a c c e p t ,  i f  no t supp o rt ,  an a rm is t ic e .
Rhee had the  c a p a c i ty  to  s t a l l ,  i f  no t d e s tro y ,  the  
co n c lu s io n  o f  an a rm is t ic e  agreement. But the United S ta te s  
was n o t  a t  a complete d isad van tage , s ince  Korea needed con­
t in u e d  U.S. a id  and su pp o rt .  Both s id e s  then , had l e v e r s  
w ith  which t o  work on the  o th e r ,  and n e i t h e r  s ide  was r e l u c ­
t a n t  to  use them. The is s u e s  were re so lv ed  to  one simple 
q u e s t io n — what was R hee 's  p r ic e  fo r  agreement and was the 
U nited  S ta te s  w i l l in g  to  pay i t ?
The newest s ig n s  o f  tro u b le  w ith  Rhee appeared in  
A p r i l ,  1953- R hee 's  1952 sp ring  and summer campaigns a g a in s t  
th e  a rm is t ic e  had been recessed  along w ith  the t a l k s  a t  
Panmunjom. I n  e a r ly  A p r i l ,  a f t e r  the  Communist acceptance 
o f  the  s ick  and wounded p r i s o n e r  exchange, Rhee re  i n s t i t u t e d  
th e  campaign of "spontaneous" d em onstra tions . In  e a r ly  A p r i l ,  
th e  N ationa l Assembly passed  a r e s o lu t io n  c a l l i n g  f o r  the
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complete u n i f i c a t i o n  of Korea. Rhee echoed t h i s  on A p ri l  5. 
in  an address  before  the  I I  Corps of the  South Korean Army.
The nex t day, jiO.OOO dem onstrated in  Seoul a g a in s t  any a rm i­
s t i c e  th a t  d id  n o t  guaran tee  u n i f i c a t i o n ,  and on the 10th ,
50,000 s tu d e n ts  dem onstrated in  Pusan c a r ry in g  " U n if ic a t io n  
o r  Death" p o s te r s .  These c a l l s  were rep ea ted  a t  every l e v e l  
of the South Korean government.^
The most im portan t South Korean e f f o r t s  were n o t  made 
in  p u b l ic .  On A p ri l  3, Fore ign  M in is te r  Pyun Yung-tai, i n ­
formed E l l i s  0. B riggs, American Ambassador to  South Korea, 
t h a t  acceptance of an a rm is t ic e  might be dependent on a  b i ­
l a t e r a l  s e c u r i ty  agreement. D u lle s  r e p l i e d  through the Ameri­
can Ambassador t h a t  a b i l a t e r a l  p a c t  might b e t t e r  be con­
s id e red  a f t e r  an a rm is t ic e  had been s ig n ed . D u l le s '  r e p ly  
was no t w ell re c e iv e d ,  and on A p r i l  9 Rhee wrote Eisenhower . 
t h a t  i f  a  peace agreement was reached which allowed the  Chi­
nese to  remain in  Korea, he would f e e l  j u s t i f i e d  in  a sk ing  
South K o re a 's  a l l i e s  to  leav e  the  co u n try  u n le s s  they were 
w i l l in g  to  jo in  in  a d r iv e  to  th e  Yalu. I f  t h i s  was impos­
s i b l e ,  the United S ta te s  could remove i t s  fo rc e s  from Korea 
i f  i t  wished. Eisenhower r e p l ie d  t h a t  the  United S ta te s  was 
committed to  u n i f i c a t i o n  of Korea, but n o t  by fo rce . With 
a g g re ss io n  r e p e l le d  the time had come to  achieve the honor­
ab le  peace th a t  the  United S ta te s  was committed to  g a in in g .
^Hermes, Truce T e n t . 441-442.
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Eisenhower hoped th a t  Rhee would do n o th in g  t h a t  would cause
2
the  U nited  S ta te s  to  r e c o n s id e r  i t s  e f f o r t s  f o r  South Korea.
General Thomas Herran, Commander o f the  Korean Com­
m unications Zone, worried t h a t  Rhee m ight do something ra s h  
to  achieve  h i s  o b je c t iv e s .  South Koreans fea red  both  the 
S ino -S ov ie t  power t h a t  surrounded them and the  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  the United S ta te s  might n o t  come to  K o re a 's  a id  again  
i f  she was a t t a c k e d . R hee 's  a b i l i t y  to  i n i t i a t e  both mass 
dem onstra tions and v ic io u s  propaganda campaigns le d  Herren 
to  recommend t h a t  the  United S ta te s  o f f e r  Rhee a  b i l a t e r a l  
s e c u r i ty  p a c t  and guaranteed  economic and m i l i t a r y  a id .^
C lark  was worried too about R h e e 's  p re se n t  a c t io n s  
and the  p o t e n t i a l  fo r  even worse t r o u b le  i n  the  f u tu r e .  The 
U.N. Command was in  a  weak p o s i t i o n  because Rhee could  employ 
th e  South Korean Army in d ep en d en tly  a f t e r  the s ig n in g  of an 
a rm is t ic e  since no arrangem ent e x is te d  to  extend U.N. c o n tro l  
over South Korean tro o p s  in to  the  p o s t - t r u c e  p e r io d .  This 
r a i s e d  th e  q u es t io n  "o f  o b ta in in g  an agreement w ith  the ROK 
which would prov ide  f o r  UNO c o n t r o l  o f  ROK fo rc e s  d u r in g  the 
p o s t - a rm is t ic e  p e r io d ."  C lark  p o in te d  ou t th a t  Rhee had 
p laced  South Korean t ro o p s  under U.N. a u th o r i ty  f o r  the
U.S. Department o f S t a t e ,  R e la t io n s  Between the  
United S ta te s  and the ROK: A Chronology o f  Major Develop­
ments , A p ri l  1-June 22 .1953 . Research P r o j e c t  337, J u ly  1953. 
D iv is ion  of H i s to r i c a l  P o l ic y  R esearch , R ecently  D e c la s s i f ie d  
Doccuments on Korean War. 1; Dwight David Eisenhower, The 
White House Years; Mandate f o r  a Change. 1953-1956 (New York: 
S igne t E d i t io n ,  1965), 231-232.
%ermes, Truce Tent. 442.
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d u ra t io n  of the h o s t i l i t i e s  and Clark b e liev e d  t h a t  conclu ­
sion  of an a rm is t ic e  would n o t  l e g a l ly  end the  h o s t i l i t i e s .
He was aware, however, t h a t  Rhee would i n t e r p r e t  the  m a t te r  
d i f f e r e n t l y .  The U.N. Commander wanted the  p o s t - a rm is t i c e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w ith  South Korea c l a r i f i e d ,  but he d id  n o t  be­
l i e v e  t h a t  i t  was th e  p ro p e r  time to  buy an agreement with 
a  s e c u r i ty  p a c t . ^
In  l a t e  A p r i l ,  th e  South Korean Ambassador in  
Washington d e l iv e re d  a n o te  inform ing th e  U nited  S ta te s  t h a t  
Korea "was p repared  to  withdraw i t s  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  from the 
U.N. Command . . . i f  the  U nited  N ations makes w ith  the  Com­
munist ag g re sso rs  any arrangem ent which a f t e r  a  c e a s e - f i r e  
agreement, would e i t h e r  p e rm it  o r  a llow  Chinese Communists 
to  rem ain south  of the  Yalu R iv e r ."  A f te r  w ithdraw al, South 
Korean fo rc e s  would f i g h t  on a lo n e .^  On the  2 6 th ,  C lark  in - ,  
formed Washington t h a t  any a c t io n  to  withdraw South Korean 
t ro o p s  from the  U.N. Command on s ig n in g  of an a rm is t i c e  th a t  
d id  n o t  re q u ire  the  Chinese t o  withdraw, would be very  dan­
gerous . C lark  was dev e lo p ing  p lans  f o r  a  " d r a s t i c  course" 
o f a c t io n  to  in su re  the  con tinued  s e c u r i ty  of th e  U.N. Com­
mand.^ The nex t day, a f t e r  a  meeting w ith  Rhee, Clark
^Clark to  JCS, C 61976, A pril  18, 1953. Box 43, 
JCS Geographic F i l e .
^ S ta te  Departm ent, Chronology. 9*
^Clark, E x c lu s iv e  f o r  C o l l in s ,  C 62098, A p r i l  26, 
1953. DDRS 163A(?6).
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re p o r te d  t h a t  Rhee was n o t  th in k in g  of " f ig h t in g  alone or
withdrawing h i s  tro o p s  from UNC w ithou t ta k in g  a good lo n g
look a t  th e  consequences of h i s  a c t io n s  and d isc u ss in g  the
m a t te r  w ith  me p r i o r  to  such a c t io n .  On the 30th, Rhee
informed C lark  th a t  U.N. tro o p s  should n o t  be withdrawn from
Korea u n le s s  the  United S ta te s  g ran ted  a  b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i ty
agreement and guaranteed  continued a id  to  the  South Korean 
8Army.
C la rk ’ s p la n s  f o r  " d r a s t i c  a c t io n "  in  Korea, P lan  
EVER READY, were completed on May 4 . The m ission  of th e  p lan  
was to  have the 8 th  Army take prompt a c t io n  to  p ro te c t  U.N. 
f o r c e s  and su p p l ie s ,  and "to  in su re  t h a t  the  U.N. p o s i t io n  
w ith  re g a rd  to  the a rm is t ic e  agreement i s  m ain tained , i n  the 
even t t h a t  o p e ra t io n a l  c o n tro l  of Republic  of Korea fo rc e s  
i s  weakened o r  l o s t  p r i o r  to  o r  a f t e r  conc lu s ion  of an 
a r m i s t i c e .
The assumption of p lan  EVER READY was t h a t  " the  gov­
ernment and people of the ROK may be r e l u c t a n t  to  a cc ep t  the 
term s of an a rm is t i c e ,"  and as a  r e s u l t ,  r e l a t io n s h ip s  be­
tween U.N. fo rc e s  and South Koreans might d ec l in e  g ra d u a l ly  
o r  suddenly . This d e c l in in g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  could  take th re e
^Clark to  C o l l in s ,  C 62143, A p r i l  29, 1953,
DDRS 163B(75).
Q
S ta te  Department, Chronology. 13.
^O utline  P lan  EVER READY, 8 th  Army, Seoul CS 52056, 
May 14, 1953, Box 43, JCS Geographic F i l e .
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p o s s ib le  forms. Under the  f i r s t  contingency, i f  South Korean 
troops  were unresponsive  to  U.N. o rd e r s ,  U.S. Array u n i t s  were 
to  secure  Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, U ijonchu, and o th e r  key a re a s ,  
and su p p l ie s  to  the  South Korean Array in  forward a re a s  were 
to  be reduced . In  case of the  second p o s s i b i l i t y ,  Korean in ­
dependent a c t io n ,  the U.S. Array would have the added d u t ie s  
of r e l i e v i n g  South Korean s e c u r i ty  u n i t s  and o f  secu ring  
v i t a l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  In  a d d i t io n ,  movement o f  c i v i l i a n  popu­
l a t i o n  was to  be l im i te d  and only lo y a l  South Korean u n i t s  
would be su p p lied  from U.S. d ep o ts .  I f  the t h i r d  p o s s ib le  
c o n d it io n  occu rred . South Koreans o v e r t ly  h o s t i l e ,  the  U.S. 
Army would " r e l i e v e  d i s lo y a l  and r e c a l c i t r a n t  le a d e rs "  in  
the m i l i t a r y ,  would d isc o n tin u e  s u p p l ie s  of food, f u e l ,  and 
m unitions to  d i s a f f e c t e d  u n i t s ,  would c o n f is c a te  arras and 
m unitions in  South Korean supply ch an ne ls ,  would withdraw a i r  
and a r t i l l e r y  supp o rt  from h o s t i l e  u n i t s ,  would p roc la im  and 
e s t a b l i s h  m a r t ia l  law, and would secure the custody of d i s s i ­
den t m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l  l e a d e r s  and s e t  up a m i l i t a r y  govern­
ment in  the  name o f  the  United N a tio n s .
At about t h i s  tim e, new problem s with Rhee a ro se .  
South Korea made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  would n o t  accep t any p lan  
which would remove Korean n o n r e p a t r i a te s  from Korea to  a 
n e u t r a l  s t a t e .  The Chinese had dropped t h i s  demand on May 7 
when they accep ted  a five-member R e p a tr ia t io n  Commission to
l ° Ib id . ,  2-4.
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take custody of the  p r i s o n e r s .  To screen  and guard th ese  
p r i s o n e rs ,  fo re ig n  t ro o p s  would have to .b e  s ta t io n e d  in  Korea 
and la rg e  numbers o f Communist "persuaders"  would have to  be 
allowed in to  South Korea. Rhee informed C lark  t h a t  he was 
opposed com plete ly  to  tu rn in g  over Korean n o n r e p a t r i a t e s  to  
any group of n a t io n s  t h a t  had Communist l e a n in g s  and to  a l ­
lowing Communist "persuade rs"  in to  South Korea. C lark tended 
to  agree w ith  R h ee 's  o p p o s i t io n  to a llow ing  " t h i s  crowd of 
p o t e n t i a l  sp ie s ,  s a b a te u r s ,  and a g i t a t o r s  i n to  h i s  r e a r  
a re a s ."  Rhee added t h a t  In d ian  troops  would n e v e r  be allowed 
in  Korea and t h a t  he would r e le a s e  Korean n o n r e p a t r i a t e s  u n i­
l a t e r a l l y  before  a l lo w in g  such a  p lan  to  be implemented.^^ 
During a m eeting  w ith C lark , Rhee a g a in  r a i s e d  the 
qu es tio n  o f  a  b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i t y  agreement. C lark  informed 
Rhee t h a t  Washington was co n s id e r in g  t h i s  c o u rse .  At th e  
same tim e, he adm itted  t h a t  an a rm is t ic e  would n o t  inc lude  
sim ultaneous w ithdrawal o f  U.N. and Chinese t ro o p s .  He hoped 
Rhee "would n o t  c o n fro n t  the  United S ta te s  w ith  u n i l a t e r a l  
a c t io n  . . . ." C l a r k 's  im pression was t h a t  Rhee would take 
such a course only  a s  a  l a s t  r e s o r t  and i f  the  United S ta te s  
ignored h i s  op in ion s  about an a rm is t ic e .  C lark  recommended 
to  Washington t h a t  a b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i ty  p a c t  w ith  South Korea 
should be worked o u t a s  soon as  p o ss ib le  to  avoid  p o s s ib le  
fu tu re  dangers . Rhee was aware the United S ta te s  could and
^^State Department, Chronology, l6 ; C lark, Danube,
263- 265 .
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would o b ta in  an a rm is t ic e  d e sp i te  h i s  o b je c t io n s .  His ac ­
t io n s  now were designed to  ga in  a s e c u r i t y  p a c t  and in c reased  
economic a id ,  and to  save face w ith  h i s  s u p p o r te rs .  C lark 
a ls o  suggested to  Washington t h a t  Korean n o n r e p a t r i a te s
should be r e le a s e d  as c i v i l i a n s  a t  the tim e of s ig n in g  of 
12an a rm is t ic e .
On May 22, Clark was informed t h a t  he was to  accep t 
the  p ro p o s i t io n  of tu rn in g  Korean n o n r e p a t r i a t e s  over to  a 
r e p a t r i a t i o n  commission. More im p o rtan t ,  he was to ld  th a t  
a  b i l a t e r a l  p a c t  was out o f  the  q u e s t io n  a t  the  p re s e n t  tim e. 
Such a  p a c t  would t a r n i s h  the  U.N. f e a t u r e s  o f  th e  Korean 
o p e ra t io n  and would be d i f f i c u l t  to  s e l l  to  the  American 
people and Congress in  l i g h t  o f  R hee 's  r e c e n t  a c t io n s  in  op­
p o s i t io n  to  an a rm is t i c e .  Washington, however, d id  o f f e r  
o th e r  inducements based on South K o re a 's  agreement to an 
a rm is t ic e :  U.N. fo rc e s  would remain in  Korea a s  long as  c i r ­
cumstances p e rm itted ;  the  United S ta te s  was go ing  to  m ain ta in  
armed fo rc e s  in  the  a re a  on a long-te rm  b a s i s ;  a t  the subse­
quent planned p o l i t i c a l  conference the  United S ta te s  would 
v ig o ro u s ly  seek a u n i f ie d ,  democratic Korea; the  United S ta te s  
would d is c u s s  an agreement f o r  comprehensive m i l i t a r y  a id ,  
in c lu d in g  support f o r  a  twenty d iv is io n  South Korean Army; 
f i n a l l y ,  Rhee would be t o ld  th a t  the  " g r e a t e r  s a n c t io n s"  
s ta tem en t ,  then  being p repared  in  co o p e ra t io n  w ith  A m erica 's
12S ta te  Department, Chronology, 16-17. 
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a l l i e s  in  the United N ations  would be p r e fe ra b le  to  a  t r e a t y  
and was the s t ro n g e s t  p o s s ib le  guaran tee  of s e c u r i t y .  A ll  
of th e se  inducements, of c o u rs e , would be dependent upon a 
"co o p e ra t iv e  a t t i t u d e  and compliance w ith  an a rm is t ic e
a g re em e n t."^3
C lark , who opposed these  p la n s ,  informed Rhee of the 
d e c i s io n .  Rhee was very  d is tu rb e d ,  n o t in g  t h a t  the proposed 
" g r e a t e r  sa n c t io n s"  s ta tem en t was m ean ing less . He was angered 
t h a t  the  United S ta te s  had paid  "no a t t e n t i o n  to  the view of 
the  ROK Government," and he could n o t  a ssu re  C lark  of con­
t in u e d  co o p e ra t io n .  Rhee once again  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  no In d ia n  
t ro o p s  would be allowed on South Korean s o i l .  He concluded 
t h a t  he could n o t  accep t  U.S. p ro p o sa ls  and, i f  need be.
South Korea would f i g h t  on a lone .
C lark  was n o t  in  the  b es t  of p o s i t i o n s ,  s ince  he op­
posed W ashington 's  p o l ic y .  He could  see no reason  f o r  deny­
ing  Rhee a  mutual defense t r e a ty  when he a t ta c h e d  such g r e a t  
importance to  one. Such an agreement would serve adm irably  
to  s o f te n  th e  blow of concess ions  t h a t  the  U nited  S ta te s  was 
making a t  Panmunjom. C lark  cau tioned  Washington t h a t  Rhee 
had th e  c a p a b i l i t y  to r e l e a s e  a l l  Korean n o n r e p a t r i a te s  u n i ­
l a t e r a l l y  and th e re  was no th in g  C lark  could  do to  p rev e n t  
such a  maneuver. Since i t  would be " p r a c t i c a l l y  im possib le
13^S ta te  Departm ent, Chronology. 18-19. 
‘ ^Clark , Danube. 268-271.
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to  avoid  charges  o f UNC d u p l i c i t y ,  n o t  only from the Commu­
n i s t s ,  but from our A l l i e s  a s  w e l l ,"  Washington had to  reach  
a p o l ic y  d e c is io n  about how to  handle the s i t u a t i o n .
When the  U.N. Command p ro p o sa ls  a t  Panmunjom became 
known, both South Korean p u b l ic  and government a l ik e  b la s te d  
the  p r o v i s i o n s . W i t h  the  s i t u a t i o n  reach in g  dangerous p ro ­
p o r t io n s ,  Washington had to  examine i t s  o p t io n s .  On May 29, 
th e  S ta te  Department met w ith  the J o i n t  C h ie fs  to  c o n s id e r  
the  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Those in  a ttendan ce  inc luded  Army Chief 
o f S t a f f  C o l l in s ,  S e c re ta ry  o f  the  J o i n t  C h ie fs  o f S t a f f  
W alter L a lo r ,  A s s i s t a n t  C h ie f  of P la n s  General C.D. Eddleman, 
U n d e rsecre ta ry  o f S ta te  Freeman Matthews, A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  
o f  S ta te  f o r  F a r  E a s te rn  A f f a i r s  W alter Robertson, Deputy 
S e c re ta ry  o f the  N a tio n a l  S e c u r i ty  Council S. E v e re t t  
Gleason, and F re d e r ic k  N o l t in g ,  A le x is  Johnson, and Kenneth 
Young o f the S ta te  Department
General C o l l in s  o u t l in e d  the  th re e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l ­
ab le  to  the United S ta te s :  to  give Rhee a  mutual defense
t r e a t y ,  to  take  Rhee and o th e r  South Korean i n t r a n s i g e n t s  
in to  custody, o r  o b ta in  an agreement from Rhee to  coopera te  
u n t i l  the  United S ta te s  cou ld  remove i t s  fo rc e s  from Korea. 
C o l l in s  b e liev ed  the  U nited  S ta te s  should pu t  Rhee under
^^Clark to  JCS, C 6263I ,  May 26, 1953, Box 44, JCS 
Geographic F i l e s ; Hermes, Truce T e n t . 446.
^^Hermes, Truce T e n t . 44?.
17 Summary of N otes o f JC S -S ta te  Department M eeting, 
U. A le x is  Johnson, May 29, 1953, DDRS l63C(75).
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p ro te c t iv e  custody  " r a th e r  than submit to  b lac k m a il ."  He 
should be tak en  in to  custody "on the b a s is  o f  i t s  being 
necessa ry  f o r  the s e c u r i ty  of our t ro o p s ."  C o l l in s  be lieved  
th a t  "We must give C lark a u th o r i ty  o r deny him the a u th o r i ty
to take Rhee in to  custody . I f  a  c r i s i s  o c c u rs ,  th e re  w on't
18be time f o r  C lark to  come back f o r  a u th o r i ty . "
Robertson opted f o r  a llow ing  Rhee to  go i t  a lone , but 
Matthews sa id  " t h i s  would be a  b lu f f  as  we c a n ' t  l e t  him go 
i t  a lo n e ."  This s h o r t  exchange g e n e ra l ly  summed up one con­
sensus—the United S ta te s ,  a f t e r  the l o s s e s  i t  had su f fe re d ,  
was n o t  going  to  withdraw from Korea and le a v e  her de fense ­
l e s s .  C o l l in s  continued to  p re s s  fo r  P lan  EVER READY, sug­
g e s t in g  t h a t  Eisenhower meet w ith  South Korean Chief of S ta f f  
Park Sun-yap, then  in  Washington, to  gain  h i s  formal ag ree ­
ment to  backing a U.S. move a g a in s t  Rhee; C o l l in s  no ted  t h a t  
Park had t a c i t l y  agreed to  do so a lread y . The S ta te  D epart­
ment b e l ie v e d  such a "sub r o s a  meeting" would be in a d v isa b le ,  
since " i f  i t  leaked , th in g s  might be bad ."  C o l l in s  recom­
mended t h a t  th e  S ta te  Department th in k  about the p ro p o s i t io n  
a l i t t l e  more
Robertson , summing up the S ta te  D ep ar tm en t 's  p o s i ­
t io n ,  p o in te d  out t h a t  General C lark , Ambassador E l l i s  0. 
B riggs, and Robert Murphy, outgoing Ambassador to  Japan  and 
General C l a r k 's  p o l i t i c a l  a d v is e r ,  a l l  favored  a  mutual
l^ ib id . ^^Ibid.
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defense t r e a t y  as the b e s t  way to  g e t  Rhee to  accept an arm i­
s t i c e .  C o l l in s  d isa g ree d ,  f e e l in g  a t r e a t y  would g ive  Rhee 
" the whip hand." Admiral Duncan, o f the J o i n t  C h ie fs ,  be­
l ie v e d  t h a t  i f  Rhee could n o t  be brought to  support U.S. 
p o l ic y  " i t  would be a d i s a s t r o u s  m i l i t a r y  d e fe a t  fo r  U.N. 
fo rc e s .  I  th in k  th a t  i t  would be worth i t  to  give him a se ­
c u r i t y  p a c t  in  o rder  to  keep him in  l i n e . "  No p o l ic y  con­
sensus was reached, though i t  was decided to  prepare  a  memo­
randum f o r  Eisenhower s e t t i n g  f o r t h  the  s i t u a t i o n  and the
20s te p s  which Clark proposed to  ta k e .
The r e s u l t i n g  memorandum favored  C o l l i n s '  p o s i t io n ,  
conclud ing  th a t  a c t io n  a t  the p re s e n t  time should be l im i te d  
to  approval of P lan  EVER READY. A proposed d i r e c t iv e  to Clark 
au th o r ized  him to implement EVER READY, in c lu d in g  those p ro ­
v is io n s  e n t a i l i n g  tak in g  Rhee and o th e r  South Korean o f f i -
21c i a l s  in to  custody.
N e i th e r  the S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  nor the S ec re ta ry  of 
Defense concurred in  the  proposed memorandum, which was p re ­
sented  to  them l a t e  in  the  a f te rn o o n  of May 29 . In s te a d ,  a 
message was d isp a tched  to  C lark  in form ing  him th a t  " the  s e r i ­
ousness o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  was a p p re c ia te d  and would be p re ­
sented to  the  P re s id e n t  on May 30 ."  I n  the meantime, he was
2 ° Ib id .
21Eddleman Memo f o r  the  Record, "Conference on Cur­
r e n t  D i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  the ROK Government Due to T heir  D is­
s a t i s f a c t i o n  with A rm istice  Terms," June 1, 1953i Enclosure 
A and Appendix, Box 44, JCS Geographic F i l e .
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au tho rized  to take p re l im in a ry  s te p s  to  meet any th rea te n ed  
emergency r e s u l t i n g  from d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  South Korea and 
to  take such a c t io n  as  n ecessa ry  in  th e  even t of a grave 
emergency to  in su re  the s e c u r i ty  o f h i s  f o rc e s .  C lark  was 
a lso  given perm iss ion  to  inform  Rhee t h a t  D u lles  "would 
s tro n g ly  recommend to  the  P r e s id e n t  t h a t  the United S ta te s  
agree to  n e g o t ia te  a  b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i t y  p a c t  w ith  the  ROK 
Government." Clark was to  u t i l i z e  t h i s  a u th o r i ty  a t  h i s  d i s ­
c r e t io n ,  i f  i t  appeared such a c t io n  would a v e r t  a  dangerous 
and p rov oca tive  s i t u a t i o n .  F in a l ly ,  C lark  was asked to  com­
ment on whether a p a c t  a t  t h i s  time would re c o n c i le  Rhee to
2?an a rm is t ic e  a long  the  c u r r e n t ly  proposed l i n e s .
The morning of May 30» a  m eeting  was held  among top 
S ta te-D efense  Department o f f i c i a l s  to  co n s id e r  the su b je c t  
of a b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i ty  agreement. Those p re s e n t  agreed t h a t  
the U nited  S ta te s  could no t concur i n  t h a t  p a r t  o f  P la n  EVER 
READY which would e s t a b l i s h  a U.N. Command government. I n ­
s te ad ,  i t  was agreed t h a t  South Korea would be o f fe re d  a 
mutual defense t r e a t y  "along  the  l i n e s  o f  our c u r r e n t  P h i l i p ­
p in e s  and ANZUS t r e a t i e s , "  and c o n d it io n ed  upon acceptance 
and coop era tion  w ith  an a rm is t ic e  agreem ent and ag ree ing  to  
leav e  i t s  tro o p s  under U.N. Command o p e ra t io n a l  c o n tro l  un­
t i l  i t  was m utua lly  agreed to  be no lo n g e r  n e c e ssa ry .
22 ' '  — ""—'—
I b i d . ; C o l l in s  to  C lark , DA 942038, May 30, 1953, 
DDRS 164B(75TT
^%ddleman Memo fo r  Record, June 1, 1953, JCS 
Geographic F i l e .
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The co n fe rees  th en  met w ith  th e  P r e s id e n t ,  who ap­
proved the  o f f e r  of a  s e c u r i t y  t r e a t y .  Two messages were 
s e n t  to  Clark l a t e  on May 30, one inform ing him o f  d is a p ­
p rova l of th a t  p a r t  o f  P lan  EVER READY c a l l i n g  f o r  a U.N. 
Command government, and the  o th e r  a u th o r iz in g  him to inform 
Rhee t h a t  the United S t a te s  was p repa red  " to  undertake  nego-
p2j,
t i a t i o n s  fo r  a  mutual de fen se  t r e a t y  w ith  the ROK . . .
The United S ta te s  had r e j e c t e d  both withdrawal from 
Korea and a U.N. Command coup as  p o l ic y  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  choosing 
in s te a d  to  o f f e r  Rhee a  mutual defense p a c t .  The problem was 
t h a t  the  d e c is io n  was reached  so slowly t h a t  th e re  was no 
gua ran tee  t h a t  Rhee would f in d  the  o f f e r  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  C lark 
sa id  as  much on May 30 , p o in t in g  out t h a t  Rhee might f e e l  
t h i s  a c t io n  was l a t e  in  a r r i v i n g .  He b e liev ed , however, t h a t  
a  defense  pact "would improve our r e l a t i o n s  with Rhee and the 
ROK Government m a te r ia l ly  and d im in ish  a c t iv e  o p p o s i t io n  to  
the new UNC a rm is t ic e  p r o p o s a l ."  C lark , w ith B riggs  concur­
re n c e ,  decided to  pu t o f f  in form ing  Rhee of the s e c u r i ty  p a c t  
o f f e r  u n t i l  i t  became c l e a r e r  how c lo se  an a rm is t ic e  was.
Clark was c o r r e c t  in  assuming th a t  an o f f e r  of a  b i ­
l a t e r a l  t r e a ty  would n o t  end South K o re a 's  o p p o s i t io n  to  an
2hI b i d . ; JCS to  C la rk ,  DA 940241, May 30, 1953, DDRS 
190(75); C o l l in s  to  C la rk ,  DA 940242, May 30,1953, DDRS 
164d(75).
^^JCS D ecision  1776/373, A Report by the  J o i n t  S t r a ­
t e g ic  P la n s  Committee, "Command of ROK Armed F o rc es ,"  June 17, 
1953, Box 44, JCS Geozraohic F i l e ;  C lark  to  JCS, Cx 62747,
May 30 , 1953, DDRS 164A(75); C lark . Danube. 2?3.
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a rm is t i c e .  On May ]0 , Rhee wrote to Eisenhower t h a t  an 
a rm is t ic e  "which would a llow  the Chinese Communists to  remain 
in  Korea would mean to  the  Korean n a t io n  . . .an acceptance 
of a dea th  sentence w ithou t p r o t e s t . "  Rhee proposed a 
sim ultaneous withdrawal of f o re ig n  t ro o p s ,  provided a  mutual 
defense t r e a t y  had been signed f i r s t .  He a lso  wanted in -  
c reased  a id  and a r e t e n t i o n  of U.S. a i r  u n i t s  in  Korea.
R h ee 's  p ro p o sa ls  were n o t  a ccep tab le  to the United 
S ta te s .  To Washington, i t  appeared t h a t  R hee 's  re q u e s t  f o r  
s im ultaneous troop  withdrawal was an a ttem p t to gain  both an 
a rm is t ic e  "which would leave su p e r io r  ROK fo rc e s  to  deal w ith  
North K orea,"  and a mutual defense  t r e a t y  w ith  the United 
S ta te s  to  in su re  U.S. in te r v e n t io n  i f  the  Chinese o r  S ov ie ts  
came to  N orth  K o re a 's  a id .  S im ultaneous withdrawal was in ap ­
p r o p r i a t e ,  s in ce  the q u e s t io n  of withdrawal o f fo re ig n  tro o p s  
from Korea had been the  s u b je c t  o f len g th y  and in te n se  d i s ­
cu ss ion s  in  Washington, with a r e s u l t i n g  f i rm  d e c is io n  th a t  
mutual w ithdrawal was a  su b je c t  f o r  a  p o s t - a rm is t i c e  p o l i t i ­
c a l  con fe ren ce . Changing t h i s  p o l ic y  now would be a  sign of
weakness and would l e a d  to  a l o s s  of U.N. o p e ra t io n a l  co n tro l
27over South Korean t r o o p s —a key p r in c ip le  o f U.S. p o l ic y .
C lark  was i n s t r u c t e d  to  in trodu ce  the  su b je c t  of a
26U.S. Senate , E xecutive  S ess ions . 1953. Volume V, 
Appendix E: A rm istice  in  Korea, 83O-63I .
^ ^ C o ll in s  to  C la rk ,  DA 940343, June 4, 1953.
DDRS 165 B( 7 5 ) .
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mutual defense  p a c t  a t  h is  d i s c r e t io n  and to remind Rhee th a t
f a i l u r e  to  reach  an unders tand ing  with the United S t a te s  on
an a rm is t ic e  would th re a te n  the  foundations upon which the
United S ta te s  then  was examining South K o re a 's  economic a id
req u irem en ts .  Any u n i l a t e r a l  a c t io n s  to  resume h o s t i l i t i e s
"would make i t  im possib le  f o r  th e  United S ta te s  and o th e r
28U.N. Governments to  continue economic a id  to  the  ROK."
With Communist acceptance on June 4 of the b a s ic  U.N. 
p ro p o sa ls ,  South Korea in c reased  the p u b lic  tempo of i t s  
c r i t i c i s m s  of the  proposed a r m i s t i c e . Rhee p u b l ic ly  c a l le d  
f o r  sim ultaneous troop  withdrawal and imposed e x tra o rd in a ry  
s e c u r i ty  r e s t r i c t i o n s  over a l l  of South Korea. He r e j e c te d  
E isenhow er 's  June 6 l e t t e r  p roposing  a b i l a t e r a l  p a c t  in  ex­
change f o r  South Korean cooperation , n o t in g  the  p r ic e  f o r  ac-
29ceptance would be " to  accep t a death  w arran t ."  '  With the 
s ig n in g  on June 8 of the  terms of re fe ren c e  f o r  p r i s o n e r s ,  
the  p u b l ic  campaign i n t e n s i f i e d  with dem onstra tions  and 
r e s o lu t io n s  of support fo r  R h ee 's  stand coming from the 
N a tio n a l  Assembly and the C abinet. In  p r iv a t e ,  Rhee informed 
C lark  t h a t  "he would f e e l  f ree  to  take any a c t io n  he deemed 
a p p ro p r ia te
^^ I b id . ; C o l l in s  to  C lark , DA 940728, June 5 , 1953. 
Box 44, JCS Geographic F i l e .
^^U.S. Senate , Executive S e ss io n s , 1953. Volume V, 
Appendix E, 832- 836; Hermes, Truce T en t , 448-449.
^^Clark to  JCS, CX 6289O, June 7, 1953. Box 44,
JCS Geographic F i l e ; S ta te  Department, Chronology, 32; 
C lark , Danbue, 275*
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With South K o re a 's  disenchantm ent growing and world 
opin ion  r e a c t in g  favo rab ly  to  the  p ro g ress  a t  Panmunjom, Sec­
r e t a r y  of S ta te  D u lle s  proposed on June 12, t h a t  Rhee come to 
Washington f o r  "a c o n f id e n t ia l  exchange of v iew s."  Rhee was 
p leased  w ith  the i n v i t a t i o n ,  but re fu sed  i t ,  c i t i n g  the  un­
s e t t l e d  s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea as  the  reason . In s te a d ,  Rhee sug­
ges ted  t h a t  D u lle s  v i s i t  Seoul. D u lles  d e c l in e d ,  but d id  
agree to  send W alter Robertson, to  help c l e a r  up "any misun­
d e rs ta n d in g s  a s  to  U.S. p o s t - a rm is t i c e  p o l i c i e s  . . . ."
Rhee agreed on June 1? to  rec e iv e  Robertson.
On June 18, in  C la r k 's  words, " a l l  h e l l  broke l o o s e . " 
In  a  w ell-p lanned  and w ell-execu ted  maneuver, and with the 
co o p era t io n  of the South Korean government, m i l i t a r y ,  and 
c i v i l i a n  p opu lace , 27,000 Korean n o n r e p a t r i a te s  "escaped" 
from p r iso n e r-o f -w a r  camps a t  fo u r  d i f f e r e n t  l o c a t io n s .  Ac-, 
co rd ing  to  the  U.N. Command, i t  was c le a r  t h a t  the "ac t io n  
had been s e c r e t ly  planned and c a r e f u l ly  co o rd in a ted  a t  top 
l e v e l s  in  the  Korean Government . . . ."  While n o t  su rp r ise d ,  
C la rk  n o n e th e le s s  t o ld  Rhee t h a t  he was "profoundly  shocked" 
by the  u n i l a t e r a l  ab rog a tion  of h i s  p e rso n a l  commitment " th a t  
you would n o t  take  u n i l a t e r a l  a c t io n  . . . u n t i l  a f t e r  f u l l  
and frank  d is c u s s io n s  w ith  me.
R h e e 's  a c t io n s  r a i s e d  th e  basic  q u e s t io n  of whether
31Eisenhower, Mandate, 23^-235* S ta te  Department,
Chronology. 32-33* 
32.Hermes, Truce T en t . 431; C lark , Danube. 281. 
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U.N. Command had o p e ra t io n a l  c o n tro l  over South Korean fo rc e s .  
The Communists, having  conceded on the v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n  
i s s u e ,  would be j u s t i f i e d  in  q u e s t io n in g ,  as th e y  d id ,  wheth­
e r  the United  S ta te s  had s u f f i c i e n t  c o n tro l  and a u th o r i ty  to  
conclude an s i rm is t ic e . While bo th  the Chinese and S o v ie ts  
took the  l i n e  in  t h e i r  propaganda t h a t  the  United S ta te s  was 
"pow erless" to  p rev e n t  R hee 's  a c t io n s ,  the N orth  Koreans r e ­
ac ted  v i o l e n t ly ,  accus ing  the United N ations o f  c o m p lic i ty  
i n  the a c t io n ,  and in q u ir in g  whether the United S t a te s  could 
c o n tro l  South Korea and i f  an a rm is t ic e  would in c lu d e  the 
"Rhee c l i q u e ."  I f  n o t  inc luded , how would America in su re
•3-a
t h a t  South Korea would l i v e  up to  an a rm is t ic e  agreem ent.
Eisenhower, in  a message to  Rhee on June 18, po in ted  
out t h a t  South Korea had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  p r i s o n e r s  as 
agen ts  o f U.N. Command. Release of the  p r i s o n e r s  v;as c a r r ie d  
ou t by the  use of open v io lence  a g a in s t  the  a u th o r i ty  of the 
U.N. Command. Eisenhower warned Rhee t h a t  u n le s s  he was p r e ­
pared  un eq u iv o ca lly  " to  accep t the a u th o r i ty  o f  the  U.N. Com­
mand to  conduct the p re s e n t  h o s t i l i t i e s  and to  b r in g  them to 
a c lo s e ,  i t  w i l l  be n ecessa ry  to  e f f e c t  an o th e r  a rrangem en t." 
C lark  "has now been au th o rized  to  take  such s te p s  a s  may be­
come n ecessa ry  in  l i g h t  o f your d e te rm in a t io n ." ^ ^  J u s t  what 
th e  new arrangem ents and necessa ry  s te p s  might be, i s  unknown.
^^Simmons, S tra in e d  A ll ia n c e .  236-38; C la rk ,  
Danube. 282.
Eisenhower, Mandate, 235-236.
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though the P re s id e n t  p robab ly  had P lan  EVER READY in  mind.
During the  nex t few days Rhee switched from c o n c i l i a ­
t i o n  to  o p p o s i t io n  and back to  c o n c i l i a t i o n ,  a s  he probed U.S. 
in te n t io n s  and r e a c t io n s ,  and con tinued  to  ba rga in  fo r  the  
b e s t  p o s s ib le  d e a l  f o r  South Korea. On June 19 and 20 he 
in d ic a te d  t h a t  s ign ing  of an a rm is t ic e  would make i t  almost 
im possib le  f o r  South Korean f o r c e s  to  remain under U.N. Com­
mand c o n t r o l .  Yet he in d ic a te d  to  o th e r  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  
he hoped w ithdrawal would be unnecessa ry
In  a June 22 meeting w ith  C la rk ,  Rhee sought to  a s ­
sure  America t h a t  he d e s i r e d  to  work w ith  Eisenhower. Clark 
informed Rhee t h a t  i t  was n e ce ssa ry  to  accep t two prem ises: 
f i r s t ,  t h a t  the  United  S ta te s  was committed f i rm ly  to  g a in in g  
an honorable  a r m is t i c e ;  second, t h a t  th e  United S ta te s  would 
n o t  use fo rce  to  e j e c t  the  Chinese from Korea o r  to  in troduce  
the  is su e  o f  w ithdrawal in to  the  t a l k s .  R hee,in  tu rn ,  "ex­
p ressed  in te n se  i n t e r e s t  i n  a  mutual defense  t r e a t y  . , .
He added t h a t  a lthou gh  Korea could  n o t  p o s s ib ly  s ign  an arm i­
s t i c e ,  i t  cou ld  support one. C lark  in  c lo s in g  the  m eeting 
r e i t e r a t e d  t h a t  i t  was n e c e ssa ry  to  r e t a i n  South Korean 
t ro o p s  under U.N. Command c o n t r o l .
The nex t day, C lark  was g iven  a  Korean a ide  mémoire
^%ermes. Truce T e n t . 452-^53*
^^U.S. Department of S ta te ,  The Rhee-Robertson Con­
v e r s a t io n s  and T h e ir  A fte rm a th , D iv is io n  of H i s to r ic a l  
P o l ic y  Research, P r o j e c t  No. 339, J u l y , 1953, DDRS 1340(75)»
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which s e t  down the necessa ry  c o n d it io n s  f o r  r e t e n t io n  of U.N. 
Command c o n tro l  over South Korean fo rc e s  and fo r  Korean ad­
herence to  an a rm is t i c e .  R hee 's  c o n d i t io n s  inc luded ; a 
l im i t a t i o n  of 90 days f o r  a  p o l i t i c a l  con fe rence , 60 days a f ­
t e r  which the United S ta te s  would support by a i r  and naval 
a c t io n  a South Korean move n o r th ;  a  mutual defense t r e a t y  
signed before  an a rm is t ic e  ; g r a n t in g  of adequate m i l i t a r y  
and economic a id  to  achieve s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ;  and no fo re ig n  
fo rc e s  to  e n te r  South Korea.
On June 24, when Robertson a r r iv e d  in  Tokyo, the f u ­
tu re  o f South Korean-American r e l a t i o n s  was u n p re d ic ta b le .
The North Koreans, s t a r t i n g  on J u ly  19, began s h i f t i n g  the 
blame f o r  the p r i s o n e r  r e le a s e  alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  to  Rhee and 
South Korea. T h is  in d ic a te d  to  C lark t h a t  the  Communists 
s t i l l  wanted a t r u c e .  I t  was in  t h i s  atmosphere of both o p t i ­
mism and pessimism th a t  top U.S. m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  o f ­
f i c i a l s  met w ith  Robertson to  c o n s id e r  th e  s i t u a t i o n .  They 
concluded th a t  the  United S t a te s  should s ig n  an a rm is t ic e  as 
q u ick ly  a s  p o s s ib le ,  w ith  o r  w ithou t South Korean agreement.
I f  Rhee continued h i s  o p p o s i t io n ,  the  United  S ta te s  should 
be prepared  to  s ig n  an a rm is t i c e ,  re g a in  i t s  p r i s o n e rs  and 
withdraw from Korea. General C lark  b e liev e d  the United S ta te s  
a ls o  should encourage the  South Korean Army to  take  a c t io n  
to  re p la c e  the p re s e n t  government by making the Army b e liev e
3?lbid .
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t h a t  the United S ta te s  was p repared  to  withdraw un less  
Rhee agreed to  an a rm istice .^®
Washington d id  n o t  com plete ly  support these p ro p o s i ­
t i o n s .  Clark was au th o r ize d  to  conclude an a rm istice  a t  any 
time on a b a s is  which d id  n o t  in c lude  e i t h e r  forced r e p a t r i a ­
t io n  o r  fo rced  South Korean compliance w ith  the  a rm is t ic e .
He was to ld ,  however, n o t  to  make "any commitment, agreement, 
or a c t io n  which would re q u i re  t o t a l  UNC withdrawal from 
K orea."  F in a l ly ,  C lark  was au th o r ize d  to  give the im pression  
to  South K o rea 's  m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  th a t  U.N. Com­
mand would withdraw i f  South Korea d id  n o t  comply w ith  the  
a r m i s t i c e . T h i s  l a s t  p o in t  was rep e a te d  on June 30, when 
the J o i n t  C h iefs  informed Clark t h a t  the  most promising ap­
proach  a t  p re s e n t  was to  cause Rhee and h i s  fo llow ers to  be­
l ie v e  th a t  the  United N ations  was ready to  withdraw. I f  t h i s  
did n o t  change R hee 's  a t t i t u d e ,  i t  was hoped " tha t  i n f l u e n t i a l  
ROK p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  e lem ents would themselve-' : e
s te p s  to  b r in g  about a  s i t u a t i o n  in  the ROK Govern.. which
40w i l l  a ssu re  ROK co o p era t io n  w ith  an a rm is t i c e ."  This ap­
proach  ignored R hee 's  g r e a t ly  in c re a sed  p o p u la r i ty .
The Rhee-Robertson t a l k s  began on June 25 and
^^Simmons, S tra in e d  A l l i a n c e , 238-239» Clark, Danube, 
284-83 ;Clark to  JOS, CX 63325, June 25, 1953. 1650(75).
39jCS to  C la rk ,  JCS 942368, June 25, 1953. Box 44,
JCS Geographic F i l e .
^°JCS to  C la rk , DBF 942613, June 30, 1953, R ecen tly  
D e c la s s i f ie d  Documents on Korean War.
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con tinued  f o r  18 days. I t  soon became c l e a r  t h a t  the re  were 
two major stum bling  blocks to  an agreement. The f i r s t  was 
the  South Korean d e s i r e  to  l i m i t  the l e n g th  of a  p o s t-a rm i­
s t i c e  p o l i t i c a l  conference to  90 days, and to  fo l lo w  i t  with 
combat o p e ra t io n s  i f  the Chinese were s t i l l  p re s e n t  in  Korea. 
The second, and most troublesome problem, was R hee 's  d e s i r e  
f o r  an immediate guaran tee  of a mutual defense  t r e a t y . O n  
June 27 , R obertson  was able to  inform Rhee t h a t  while i t  was 
im possib le  to  impose a 90 day l i m i t  on o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  p a r ­
t i c i p a t i n g  in  a  p o l i t i c a l  conference , Eisenhower did f e e l  
t h a t  i f  a t  th e  end of 90 days " i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  the  con­
fe ren ce  was n o t  making p rog ress  and was being abused by the  
Communists . . .he would be prepared  to  a c t  in  c o n ce r t  w ith  
the  ROK w ith  a  view to  having the United S ta te s  and the ROK 
r e t i r e  j o i n t l y  . . . ." On the second d isp u ted  p o in t ,  
E isenhower s a id  he could no t "guarantee" a mutual defense 
p a c t  because such an agreement was su b je c t  to  Senate approval, 
but he was ready  to  begin n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  such a  t r e a ty  
im m edia te ly .^^
Rhee was n o t  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  E isen how er 's  a ssu ran ces , 
a s  he co n tin u ed  to  i n s i s t  on concluding a s e c u r i t y  p a c t  p r io r  
to  the  s ig n in g  of an a rm is t ic e .  I n  a d d i t io n ,  Rhee continued 
to  i n s i s t  on a  resum ption of h o s t i l i t i e s  i f  the  planned
^Robertson to  D u lle s ,  June 26, 1953. 795*00/6- 
2653, DDRS 31A(75).
I b i d . .  June 27, 1953, 795*00/6-2753, DDRS 31B(75)* 
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p o l i t i c a l  conference did n o t  lead  to  Chinese withdrawal from 
K o r e a . O n  Ju ly  3» the United S ta te s  r e i t e r a t e d  i t s  w i l l in g ­
ness  to  begin n e g o t ia t io n s  immediately f o r  a mutual defense 
t r e a t y ,  su b je c t  to  f i n a l  Senate a p p ro v a l .  The United S ta te s  
a lso  o ffe red  to  withdraw from the p o l i t i c a l  conference to  
c o n su l t  w ith South Korea on what s te p s  might p ro p e r ly  and 
reasonab ly  be taken i f  Chinese t ro o p s  had n o t  withdrawn from 
Korea o r  i f  a  u n i f ie d  Korea had n o t  been agreed to  a f t e r  90 
days. In  r e tu r n ,  South Korea would be expected to  support 
the  a rm is t ic e  and to  leave  i t s  t ro o p s  under U.N. Command con-
hh
t r o l .  On the  same day. W. B edell Smith, A cting  S e c re ta ry  
of S ta te ,  informed Robertson t h a t  i f  Rhee found the  J u ly  3 
p rop osa l  u n accep tab le ,  " the  time had p robab ly  come f o r  you 
to  leave  i f  you f e e l  your continued  p resence  w i l l  serve no 
u se fu l  p u rp o se .
The United S ta te s  had met every  South Korean demand 
but the  one r e q u i r in g  a resum ption of h o s t i l i t i e s .  Rhee 
s t i l l  was r e lu c ta n t  because n e g o t i a t io n s  f o r  a mutual defense 
t r e a t y  would be u s e le s s  w ithou t Senate approva l. While R hee 's  
a c t io n s  had n o t  in sp i re d  confidence among a  number of Sena­
t o r s ,  both D ulles  and Senator W illiam F. Knowland and Senator
43^ S ta te  Department, Rhee-Robertson. 19-20.
^^Robertson to  D u lle s ,  J u ly  2, 1953, 795.00/7-253, 
U.S. Senate , E xecutive  S ess io ns . 1953. Appendix E, 837.
4c
W. B edell Smith to  Robertson , J u ly  3» 1950, 
795.00/7-353. DDRS 31F(75).
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H. Alexander Smith, a ssu red  Rhee t h a t  they  were c o n fid e n t  
of favo rab le  Senate a c t io n  on a  s e c u r i ty  p a c t .  Of c o u rse ,  
South Korean co o p era tio n  would go f a r  to  assu re  approval.
Rhee remained r e l u c t a n t ,  bu t the  United  S ta te s  stepped up i t s  
p re s su re  on th e  p o l i t i c a l  l e v e l ,  by in ducing  sp e c u la t io n  t h a t  
the  United S ta te s  in tended  to  sign  an a rm is t ic e  and withdraw 
w ithou t c o n su l t in g  South K orea. On th e  m i l i t a r y  l e v e l ,  th e  
United S ta te s  t ig h te n e d  th e  screws on su p p l ie s  both f o r  new 
South Korean Army d iv i s io n s  and fo r  K orea in  g e n e ra l .
The Communists a ls o  were adding  to  the  p re s su re  on 
Rhee. W alter Hermes has n o ted  th a t  "The b r i e f  r e s p i t e  on the  
b a t t l e f i e l d  ended on June 24 and the  Communists d is c lo s e d  
t h e i r  d e c is io n  to devote s p e c ia l  a t t e n t i o n  to the  ROK d i v i ­
s io n s  a long  the  f r o n t . "  Both s id e s  s u f fe re d  severe c a s u a l ­
t i e s .  On J u ly  13, the Chinese launched a la rg e  o ffen s iv e  
a g a in s t  the e l i t e  C a p ita l  D iv is io n  of the  South Korean Army, 
d r iv in g  i t  back as deep as  s ix  m iles beyond South K orean-held  
l i n e s .  They i n f l i c t e d  heavy c a s u a l t i e s  and ro u ted  s e v e ra l  
o th e r  South Korean u n i t s .  Only combined American-South 
Korean ground o p e ra t io n s  h a l t e d  the Communist advance and r e ­
gained the  l o s t  t e r r i t o r y .  The message, however, was c l e a r — 
the  South Korean Army was n o t  ready to  stand on i t s  own, 
much l e s s  contem plate an independent move n o r th .  The
46S ta te  Department, R hee-R obertson . 28, 40, 54.
^^Clark to  JCS, CX 63500, J u ly  5. 1953, Box 44, 
JCS Geographic F i l e .
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Communists added p o l i t i c a l  p re s su re  by announcing on Ju ly  8 
t h a t  they  would resume the  a rm is t ic e  t a l k s ,  which had been
Kg
rec esse d  s ince  the  r e le a s e  of the Korean n o n r e p a t r i a te s .
On J u ly  9i Rhee very r e l u c t a n t l y  conceded. He in ­
formed Robertson t h a t  while South Korea could n o t  s ign  the 
t ru c e  agreem ent, i t  would n o t  o b s t ru c t  the  im plem entation of 
i t s  term s. In  exchange Rhee rec e iv e d  the  promise of a mutual 
defense  t r e a t y ,  lo n g - te rm  economic a id ,  expansion of the 
South Korean Army to  twenty d iv i s io n s ,  an agreement to  with­
draw a f t e r  $0 days from a  p o s t - a r m is t i c e  p o l i t i c a l  conference 
i f  i t  became s ta le m a ted ,  and a guaran tee  to  hold h ig h - le v e l  
American-Korean t a l k s  on o b je c t iv e s  p r i o r  to  the  p o l i t i c a l
confe rence .
The a rm is t ic e  t a l k s  resumed on J u ly  10, and the im­
mediate q u e s t io n  was whether the  United S ta te s  could guarantee  
South K o re a 's  a c t io n s  in  the  p o s t - a rm is t i c e  p e r io d .  On the 
13th ,  the  U.N. C h ie f  N e g o t ia to r  informed the Communists t h a t  
U.N. Command would withdraw a l l  m i l i t a r y  a id  and support i f  
South Korean fo r c e s  v io la t e d  the  t ru c e  arrangements.^® This 
was an adequate g u a ra n te e ,  bu t s ince  the  t a l k s  were o ccu rr ing  
d u r in g  the  l a s t  Communist o f f e n s iv e ,  no agreement could be
48S ta te  Department, Rhee-Robertson . 39, 45; Hermes, 
Truce T e n t . Chapter XXI; Simmons, S tra in e d  A l l i a n c e . 239.
49 S ta te  Department, Rhee-Robertson. 6O; Robertson to 
D u lle s ,  J u ly  8 and 9, 1953, 795.00/7-853 and 795.00/7-1053, 
U.S. Senate , E xecu tive  S e ss io n s .  1953. Volume V, Appendix E, 
841-846; C lark , Danube. 287-2831
^®State, Department, Rhee-Robertson. 38 .
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expected u n t i l  the outcome o f  t h a t  o ffen s iv e  became c l e a r .
By Ju ly  1 9 f the Communist push was over, l in e s  were s t a b i ­
l i z e d  and the enemy was ready to  complete an a rm is t i c e .  
Working o u t the d e t a i l s  came slowly, but on Ju ly  27, the 
a rm is t ic e  was signed a t  Panmunjom. C oincident with t h i s ,  
was issu an ce  o f the " g r e a te r  sa n c t io n s"  s ta tem en t, which 
U.N. members w ith  t ro o p s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  the Korean War 
signed. This s ta tem ent warned t h a t  i f  ag g ress ion  was r e ­
newed, the  r e a c t io n  would be u n i te d  and sw ift  and the conse­
quences would be so grave t h a t  " i t  would no t be p o s s ib le  to  
confine the  h o s t i l i t i e s  w ith in  the  f r o n t i e r s  o f Korea.
R h ee 's  a s se n t  to  the a rm is t ic e  was gained a t  the
c o s t  of a  b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i ty  p a c t  t h a t  commited America to
a continued r o le  in  South K o re a 's  f u tu r e .  The United S ta te s  
worked p a t i e n t l y  on Rhee, r e f u s in g  to  withdraw or to  fo rce  
h i s  do w n fa ll .  Many o th e r  p r e s s u re s  were ap p lied  u n re le n ­
t in g ly  and they  f i n a l l y  outweighed the  f e a r s  Rhee f e l t  a s  
a  r e s u l t  o f  dom estic p re s s u re s  n o t  to  compromise.
From the  time of the prom ising  Communist agreement
on March 28 to  exchange s ic k  and wounded p r i s o n e rs ,  to  the
time of the  s ig n in g  of the  a rm is t ic e  on Ju ly  27, the U.N. 
Command s u f fe re d  over 64,000 c a s u a l t i e s  and the Communists 
an e s t im a te d  135,000. From June , 1950 to  Ju ly  27, 1953, 
th e  U.N. Command su ffe red  over 500,000 c a s u a l t i e s  ( the  U nited
^^Hermes, Truce T ent. 400-490.
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S ta te s  142,019) and the  Communists an e s t im a te d  1 .5  m i l l io n .  
The c o s t ,  a cco rd ing  to  one p ro je c t io n ,  reached $83 b i l l i o n  
by 1956, in c lu d in g  d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  c o s t s . T h e  United 
S ta te s  d e c is io n  to  stand  in  Korea, a g a in s t  what was seen as 
naked Communist a g g re s s io n ,  had proven to  be a  c o s t ly  one. 
With the s ig n in g  o f  a  b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i ty  p a c t ,  a  continued 
U.S. commitment to  the  su rv iv a l  o f  South Korea was guaran teed , 
a s  was a con tinued  ex pend itu re  o f  l i v e s  and money.
^ ^ I b i d . .  501 .
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CONCLUSIONS
The o n se t  of World War I I  le d  the  United S ta te s  to  
assume major new commitments in  A sia . F i r s t  a t  C airo  and 
Teheran, and then  a t  Y a lta  and Potsdam, the  U nited  S ta te s  
fo rm ally  committed i t s e l f  to a  l a r g e r  and more a c t iv e  ro le  
in  Asian a f f a i r s .  This was m anifested  p r im a r i ly  in  U.S. 
p o l ic y  towai-d China, bu t  i t  a lso  could be seen in  A m erica 's  
p ledge to  e s t a b l i s h  in  due course a f r e e ,  independent, and 
dem ocratic  Korean s t a t e .  The United S ta te s ,  however, had 
p repa red  no s p e c i f i c  p la n s  to implement such a program. I n  
p a r t ,  t h i s  was the r e s u l t  of the S ta te  D epartm en t 's  f a i l u r e  ■ 
to  give more than minimal thought to  a postw ar p lan  f o r  
Korea. The United S ta te s  could n o t  be sure what the  lo c a l  
m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  would be, which l im i te d  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  
fo rm ula te  p la n s .  R oosevelt and then  Truman l a r g e ly  ignored  
the  th in k in g  th a t  had been done about Korea p r i o r  to  Y a lta  
and Potsdam.
While the S ta te  D epartm ent's  p o l ic y  p apers  on Korea 
were g iven  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  a t Y a lta  and Potsdam, in  the 
immediate postw ar p e r io d  the  S ta te  Department assumed p o l ic y  
making r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  Korea. The S ta te  Department based 
I t s  p lan n in g  on a d e s i r e  to  have a  non-Communist, independent
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Korea e s ta b l is h e d  through Soviet-A m erican coopera tio n . The 
b e s t  way to  accom plish t h i s  g o a l ,  i t  was b e liev e d ,  was 
through a  t r u s t e e s h i p  and the  S ta te  D epartm en t 's  p o l ic y  was 
to  maximize co o p era t io n  between the  two occupa tion  zones so 
t h i s  could be ach ieved . At Moscow in  December, 19^5, a  p lan  
was fo rm ula ted  whereby a  J o i n t  Commission was e s ta b l is h e d  to  
c o n su l t  w ith  a l l  dem ocratic  so c ia l  o rg a n iz a t io n s  and p o l i t i ­
c a l  p a r t i e s  in  Korea to  form a p r o v i s io n a l  government.
While p la y in g  a su bord ina te  r o le  in  p o l ic y  making, 
the  m i l i t a r y  was the  agency d es ig n a ted  to  implement the  S ta te  
D epartm en t 's  p o l ic y .  Im plem entation o f  W ashington 's p o l ic y  
became in c re a s in g ly  d i f f i c u l t  as  the  m i l i t a r y  more and more 
questioned  th e  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f any p lan  f o r  Korea which r e l i e d  
on Sov ie t c o o p e ra t io n —e s p e c i a l l y  a  p la n  f o r  a non-Communist 
Korea. S t r a in s  in  R o o s e v e l t 's  "grand s t r a te g y "  had begun to  - 
show even b e fo re  the end of the war and the  f r u s t r a t i o n s  the  
m i l i t a r y  faced  in  Korea in  i t s  a t te m p ts  to  reach  agreements 
w ith  the  S o v ie t  Union only served  to  r e in f o r c e  i t s  b e l i e f  
t h a t  Soviet-A m erican co o p era t io n  was im p o ss ib le .  The 
American M i l i t a r y  Government in  Korea d i r e c te d  i t s  p o l ic y  to ­
wards e s t a b l i s h in g  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  dem ocratic  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ­
t i e s .  E v en tu a l ly  i t s  p o l ic y  was geared to  p rep a r in g  South 
Korea f o r  in dependen t, dem ocratic  s t a t u s .  The occupation 
experience  i t s e l f  l e d  American M i l i t a r y  Government to  work 
a t  c ro s s  purposes  w ith  th e  S ta te  D epartm en t 's  p o l ic y  of
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co o p era t io n  w ith  the  S o v ie t  Union, while a t  the same time 
recommending th a t  American p o l ic y  should be changed. This 
was an im portan t f a c to r  i n  a l t e r i n g  U.S. p o l ic y  in  Korea.
A second f a c t o r  was the d i f f i c u l t  p o s i t io n  the  m i l i ­
t a r y  found i t s e l f  in  as th e  postw ar p e r io d  p ro g resse d .
Congress was w ie ld ing  a penny-p inch ing  axe and U.S. demobi­
l i z a t i o n  was c a r r i e d  out w ith  b re a th ta k in g  speed and e f f i ­
c ie n cy .  As d i s t r u s t  and su sp ic io n  between Moscow and '
Washington grew, i t  became in c re a s in g ly  ap paren t  t h a t  a  
permanent peace had n o t  been e s ta b l i s h e d  a t  the  end of the 
war. Paced w ith  c u ts  in  manpower and m a te r ie l ’, the  m i l i ta r y  
was fo rced  to  take  a s e r io u s  look a t  the  r e l a t i v e  s t r a t e g i c  
importance of a l l  a re a s  o f  the  world so t h a t  American commit­
ments could  be brought i n t o  l in e  w ith  a v a i la b le  re so u rc e s .  
K orea seemed to be a p a r t i c u l a r l y  weak sp o t s ince  the  Sovie t 
Union had the p o t e n t i a l  t o  pour in  masses o f tro o p s  while the 
U nited  S t a te s ,  because o f  th e  m i l i t a r y ' s  r e l a t i v e  s t a t e  of 
weakness, found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  p rov ide  even ahe sm all number 
o f  U.S. t ro o p s  th en  occupying Korea. With t h i s  in  mind, the 
m i l i t a r y  concluded t h a t  K orea  had l i t t l e  s t r a t e g i c  va lue , and 
t h a t  A m erica 's  i n t e r e s t s  i n  A sia  la y  in  o th e r  more v i t a l  and 
d e fe n s ib le  a re a s .
The m i l i t a r y  began, a s  e a r ly  as  1946, to  urge the 
S ta te  Department to  adopt a  p o l ic y  in  Korea th a t  would r e s u l t  
in  U.S. withdrawal a t  the e a r l i e s t  p o s s ib le  time w ith  a  
"minimum of bad e f f e c t s . "  By 1947, the  m i l i t a r y  had succeeded
-  404 -
in  p e rsu ad in g  a r e l u c t a n t  S ta te  Department to adopt a p o l ic y  
designed to  have the  United S ta te s  tu rn  the Korean problem 
over to  th e  United N a tio n s ,  where American r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
would be m u l t i l a t e r a l  in  n a tu r e .  At the  same tim e, the 
United S ta te s  would prov ide  economic a id  to  b u i ld -u p  South 
K o re a 's  economy and i t s  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g th .
Being r e l u c t a n t  to  accep t t h i s  p o l ic y  because i t  be­
l ie v e d  K o re a 's  p o l i t i c a l  va lue  was of g r e a t  importance in  the 
Cold War, the  S ta te  Department fough t v a r io u s  d e la y in g  ac ­
t io n s ,  but in  the  end the  m i l i t a r y  won ou t and U.S. tro o p s  
were withdrawn from Korea in  19^9- In  August, 1948, an in d e ­
pendent Republic of Korea was e s ta b l i s h e d  in  the  American 
zone under the a u sp ic e s  o f  the United N ations , and th e  United 
S ta te s  hoped t h a t  i t  would be ab le  to  surv ive w ith  American 
a id  and w ith  the  symbolic moral fo rce  o f  the United  N a tio n s  
underp inn ing  i t .  O f f i c i a l s  in  Washington acknowledged, how­
e v er ,  t h a t  th e re  was a  good chance t h a t  the  Communists would 
e v en tu a l ly  g a in  the  upper hand th roughou t the p e n in s u la .
The United S t a te s  decided  t e n t a t i v e l y  a t  t h a t  time 
n o t  to  extend  a  p o l ic y  of containm ent to  Korea. Given the  
means a v a i la b le  t o  ach ieve  U.S. ends, the  m i l i t a r y  b e liev e d  
th a t  i t  could  n o t  a f fo rd  to  make containm ent a  worldwide 
p o l ic y .  But th e re  were e lem ents  in  the  m i l i t a r y ,  S e c re ta ry  
F o r re s t  a l l .  General V/edemeyer, General B rad ley , and o th e r s ,  
who favored  the  r e t e n t i o n  of U.S. t ro o p s  in  Korea. The S ta te  
Department saw the  Korean s i t u a t i o n  from a  p o l i t i c a l  p o in t
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of view. Korea was a  b a tt leg roun d  between the Sov ie t Union 
and the  U nited  S t a te s  and to  allow South Korea to  f a l l  in to  
Communist hands would be a v e ry .s e r io u s  blow both to  U.S. 
p r e s t ig e  and to  th e  v a l i d i t y  of U.S. commitments around th e  
world. Some S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s ,  however, favored  
w ithdraw al, and w ith  n e i t h e r  department unanimous in  i t s  sup­
p o r t  o r  o p p o s i t io n ,  the d e c is io n  had to  be t e n t a t i v e  and sub­
j e c t  to  easy  change when d i f f e r e n t  c ircum stances a r o s e . Po­
l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  o b je c t iv e s  had proven to  be incom patib le  
in  rea ch in g  t h i s  d e c is io n ,  though both departm ents agreed 
th a t  the o t h e r ' s  p o s i t i o n  was v a l id .
With the  f a l l  o f  China in  19^9 and i t s  c o n s o l id a t io n  
as a communist s t a t e ,  th e  Army C hief of S t a f f ,  the  S e c re ta ry  
of S ta te ,  and th e  S e c re ta ry  of Defense req u es ted  a  r e a p p r a i s ­
a l  of U.S. p o l ic y  in  A s ia—the even tual r e s u l t  was NSC 48/2 , 
which c a l le d  f o r  a  more v igorous p o l ic y  in  the P a c i f i c .  In  
a d d i t io n ,  Army C h ief  o f S t a f f  Bradley s p l i t  w ith  h i s  c o l ­
leagues  on th e  J o i n t  C h iefs  of S ta f f ,  as he attem pted to  ga in  
a balanced p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y  es t im ate  o f  the Korean s i t u ­
a t io n .  He concluded t h a t  the  United S ta te s  should leave a 
token fo rc e  i n  South Korean fo r  i t s  symbolic v a lu e . A ll  
th ree  men l a i d  a c l e a r  groundwork f o r  U.S. i n te r v e n t io n  i n  
Korea in  Ju n e , 1950.
By th e  eve of th e  North Korean in v a s io n ,  th e  impetus 
of the  Cold War had tu rned  Korea in to  an a rena  f o r  S o v ie t-  
American c o n f r o n ta t io n .  While both s id e s  exacerba ted
— 4o6 —
p re v io u s ly  e x i s t in g  problems in  Korea, f o rc e s  o u ts id e  the 
in f lu e n ce  of even ts  w ith in  Korea determ ined t h a t  c o u n t r y 's  
f a t e .  Korea became one more symbol o f  the  c o n f l i c t  between 
the two g r e a t  powers. T h is  c o n f l i c t  f l a r e d  i r t u  a  h o t war 
in  Korea—a  war t h a t  the United S ta te s  had l e f t  South Korea 
unprepared to  f i g h t .
With the ou tbreak  o f  the Korean War, the  S ta te  De­
partm ent overcame m i l i t a r y  opposition  t o  g a in  the  commitment 
of U.S. ground fo rc e s  to  coun te r  what was p e rce iv ed  as  
S o v ie t - in s p i r e d  ag g re ss io n  i n  Korea. Only a t  t h i s  p o in t  did 
Truman r e a l l y  in tru d e  h im se lf  in  Korean p o l ic y  d is c u s s io n s .
In  the  p re v io u s  f iv e  y e a rs  po licy  f o r  Korea had been the  r e ­
s u l t  o f  in te rd e p a r tm e n ta l  c o n f l i c t s .  With the d e c is io n  to  
in te rv e n e ,  Korea was transform ed in to  a " v i t a l  s e c u r i ty  i n ­
t e r e s t "  w i th in  the framework of A m erica 's  Asian p o l ic y .  The 
p ro ce ss  o f in te rv e n t io n  a l s o  led  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  to  the  
ve rb a l  im p o s it io n  of the 7 th  F lee t in  the  Formosa S t r a i t s — 
th u s  p u t t i n g  the  United S ta te s  on a  c o l l i s i o n  course w ith  
China. By J u ly  7, 1953, NSC 154/1 would s t a t e  t h a t  " i t  i s  
im portan t to  our n a t io n a l  s e cu r i ty  th a t  p o l i t i c a l  and econom­
ic  p re s su re  a g a in s t  China be developed and m ain tained  d u ring  
the immediate p o s t - a r m is t i c e  pe rio d ."^
Once the  P re s id e n t  and the S ta te  Department s e t  the  
p o l ic y  of i n te r v e n t io n ,  i t  n a tu r a l ly  f e l l  to  the  m i l i t a r y  to
N^SC 154/ 1 , July 7, 1953, National Security Council 
F ile , M ilitary Branch, National Archives, Washington D.C.
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implement t h a t  p o l ic y  and i t  would be implemented in  a  way 
t h a t  was ag reeab le  to  the  m i l i t a r y ' s  o b je c t iv e s .  The "d ec i­
sion" to  c ro s s  the  38th  p a r a l l e l  and to  u n ify  Korea was 
reached  a lm ost by d e f a u l t .  The Defense Department, a rgu ing  
on p o l i t i c a l  g rounds, favored  a  move a c ro ss  the  p a r a l l e l  to  
u n ify  Korea. The S ta te  Department was much l e s s  sure about 
such an a c t io n ,  f e a r in g  p o s s ib le  S o v ie t  or Chinese in te rv e n ­
t i o n .  Elements in  th e  S ta te  Departm ent, l e d  by John A l l is o n ,  
Dean Rusk, and John F o s te r  D u l le s ,  favored  a  p o s i t io n  s im i la r  
to  t h a t  o f the Defense Departm ent. With M acA rthur 's  tremen­
dous success  a t  Inchon as  the m ajor m o tiv a tin g  f a c t o r ,  the 
S ta te  Department, in  the p ro c e ss  of hammering out a  consensus, 
was w i l l in g  to  be convinced t h a t  the  G e n e ra l 's  northward 
d r iv e  should n o t  be stopped. Thus the a ttem p t to cap tu re  a 
c l e a r  S o v ie t  sphere of i n t e r e s t  was l e s s  a  p o s i t iv e  d e c is io n  
and more a  case  o f su b m itt in g  to  the  e x ig e n c ie s  of the  
b u re a u c ra t ic  dec is ion -m ak ing  p ro c e s s .
The d is c u s s io n s  t h a t  occurred  co n ce rn ing  the d e c is io n  
to  con tinue  the  d r iv e  n o r th  i n  the face  of p o s s ib le  Chinese 
i n te r v e n t io n  saw the  S ta te  Department a rg u in g  t h a t  the  m i l i ­
t a r y  t h r e a t  o f in te r v e n t io n  was such th a t  a  p o l ic y  of g re a t  
c a u t io n  should be adopted , w hile  the  m i l i t a r y  argued t h a t  po­
l i t i c a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  made i t  n e ce ssa ry  n o t  to  show any 
s ig n s  o f  r e lu c ta n c e  in  the  d r iv e  n o r th .  The J o i n t  C h ie fs  ad­
m it ted  in  November, 1950, t h a t  i t  was n o t  m i l i t a r i l y  n e ce s­
sa ry  t o  d r iv e  r i g h t  up to  the  Yalu R iv e r ,  b u t  they  argued
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a g a in s t  any change in  M acA rthur 's  d i r e c t i v e s .  The most they 
would agree to  do was propose to  MacArthur t h a t  he s e t  up a 
b u f f e r  zone. M i l i ta ry  success  became the overwhelming f a c to r  
d e te rm in in g  p o l ic y  a f t e r  the Inchon la n d in g .  M acA rthur's r a ­
p id  northward d r iv e  p re sen te d  the  f r e e  world w ith  too g re a t  
o f  an op p o rtu n ity  to  ga in  a v ic to r y  a t  Communist expense.
Thus p o l ic y  makers l e t  t h e i r  d e s i r e  to  m ain ta in  a  su c ce ss fu l  
consensus outweigh the very c l e a r  s ig n s  of Chinese in te rv e n ­
t i o n ,  so t h a t  MacArthur could  con tinue  h i s  d r iv e  to  sweep the 
e n t i r e  Korean p e n in su la  in to  the Western camp.
A f te r  the Chinese i n te r v e n t io n ,  both  the  S ta te  D epart­
ment and Defense Department were shaken and both  were w i l l in g  
to  de lay  d e c is io n s  u n t i l  the m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  made the 
cho ice  an obvious and sa fe  one. The S ta te  Department d e fe r ­
r e d  to  the m i l i t a r y  to  d e sc r ib e  m i l i t a r y  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  so 
t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e s  might be s e t ,  while the m i l i t a r y  
d e fe r r e d  to  the  S ta te  Department to  r e a s s e s s  p o l i t i c a l  ob­
j e c t i v e s  so t h a t  m i l i t a r y  p o l ic y  could be a d ju s te d .  Only with 
th e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  of the b a t t l e f i e l d  s i t u a t i o n  was the  d e c i ­
s io n  made to  remain in  Korea and to  i n f l i c t  the  maximum p o s­
s i b l e  c a s u a l t i e s  on the enemy while seek ing  a p o l i t i c a l  so lu ­
t i o n  to  the c o n f l i c t .  In  re a ch in g  t h i s  d e c is io n ,  b o th  the 
S ta te  Department and the Defense Department o p e ra ted  from op­
p o s in g  p o in ts  o f  view. The Defense Department p laced  primary 
emphasis on m a in ta in in g  the  i n t e g r i t y  of M acA rthur 's  fo rc e s  
f o r  the  defense of Japan, while the S ta te  Department p laced
-  409 -
i t s  primary emphasis on s ta n d in g  in  Korea as  the b es t  method 
to defend Japan . The r e s u l t  was t h a t  the U.N. Commander 
n e v e r  rece ived  c l e a r  and com patible  d i r e c t i v e s  from Washing­
to n ,  though the  e a s in g  o f  the m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  in  January 
and February, 1951i made t h i s  l e s s  of a problem than  i t  was 
in  the  c r i t i c a l  weeks im m ediately  a f t e r  C h in a 's  in te rv e n t io n .
The S ta te  Department and the Defense Department a lso  
d i f f e r e d  on the  b e s t  way to  handle the r e p a t r i a t i o n  is su e .
The P re s id e n t  was fo rced  to  decide the is su e  in  favor of the 
m i l i t a r y  and v o lu n ta ry  r e p a t r i a t i o n .  There was l e s s  o f  a 
s p l i t  over how to  handle R h e e 's  o p p o s i t io n  to  an a rm is t ic e ,  
though the re  were those i n  the  m i l i t a r y  who favored  the o p tio n  
o f  a  U.N. coup t h a t  would fo rce  Rhee to  acqu iesce  to  an arm i­
s t i c e .  Both th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  and the S ec re ta ry  of De­
fen se  decided t h i s  a c t io n  would be in c o n s i s te n t  w ith  A m erica 's  
s t a t e d  g oa ls  i n  Korea, and decided t h a t  to  g a in  R hee 's  a s se n t  
to  an  a rm is t ic e  agreement the  United S ta te s  would o f f e r  a 
b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i t y  p a c t—even though t h i s  th re a te n e d  to  under­
mine the c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  a sp e c ts  of the Korean in te rv e n ­
t i o n .
Washington c re a te d  unnecessary  problems f o r  i t s e l f  
by f a i l i n g  to  have firm  c o n t r o l  over the su b o rd in a te s  a s ­
s igned  to implement American p o l ic y .  Washington a lso  c re a te d  
problem s f o r  i t s e l f  by f a i l i n g  to  make i t  very  c l e a r  i n  .‘'950 
t h a t  i t  had a s u b s t a n t i a l  i n t e r e s t  in  K o re a 's  f u tu r e  d e sp i te  
the  absence of American t ro o p s .  F in a l ly ,  Washington c re a te d
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problem by f a i l i n g  to r e s t r a i n  M acArthur's m i l i t a r y  moves 
in  Korea adequa te ly , because no one in  the  bureaucracy  
wanted to  take a  chance on advoca ting  such a p o l ic y — which 
i s  the  na tu re  of any bureaucracy . While i t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t  
r e s t r a i n i n g  MacArthur i n  November might have come too  l a t e ,  
th e re  can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  Washington sensed a  dangerous 
s i t u a t i o n  in  Korea and allowed i t  to  explode w ithou t tak ing  
a  d e c is iv e  s tan d  to  p rev en t  i t .
United S ta te s  p o l ic y  in  Korea from 19^5-1953 was an 
e x te n s io n  of the  development of a growing American in v o lv e ­
ment in  A sia . Japan and China rece iv ed  the  prim ary emphasis, 
w ith  the P h i l ip p in e s ,  In d o n es ia ,  Indochina , and Korea occupy­
in g  l e s s e r  p o s i t io n s  in  U.S. p la n s .  With the  f a l l  o f  China 
in  1949, the U nited  S ta te s  moved to s t re n g th e n  i t s  p o s i t io n  
in  those a reas  s t i l l  rem aining open to  a U.S. in f lu e n c e .
Japan was to  be s tren g th en ed  and the U.S. m i l i t a r y  presence 
on Okinawa was to  be in c re a se d .  At the same tim e, the  United 
S t a te s  re-exam ined i t s  p o l ic y  in  Indoch ina . A number of h igh- 
ran k in g  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  made s ta tem en ts  in  1950, n o t  a l l  of 
which were p u b l ic ,  dem onstra ting  A m erica 's  i n t e r e s t  in  main­
t a i n i n g  South K o re a 's  e x is te n c e  as p a r t  of the  e x i s t i n g  power 
s t r u c tu r e  in  A s ia . The in v as io n  of South Korea was seen as 
a  Sov ie t a t ta c k  on the system the  U nited  S ta te s  was t ry in g  
to  b u i ld  in  A s ia , thus  r e q u i r in g  a response  i f  American p o licy  
was to  have any c r e d i b i l i t y .  Though the  im ponderables of 
ideo logy  or id e a l ism  in f lu e n ce d  the d e c is io n  to in te rv e n e ,
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the United S ta te s  ac ted  in  Korea in  consonance w ith what was 
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